Varieties of Musical Pleasure: Thrills, Chills, and Other Delights*

This article analyses a phenomenon that is seldom discussed, even though it is universally recognizable to music lovers and scholars alike: the musically induced bodily pleasure we call 'the chills'. The author draws on recent scholarly research, as well as on personal experiences, to describe what he calls a poignant, bittersweet musical experience that embodies profound truths about human life. He then compares this experience with other forms of musical pleasure.

1.
Though the value of music goes beyond, in a number of respects, the pleasure it provides when appropriately attended to, the capacity to provide such pleasure, it should be admitted, is a significant part of that value. To be sure, there are values that attach to both individual pieces of music and music as a whole that do not cash out in terms of pleasures afforded listeners, but such values will not be the focus of my present reflections. Here and now it is the hedonic that will rule. This paper will be a sort of paean to musical pleasure and a friendly interrogation of its various modes and means.

Some preliminary remarks are in order concerning the sort of attention that should be understood to be involved when I speak of pleasures properly afforded a listener by music. Such attention is close and concerted; it is locally focussed, though global-context-sensitive. Such attention is aesthetic, or appropriate to music as an art; that is, it carries to the role played by what is precisely heard in the generation of any pleasure that ensues, so that the music serves, at least in part, as object of such pleasure. Finally, such attention is stylistically and historically informed, at least on a tacit level, allowing a given piece of music to be heard as such, each characteristic - formal, expressive, rhetorical, representational - being registered for what it is and not, as Bishop Butler put it, another thing.¹

2.
Let me signal at the outset some obvious dimensions of difference among musical pleasures. Musical pleasures differ in how active they are, how intellectual they are, how essentially physiological or physiologically-centered they are. Musical pleasures differ with respect to intensity, e.g. they may be acute or mild; with respect to duration, e.g. they may be passing or long-lasting; with respect to durability, e.g. they may be one-shot affairs or eminently repeatable, with respect to communicability, e.g. they may be highly esoteric or widely shared. Musical pleasures differ in the different values thereof, e.g. elevated or trilling, in the different social imports thereof, e.g. solidarizing or exclusionary, and conceivably also in the different moral qualities thereof, e.g. humanizing or dehumanizing.²

Musical pleasures differ further in when they are taken, so to speak, relative to when the music to which they refer is heard. That is to say, though most

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² For a defense, inspired by Edmund Gurney, of the primacy of local focus in the aural comprehension of music see my Music in the Moment, Ithaca 1998.

³ For more on this aspect of aesthetic attention, see my "What Is Aesthetic Pleasure?", in: Pleasures of Aesthetics, op. cit.


musical pleasure, I would claim, arises from the real-
time following of music in its formal and expressive
evolution, some musical pleasure is anticipatory, pre-
ceeding audition (for example, that bound up with
advance imaginings of a ninth Mahler symphony on
the part of a listener familiar only with the other
eight), and some musical pleasure is recollective,
occurring after audition (for example, that bound up
with retrospective admiration of the management of
balance between soloist and orchestra in Brahms's
violin concerto).

One dimension of difference among musical plea-
sures may correspond to two contrasting modes of
listening, or perhaps two contrasting stances towards
the listening that is going on. On the one hand one
may, without losing contact with the music in its full
particularity, let a piece of music enfold one, envelop
one, wash over one, so that one gives oneself over to it
in a personal way, as to a lover, or perhaps a trusted
therapist. On the other hand one may undertake to
keep music at a distance, so to speak, observing its
lapidary details, its emotional maneuvers, its dra-
natic gestures as something external to and apart
from the self that listens. Each mode carries with it
distinct sorts of pleasure, ones that, manifestly, are
not easily combined on a given occasion.

A question that presents itself at this point is the fol-
lowing. Is there a one-to-one correspondence between
musical pleasures and pleasurable musical features?
That is to say, is it the case that for every musical plea-
sure there is a musical feature such that the pleasure
is a pleasure in that feature? This seems unlikely. Of
course many instances will conform, and manifestly,
to the hypothesis in question, e.g. pleasure in the
intricacies of Bach's counterpoint, or pleasure in the
mellifluousness of phrase in Mozart's late piano con-
certi, or pleasure in the sheer amplitude of Schubert's
C major Symphony?

But what of the pleasure of being simply transpor-
ted by music, no doubt for some reason or other, but
none that presents itself to reflection? Naturally one
can always say that it was the music as a whole, in all
its concreteness, that transported one, but that does
not imply that there is any particular feature, e.g. for-
mal perfection, sensual beauty, or expressive depth,
that has claim to being the object of the pleasure in
question. And one can equally well always postulate a
sort of transportative virtue - evidently possessed by
the music, given it has transported one - and main-
tain that the pleasure of being transported is a plea-
sure in that power of the music, but this, I imagine,
will convince no one. I conclude that even if most
musical pleasures readily reveal themselves to be
pleasures taken in or turning on particular musical
features, such need not be true of all musical plea-
sures.

3,

I come now to what will be the main preoccupation of
this essay, namely, a curious response to music that
is, I will assume, familiar to most dyed-in-the-wool
music lovers, and one that has interested at least this
music lover for the longest time. It is the singular
phenomenon of music-induced "chills", the affect
accompanying such "chills", and the attitude taken
toward such "chills". My point of departure is a recent
scientific study of the phenomenon, conducted over a
number of years by one Jack Panksepp, and summa-
rized and interpreted in a recent article, "The