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THESIS

**COLLAPSING INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS
THROUGH LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION: A
COMPARISON OF TARGETED KILLING AND
TARGETED INCARCERATION IN INSURGENT
ORGANIZATIONS**

by

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March 2010

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DECAPITATION: A COMPARISON OF TARGETED KILLING AND
TARGETED INCARCERATION IN INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Killing or capturing an insurgent leader provides a means of eliminating the knowledge, charismatic power, and direction that the leader instills within the organization. Technological breakthroughs in signal intelligence (SIGINT), an increase in the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the beginning of the global war on terror have brought the employment of leadership decapitation as a means of collapsing insurgent organizations back into the consciousness of western society. While the goal of government forces is to separate the insurgent leader from the organization, the techniques of killing or capturing insurgent leadership provide distinct advantages and drawbacks. This thesis asks the research question: under what conditions is the targeted killing of an enemy leader preferable to the targeted incarceration of an enemy leader during counterinsurgency operations? The analysis of four case studies provides the insight required to determine whether an insurgent organization is susceptible to collapse as a result of leadership decapitation. This thesis finds that killing versus incarcerating a terrorist leader seems to make little difference. Instead, insurgent organizations are most likely to collapse when they fail to name a successor, regardless of whether the leader is killed or captured. Through careful study of an insurgent organization's structure, military leaders can operationalize this thesis and develop a strategy to collapse an insurgent organization through leadership decapitation.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALN: *Armée de Libération Nationale*

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CRUA: Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action

DV: Dependent Variable

ENA: *Étoile Nord-Africaine*

FAO: *Frente Amplio de Oposición*

FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

FLN: *Front Libération Nationale*

FPN: National Patriotic Front

FSLN: *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*

GEIN: Special Intelligence Group

GPRA: *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne*

HoA: Horn of Africa

HUMINT: Human Intelligence

HVI: High Value Individual

IV: Independent Variable

MDN: Nicaraguan Democratic Movement

MTLD: *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libérées Démocratiques*

OS: *Organisation Spéciale*

PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PPA: *Parti du peuple Algérien*

SIGINT: Signal Intelligence

SOF: Special Operations Forces

UDEL: Democratic Liberation Union

UNAP: Union of Popular Action

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Killing or capturing an insurgent leader provides a means of eliminating the knowledge, charismatic power, and direction that the person provides the insurgent organization. Technological breakthroughs in signal intelligence (SIGINT), an increase in the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the beginning of the global war on terror have brought the employment of leadership decapitation as a means of collapsing insurgent organizations back into the consciousness of western society. Between 1803 and 1999, government forces have used leadership decapitation through either killing or capturing insurgent leaders 168 times.¹ “Decapitation increases the incumbent’s chances of winning against these groups relative to their chances of victory against these groups in which insurgent leaders are not captured or killed.”² Decapitation raises the probability of the government’s success in quelling an insurgency to 86%.³ The removal of an insurgent leader disrupts the planning and operations of an organization, devastates the organization’s morale, and occasionally places more moderate leaders in positions of power. While the goal of government forces is to separate the insurgent leader from the organization, the techniques of killing or capturing insurgent leadership provide distinct advantages and drawbacks. Killing an insurgent leader increases the probability of collateral damage to the civilian population. U.S. Predator strikes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa have eliminated key al Qaeda leaders but have also caused civilian casualties and the destruction of property. Collateral damage degrades support for operations against al Qaeda both in the United States and abroad. Though controversial, much of the existing literature claims that the targeted killing of insurgent and terrorist leaders increases the likelihood of an

¹ Patrick Johnston, "The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency" (PhD dissertation, Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University), 1 (accessed June 7, 2009).

² Ibid., 28.

³ Ibid., 27.

escalation in violence following the killing. While capturing insurgent leaders limits collateral damage and prevents increases in violence, insurgent leaders remain alive. Many insurgent leaders continue to direct operations against government forces and inspire subordinates while incarcerated. Leadership decapitation removes insurgent leaders from direct influence over their organizations, but the second and third order effects of the tactics used to eliminate insurgent leadership affect the ultimate outcome of counterinsurgency operations.

Insurgent leaders, knowing they are targeted by government forces, must make the critical decision to name a successor or not to name a successor. Many insurgent leaders name a successor to prevent internal power struggles or infighting when the leader is killed or captured. The presence of a second-in-command allows the insurgent leader to transfer his leadership legitimacy to his successor and also facilitates the continuation of insurgent operations once the leader is captured or killed by government forces. However, by naming a successor, the leader allows government forces to target the second-in-command as well as the leader. In organizations where no successor is named, new leaders must establish themselves in the hierarchy which results in delays in operations. For example, following the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, numerous people claimed authority to lead the *Tehrik-i-Taliban*. The infighting resulted in the deaths of several Taliban leaders and the loss of time to conduct operations against the Pakistani Government. On the other hand, some insurgent leaders may choose purposely to not name a successor in an attempt to maintain divisions among their subordinates and thus prevent potential coups or challenges of the leader's power. Insurgent leaders must weigh the consequences of the decision to name a successor carefully.

B. SCOPE

The Global War on Terror has brought the strategy of targeted killings to the forefront of discussion in many political and military organizations. While the decision to kill an insurgent leader is not taken lightly, there is much debate surrounding the effectiveness and correct application of the strategy. Though recently brought back into

discussion, the strategy of targeted killings is not a new concept. The Israelis have performed targeted killings against Palestinian militants for many years, the British are suspected of targeting Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) leadership with targeted killings and most recently, the United States has employed targeted killings against Islamic radicals in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa (HoA). An alternative to the targeted killing of insurgents is for states to selectively target and incarcerate insurgents. Incarceration presents the state with a new set of benefits and drawbacks which must be reconciled against the option of targeted killing. States must choose which option presents the most utility, and determine when each option is preferable.

This thesis compares the effects of the targeted killing of insurgent leaders against the targeted incarceration of insurgent leaders. The research question asks under what conditions is the targeted killing of an enemy leader preferable to the targeted incarceration of an enemy leader during counterinsurgency operations? There are two independent variables (IV) in this study. The first IV is the counterinsurgency strategy utilized to combat the insurgent leadership and can have a value of kill or capture. The second IV is the naming of a leadership successor to the organization and has a value of either naming a clear successor to the current leader or not naming a clear successor to the current leader. The dependent variable (DV) is identified as insurgent activity and is measured through the increase or decrease of enemy activity five years after the operation. This study examines the interaction of the two independent variables to observe the variation in the dependent variable.

This study will provide commanders with a better tool in their decision making process to determine if a target should be killed or captured. Understanding the conditions which make an insurgent organization vulnerable to targeted killings or targeted incarcerations is powerful in undermining an insurgent organization's stability. Military commanders and planners in counterinsurgency operations regularly face the decision to either kill or capture an enemy targeted personality. The decision to kill an insurgent leader is required occasionally when terrain, weather, or distance prevent ground forces from reaching and incarcerating the target. However, when insurgent

leaders have been captured and released multiple times, the target poses a threat to the state's interests, or when the state sends a message to enemy combatants, the ground commander must weigh the costs and benefits of killing or incarcerating an insurgent. The decision to kill or incarcerate a target is carefully weighted, but often the criteria weighed are inexact and flexible leading to discrepancies among commands. Providing a model which accurately weighs the factors will provide commanders with a tool to make better decisions.

The findings of this study could be generalized to governments involved in counterinsurgency campaigns. Relevant examples of these characteristics are Israeli operations against Hamas and Hezbollah, U.S. combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and HoA, or the operations of Latin American Governments against insurgent networks such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).

C. THESIS ROADMAP

This thesis will first examine the existing literature on targeted killing and targeted incarceration. This literature outlines the advantages and disadvantages of employing targeted killings or targeted incarcerations in environments defined by counterterrorism operations, conventional military operations, and counterinsurgency operations. Armed with an understanding of the existing arguments, an examination of a new theory is possible. Utilizing the interaction of the state's strategy of targeting insurgent leaders with the insurgent's strategy of leadership succession as the foundation for discussion, this thesis will present several new ideas which will assist in combating and collapsing insurgent organizations. Finally, four case studies will illustrate the new theory and provide the reader with lessons learned which may prove operational in current and future conflicts.

II. EXISTING LITERATURE

The Global War on Terrorism continues to highlight the debate over the effectiveness of targeted killing against enemy leadership. United States' Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regularly target and eliminate high value individuals (HVI) and terrorist cell leaders in an attempt to disrupt radical Islamist groups capable of influencing America's global interests. The expansion of Hellfire missile strikes launched from Predator drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa (HoA) displays clearly the United States' reliance on the tactic of leadership decapitation. "Since President Obama took office, there have been reports of more than 40 attacks by Hellfire missiles fired from drones, an increase over the approximately 30 missile strikes launched in 2008 during the Bush administration."⁴ Ongoing conflicts between the Israeli Government and Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as insurgencies in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia emphasize the necessity of developing effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies. Researchers continue to analyze and discuss the effectiveness of Israel's policy of leadership decapitation, but often overlook the growing requirement to study the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in terrorist organizations outside the Israeli/Palestinian conflict or against insurgencies. To fully understand the overwhelming and often contradictory evidence surrounding targeted killing, it is important to examine the research conducted on the targeted killing of terrorist leaders, conventional military leaders, and insurgent leaders. The first three sections of this chapter examine the existing literature on the decapitation of terrorist leadership, conventional military leadership, and insurgent leadership; the fourth section examines the effectiveness of the targeted incarceration of terrorist leadership; and the final section compares the advantages and disadvantages of targeted killing and targeted incarceration in an attempt to clarify the reader's understanding of the topic.

⁴ Pam Benson, "White House OKs Expanding CIA Drone Program in Pakistan," *CNN* 4 December, 2009, www.cnn.com (accessed 4 December 2009).

A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Counterterrorism organizations consistently seek methods to eliminate, defeat, or diminish terrorist organizations threatening the state's authority. Three main reasons are regularly cited by existing literature on the effectiveness of targeted killings: 1) targeted killings incapacitate terrorist organizations; 2) targeted killings deter additional terrorist violence against the state; and 3) targeted killing signals the determination of the state to fight terrorism.

1. Incapacitation Effects of Targeted Killing

The role of leadership in the incapacitation of terrorist organizations is well documented. Kent Oots argues that leadership plays an integral role in the formation of terrorist organizations, and that a loss of leadership can facilitate the decline of an organization. "In many instances, if the authorities can remove the leadership, an organization will cease to function."⁵ As a result, counterterrorist organizations continually attempt to weaken terrorist organizations through the elimination or threat of elimination of key leadership. "Terrorist groups rely heavily on the abilities and charisma of their top leaders. When these leaders are removed, the organizations lose effectiveness and focus, become prone to infighting, and collapse."⁶ Steven David echoes the assertion that charismatic leaders unite terrorist organizations and are difficult to replace, citing the diminished "effectiveness of Palestinian terrorist organizations where leadership, planning, and tactical skills are confined to a few key individuals."⁷ The elimination of key leaders also removes the individuals who possess the knowledge of operations, resources, financing, and synchronization of attacks.⁸ The destruction of human capital in leadership positions hinders the effectiveness of the organization to

⁵ Kent L. Oots, "Organizational Perspectives of the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism* 12, no. 3 (1989), 141.

⁶ Aaron Mannes, "Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?" *The Journal of International Policy Solutions* 9 (Spring, 2008), 40.

⁷ Steven R. David, "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," *Ethics & International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (2003), 7.

⁸ Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April, 2006), 104.

conduct large-scale, coordinated attacks. Replacing key terrorist leaders with equally skilled surrogates is difficult due to the years of training and experience required to effectively organize and support a terrorist network.⁹ The elimination of key terrorist leaders also forces the remaining leaders to go into hiding. “To avoid elimination, the terrorists must constantly change locations, keep those locations secret, and keep their heads down, all of which reduces the flow of information in their organization and makes internal communications problematic and dangerous.”¹⁰ Motivating Palestinian fighters during Israel’s campaign against Hamas leadership was also difficult when Hamas’ leadership was in hiding. “After Israel killed Yassin, Hamas appointed Rantisi as his successor. Israel promptly killed Rantisi. Hamas then announced that it had appointed a new leader but would not name him publicly: ...hardly a way to inspire the group’s followers.”¹¹ In addition, Daniel Byman observes that the Israeli policy of targeted killings “increases the number of attacks, but the number of Israeli deaths declines, indicating that the effectiveness of the attacks diminished.”¹²

While analytical evidence substantiates many of the above claims, the empirical evidence which grounds Jenna Jordan’s research lends an additional layer of credibility. The empirical research conducted by Jordan provides excellent statistical data to support many of the analytical claims made in the existing literature on targeted killing. In her empirical study of Palestinian terrorist organizations, she concludes that targeted killings focused on members of a terrorist group’s upper echelons rather than simply removing leaders is most effective.¹³ “When only the leader was removed, the organization fell apart 33.33% of the time, and when members of the upper echelon were removed 54% of the organizations fell apart.”¹⁴ Jordan refutes the assertion that the removal of charismatic leaders results in the collapse of a terrorist organization. She argues that

⁹ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 104.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 103.

¹³ Jenna Jordan, "Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations" (Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 2004), 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

“charisma cannot predict when decapitation will be successful...if charisma can be transferred then the removal of a leader would not necessarily result in the collapse of an organization.”¹⁵ “Of the seventy-two cases of leadership decapitation examined in this study, forty-one of [the] organizations remained active after decapitation, while 31 fell apart.”¹⁶

Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield’s empirical research on Palestinian violence during the Second Intifada presents a more neutral conclusion to the examination of targeted killings’ effectiveness in incapacitating a terrorist organization. Hafez and Hatfield’ research shows that “targeted assassinations show no promise for either increasing or decreasing the levels of Palestinian violence.”¹⁷

While some research supports the assertion that targeted killings incapacitate terrorist organizations, other research refutes this assertion and claims that targeted killings actually increase the number of attacks and diminish the chances of successful negotiations. The negative consequences of a policy of targeted killing can sometimes outweigh the advantages that the state gains. “Killing terrorist leaders can also lead to negative consequences, including greater radicalization of the targeted terrorist group, elimination of possible negotiating partners, and the triggering of retaliatory attacks.”¹⁸

The Israeli policy of targeted killing creates grievances within the Palestinian community and generates animosity between the population and governing authority. David Jaeger completed an analysis of Palestinian public opinion polls following Israeli targeted killings of Palestinian terrorists. The analysis discovered that “Palestinian fatalities lead the Palestinian population to move away from more moderate positions.”¹⁹ Mia Bloom also examines the public opinion effect of targeted killing and determines

¹⁵ Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations*, 4–6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁷ Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, "Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 4 (June 2006), 371.

¹⁸ Mannes, *Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?*, 40.

¹⁹ David Jaeger A. and others, *The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, [2008]).

that targeted killings “make Hamas’s rhetoric appear valid and prescient.”²⁰ Peter Rosendorff expands on these arguments and states that the grievances of the Palestinian population produced by Israel’s policy of targeted killing increases the recruitment of new terrorists.²¹ This radicalization of the Palestinian population and the increased recruitment of the population into terrorist organizations not only decreases support for negotiations with Israel, but also increases violence directed towards Israel.

Though numerous American presidents have emphasized the need to restart the Middle East peace process, the negotiations appear to accomplish few lasting results. Or Honig points to Israel’s policy of targeted killings as a possible explanation for the failure. “Killing the adversary’s leaders is counterproductive when it results in the elimination of a future negotiating partner.”²² Honig goes on to argue that targeted killings have entrenched Hamas’s popularity, undermined the image of the Palestinian Authority, and broken successful ceasefires between the two sides.²³ As peace negotiations and ceasefires fail, Palestinian violence increases.

Steven David argues that “No compelling evidence exists that targeted killing has reduced the terrorist threat against Israel.”²⁴ In fact, most authors argue that targeted killings increase violence directed against the state. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson state that “when counterterrorism imposes hardship on an aggrieved population, support for continued violence is likely to increase both because the opportunity costs of violence decrease and because the people conclude that the government is not concerned with their welfare.”²⁵ Jaeger and Paserman follow this argument and state that targeted killings “may boost the desire for vengeance among Palestinians, facilitating the

²⁰ Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004), 65.

²¹ B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? the Proactive Response Dilema," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 5 (October, 2004), 658.

²² Or Honig, "Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30 (2007), 564.

²³ *Ibid.*, 565–567.

²⁴ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 8.

²⁵ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007), 365.

recruitment of potential suicide bombers, and therefore increase the level of violence against Israeli targets.”²⁶ Aaron Mannes studies targeted killing from a different perspective and examines religious-based terrorist organizations in Israel. He argues that “there [is] a strong indication that religious terrorist groups increase their level of deadly violence substantially when subject to decapitation strikes.”²⁷

Ultimately, an examination of the literature surrounding the employment of targeted killings against terrorist organizations provides contradictory results. As a result, it is likely that other variables interact with targeted killings to effect the increases or decreases in violence among terrorist organizations.

2. Deterrence Effects of Targeted Killing

The literature suggests that the employment of targeted killing against terrorist organizations produces a deterrent effect which limits terrorist activity. For example, targeted killings in Gaza and the West Bank show a deterrent effect on Palestinian terrorist organizations. Jaeger and Paserman conduct an empirical analysis of data on violence and attempted violence during the Second Intifada in Israel. Their analysis reveals that “targeted killings of Palestinian leaders have a short-term deterrence or incapacitation effect: the overall number of Israeli fatalities, and the number of Israelis killed in suicide attacks fall in the first week after a targeted killing.”²⁸ Though initially successful in deterring Palestinian violence, the deterrence effect for targeted killings appears to diminish after the first week. David also believes targeted killings deter Palestinian terrorist organizations, but for a longer duration. In his view, “there are skilled, capable Palestinians who do not engage in terrorist operations for fear of Israeli reprisals.”²⁹ Targeted killings may also deter Palestinian commanders and the terrorist

²⁶ David A. Jaeger and M. Daniele Paserman, *The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings* (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, [2007]).

²⁷ Mannes, *Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?*, 43.

²⁸ Jaeger and Paserman, *The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings*, 2–3.

²⁹ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 7.

support network. “Behind every suicide bomber are others who might not be as ready for martyrdom.”³⁰ However, there is contradictory evidence to these claims. An empirical study by Hafez and Hatfield examines the claims that targeted killings deter Palestinian violence. Hafez and Hatfield’s study discovers that Israel’s defensive measures of barrier building and increased intelligence collection are responsible for the deterrent effect on Palestinian terrorists, not targeted killings.³¹ A second argument for the failure of targeted killings as an effective deterrent against Palestinian violence comes from belief that leaders killed in targeted killings are perceived as martyrs and inspire violent behavior. Martyrdom is one of the highest honors in Palestinian society.³² The decapitation of terrorist leadership creates “mythologies of martyrdom” which can radicalize the population.³³ Byman examines Hezbollah’s veneration of its martyrs and concludes that the creation of martyrs assists terrorist organizations in marketing the organization and recruiting new terrorists.³⁴ The creation of martyrs through targeted killing may also encourage terrorist organizations to unite and work together against Israel.³⁵ The literature argues that targeted killings are ineffective against terrorist organizations or create consequences which outweigh the benefits. However, the literature is limited to Israel and relies on theoretical analysis rather than empirical evidence.

3. Targeted Killing Signals the State’s Determination to Fight

Suicide bombings and terrorist attacks place a great deal of strain on the state’s political credibility with the population. As a result, the political authority must respond to terrorist attacks and answer the population’s demand for recourse. Targeted killings

³⁰ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 7.

³¹ Hafez and Hatfield, *Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising*, 374.

³² Bloom, *Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding*, 74.

³³ Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends," *United States Institute of Peace: Special Report* (25 May, 1999), 3, www.usip.org (accessed 14 December 2009).

³⁴ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 100.

³⁵ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 12.

“satisfy domestic demands for a forceful response to terrorism.”³⁶ Existing literature examines Israel’s policy of targeted killing on the Israeli population. Bloom argues that “[targeted killing] showed that the government was being proactive, counteracting the chaos brought about by the bombings and bringing precision and order back to the conflict.”³⁷ David takes this point of view a step further and states that even though targeted killing may have increased terrorist attacks in Israel, targeted killings are effective in “providing retribution and revenge for a population under siege and may, over the long term, help create conditions for a more secure Israel.”³⁸ Hafez and Hatfield concur with the assertion that targeted killings signal the state’s determination to fight terrorism, but also conclude that the elimination of capable terrorist leaders does not impact either the number or success of terrorist attacks.³⁹

While targeted killings may allow the state to signal its determination to fight terrorism, there is little indication that this strategic signaling employed by the state impacts the terrorist organization’s operations. In reality, the true impact of killing a terrorist leader is perceived by the general population who require some measure of control in a chaotic environment. The death of a terrorist leader conveys the state’s strength and control to a population fearful of random terrorist attacks.

B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES

One of the major criticisms of researching the effects of targeted killing on terrorist organizations is that the research is usually limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and thus difficult to generalize to the wider counterterrorism fight. However, targeted killings have also been employed against conventional military leaders. During World War II, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was killed in a targeted killing authorized by the U.S. Commander-

³⁶ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 102.

³⁷ Bloom, *Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding*, 85.

³⁸ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 2.

³⁹ Hafez and Hatfield, *Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising*, 378–379.

in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean, Admiral Nimitz. Though the outcome of the attack proved inconclusive in demoralizing the Japanese Navy, politicians and military commanders continue to employ the tactic.

John Warden examines the importance of military and civilian leadership during the Persian Gulf War. He states that “capturing or killing the state’s leader has frequently been decisive.”⁴⁰ Warden goes on to contend that “the most critical ring is the enemy command structure because it is the only element of the enemy—whether a civilian at the seat of government or a general directing a fleet—that can make concessions.⁴¹ Though Warden produces a convincing argument, historical evidence may contradict his assertion.

In answering this question, Stephen Hosmer examines the effectiveness of targeted killings on the enemy’s decision process. He contends that targeted killings are usually unsuccessful in achieving the attacker’s goals. “Experience shows that the demise of a targeted leader rarely produces the changes in government policy and practice anticipated.”⁴² In addition, targeted killings may not deter unwanted enemy activity, may create harmful unintended consequences, and sometimes fail to even kill the targeted leader.⁴³ Though Warden and Hosmer find themselves on different sides of the targeted killing debate, both authors argue that careful study of the enemy organization and the environmental factors is required to determine the potential success of a targeted killing.

C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON COUNTERINSURGENCIES

The effectiveness of targeted killing on counterinsurgency operations is rarely studied with more than superficial analysis. Paul Staniland states that “killing insurgent

⁴⁰ John A. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century," in *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1992), 65.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁴² Stephen T. Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 19.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 19.

leaders can trigger disarray and even disintegration within insurgencies or at least disrupt their operations and organization.”⁴⁴ Though targeted killings may succeed against insurgent groups, the operations are difficult for the counterinsurgent and in some cases; decentralized organizations can replace leaders quickly.⁴⁵ In contrast to Staniland, Patrick Johnston examines the subject in greater depth. He conducts an empirical study on a dataset of 168 insurgencies between 1803 and 1999. Johnston outlines four reasons why leadership decapitation is effective against insurgencies: 1) killing a charismatic insurgent leader can break the morale of his followers; 2) eliminating radical insurgent leadership may place the organization under the control of more moderate leaders; 3) killing insurgent leaders limits the insurgent’s ability to plan and coordinate operations against the state; and 4) captured insurgent leaders occasionally renounce violence against the state and encourage their followers to surrender.⁴⁶

Johnston’s analysis of counterinsurgency operations reveals that the counterinsurgent is more likely to prevail when leadership decapitation is employed. “Decapitation raises the predicted probability of government victory to 86%, a change of over 46%.”⁴⁷ Johnson refutes assertions that leadership decapitation increases violence against the state, since insurgent organizations rely on strategic calculations to plan attacks rather than emotional retaliatory attacks.⁴⁸ Johnston also refutes claims that a specific ideological belief makes an insurgent organization more or less susceptible to leadership decapitation. “Secessionist, communist, and religious insurgencies are all “causes” to which those who fight for them are committed...group members are likely highly committed regardless of whether or not the group abides by a specific ideology.”⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (Winter, 2005), 27.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 27–28.

⁴⁶ Johnston, *The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency*, 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

Johnston and Staniland's analysis of insurgencies reveal that targeted killing of insurgent leadership increases the counterinsurgent's chances of successfully defeating the insurgency.

D. EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED INCARCERATIONS ON LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION

An examination of existing literature on leadership decapitation reveals an overwhelming majority of authors who prefer targeted incarcerations over targeted killings. Mannes states that "few argue against the method of arrest and trial of terrorist leaders."⁵⁰ Though targeted killings permanently eliminate a leader, arresting a leader possesses distinct advantages. Arresting terrorist or insurgent leadership may prevent a subordinate from stepping into the leadership position. "An imprisoned religious leader may continue to be a source of authority that prevents a new leader from taking charge."⁵¹ The capture of high-value individuals also encourages news headlines, engenders popular support, and provides the state with a public relations victory.⁵² Arresting leaders allows security forces to "interrogate the suspect and learn about future plots and additional operatives, who can then be arrested too."⁵³ Kaplan examines the impact of arrests on suicide bombings in Israel. "Arresting suspected terrorists appears to reduce suicide bombings without inducing the recruitment of additional terrorists."⁵⁴ Though arresting suspected terrorist and insurgent leaders appears beneficial, there are definite risks to the counterinsurgent or counterterrorism force executing the capture. The potential risks to government forces executing capture operations often overwhelm the benefits of arresting a high value target (HVI) and necessitate a targeted killing operation.

⁵⁰ Mannes, *Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?*, 40.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁵² Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks" Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2009).

⁵³ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 99.

⁵⁴ Edward H. Kaplan and others, "What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28 (2005), 234.

E. TARGETED KILLING VERSUS TARGETED INCARCERATIONS

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of targeted killing against targeted incarceration is often difficult. Targeted killings may decrease the risk to government forces, but create unintended consequences. Edward Kaplan argues that the benefits of arresting leaders outweigh the risks to government forces. “Preventative arrests, as opposed to the targeted killing of suspected terrorists, are responsible for the dramatic reduction in suicide bombings inside Israel since March 2002.”⁵⁵ Byman echoes this assertion by stating that “arresting terrorists, when possible, is a much better course.”⁵⁶ Jordan also believes the advantages of arresting leaders outweigh the advantages of killing a terrorist leader. Her empirical analysis of counter terrorism operations executed by the Israeli Government against Palestinian terrorist organizations shows that “of the organizations that fell apart, 63.9% were from arrests, while 36.11% were from the death of the leadership.”⁵⁷ Johnston acknowledges the existing counterterrorism literature, but his empirical analysis of counterinsurgencies reveals that both capturing and killing insurgent leadership are “positive predictors of counterinsurgency victory.”⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Edward H. Kaplan and others, *What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model*. 232.

⁵⁶ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 99.

⁵⁷ Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations*, 28.

⁵⁸ Johnston, *The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency*, 28.

III. EXAMINING A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION

The existing literature provides a framework to build additional arguments and conduct additional research. Johnston's and Jordan's works on leadership decapitation form the basis for this thesis's further examination of the effectiveness of targeted killing and targeted incarceration. Johnston argues that leadership decapitation through the killing or capturing of insurgent leadership is not only effective, but plays an integral role in defeating an insurgent organization. He also states that the killing or incarceration of insurgent leaders is immaterial. Jordan concludes that removing second tier leadership from a terrorist organization causes the group to collapse. These two arguments, in cooperation with the greater body of literature surrounding the debate over whether targeted killings increases or decreases insurgent violence help to inform the theory proposed in this thesis.

The framework provided by the existing literature shows that conditions exist when targeted killings and targeted incarceration are effective in reducing insurgent violence. The creation of a 2x2 matrix assists in outlining the choices the state and the insurgent leadership face (see Figure 1). The state, having made the determination to target the insurgent leader must decide to either pursue a strategy of targeted killing (K) or targeted incarceration (I). On the other hand, the insurgency's leadership must determine whether it is in the organizations best interest to name a successor (S) or to not name a successor (N). The interaction of these two decisions will assist in determining the best outcome for each of the combatants.

	Successor (S)	No Successor (N)
Kill (K)	(K,S) Ineffective	(K,N) Effective
Incarcerate (I)	(I,S) Ineffective	(I,N) Effective

Figure 1. 2x2 Matrix outlining the combatant's choices

The state possesses a wide array of choices in its interaction with an insurgent leader. The first decision is whether or not to target the insurgent leader. Historical evidence shows that insurgencies rarely if ever collapse on their own. Therefore, the state must target insurgent leaders through some kinetic or non-kinetic engagement. Non-kinetic engagements such as negotiations, information operations, strategic communication, or psychological operations are an ongoing process and do not exist in isolation from kinetic operations such as killing or capturing insurgent leaders. In fact kinetic operations and non-kinetic operations often possess reinforcing effects on the targeted insurgent leader. This thesis examines the state's decision to target an insurgent leader through either targeted killing or targeted incarceration with the understanding that the state is simultaneously engaging the insurgent leader with non-kinetic options as well.

Insurgent leaders also possess a myriad of choices in determining their organization's command structure and control mechanisms. Hierarchical organizations possess distinct qualities which separate them from flat or decentralized organizations. Purely hierarchical organizations possess a definite chain of command to control the organization's operations, while purely flat organizations possess no identifiable leadership entities. Most insurgent organizations exist somewhere between these two poles on the leadership structure scale. Therefore, insurgent leaders must determine how far along this organizational spectrum they want their organization to move. With a command and control framework in place, insurgent leaders must determine their second-in-command or successor. Insurgent leaders recognize that the state attempts to maintain order and rule of law in the country. As a result, insurgent leaders understand that the state is actively working to eliminate insurgent leadership through either incarceration or targeted killing. Insurgent leaders must make preparations for their possible elimination. Naming a successor eliminates possible power struggles, but allows the state to target the successor as well as the leader. Therefore, insurgent leaders must make the difficult decision of naming a successor or not naming a successor.

The effectiveness of targeted killings and targeted incarcerations is determined by the interaction of the two independent variables and the measurement of change in the dependent variable (see Figure 2). The first independent variable is the

counterinsurgency strategy employed by the government's forces against the insurgency's leadership and is defined through the targeted killing or targeted incarceration of insurgent leaders. The second independent variable is the leadership succession strategy employed by the current leader of an insurgent force and is defined through the current leader naming a successor or not naming a successor. The dependent variable observed is insurgent activity which is measured by either the increase or decrease in insurgent activity five years after the kill/capture operation.

A. TESTING THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Hypotheses are constructed and then tested with qualitative analysis of case studies. The most effective method to test the proposed hypotheses is through structured-focused comparison. Structured-focused comparison provides the method to isolate the targeted variable across multiple case studies and compare the case studies in a semi-controlled environment. It is also important to analyze the process-tracing in the cases. Process tracing allows the researcher to follow the causal mechanisms and study the inner workings of the process as the independent variables interact to cause changes in the dependent variable.

When an insurgent leader is removed through either death or incarceration, the second-in-command will fill the leadership void and lead the organization.⁵⁹ The appointment of this successor prior to the removal of the leader is important to conferring the legitimacy to lead on the successor.⁶⁰ With legitimacy, the successor can continue the ideological struggle against the state and carry on the military fight initiated by the killed or incarcerated leader. This seamless transfer of power should increase or maintain violence directed at the state. However, when an insurgent leader is removed from an organization prior to selecting a successor, infighting and power struggles are likely to emerge as leaders vie for the legitimacy to lead the insurgent organization.⁶¹ These

⁵⁹ Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations*, 18.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Mannes, *Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?*, 40.

power struggles result in a loss of operational momentum and a misdirection of ideological objectives. If there is not a clear successor to the eliminated leader, then the insurgent organization will collapse, fragment, or suffer a loss in operational capability.⁶² If positioned correctly, the state can capitalize on this loss of capability and further degrade the insurgent organization. The following hypotheses are proposed to test this research question.

H1: If targeted killings are executed against leaders of insurgencies with no apparent successor, then insurgent violence should decrease after their leader is killed.

Insurgent organizations rely heavily on the knowledge, skill, and leadership qualities of their leaders to combat the superior force applied by the state.⁶³ Without quality leaders, the insurgent organization succumbs to the state's power. Therefore, when an insurgent leader is eliminated through targeted killing and a clear successor is not appointed, the insurgent organization is likely to experience a decrease in operational capability due to infighting and internal struggles for power. This infighting distracts the organization from its military goals and limits the quality and quantity of insurgent attacks of the state. When a new leader finally emerges from the turmoil, it is unlikely that the new leader possesses the same legitimacy to lead the organization as the former leader. Some portion of the organization is likely to reject the new leader and either fragment the organization into a new splinter organization or quite the struggle altogether. As a result, the death of an insurgent leader without a clear successor is likely to cause a decrease in insurgent violence directed at the state.

H2: If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders without a clear successor then insurgent violence should decrease following the arrest of the leader.

Similarly to hypothesis H1, the arrest of an insurgent leader without a clear successor is likely to decrease insurgent violence. When the leader is incarcerated without appointing a successor, infighting and power struggles are likely to emerge. If the leader cannot communicate the choice of a successor from prison, then the infighting is likely to continue. When a new leader emerges, it is likely that some portion of the

⁶² Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations*, 22.

⁶³ David, *Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing*, 7.

insurgent organization will maintain an affinity for the incarcerated leader and cling to the old ideology and methodology. Any changes or adjustments counter to the incarcerated leader's directives are likely to be perceived as illegitimate. This power struggle between the incarcerated leader and the new leader of the organization is likely to fracture the organization and diminish the operational effectiveness against the state. Additionally, the lack of a legitimate successor to replace the incarcerated leader will prevent the leader from becoming a martyr and a uniting factor within the insurgent organization. As a result, the targeted incarceration of an insurgent leader should reduce the amount of violence directed at the state.

H3: If targeted killings are executed against insurgent groups with a clear successor to the leader, then violence will increase or remain constant.

The death of an insurgent leader is a critical loss for an insurgent organization, even when a clear successor has been appointed. However, an insurgent organization is better able to cope with the loss and quickly rebound if a legitimate successor is able to assume command of the organization. An appointed successor is likely to possess many of the charismatic leadership abilities, knowledge, and ideological vision that the assassinated leader possessed. As a result, the successor should transition to power quickly with only a minimal lull in military operations against the state.⁶⁴ A legitimate successor is also capable of exploiting the assassination to draw upon images of martyrdom. As the assassinated leader is perceived as a martyr, the insurgent organization will unite around their fallen leader and coalesce into a more dangerous entity.⁶⁵ The targeted killing of an insurgent leader with a clear successor will increase violence directed at the state due to the transfer of legitimacy which prevents a lull in insurgent capability and the creation of a martyr narrative which unites and inspires the organization.

⁶⁴ Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations*, 6.

⁶⁵ Byman, *Do Targeted Killings Work?*, 100.

H4: If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders with a clear successor, then insurgent violence should increase or remain constant following the arrest of the leader.

Many scholars argue that targeted incarceration of leaders decreases violence.⁶⁶ However, when an insurgent leader is incarcerated and a clear successor remains to assume command of the organization, violence should actually remain the same or increase. The presence of a legitimately appointed successor prevents infighting, ideological conflict, and delays in military operations against the state. Additionally, because the successor was selected by the incarcerated leader prior to his capture, the successor possesses the legitimacy to lead the insurgent organization without a conflict of legitimacy or power struggle with the incarcerated leader. The successor is also able to create a martyr narrative surrounding the incarcerated leader.⁶⁷ Perceived as a martyr languishing in prison for the cause, the ideological leader inspires the insurgent organization to increased unity. The unity of the insurgent organization increases the lethality, recruitment, and the frequency of attacks on the state.

These hypotheses are tested through the examination of four illustrative case studies. The examination of these four insurgent organizations with similar command and control structures and similar charismatic leaders provides a measure of control during the experiment. As the government's strategy of killing or incarcerating insurgent leaders is varied against the insurgent's strategy of naming a successor or not naming a successor, the variation of the dependent variable is measured. The measurement of insurgent violence five years after the government either kills or incarcerates an insurgent leader provides a method of determining the effectiveness of the government's strategy. In this thesis, four case studies are examined to illustrate the interaction between the independent variables (see Table 3). In the first case study, the deaths of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and Carlos Fonseca in Nicaragua are examined to illustrate the failure of killing insurgent leaders who possess a clear successor. The incarceration of Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria exemplifies the failure of a government strategy of incarcerating

⁶⁶ Johnston, *The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency*, 9.

⁶⁷ Crenshaw, *How Terrorism Ends*, 3.

insurgent leaders with a clear successor. In Israel, the death of Fathi Shikaki shows the successful employment of targeted killing against an insurgent leader with no clear successor. Finally, the incarceration of Abimael Guzman in Peru shows the successful employment of a strategy of targeted incarceration against an insurgent leader with no clear successor. The examination and discussion of these four case studies should provide clarity to assist governments in determining the proper strategy to employ to defeat insurgent organizations.

<u>Independent variable #1</u>	<u>Independent Variable #2</u>	<u>Dependent Variable</u>
Counter Insurgency Strategy	Insurgent Leadership Succession Strategy	Insurgent Activity
-Targeted Killing	-Named Successor	-Activity Increases
-Targeted Killing	-No Named Successor	-Activity Decreases
-Targeted Incarceration	-Named Successor	-Activity Increases
-Targeted Incarceration	-No Named Successor	-Activity Decreases

Figure 2. Independent and Dependent Variables

	Successor (S)	No Successor (N)
Kill (K)	Nicaragua Ineffective	Israel Effective
Capture (C)	Algeria Ineffective	Peru Effective

Figure 3. Effects of counterinsurgent strategy on Selected Case Studies

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IV. CASE STUDIES

A. TARGETED KILLING WITH A NAMED SUCCESSOR: CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR AND PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO

Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro represent the most visible and inspirational leaders of the revolution against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Drawing upon the nationalist and anti-colonial ideology of General Augusto César Sandino and Marxist philosophy, Fonseca and Chamorro galvanized the Nicaraguan population and incited widespread popular revolt. Fonseca founded the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) in 1961 to overthrow Nicaragua's dictatorial regime and institute sweeping social reforms in Nicaragua. Similarly, Chamorro founded the Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL) in 1974 as a means of inspiring popular unrest within the country and removing the corrupt Nicaraguan government. Despite the backing of the United States the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle succumbed to the overwhelming popular discontent fostered by the UDEL and constant guerrilla attacks waged by the FSLN. In an attempt to maintain power, Somoza employed the National Guard, Nicaragua's military force responsible for law and order, as his private army and brutally repressed the Nicaraguan working class and the Sandinista rebels. With popular support mounting against his regime, Somoza attempted to quell the uprising by employing a strategy of targeted killing against Fonseca and Chamorro. Though successful in killing both Fonseca and Chamorro, Somoza did not foresee the unifying effect the killings would produce within the population. Ultimately, the disparate revolutionary organizations coalesced to form the National Patriotic Front (FPN) and overthrew Somoza in July 1979.

1. Origins of the Insurgency

Nicaragua has a long history of civil strife and government corruption. Following the country's independence from Spain in the 1820s, a small number of wealthy families ruled Nicaragua. Frequent armed conflict between the families led to political and

economic instability which ultimately forced the United States to intervene. From 1912 to 1925, U.S. Marines stationed in Nicaragua maintained peace in the country and installed a pro-U.S. conservative government.⁶⁸ The United States organized and trained the National Guard to maintain law and order in the country and installed Anastasio Somoza Garcia as the new leader of the military force. In 1925, the U.S. Marines withdrew from Nicaragua but quickly returned due to the outbreak of civil war in 1926. General Augusto César Sandino, one of the revolutionary leaders, refused to surrender and continued to fight until 1933 when the economic strains of the Great Depression forced the United States to withdraw from Nicaragua.⁶⁹ Sandino, a staunch nationalist and anti-colonialist, inspired the Nicaraguan population and built a substantial following. Fearing Sandino's rising power, Anastasio Somoza Garcia kidnapped and executed Sandino in 1934.⁷⁰ With his power secure, Anastasio Somoza Garcia used the National Guard to seize power in 1936. The Somoza family created a virtual dictatorship in the country until overthrown in 1979. Anastasio Somoza Garcia was assassinated in 1956 and his son Luis Somoza Debayle assumed control of Nicaragua until he died of natural causes in 1967. Following the death of Luis Somoza Debayle, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the West Point educated son of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, assumed control of Nicaragua until 1979 when he was overthrown by the FSLN.

2. Insurgent Leadership

The founder and leader of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca Amador, was born in Matagalpa, Nicaragua in 1936. He was the illegitimate son of a poor single mother who worked as a cook.⁷¹ While in high school, Fonseca was attracted to Marxist ideologies and later joined the Nicaraguan Socialist Party while attending the National Autonomous University.⁷² Following the assassination of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Fonseca was

⁶⁸ James DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 236.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 241.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 241.

arrested in a massive crackdown on Nicaraguan dissidents by the National Guard and imprisoned. Released from prison in 1957, Fonseca was selected by the Nicaraguan Socialist Party to attend the Sixth Youth and Student Festival in the Soviet Union.⁷³ Upon his return from Moscow, Fonseca expressed dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan Socialist Party's lack of support for armed revolt. In 1959, he left the Socialist Party and joined the Sandinist guerrilla campaign.⁷⁴ Fonseca was wounded in combat against the National Guard and fled to Central America and later Cuba where he met Che Guevara.⁷⁵ During his meeting with Che Guevara, Fonseca adopted Guevara's foco theory of revolution which emphasized a focused, rural-based, popular movement as a means of waging a low-intensity guerrilla war against the state.⁷⁶ Fonseca was inspired to transplant this new philosophy to Nicaragua. "In July 1962 Carlos Fonseca Amador, together with Silvio Mayorga and Tomás Borge, founded *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN). Their aim was to realize in Nicaragua what the 26th of July Movement had achieved in Cuba."⁷⁷ Impatient to begin an armed revolt against the Somoza regime, Fonseca established the FSLN's first guerrilla cell in the Coco and Bokay River regions in 1963.⁷⁸ In 1967, Fonseca established his second cell in the Pancasan region.⁷⁹ Without political preparation of the regions, both guerrilla cells were crushed by the National Guard and the FSLN was forced to abandon the foco theory of revolution. From 1967 until 1974, the FSLN abandoned military action against the Somoza regime, reevaluated its strategy, and gathered recruits for a more coordinated military effort which included a popular uprising.

The popular uprising the FSLN required to reinstate military actions against the Somoza regime was provided by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. Chamorro was born into a

⁷³ Henri Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*. (London; New York: Verso; Distributed by Schocken Books, 1981), 20.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁷⁶ Michael D. Gambone, *Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 1961-1972* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 56-57.

⁷⁷ Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*, 20.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

wealthy family from the city of Granada in 1924. The Chamorro family owned the *La Prensa* newspaper in Managua and inspired Chamorro to learn the newspaper business in school. Chamorro studied at the Central University of Managua where he was arrested several times for protesting against the Somoza regime.⁸⁰ Upon graduation, Chamorro went to the National Autonomous University in Mexico to study law. While in Mexico, Chamorro learned more advanced techniques in newspaper publishing and upon his return to Nicaragua in 1948 he took over the direction of *La Prensa*. Imbued with more radical ideas than his father, Chamorro published articles critical of the Somoza regime and founded the Union of Popular Action (UNAP) to inspire social revolution and the overthrow of Somoza.⁸¹ Chamorro was imprisoned in 1954 after a failed attempt to overthrow the Somoza regime and sentenced to two years in prison. Shortly after being released in 1956, Chamorro was once again arrested after the assassination of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. Chamorro was tortured into confessing knowledge of the attack and was sentenced to six months in jail and forty months of house arrest in San Carlos del Rio on the Costa Rican border.⁸² Chamorro escaped from house arrest and lived in exile in Costa Rica for two years. While in exile, Chamorro organized the Nicaraguan resistance movement and worked to procure weapons and support from Cuba and Venezuela.⁸³ In 1959, Chamorro raised a 110-man guerrilla force and flew back to Nicaragua to begin a guerrilla campaign and popular uprising against the Somoza regime.⁸⁴ Due to poor planning and the premature nature of the operation, the National Guard crushed the uprising quickly. Chamorro was captured and sentenced to nine years in prison for treason. However, as part of a general amnesty, Chamorro was released in 1960.⁸⁵ From

⁸⁰ Patricia Taylor Edmisten, *Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy* (Pensacola: University of West Florida Press, 1990), 15.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

1960 until 1974, Chamorro continued to publish *La Prensa* and criticize the Somoza regime, but limited his radical activities until conditions for a popular uprising emerged in Nicaragua.

3. Insurgent Actions

The earthquake that struck Nicaragua in 1972 marked the beginning of the popular uprising against the Somoza regime. Nicaragua's capital city, Managua, was leveled in the quake and over 10,000 people were killed. "Amidst the chaos, the [National] Guard disintegrated into a collection of mobs intent on looting what remained of downtown Managua."⁸⁶ In response to the disaster and societal breakdown, the international community pledged millions of dollars in aid to rebuild the country. The majority of the aid was siphoned off into Anastasio Somoza Debayle's personal accounts and never distributed to the population.⁸⁷ The social discontent surrounding the mishandling of the 1972 earthquake encouraged young Catholic priests, inspired by liberation theology, to encourage the poor population to demand fair wages, education opportunities, medical care, and equal rights.⁸⁸ The beginnings of social unrest in Nicaragua reawakened the FSLN. Though still rebuilding, the FSLN represented the most credible subversive threat to the government of Nicaragua.⁸⁹ From 1972 to 1974, the FSLN prepared for military action against the Somoza regime and financed its preparations through kidnappings and small-unit raids on government targets.⁹⁰ "On December 27, 1974, a group of thirteen armed Sandinistas seized several politically

⁸⁶ Gambone, *Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 1961–1972*, 211.

⁸⁷ Karen DeYoung, "Nicaraguan Rebels Gaining Support; Dissatisfaction with Somoza's Government Spreading Throughout Country; New Analysis," *The Washington Post*, sec. Foreign Service, 24 August 1978, 1978, www.lexisnexis.com (accessed 24 December 2009).

⁸⁸ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 244.

⁸⁹ Gambone, *Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 1961–1972*, 209.

⁹⁰ Thomas W. Walker, "The Economic and Political Background," in *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), 159.

prominent hostages at the home of a wealthy cotton exporter.”⁹¹ The hostages were traded for eighteen FSLN prisoners, \$5 million dollars, and safe passage to Cuba.⁹² Somoza responded to the attack by declaring a state of emergency in Nicaragua which imposed martial law and censorship of the press. As the Somoza regime’s heavy handed tactics became more widespread, middle and upper class resistance organizations began to form. Alfonso Robelo, a wealthy businessman formed the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) to call for the removal of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the incorporation of the FSLN into the future government.⁹³ Monseigneur Miguel Obando y Bravo, the Archbishop of Managua, formed the *Frente Amplio de Oposición* (FAO) to emphasize the Catholic Church’s support for the removal of Somoza.⁹⁴ Though multiple opposition organizations emerged in the early 1970s to call for the removal of the Somoza regime, ideological and class divisions prevented the organizations from effectively threatening the government. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro found the common ground between the disparate organizations and organized a united opposition against the government. “In 1974 [Chamorro] brought together all of the opposition—the dissident Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Socialists, intellectuals, and labor leaders—under the banner of the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL).”⁹⁵

While Chamorro united political opposition to the government of Nicaragua through the UDEL, Carlos Fonseca and the FSLN struggled to find unity within the military resistance. In 1975, the FSLN fragmented into three factions: the Prolonged People’s War led by Tomás Borge and Henry Ruiz who believed resistance began in the rural population; the Proletarios led by Jaime Wheelock who believed that resistance centered in the urban population; and the Terceristas led by Daniel and Humberto Ortega who de-emphasized the organizations Marxist ideology in favor of social reform.⁹⁶ With the FSLN fracturing, Anastasio Somoza Debayle attempted to completely collapse the

⁹¹ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 244.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 244.

⁹³ Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*, 43.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹⁵ Edmisten, *Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy*, 61.

⁹⁶ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 242–243.

resistance through the elimination of the FSLN's key leadership. Carlos Fonseca Amador was the central leader of the FSLN.⁹⁷ On 8 November 1976, the National Guard tracked Fonseca into the Zelaya region and killed him. The death of Fonseca failed to collapse the FSLN. Prior to Fonseca's death, Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Terceristas faction of the FSLN, had emerged as the clear successor to Carlos Fonseca.⁹⁸ Though the FSLN did not unite under Ortega until 1978, Ortega's position as the most successful FSLN military commander, leader of the Terceristas faction, and ideological emphasis on social reform provided the legitimacy Ortega required to succeed Carlos Fonseca as the leader of the FSLN.⁹⁹ Upon Fonseca's death, Daniel Ortega immediately succeeded Fonseca and continued efforts to reunify the FSLN. With mounting pressure from the United States over human rights abuses, the fracturing of the FSLN, and the death of Fonseca, Anastasio Somoza Debayle rescinded the state of emergency declaration in September 1977.¹⁰⁰ The lifting of the repressive state of emergency resulted in a rapid continuation of FSLN military attacks and popular uprisings. "The FSLN reappeared in October 1977, operating with more modern weapons and carrying out hit-and-run raids throughout the country."¹⁰¹ The Terceristas continued to produce the most effective attacks on the National Guard and the faction slowly gained the leadership of the FSLN. With Daniel Ortega and the Terceristas in control, the FSLN attacked the National Guard barracks in Ocotal, Masaya, and San Carlos in October 1977.¹⁰² Though the attacks were a failure, the show of military resistance galvanized support for the FSLN and encouraged recruitment.

Pedro Joaquín Chamorro also took advantage of the loosening of press censorship and increased his attacks on the Somoza regime in *La Prensa*. Through the UDEL and control of *La Prensa*, Chamorro wielded a great deal of power and posed a threat to Somoza's authority. "Chamorro was one of the most respected political moderates in the

⁹⁷ Tomás Borge, *Sandinistas Speak*, 1st ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982), 23.

⁹⁸ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 243

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 242–243.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 244.

¹⁰¹ Walker, *The Economic and Political Background*, 243.

¹⁰² Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*, 40.

country and was thought the most likely to hold a key position in any new government should Somoza step down or be forced to leave.”¹⁰³ To maintain power, Somoza once again employed targeted killing in an attempt to collapse the resistance movement. On 10 January 1978, Chamorro was shot to death after leaving church and was succeeded by Rafael Córdova Rivas as the leader of the UDEL.¹⁰⁴ Rivas represented several high profile FSLN leaders in court and was a close personal friend of Chamorro. “The assassination of Chamorro was the spark that lit the prairie fire. The resulting outrage coalesced all opposition to the regime into a single movement. Henceforth there would be a continual succession of mass demonstrations, general strikes, and partial insurrections.”¹⁰⁵ An eighty-five percent effective general strike from January to February 1978 crippled Nicaragua’s economy.¹⁰⁶ A massive popular uprising in Monimbo in February 1978 and FSLN attacks on National Guard outposts in Rivas and Granada stretched the resources of the National Guard. With the country on the brink of chaos, the FSLN launched their most sophisticated attack of the insurgency. On August 22, 1978, an FSLN unit seized the National Palace and took more than 1,500 people hostage, including most of the government’s officials.”¹⁰⁷ In exchange for the release of the hostages, the FSLN demanded the release of over fifty FSLN prisoners, \$500,000 dollars, and safe passage out of the country. Inspired by the seizure of the National Palace, youth around the country began to openly revolt against the Somoza regime. Somoza reimposed martial law and brutally suppressed the uprisings. Many of the youth fled to the Sandinista camps and joined the FSLN. As Nicaragua descended further into chaos, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba began to openly support the insurgency, while the United States slowly removed its support from the Somoza regime. The Somoza regime began to crack under the internal and international pressure and in May 1979, the FSLN launched its final offensive against the Nicaraguan government.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Edmisten, *Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy*, 2

¹⁰⁴ Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution*, 40.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁶ Walker, *The Economic and Political Background*, 160.

¹⁰⁷ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 245.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 246.

With the FSLN in control of numerous major cities and threatening Managua, Somoza ordered the bombing of all FSLN-held cities in an attempt to break the insurgency. News footage of the heavy-handed tactics employed to quell the uprising turned international public opinion against Somoza and his position became untenable.

4. Outcome of the Insurgency

With Nicaragua in complete chaos, Somoza sought international assistance to regain control of the country. The widespread human rights abuses and massive brutality employed by Somoza and the National Guard eliminated any chance of international aid. President Carter ordered Somoza to step down as president. The Organization of American States voted seventeen to two to support Somoza's resignation.¹⁰⁹ Finally, on 13 July 1979, Somoza and his top National Guard officers fled to Guatemala.¹¹⁰ Without the country's leadership, the National Guard collapsed and the FSLN occupied Managua on 19 July 1979. After the Somoza regime fell, "the FSLN joined with other anti-Somoza groups to establish a revolutionary executive committee of five persons to run the country until elections were held."¹¹¹ Though the Somoza family's property and assets were reallocated to the people, Somoza managed to flee Nicaragua with the country's liquid assets. While in exile in Paraguay, Somoza was assassinated by the Sandinistas in 1980. Though Anastasio Somoza Debayle successfully eliminated two of the Nicaraguan insurgency's most important leaders, his strategy of targeted killing failed to collapse the insurgency and failed to prevent either the FSLN or UDEL from achieving their political objectives.

5. Analysis

Anastasio Somoza Debayle believed that the elimination of the key insurgent leaders was critical to the collapse of the insurgency. Carlos Fonseca Amador and the FSLN represented the greatest military threat to the Somoza regime. Though Fonseca's

¹⁰⁹ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 246.

¹¹⁰ Walker, *The Economic and Political Background*, 165.

¹¹¹ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 247.

attacks against the National Guard failed to produce substantial military outcomes, the attacks did succeed in galvanizing popular support and maintaining pressure on the Somoza regime. As the clear leader of the FSLN, Fonseca represented the most lucrative target for the Somoza regime's attempt at leadership decapitation. However, Somoza failed to understand an important detail imbedded within the structure of the FSLN's leadership network. The FSLN was a guerrilla army that maintained a loose hierarchical structure of national, regional, and cell commanders to guard against the loss of any one leader. This structure allowed the FSLN to view Daniel Ortega, the most successful FSLN military commander and ideological leader as the legitimate successor in the event of Fonseca's capture or death. In 1976, Daniel Ortega and the Terceristas faction were gaining power and legitimacy rapidly within the FSLN. As a result, Daniel Ortega possessed the legitimacy to step forward as Fonseca's clear successor and direct the FSLN's military and political operations. With a clear successor, the death of Carlos Fonseca Amador served only to unite the FSLN, enflame popular discontent, and legitimize Daniel Ortega's assumption of power.

Though the killing of Carlos Fonseca Amador failed to achieve the collapse of the insurgency, Anastasio Somoza Debayle once again attempted a strategy of targeted killing in 1978 with the murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. Chamorro represented a clear challenge to Somoza's power and authority in Nicaragua. *La Prensa* regularly published articles critical of the regime and exposed government corruption. Chamorro was exceptionally successful at instigating popular uprisings and revolts throughout the country due to his popular appeal. Chamorro successfully procured weapons and financial support from foreign donors to support armed struggle against the regime. Finally, Chamorro's popular appeal established him as the clear leader to assume the presidency in the event Somoza left office. Though Somoza possessed numerous reasons to fear Chamorro's power and eliminate a rival, Somoza failed, once again, to understand the dynamics of the UDEL or the personal preparation of Chamorro. As an umbrella organization designed to synchronize the efforts of multiple smaller movements, the UDEL elected its leadership. Chamorro was the clear and legitimate leader of the UDEL and directed a semi-hierarchical chain of command to conduct operations against

Somoza. In addition, Chamorro fought the insurgency against Somoza for over forty years and understood the dangers of leadership. Chamorro spoke of death regularly with his wife and subordinates and took measures to guard his family, his newspaper, and the UDEL from disruption in the event of his murder.¹¹² Chamorro appointed successors to carry on his ideology. Pablo Antonio Cuadra succeeded Chamorro as the publisher of *La Prensa*, and Rafael Córdova Rivas succeeded Chamorro as the leader of the UDEL. Chamorro's preparations established the legitimacy of his successors and prevented the collapse of the UDEL.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle's strategy of targeted killing proved a complete failure. As argued by Byman and Bueno de Mesquita, the assassinations of Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro only united the resistance organizations, galvanized support for armed struggle, and encouraged popular uprisings against the Somoza regime. As noted by Bloom, the elevation of Fonseca and Chamorro as martyrs increased the violence against the Somoza regime and hastened the regime's downfall. Fonseca and Chamorro's successors possessed not only the skill to lead the organizations, but also the legitimacy to succeed clear leaders of the Nicaraguan resistance.

The counterfactuals surrounding the Nicaraguan revolution are interesting to examine. It is possible that the Somoza regime could have averted disaster by incarcerating Fonseca and Chamorro, simply continuing to suppress the insurgency without eliminating key leaders, or killing Fonseca and Chamorro before their clear successor emerged. Though both Fonseca and Chamorro were imprisoned multiple times, the insurgency never escalated as a result of their incarceration. It is likely that the FSLN would have remained fragmented had the assassination of Fonseca not catalyzed the three disparate factions. It is also likely that the Somoza regime could have simply maintained steady pressure on the insurgency. Without the heavy-handed repression of the population, the Nicaraguan population would not have risen up against Somoza and the United States would not have withdrawn its support from the anti-communist regime. Had the Somoza regime killed Fonseca and Chamorro in the insurgency's infancy, before

¹¹² Edmisten, *Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy*, 3–5.

a hierarchical structure or clear successors emerged within the organization, it is possible that the FSLN would have collapsed or never fully formed.

B. TARGETED INCARCERATION WITH A NAMED SUCCESSOR: AHMED BEN BELLA

Ahmed Ben Bella, an Algerian Non-Commission Officer in the French Army, organized the *Front Libération Nationale* (FLN) in 1954 to combat the French oppression of the Muslim majority in Algeria and eliminate France's colonial holdings in Algeria. Ben Bella worked closely with the Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian governments to arm and finance the insurgency in Algeria. Due to Ben Bella's stature as an insurgent leader as well as his role as the key resource conduit from neighboring Arab states, the French intelligence service attempted to kill Ben Bella twice, and finally captured him in 1956. The French believed the removal of Ben Bella would cutoff critical supplies, eliminate a charismatic leader, and ultimately cause the collapse of the Algerian resistance. In reality, the removal of Ben Bella united the disparate resistance groups in Algeria, encouraged additional support for the insurgency, and Ben Bella remained an inspirational symbol to the Algerian insurgents. In the end, France was compelled to recognize the independence and self-determination of Algeria and Ben Bella was elected the country's first president.

1. Origins of the Insurgency

France annexed Algeria in 1830 and demanded allegiance from the Algerian Muslim population. "France asserted that Algeria was an extension of French national territory and that its native born inhabitants were national subjects."¹¹³ In response to French occupation and discrimination, a nationalist and anti-settler movement emerged during the 1920s in North Africa and Algeria which ultimately resulted in the opening of hostilities in the French-Algerian War. The Algerian nationalist movement began in 1925 with the creation of *Étoile Nord-Africaine* (ENA) by Messali Hadj.¹¹⁴ Messali

¹¹³ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 19.

¹¹⁴ Joachim Joesten, *The New Algeria* (Chicago: Follett Pub. Co, 1964), 74.

Hadj was a member of the French Communist Party and a staunch pacifist who believed in the elimination of French colonial power in Algeria through peaceful means and the full independence of the country. In 1937, the ENA was dissolved by French authorities in Algeria and Messali Hadj was arrested. Several months later, Messali Hadj founded the *Parti du peuple Algérien* (PPA), which was outlawed quickly by the French authorities and Messali Hadj was placed under house arrest.¹¹⁵ Though underground, the PPA continued to work towards Algerian independence through peaceful methods until 1945. On 8 May 1945, public demonstrations for Algerian nationalism in Sétif turned violent as French forces killed or injured thousands of Algerian protestors.¹¹⁶ This overreaction by French forces hardened resistance to French colonization and created splinter organizations which sought to overthrow the French through violence. In 1946, Messali Hadj organized the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libérées Démocratiques* (MTLD) which sought an independent Algeria through legal means. “While the MTLD operated on a legal basis to pursue independence primarily as an Islamic and Arab movement, the PPA unofficially continued its course underground and created the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS) as a paramilitary resistance organization.”¹¹⁷ As the more militant faction of the MTLD gained power within the organization, Messali Hadj began to disengage; continuing to seek a peaceful means to achieve independence. As the non-violent factions faded in Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella emerged as the most notable insurgent leader of the Algerian resistance.

2. Insurgent Leadership

Ahmed Ben Bella was born on 25 December 1916 in the town of Marnia in the Oran district of Algeria.¹¹⁸ The Muslim population of Algeria received harsh treatment and little possibility of economic advancement due to the discriminatory policies of the

¹¹⁵ Mouloud Feraoun and James D. Le Sueur, *Journal, 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War* [Journal, 1955-1962.] (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xiv.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, xiv.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 7.

one million French colons who exercised authority in Algeria. Despite open discrimination against the Muslim Algerians, Ben Bella attended primary school in Marnia and secondary school in the town of Tlemcen.¹¹⁹ While in school, Ben Bella was inspired by the nationalist and anti-settler movements in Algeria due to the daily repression of the Algerian Arabs. He also experienced the widespread racial discrimination which the French colons used to oppress the Muslim population.¹²⁰ He left school without graduating and joined Messali Hadj's newly organized PPA in 1937.¹²¹ Shortly after joining the PPA, Ben Bella was conscripted into the French Army and posted to an Alpine infantry regiment outside of Marseilles.¹²² He attained the rank of sergeant before France capitulated to the German occupation forces. Ben Bella returned to Algeria following the French defeat, but was recalled to duty as a member of a Moroccan unit in 1943.¹²³ Ben Bella assisted in the allied liberation of Rome, received three citations from the French government, and earned the rank of sergeant-major.¹²⁴ Throughout his tours in the military, Ben Bella remained politically active and worked to end discriminatory policies against Algerian conscripts through protests and his writings. Following the conclusion of WWII, Ben Bella heard of the French reprisals against Algerian nationalist uprising in Sétif and Guelma, and returned home in 1945 to assist in the struggle for Algerian independence.¹²⁵ Upon his return, Ben Bella was elected a councillor for his hometown of Marnia and joined the MTLD.¹²⁶ Ben Bella organized and resourced protests against the discriminatory election practices of the French authority. After Ben Bella lost his family's farm in Marnia, he moved to Algiers and

¹¹⁹ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 7.

¹²⁰ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*, Rev ed. (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1987), 74.

¹²¹ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 7.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹²⁴ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 48.

¹²⁵ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 7.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

began underground work for the MTLD.¹²⁷ In 1947, Ben Bella became the leader of the OS and began preparations for armed insurrection against the French authority.¹²⁸ “The O.S. was first heard from in 1947 when it carried out a number of bombings and other terrorist activities.”¹²⁹ Ben Bella’s militant ideology and successful planning of subversive activities expanded his influence within the Algerian resistance movement and he was elected chief political organizer for the MTLD in 1949.¹³⁰ Ben Bella funded and resourced his subversive activities in Algeria through bank robbery and petty theft. In 1950, he was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for the robbery of the main Oran post office which netted the OS three million francs.¹³¹ With the OS exposed to the French intelligence agencies, the OS leadership that managed to avoid incarceration fled to Cairo, Tunis, or Tripoli. In 1952, Ben Bella escaped from prison and traveled to Egypt to reestablish the OS.¹³² While in Egypt he met with Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser who had recently overthrown King Farouk as the ruler of Egypt. Nasser provided Ben Bella with inspiration as well as weapons, financial assistance, and tactical advice for the Algerian guerrilla movement.¹³³ Inspired to begin direct action against the French authority in Algeria, Ben Bella along with Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Boudiaf, Belkacem Krim, Hocine Ait-Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Ben Boulaid, Mahmud Didouche, and Ben Mehidid met in Egypt in 1954 and established the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA).¹³⁴ The CRUA was formed to undermine the existing revolutionary organizations in Algeria and overthrow the French colonial authority

¹²⁷ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁹ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 23.

¹³⁰ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹³¹ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 23.

¹³² Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹³³ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 49.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

through direct action.¹³⁵ In the spring of 1954, Ben Bella, Mustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Mahmud Didouche met, once again, in Geneva, Switzerland to plan the revolt against French rule in Algeria.¹³⁶ In October 1954, the CRUA was renamed the *Front Libération Nationale* (FLN) and the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN) was formed.¹³⁷ On 1 November 1954, the ALN launched a series of terrorist attacks and uprisings against French rule, which marked the beginning of Algeria's war for independence.

3. Insurgent Actions

Though the initial phase of the FLN's campaign against French colonial rule was well planned by the war council, the targets of the first terror attacks were relatively random and designed to destabilize the government. "The FLN leaders did not plan much beyond the first step, and they improvised as they went along."¹³⁸ The FLN leadership divided Algeria into six *wilayas* (regions) and assigned a military commander to control the war effort in each region.¹³⁹ The first phase of the FLN's operations consisted of blind terrorism "designed primarily to attract publicity both for the cause of Algerian independence ... and, secondarily, to spread insecurity."¹⁴⁰ The initial attacks focused on the Aurès Mountains, Constantine, Algiers, Kabylia, and Oran. The FLN struck isolated French garrisons and conducted sabotage, bombings, and assassinations against symbols of the French authority.¹⁴¹ The second phase of the war was selective terrorism which was designed to control the Muslim population through the elimination of Muslims working with the French administration, destruction of trust between the Muslims and the French, incitement of the Muslim population against the French, and the

¹³⁵ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 15.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹³⁷ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹³⁸ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 15.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

organization of the Muslim population into local committees.¹⁴² “Not all terrorist actions were so well calculated with a precise goal in mind, but since disorder automatically helps the insurgent, incoherent terror served its purpose merely by promoting instability.”¹⁴³ The fear and instability created by the FLN’s attacks throughout Algeria set the conditions for the opening of a guerrilla war against the French. The FLN initiated a guerrilla campaign quickly in areas where government control was weak or terrain limited government intervention. The Aurès Mountains provided the perfect safehaven for the FLN to plan, resource, refit, and train for the guerrilla war. As the guerrilla war expanded, the FLN supported the combat operations with an intensive propaganda campaign designed to discredit the French administration and encourage recruitment into the insurgency.¹⁴⁴ Because the FLN received nearly unhindered support from the Muslim population in Algeria, the FLN was “able to fight a relentless guerrilla war, seldom attacking in force, always retreating before superior numbers, vanishing at dawn and re-emerging at nightfall.”¹⁴⁵ Though Ben Bella planned and coordinated the FLN’s attacks on the French authority, he did not participate in the fighting and remained in Egypt to procure resources. In 1954, Ben Bella was tried *in absentia* by an Algerian court and sentenced to death.¹⁴⁶ As a result, Ben Bella was pursued by the French authorities and could not contribute to the military campaign without becoming a liability to the FLN. Ben Bella organized the ‘forces of the exterior’ in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt to train new soldiers, raise funds for the war, and supply the ALN with weapons and munitions.¹⁴⁷ After only five months of FLN attacks, the French authorities declared a state of emergency in Algeria due to the widespread revolt of the Muslim population throughout the country. Neither the declaration of a state of emergency nor the introduction of large numbers of French conscripts in January of 1956 was able to quell

¹⁴² Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958*, 15–16.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 16–17.

¹⁴⁵ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 28.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 49–50.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

the unrest in Algeria.¹⁴⁸ Though the insurgency in Algeria grew exponentially from 1954 to 1956, the French government refused to take the insurgency seriously until late 1956 when the terrorist attacks had exploded into a large-scale guerrilla war.

4. Government Counteractions

Following the end of WWII, France's colonial empire began declining rapidly as Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco fought successful wars of independence in the mid 1950s. These territorial losses fortified France's desire to maintain Algeria in its sphere of influence and necessitated the pursuit of drastic methods to suppress the Algerian insurgency. The French executed a massive surge of combat forces into Algeria to quell the insurgency. From 1954 until the war ended in 1962, the French increased troop levels in Algeria from 50,000 soldiers to 400,000 soldiers.¹⁴⁹ Though the French outnumbered the FLN insurgents by an eight to one ratio, the French were unable to eliminate the insurgents due to the populations unwavering support for the FLN fighters. Faced with mounting losses and failures, the French government initiated secret negotiations with the FLN, while the military simultaneously attempted to target the FLN's leadership and decapitate the organization. In 1956, French delegations met secretly with the FLN five times and were prepared to begin open negotiations with Ben Bella in October.¹⁵⁰

Despite ongoing secret negotiations, the French military continued to target Ben Bella. "From early on in the Algerian war, the French secret intelligence service had identified Ahmed Ben Bella as the 'Number One leader' of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) revolt and had mounted abortive attempts to assassinate him."¹⁵¹ Attempting to negotiate an end to the Algerian insurgency, the Tunisian and Moroccan heads of state invited Ben Bella to attend a secret summit meeting in Tunis with the a French delegation.¹⁵² The French Secret Service intercepted Ben Bella's flight plans and

¹⁴⁸ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 29.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁵⁰ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, 157.

¹⁵¹ Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders*, 35.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 35.

devised a plan to capture the FLN leader. “On October 22, 1956, the French military broke international law and seized the Sultan of Morocco’s private aircraft, which carried important leaders of the Algerian revolution (Ben Bella, Budiaf Khider, Ait Ahmed, and a well-known intellectual, Moustapha Lacheraf).”¹⁵³ Ben Bella and his associates spent the remainder of the war in French prison, but the capture failed to elicit France’s desired result. While imprisoned in France, Ben Bella continued to lead the FLN and continued to fight for the rights of Algerian political prisoners through hunger strikes.¹⁵⁴ The capture of Ben Bella ignited an international firestorm of criticism for France’s actions and galvanized North African support for the FLN. Despite criticism, France attempted to capitalize on the removal of Ben Bella and began a heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign to eliminate FLN safehavens. In 1957, General Jacques Massu and a division of French parachutists cleared the Casbah, an insurgent stronghold in Algiers. A concerted French military effort succeeded in retaking the major cities and population centers in Algeria, but these efforts proved inadequate as the FLN retreated to the safety of the Aurés Mountains and Tunisia to regroup and rearm. With open support from Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, the FLN continued its unhindered attacks on French interests in Algeria. By 1959, France’s resolve in Algeria began to crack under the strain of internal government instability, a failure to quell the Algerian insurgency, and reports of rampant torture and extreme treatment of the Algerian Muslims. In response to criticism at home, Charles de Gaulle, the president of France, began openly advocating self-determination and independence for Algeria. With the guerrilla war stagnating French efforts and the possibility of achieving independence, the internal leadership of the FLN established a shadow government, the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA), to prepare for independence.¹⁵⁵ Ben Bella, though imprisoned in France was elected vice-president of the new shadow government.¹⁵⁶ “By 1962 it became clear that the French government could not win the war in Algeria and

¹⁵³ Feraoun and Le Sueur, *Journal, 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War*, xix.

¹⁵⁴ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹⁵⁵ Feraoun and Le Sueur, *Journal, 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War*, xxiii.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

had to agree to self-determination for the Algerian People.”¹⁵⁷ From prison, Ben Bella served as one of the FLN’s chief negotiators, and on 18 March 1962, the FLN and the French government signed the Evian Accords which ended the French Algerian War. Ben Bella was released from prison and returned to Algeria as a war hero and national icon. In 1963, Ahmed Ben Bella, was elected Algeria’s first president, confirming the failure of the French Secret Service’s attempt to decapitate the FLN.

5. Analysis

The French Secret Service believed that the removal of Ahmed Ben Bella would leave the FLN leaderless and collapse the Algerian insurgency. French intelligence sources identified Ben Bella as the leader of the FLN prior to the Muslim uprising in 1954.¹⁵⁸ His meetings with North African leaders and ability to fund, arm, train, and supply Algerian insurgents presented Ben Bella as an excellent target. However, French intelligence analysts failed to understand the leadership structure of the FLN. The internal leadership of the FLN was organized into a loose hierarchy of regional, zone, sector, and district commanders with semi-autonomous control over their respective areas.¹⁵⁹ Ben Bella controlled the external leadership of the FLN as well as the resources which supported the FLN’s internal leadership. As a result, Ben Bella exercised some measure of strategic control over the internal leadership. This leadership arrangement created a rift between Ben Bella and Ramdane Abane, the most powerful of the FLN’s internal leaders, and Ben Bella’s clear successor.¹⁶⁰ The capture of Ben Bella proved a colossal blunder for the French government. “Secretly, the ‘interior’ leaders were delighted by Ben Bella’s capture and incarceration.”¹⁶¹ The removal of Ben Bella allowed the more radical Abane to take strategic control of the FLN and direct a more aggressive terrorist policy against the French military. The arrest united and galvanized

¹⁵⁷ Adi and Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*, 8.

¹⁵⁸ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, 86.

¹⁵⁹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958*, 19.

¹⁶⁰ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, 143.

¹⁶¹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958*, 35.

the FLN's leadership; healing many of the internal divisions which prevented coordinated action against the French military. The French believed that Ben Bella's charismatic allure would fade while incarcerated, but Ben Bella continued to serve as a daily reminder of France's oppression of the Algerian Muslims. Through hunger strikes and international recognition as a political prisoner, Ben Bella legitimized the FLN's struggle for independence, remained relevant as an FLN leader, and served as an inspiration to the suffering guerrilla fighters in Algeria. The incarceration of Ben Bella also eliminated a willing negotiating partner. Prior to incarceration, Ben Bella participated in peace negotiations with French delegations, but after five years in prison, Ben Bella refused any peace overtures which did not include Algerian sovereignty and an end to French influence in Algeria.¹⁶² As shown by Honig, eliminating negotiating partners can counteract the state's strategy. Ben Bella's capture generated widespread international condemnation of the French Secret Service's actions which eroded public support for the Algerian War in France and infuriated the rulers of Tunisia and Morocco. After Ben Bella's arrest, both Tunisia and Morocco openly financed, armed, and provided training facilities for FLN fighters. The French Secret Service's strategy of eliminating the FLN's leadership failed to accomplish the designed intent because the FLN possessed a clear and legitimate leader to succeed Ahmed Ben Bella.

Examining the counterfactuals in the Algerian insurgency provide additional insight into the case study. In the beginning of the war, Ben Bella was a willing negotiating partner with the French government. In fact, he was flying to Tunis to attend secret negotiations with the French delegation. Had the French Secret Service shot Ben Bella's plane down or managed to kill Ben Bella, negotiations would still have ended before a settlement was reached. It is unlikely that Ben Bella's hard line successor would have continued negotiations with the French in the event of Ben Bella's death. The structure of the FLN's internal leadership ensured that Ben Bella always possessed a successor in the event of his capture or death. To defeat the FLN insurgency, the French Secret Service had to undermine all the violent FLN leaders of the FLN and legitimize the non-violent leadership of a leader like Messali Hadj. Ultimately, France's only

¹⁶² Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, 469.

opportunity to improve its position and maintain its colony in Algeria was to negotiate a settlement to the conflict with Ben Bella or a non-violent Algerian leader.

C. TARGETED KILLING WITH NO NAMED SUCCESSOR: FATHI SHIKAKI

Fathi Shikaki, a Palestinian medical doctor, founded the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 1980 in order to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation through armed confrontation with Israel. Shikaki formed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in response to the failure of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to show any credible advances in achieving Palestinian independence. Though the PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad differed on the strategy of achieving a Palestinian state, the organizations were willing to coexist and work towards a common goal. However, the emergence of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 1990s fragmented the organizations. Hamas and the PLO formed a temporary alliance to strengthen the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Israel. The 1993 Oslo Accords allowed the PLO and Hamas to negotiate a settlement with Israel which provided the “important first step towards the creation of a Palestinian State because it transferred to the PLO practical control over a small amount of territory in Gaza and the town of Jericho.”¹⁶³ Fathi Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad refused to participate in the negotiations and increased attacks on Israeli citizens in an attempt to disrupt the negotiations. In 1995, the Israeli Mossad killed Fathi Shikaki on the island of Malta. Shikaki’s death proved a devastating loss to the organization. Without an effective leader, Palestinian Islamic Jihad ceased to pose a credible threat to Israel or the peace negotiations.

1. Origins of the Insurgency

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was founded in Egypt in 1980 with inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is a fundamentalist Islamic movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. “The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to restore the historical Caliphate and then expand its authority over the entire

¹⁶³ Robert Edwards Hunter and Seth G. Jones, *Building a Successful Palestinian State: Security* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 2.

world, dismantling all non-Islamic governments.”¹⁶⁴ Though active throughout the Middle East, the Brotherhood focuses its efforts on overthrowing the Egyptian government through mostly political means. Three Sunni Muslim Palestinian students studying in Egypt; Fathi Shikaki, Abdul Aziz Odeh, and Bashir Moussa, believed that Palestine, not Egypt, was central to the transformation of the whole Arab world and split from the Muslim Brotherhood. The three students “believed they could challenge the secular nationalism of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since the PLO’s armed struggle was showing no concrete results.”¹⁶⁵ The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was a small but fiercely militant Islamic group formed from a handful of loosely connected factions led by Fathi Shikaki.¹⁶⁶ Abdul Aziz Odeh served as the organization’s spiritual advisor.¹⁶⁷ Shikaki’s ideology and beliefs were formed from his experiences in a Palestinian refugee camp and inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These two events led Shikaki to espouse the violent overthrow of Israel as central to the liberation of Palestine, the creation of a Palestinian state, and lasting change in the Middle East. Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat In 1981, Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were expelled from Egypt and fled to Palestine where the organization established terrorist cells in Israeli occupied areas.¹⁶⁸ By 1986, Fathi Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were prepared to initiate a terrorist campaign against the State of Israel.

2. Insurgent Leadership

Fathi Shikaki was the central leader in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Shikaki was born near Nablus in the Fara Refugee camp in 1951. Growing up as a refugee in Palestine, Shikaki felt the isolation and oppression of Israeli occupation, which impacted the rest of his life. In 1974, Shikaki moved to Egypt and entered medical school at the

¹⁶⁴ The Investigative Project on Terrorism, "The Muslim Brotherhood," The Investigative Project on Terrorism, www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/135.pdf (accessed 30 November, 2009).

¹⁶⁵ Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe Reference, 1997), 337.

¹⁶⁶ Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 283.

¹⁶⁷ Crenshaw and Pimlott, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, 337.

¹⁶⁸ Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 284.

Zagazig University. The university was a hotbed of Islamic militancy and Shikaki embraced radical Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood while studying in Egypt.¹⁶⁹ Upon graduation, Shikaki opened a private medical clinic in Gaza. Despite his medical practice, Shikaki drew inspiration from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and continued to develop his radical ideology. In 1980, he broke with the Muslim Brotherhood and organized the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Following his exile from Egypt in 1981, Shikaki began low-level attacks on Israeli citizens from his base in Gaza. In 1986, Fathi Shikaki was arrested by the Israeli police and sentenced to four years in jail for arms smuggling.¹⁷⁰ Shikaki was deported to Lebanon in April 1988, and later settled in Damascus, Syria in 1990.¹⁷¹ The Syrian government provided a safe location for Shikaki and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to plan and conduct operations against Israel. Shikaki remained in Syria and transmitted orders via the telephone or internet to local planners in Israel and Palestine.¹⁷² Shikaki changed his tactics with the initiation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO infuriated Shikaki who believed that Palestine must be liberated by force.¹⁷³ In an attempt to disrupt the peace negotiations, the Palestinian Islamic jihad began attacking Israeli government targets rather than civilian targets. Though the attacks failed to prevent the signing of the Oslo Accords, the disruption of the peace process was central in Israel's decision to eliminate Shikaki.

3. Insurgent Actions

The disruption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations served the interests of numerous countries in the Middle East and North Africa. A ceasefire between the Palestinians and Israelis would allow the Israelis to focus their military efforts against

¹⁶⁹ Mary Curtius, "Founder of Islamic Jihad Reported Slain," *Los Angeles Times*, sec. Foreign, 29 October, 1995, www.nexis.com (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² David Eshel, "Targeted Killings- A Military Assessment of Israeli Assassination Operations as a Counter- Terrorist Tactic," *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre* (2002), www.jtic.janes.com (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁷³ Curtius, *Founder of Islamic Jihad Reported Slain*.

Iran and Libya. As a result, both Iran and Libya supported the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's military actions against Israel. Iran provided Shikaki with financing for training camps as well as guidance and direction for numerous attacks on Israeli targets in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁷⁴ The Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, trained Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters and issued passports to the group's members.¹⁷⁵ Gaddafi issued a passport to Fathi Shikaki under the name of Ibrahim Shawesh, which allowed Shikaki to travel freely and procure support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's fight.¹⁷⁶ The support from Iran and Libya proved invaluable in financing and training fighters for attacks against Israel.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad "never bothered with building the network of community health and education services in Gaza or the West Bank that has helped Hamas gain popularity."¹⁷⁷ Instead, Shikaki directed his organization to violently overthrow the Israeli government and oppose any negotiations with Israel. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad carried out dozens of attacks on Israeli targets between 1986 and 1995. Shikaki initiated his terrorism campaign against the Israeli government in October 1986 with the Gate of Moors attack. During the attack, two Palestinian Jihad members threw hand grenades at an Israeli Army inauguration ceremony.¹⁷⁸ The attack killed one and wounded sixty-eight Army recruits.¹⁷⁹ In 1987, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad assassinated an Israeli police captain. Following the arrest and deportation of Shikaki and Odeh to Lebanon, Palestinian Islamic Jihad regrouped and continued its attacks on Israel. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 angered many Palestinians who felt betrayed by their representatives in the PLO and Hamas. As a result, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's membership increased to three-hundred fighters in Lebanon

¹⁷⁴ Shmuel Bar, *Iranian Terrorist Policy and Export of Revolution* (Herzliya, Israel: Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, [2009]).

¹⁷⁵ Curtius, *Founder of Islamic Jihad Reported Slain*.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Crenshaw and Pimlott, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, 338.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 338.

and three-hundred fighters in Gaza.¹⁸⁰ In 1995, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad killed nineteen Israeli military personnel at a bus stop in Netanya.¹⁸¹ Several months later, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad executed a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv which killed thirteen Israeli civilians.¹⁸² The organization effectively used suicide bombings on targets selected to maximize Israeli casualties throughout 1995. Shikaki directed the attacks from Damascus, while local planners in the Israeli occupied areas used secret locations to prepare explosives and suicide bombers for their missions.¹⁸³ The attacks were designed to destabilize the peace negotiations, and drew criticism from not only the Israelis, but also the PLO and Hamas. The timing and potential impact of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's attacks threatened to stall the fragile peace negotiations, and forced the Israeli government to take action to prevent continued interference.

4. Government Counteractions

Shikaki's strong ties and frequent travels to Libya provided Israel with the opportunity to eliminate the terrorist leader. Gaddafi financially supported and maintained close ties with the violent Palestinian organizations in Israel. However, when the PLO and Hamas began negotiating with Israel, Gaddafi withdrew his support for the Palestinian organizations with the exception of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Following the Oslo Accords, Gaddafi began expelling Palestinians from Libya to protest the peace negotiations.¹⁸⁴ In response, Shikaki flew to Libya to meet with Gaddafi and to ask Gaddafi to stop expelling Palestinians from the country.¹⁸⁵ The two leaders quarreled during the meeting and Shikaki left Libya shortly after arriving.¹⁸⁶ On his return trip to Damascus, Shikaki stopped for the night at his favorite hotel on the Mediterranean island

¹⁸⁰ Mary Curtius, "PLO Urges Calm After Slaying of Jihad Leader," *Los Angeles Times*, sec. Foreign, 30 October, 1995, www.nexis.com (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁸¹ Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 284.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 284.

¹⁸³ Eshel, *Targeted Killings- A Military Assessment of Israeli Assassination Operations as a Counter-Terrorist Tactic*, 2.

¹⁸⁴ Curtius, *Founder of Islamic Jihad Reported Slain*.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

of Malta.¹⁸⁷ “Maltese newspapers and radio said [Shikaki] was shot in the head at point-blank range by a man in black in the seaside resort of Sliema hours after arriving in Malta.”¹⁸⁸ Though not confirmed, the Israeli Mossad is believed to be responsible for the targeted killing of Fathi Shikaki. The death of Fathi Shikaki on 26 October 1995 weakened the Palestinian Islamic Jihad significantly. “The assassination in 1995 of [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] chief Fathi Shikaki in Malta seriously damaged that organization, which failed to recuperate fully until April 2002.”¹⁸⁹ The Palestinian Islamic Jihad reemerged seven years after the death of Fathi Shikaki due to the Second Intifada which began in 2000.¹⁹⁰ The sharp increase in the number and ferocity of attacks between 2000 and 2002 created the environmental conditions which drove many Palestinians to support more violent ideologies and allowed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to reform its support base.

5. Analysis

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad formed around Fathi Shikaki, who served as the group’s ideological leader as well as the overseer of all operations. This centralization of authority and decision making limited the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s ability to adapt to the loss of their leader. Shikaki’s death created a leadership void within the organization which could not be filled easily.¹⁹¹ Without a named successor to take over leadership of the organization, the members were forced to elect a new leader without Shikaki’s approval. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, a former part-time professor at the University of South Florida was elected the new leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in October

¹⁸⁷ Janes' Information Group, "Who Killed Fathi Shikaki?" *Jane's Information Group* (1995), www.jtic.janes.com (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁸⁸ Curtius, *Founder of Islamic Jihad Reported Slain*.

¹⁸⁹ Eshel, *Targeted Killings- A Military Assessment of Israeli Assassination Operations as a Counter-Terrorist Tactic*, 3.

¹⁹⁰ Majd Bader, "The Israeli Policy: Targeted Killing for Preventive Self-Defense or Extra-Judicial Executions?" (LL.M, American University, Washington College of Law), 1.

¹⁹¹ Steve Rodan, "The Big Fish that Got Away," *The Jerusalem Post*, sec. World, October 17, 1997, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 23 February 2010).

1995.¹⁹² “Most independent American monitors of terrorist activity say they were not familiar with Shallah, although Arab journalists now say he helped organize the Palestinian branch of Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s.”¹⁹³ While qualified to lead the organization, Shallah’s time in the United States and absence from the organization cast doubt on his character. Investigations conducted after Shallah departed the United States for Syria concluded that he had not participated in any terrorist activities while at the University of Central Florida.¹⁹⁴ Shallah also faced a united front from Palestinian groups and the Israeli government working towards a negotiated peace. “The sharp decline in terrorist attacks, particularly the bloody suicide bombings, was due to the combined preventative counter-terrorist policy of the [Palestinian Authority] and Israel.”¹⁹⁵ Shallah lacked the ideological and charismatic appeal that Shikaki possessed and was unable to counter the alliance between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government.¹⁹⁶ Shikaki was also plagued by a lack of distinction within Palestine. Though Shallah spoke vehemently against Israel, he never captured the legitimacy of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s core followers or the Palestinian population. “After five years at the Jihad’s helm, Shallah [remained] so little known that neither the general manager of Jerusalem’s largest Arab newspaper or the head of a leading Arab think tank had ever heard of him.”¹⁹⁷ Prior to the beginning of the Second Intifada, Fathi Shikaki and his brother Dr. Khalil Shikaki were better known and respected in Palestine than Shallah.¹⁹⁸ Shallah’s lack of notoriety may have resulted from his inability to travel beyond the confines of his Syrian headquarters. Unlike Shikaki, Shallah did not travel to the West

¹⁹² James Harper, "Federal Agents Investigate Ex-USF Teacher," *St. Petersburg Times*, sec. Tampa Bay and State, 3 November, 1995, www.nexis.com (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Susan Taylor Martin, "Arab Eyes Turning to Ex-USF Professor," *St. Petersburg Times*, sec. National, 16 October, 2000, www.freerepublic.com (accessed 23 February 2010).

¹⁹⁵ Ely Karmon, " Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (March, 2000), 2, www.meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue1/jv4n1a7.html (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁹⁶ Novelguide.com, "Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Novelguide.com, www.novelguide.com (accessed 23 February 2010, 2010).

¹⁹⁷ Martin, *Arab Eyes Turning to Ex-USF Professor*.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Bank, Gaza, or other Arab countries to build support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.¹⁹⁹ The chances of Shallah's capture or assassination outside Syria were prohibitive to international travel. Without the charismatic appeal of Shikaki, the physical presence in the fight against Israel, and the ability to muster large support within the Arab community, Shallah lacked the legitimacy to effectively lead the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Lacking the legitimacy of his core followers, Shallah did not possess the strength to counteract the powerful attraction of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. As a result, Shallah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were overwhelmed by larger organizations like Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and slipped into obscurity until 2002. Only the complete breakdown of peace negotiations in Palestine and the initiation of the widespread violence which characterized the Intifada Al-Aqsa in 2000 allowed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to reemerge as a viable terrorist organization. The Second Intifada created violence and anger against Israel which drove Palestinians back to violent terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The Israeli government may have employed the best solution to collapse the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Without a clear successor, Fathi Shikaki's assassination failed to engender the same outrage that other Palestinian martyrs received. Had the Israeli government incarcerated Fathi Shikaki, it is doubtful that the strategy would have collapsed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As the earlier records show, Shikaki would not have reconciled with the government or encouraged his followers to embrace the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. From prison, Shikaki could also have communicated with his followers and conferred legitimacy upon Ramadan Abdullah Shallah. However, imprisoning Shikaki was preferable to the Israeli government not acting. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad's frequent attacks against Israeli targets would certainly have disrupted the peace negotiations. Had Shikaki appointed Shallah as his successor prior to Shikaki's death, it is likely that Shallah would have possessed the legitimacy to counter the peace process and continue violent attacks against Israel. However, this appointment would certainly have caused Shallah's arrest in the United States.

¹⁹⁹ Martin, *Arab Eyes Turning to Ex-USF Professor*.

D. TARGETED INCARCERATION WITH NO NAMED SUCCESSOR: ABIMAEEL GUZMAN

Abimael Guzman, a university professor in Peru, founded the Shining Path or Sendero Luminoso in 1970 to overthrow the Peruvian elites in Lima and install a Maoist-based communist regime in Peru. Guzman is viewed by his followers as “the Fourth Sword of Marxism, a heroic figure whose life’s work and ideological contributions stand in logical order with those of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.”²⁰⁰ The Shining Path expanded steadily and by 1992, the Peruvian government was on the verge of collapsing under the threat of constant terrorist attacks across the country. Guzman single-handedly directed the Shining Path’s operations, and created a cult-of-personality within the organization. Upon Guzman’s capture in 1992, the Shining Path collapsed, and “within three years, the insurgency ceased to pose a serious threat to the Peruvian State.”²⁰¹

1. Origins of the Insurgency

The origins of the Shining Path were rooted in the ideology of Jose Carlos Mariategui. In 1923, Mariategui formed the Peruvian Communist Party to fuse communist ideology with Indian nationalism.²⁰² Mariategui believed that a peasant-based uprising by oppressed highland Indians could recapture the society destroyed by Spanish conquest and the urban elite in Lima.²⁰³ The ideology espoused by Mariategui united the Peruvian Communist Party until 1964 when the Sino-Soviet split divided the party. The pro-Moscow wing of the party supported a traditional non-violent strategy which emphasized achieving the party’s goals through peaceful means and co-optation of the ruling class.²⁰⁴ The pro-Chinese wing of the party, also known as *PCP-Bandera Roja* (Red Flag), espoused a strategy of armed struggle and sought to follow the example of

²⁰⁰ Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990), 3.

²⁰¹ James C. Rix, "Beyond Guzman? The Future of the Shining Path in Peru" (Master's Degree, Naval Postgraduate School), 292.

²⁰² Simon Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), 2.

²⁰³ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 5.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

Mao Tse Tung in China. The pro-Chinese faction “declared that the revolution would originate in the countryside through the mobilization of the peasantry and lead to the final encirclement of urban Peru.”²⁰⁵ The ideological divisions over the importance of armed struggle continued to plague the Peruvian Communist Party. In 1970, *PCP-Bandera Roja* split once again due to complaints that the party’s leadership was not moving to initiate armed revolt against the government of Peru. During the rift, the more radical members of the organization, including Abimael Guzman and his followers, were expelled from *PCP-Bandera Roja*. The cleavage of Guzman and the more militant factions of the *PCP-Bandera Roja* severed the final restraints on Guzman and facilitated the formation of a more radical organization focused on the violent overthrow of the Peruvian government. Guzman quickly solidified his core followers and named the organization the Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui or simplified to the Shining Path.

The Shining Path grew quickly in the remote Andean districts of Peru where poverty was rampant and rich landowners oppressed their Indian tenants. In the Ayacucho department, three quarters of the inhabitants lived by subsistent farming, a fifth of the peasants were tied to rich landowners as serfs, and servants were regularly raped or kicked off the land by landowners.²⁰⁶ The district of Ayacucho provided the perfect conditions for the development and growth of the Shining Path and its revolutionary Marxist ideology. The extreme poverty, absence of schools and medical clinics, malnutrition, and contempt for the central government allowed the Shining Path to recruit disenfranchised Indians into the organization.²⁰⁷ As the Shining Path expanded from Ayacucho, membership grew to include poor highland peasants, urban unemployed, radical leftist students, and organized labor.²⁰⁸ Guzman inspired this heterogeneous following through an effective blend of Mao’s teachings on peasant-based rebellion with Mariategui’s native socialism, which spoke to the discontent and social realities in Peru.

²⁰⁵ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*.

²⁰⁶ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 3.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰⁸ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 11.

2. Insurgent Leadership

Abimael Guzman grew up as the illegitimate son of prosperous white father in Arequipa, Peru.²⁰⁹ Inspired by Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, the Cuban Revolution, and two trips to China, Guzman sought to bring about a Marxist revolution in Peru through armed struggle. Guzman believed education was essential to recruitment and to the creation of a core group of followers. As a professor of philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga, Guzman taught his ideological beliefs in Marxist revolution through armed struggle. Guzman quickly expanded the recruitment base for the Shining Path in 1971, when he became the personnel director for the university.²¹⁰ This position allowed him to hire a cadre of radical professors capable of indoctrinating the students with the ideology of the Shining Path. Many of these students returned to their villages and towns following graduation to teach and expand the network of political activists. From the formation of the Shining Path in 1970 until 1977, Guzman focused on educating his followers, recruiting new members, and expanding his support base within the Andean highlands.²¹¹ Guzman also organized the Shining Path to begin operations against the government of Peru. The Shining Path was organized with a semi-hierarchical structure designed to control the growing guerrilla army.²¹² The hub of the shining Path is the *National Directorate* and the inner circle of the central committee which makes decisions and directs the outer rings composed of the full committee, the party, the guerrilla army and front organizations.²¹³ Guzman, as the leader of the Shining Path, maintained central control of strategic decisions and exercised operational control through the National Directorate and the central committee.²¹⁴ The central committee of the Shining Path directs six regional commands which are responsible for “establishing bases, recruitment, building a network of local support, and

²⁰⁹ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 2–3.

²¹⁰ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 5.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

²¹² Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 6.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 6.

²¹⁴ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 6.

planning and carrying out local operations.”²¹⁵ Members of the inner circle dispersed throughout Peru to oversee the operations of the regional commanders and maintain lines of communication back to Guzman through a system of couriers, dead drops, and the national postal system.²¹⁶ This intricate system of communication allowed Guzman to exercise control over local operations which were carried out by Shinning Path members organized into small cells with a local support structure.²¹⁷ Organized around a strict hierarchy, the Shining Path emerged from its recruitment and training phase with a national logistical support network, an army of trained insurgents, and a strong ideological core of followers who enforced strict obedience to Guzman. The slow systematic growth of the Shining Path provided a safehaven and tactical space for the organization to begin planning for armed confrontation with the government of Peru.

3. Insurgent Actions

In May 1980, Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path launched the first attacks against the Peruvian government. The Shining Path attacked polling stations in the poor village of Ayacucho in an attempt to “instigate a popular war that will begin in the high country and spread throughout rural Peru, and surround and finally overwhelm the cities.”²¹⁸ Guzman believed that the overthrow of the government required a coordinated strategy consisting of five phases: “(1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage against Peru’s socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle; (4) the conquest and expansion of the revolution’s support base and the strengthening of the guerrilla army; and (5) general civil war.”²¹⁹ From 1980 until 1983, the Shining Path attacked Peru’s civic infrastructure, government institutions, and symbols of capitalism in order to destabilize the Peruvian government and force the government to overreact. Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the president of Peru, initially neglected to take action against the Shining Path due to fears of another coup in the country. By 1981, the Peruvian

²¹⁵ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 6.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

government was forced to take action against the Shining Path and instituted new anti-terrorism laws, declared a state of emergency in Ayacucho, suspended constitutional protections, and created a special police unit (Sinchis) to hunt down member of the Shining Path.²²⁰ The heavy-handed methods of the Sinchis, government oppression of the population, and continued neglect of the poor remote regions of Peru allowed the Shining Path to expand recruitment and operations quickly. By 1983, the Shining Path began phase three of Guzman's strategy and extended operations outside the central highlands.²²¹ As the Shining Path continued to extend their reach, the government of Peru responded with military force and further restricted civil rights. These countermeasures once again created animosity towards the central government and increased the recruitment potential of the Shining Path. By 1985, the Shining Path had extended their reach to the entirety of Peru, had begun phase four of Guzman's strategy, and were poised to initiate combat operations in Lima.²²² The growth of the Shining Path's military arm coincided with the emergence of Guzman's new political authority. As the central government was pushed out of a region by the Shining Path, Guzman filled the void, creating a shadow government which was prepared to takeover authority when Peru's central government inevitably collapsed. Despite the significant successes won by Guzman and the Shining Path in Peru, the organization eventually broke down due the cult-of-personality which grew around Guzman and the lack of subordinates capable of succeeding Guzman's leadership.

4. Government Counteractions

The Shining Path's attacks on Lima and the elite citizens of Peru forced the government to reexamine its anti-terrorism strategy and take more decisive action against the Shining Path. The Peruvian government conducted a complete review of its

²²⁰ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 16.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²²² *Ibid.*, 18, 25.

counterinsurgency strategy from 1988 to 1989.²²³ By 1990, the government unveiled a new strategy which focused on civil action programs in urban neighborhoods, the formation of a special intelligence group (GEIN) to track down Guzman, the creation of civil defense forces (Rondas) to defend the population against the Shining Path's attacks, and the integration of local soldiers into military units to gather intelligence and prevent indiscriminate attacks.²²⁴ Peru's President Alberto Fujimori also initiated legislation in 1991–1992 which expanded the definitions of terrorism and increases penalties for terrorist activities.²²⁵ President Fujimori also “[suspended] democracy to allow for a total campaign against [the Shining Path].”²²⁶ These government actions placed increasing pressure on the leadership of the Shining Path and forced Guzman to convene a “plenary meeting of Shining Path's central committee” to discuss the organization's strategy in Lima.²²⁷ The GEIN received intelligence on the meeting's location and surrounded the house. Abimael Guzman and several of his leading lieutenants were arrested on 12 September 1992 in a middle class neighborhood of Lima. The arrest “dealt what is likely to prove a deadly blow to the guerrilla's chances of seizing power in Peru.”²²⁸ The loss of Guzman's leadership proved insurmountable to the Shining Path's hierarchical command structure and the organization disintegrated quickly. “Although violent incidents declined only slightly over the 6 months following Guzman's capture and then increased over 7 months in 1993, these proved to be the last gasps of a dying movement.”²²⁹ By 1994, the Shining Path could no longer threaten the government of Peru.

²²³ David Scott Palmer, “Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru,” in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*, ed. James J. F. Forest, Vol. 3 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 297.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 298–299.

²²⁵ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 17–18.

²²⁶ Rix, *Beyond Guzman? The Future of the Shining Path in Peru*, 1.

²²⁷ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 1.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

²²⁹ Palmer, *Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru*, 299–300.

5. Analysis

The Shining Path formed around the charismatic leadership and driving ideology of Abimael Guzman. Guzman created a cult-of-personality in which he was not only the founder and leader, but also the “spiritual leader and guiding light.”²³⁰ The loss of Guzman created a leadership void in the Shining Path that Guzman’s subordinates were unable to fill. “It is doubtful that there is anybody in the party with the same capacity as a political-military analyst, strategist, and tactician” as Guzman.²³¹ Without Guzman’s leadership, the Shining Path was “unable to adapt the pre-laid plans as and when necessary: develop effective new ones; and resolve internal contradictions or disputes advantageously, thereby weakening the party and creating the possibility of divisions.”²³² The fact that Guzman was arrested by the government forces and sentenced to life in prison and not killed in the raid is also significant. “The preservation of Guzman is likely to perpetrate a leadership vacuum in Shining Path because while he remains alive, nobody is likely to seize the initiative too boldly.”²³³ Mannes notes this affect as well in his analysis of terrorist organizations. While the loss of Guzman was a significant blow to the Shining Path, the proximate cause of the Shining Path’s collapse was the lack of a viable successor to take over when Guzman was captured. There is no evidence that Guzman appointed a successor prior to his capture in 1992.²³⁴ However, even if Guzman had appointed a successor, the appointed successor was probably eliminated prior to taking control. Many of Guzman’s closest lieutenants were captured or killed in the late 1980s and the majority of the central committee was captured with Guzman in 1992. The lack of a viable successor threw the Shining Path into organizational disarray. Without Guzman’s leadership, the Shining Path lacked direction and focus to control the popular war against the government. The Shining Path’s historic support base within the population also began to crumble once Guzman’s larger-than-life personality was

²³⁰ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 51.

²³¹ Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, 25.

²³² *Ibid.*, 26.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 51.

removed and casualties from the Shining Path's indiscriminate attacks began to mount. With Guzman in prison, the Shining Path lacked not only a leader, but a successor as well. Any candidate attempting to succeed Guzman would be illegitimate since they were not appointed by Guzman, and could not fill the void in Guzman's cult-of-personality.

It is possible that the targeted killing of Abimael Guzman would have produced similar results as his incarceration. The death of Guzman as well as the incarceration of the majority of his inner circle would still have eliminated a clear successor to the Shining Path's leaders. However, the death of Guzman would have prevented his partial reconciliation with the government and would have eliminated the cult-of-personality which restrained any potential successors from fully committing to the leadership role. Capturing Abimael Guzman was preferable to killing him, and killing him is certainly preferable to doing nothing. Had Guzman successfully appointed a successor who was not captured, it is likely that the Shining Path would have been able to continue to fight the Peruvian government. With legitimacy conferred upon the successor by Guzman, the Shining Path would have naturally coalesced around the new leader and continued Guzman's ideological struggle.

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V. ANALYSIS

The examination of successful and failed targeted killing and targeted incarceration policies employed against the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* in Nicaragua, the *Front Libération Nationale* in Algeria, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, and *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru, allow the testing of the four hypotheses proposed in the methodology section.

H1: If targeted killings are executed against leaders of insurgencies with no apparent successor, then insurgent violence should decrease after their leader is killed.

The cases study examining the assassination of Fathi Shikaki provides support for this hypothesis. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad ceased to pose a credible threat to Israel and the PLO after the death of Shikaki. The organization was unable to mount any violent attacks against Israel or the PLO until 2002 when the Second Intifada began. The Second Intifada created an environment of widespread violence and heavy-handed Israeli reprisals which drove many Palestinians back to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. While the peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel limited the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's ability to conduct violent attacks, the stated policy of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was to disrupt the peace negotiations and achieve a Palestinian state through armed struggle. It is therefore, safe to assume that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad intended to conduct attacks against Israel, but lacked the leadership, weapons, and fighters to launch a successful attack.

An examination of the Israeli government's actions against Fathi Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad show that a policy of targeted killing when employed against an insurgent force without a clear successor to its leader is more likely to succeed. When Fathi Shikaki was assassinated by the Israeli Mossad he failed to name a successor to the organization prior to his death. Without a clear successor, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad struggled to find a suitable replacement. Though Ramadan Abdullah Shallah was selected to succeed Shikaki, Abdullah never possessed any credibility or legitimacy within the group. Shikaki never personally named Abdullah as his successor, and

Abdullah's tenure in the United States compromised his credibility with the organization's hardliners. Without a legitimate leader, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad collapsed as its members joined other organizations or embraced the peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

H2: If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders without a clear successor then insurgent violence should decrease following the arrest of the leader.

The case study of Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path provides support for the hypothesis that targeted incarcerations against insurgent leaders without a clear successor decreases the likelihood of insurgent violence against the state. Abimael Guzman's arrest in 1992 facilitated the collapse of the Shining Path. Guzman possessed a larger-than-life, charismatic personality which he used to control the Shining Path. Though he was surrounded by a semi-hierarchical organization and a core inner circle of followers, he failed to name a successor to the organization prior to his arrest. Following the arrest of Guzman, Oscar Ramirez Durand assumed control of the Shining Path, but the organization declined quickly. Insurgent violence decreased for six months after Guzman's arrest, then surged for seven months in 1993.²³⁵ However, after 1993, the Shining Path's violent attacks decreased to an insignificant level. Though Durand vowed to fight the Peruvian government, Guzman encouraged the Shining Path to negotiate a settlement with the government and surrender. Despite his imprisonment, Guzman's followers still saw him as the legitimate leader of the Shining Path and the majority of his fighters ended their struggle against the Peruvian government. As long as Guzman was alive, Durand could never possess the legitimacy to successfully lead the Shining Path. In 1999, Oscar Ramirez Durand was arrested in the Peruvian highlands with a tired and hungry band of female guerrillas. The seven years of leadership took an enormous physical and emotional toll on Durand, but his lack of legitimacy within the Shining Path prevented him from achieving any significant gains against the Peruvian government. The incarceration of Guzman represented a loss the Shining Path's new leadership could not overcome.

²³⁵ Palmer, *Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru*, 299–300.

H3: If targeted killings are executed against insurgent groups with a clear successor to the leader, then violence will increase or remain constant.

The case study of the Sandinista revolution provides support for this hypothesis. Nicaragua's policy of targeted killing employed against the FSLN and the UDEL increased violent attacks against the state. The deaths of Fonseca and Chamorro enraged the population and galvanized support for the resistance which Daniel Ortega and Rafael Córdova Rivas were able to harness to accomplish their organization's objectives. In the wake of the assassinations, violent attacks against the government skyrocketed. The increase in insurgent violence forced the Nicaraguan government to adopt more repressive and heavy-handed tactics which further inflamed the population. Ultimately, The FSLN and UDEL managed to escalate the violence to the point where the Somoza regime's position was no longer tenable, and Somoza was forced to flee the country.

While Israel successfully collapsed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad through a policy of targeted killing, the Nicaraguan government failed against the FSLN and the UDEL. Nicaragua failed because both Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro both named successors prior to their deaths. By naming Daniel Ortega and Rafael Córdova Rivas as their successors, Fonseca and Chamorro ensured that their successors possessed the legitimacy to lead the organizations and continue the insurgency against the Nicaraguan government. With legitimacy passed to their successors, both Fonseca and Chamorro were viewed as martyrs, fathers of the revolution, and figures to rally support around. The assassinations of Fonseca and Chamorro swelled the ranks of the FSLN. From the mid-1960s until 1976, the FSLN commanded a fighting force of around 150 guerrillas.²³⁶ The number of guerrilla fighters rose exponentially to 1000 fighters after the death of Fonseca, and to 5,000 after the death of Chamorro.²³⁷ The increase in guerrilla fighters combined with the overwhelming popular uprisings created an environment where Somoza and the National Guard possessed no alternatives but to surrender control to the country to the rebels.

²³⁶ DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 245.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 245.

H4: If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders with a clear successor, then insurgent violence should increase or remain constant following the arrest of the leader.

The case study of the FLN in Algeria provides support for this hypothesis. The targeted incarceration of Ahmed Ben Bella in 1956 failed to decrease the insurgent violence against the French government because Ben Bella's successor, Ramdane Abane, possessed the legitimacy to assume control of the *Front Libération Nationale*. Ben Bella possessed a distinct charisma which allowed him to control both the external and internal factions of the FLN, but he lacked the cult of personality that characterized Abimael Guzman in Peru. This distinction is important in understanding the divergent outcomes in Algeria and Peru. When Ben Bella was imprisoned, his loyal support base within the FLN transferred their allegiance to Ramdane Abane, the leader of the internal FLN. As a result, Abane seamlessly assumed operational control of the FLN. While in prison, Ben Bella's philosophy hardened and he became more resistant to negotiations with the French. Unlike Guzman, Ben Bella never undermined the authority of his successor while incarcerated. Though Ben Bella was no longer the operational leader of the resistance, he continued to serve as an inspiration to the guerrilla fighters in Algeria. The FLN perceived Ben Bella as a martyr due to his long incarceration in France and multiple hunger strikes. In response to his capture and subsequent suffering, violent attacks increased exponentially. At the beginning of the insurgency, France allocated 50,000 soldiers to Algeria; however, by the end of the conflict France was forced to allocate 400,000 soldiers to the defense of Algeria.²³⁸ Despite the substantial influx of government forces, France could not quell the escalating insurgent violence, and in 1962 France signed the Evian Accords to end the Algerian War and granted the Algerian people the right to self-determination.

²³⁸ Joesten, *The New Algeria*, 27.

VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis provides some new insights into the study of the effectiveness of targeted killing and targeted incarceration. The evidence suggests that the state's employment of a strategy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration against an insurgent organization without a clear successor is more likely to cause the insurgent organization to collapse. This thesis also suggests that both targeted killing and targeted incarceration are effective in reducing insurgent violence five years after the event.

The proper application of a policy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration can collapse an insurgent organization; however, the improper application of this strategy can lead to the overthrow of the government. The Israeli government successfully collapsed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel through the targeted killing of Fathi Shikaki because Shikaki failed to name a successor and the eventual appointee lacked the legitimacy to lead the organization. Similarly, the Peruvian government successfully collapsed the Shining Path because Abimael Guzman failed to name a successor before his capture, and the eventual successor never achieved the legitimacy to lead because he remained locked in a power struggle with the imprisoned Guzman. As the French government in Algeria and the Nicaraguan government discovered, attempting to collapse an insurgent organization through a strategy of targeted killing or incarceration requires detailed knowledge of the insurgency's command structure. The French failed in Algeria because Ahmed Ben Bella's successor possessed legitimacy in his own right, and did not become mired in a power struggle with the imprisoned Ben Bella. The Somoza regime failed to collapse the Sandinista insurgency because both Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro named successors to their respective organizations. Therefore, prior to engaging in a strategy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration, the state should gather intelligence and collect specific information points to determine whether the leader of the insurgency has declared a successor, and whether that successor possesses the legitimacy to lead the organization. The determination of whether to kill or incarcerate the leader relies on a separate set of data points.

A great deal of debate surrounds the question of whether targeted killing or targeted incarceration is more effective in reducing insurgent violence. The case studies examined in this thesis, suggest that both targeted killing and targeted incarceration are effective in reducing insurgent violence. Following the death of Fathi Shikaki, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad failed to mount a significant attack against Israel until 2002 when the Second Intifada began. Likewise, the incarceration of Abimael Guzman reduced the Shining Path's attacks to an insignificant number five years after his capture. Both Shikaki and Guzman believed in the complete overthrow and destruction of the state's authority. Both Leaders fiercely resisted any negotiated settlement with the state. Though Guzman was briefly coerced into reconciling with the state while in prison, he recanted his statements quickly. Both Shikaki and Guzman failed to become martyrs due to environmental conditions. Shikaki led the Palestinian Islamic Jihad while peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinian Authority were occurring. After the death of Shikaki, the Palestinian Authority prevented the elevation of Shikaki to martyr status and quelled any potential Palestinian Islamic Jihad violence. Guzman also failed to become a martyr due to environmental conditions. Guzman and the Shining Path were on the verge of victory in Peru when he was captured. The capture deflated the momentum of the Shining Path and Guzman's coerced and short lived reconciliation with the government eroded some of his cult of personality. The lack of leadership and support within the Shining Path prevented the fashioning of Guzman into a martyr. Ultimately, the determination to kill or incarcerate an insurgent leader depends on the determination of the ground force commander and mission requirements

This study possesses implications for the future targeting of insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa. The United States continues to target Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, through both direct action operations with Special Operations Forces and Predator drone strikes. However, the targeted killing of Mullah Omar will not cause the Taliban to collapse. Mullah Omar's second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader, has maintained *de facto* control over

the Taliban for the last three years.²³⁹ However, in December 2009 Mullah Omar declared Mullah Barader and Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir co-head military commanders of the Taliban.²⁴⁰ With Mullah Berader's capture in February 2010, Mullah Zakir possesses the sole legitimacy to succeed Mullah Omar as the leader of the Taliban. As the self proclaimed "leader of the faithful" Mullah Omar's death would likely galvanize Taliban support behind Mullah Zakir and eliminate any chance of a negotiated settlement. Killing both Mullah Omar and Mullah Zakir in a single attack would likely eliminate any legitimate successor to Mullah Omar and cause extensive infighting within the organization. The incarceration of Mullah Omar may represent a more feasible and positive outcome for the United States. With Mullah Omar in prison, the United States can acquire valuable intelligence for additional operations. Zakir, as the clear successor, would assume full control of the Taliban's strategic decisions. As a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Zakir possesses a more hard line ideology and is unlikely to negotiate with Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai. The incarceration of Mullah Omar may prevent a popular uprising in Afghanistan, but it will not open the door for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Targeted killing and targeted incarceration do not provide a silver bullet to collapse an insurgency; however, when employed correctly, they will increase the counterinsurgent's chances of prevailing in the conflict. The mission commander should determine the targeting method of insurgent leaders based on the mission requirements and environmental conditions. Governments should incorporate targeted killing and targeted incarceration as a portion of their counterinsurgency strategy, but should use caution in their employment against insurgent organizations when the insurgent's leadership structure and operating environment are not fully known.

²³⁹ Ron Moreau, "America's New Nightmare: If You Thought the Longtime Head of the Taliban was Bad, You should Meet His no. 2," *Newsweek*, 25 July 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/208637> (accessed 31 January 2009).

²⁴⁰ Information provided by Senior US Government Military Analyst.

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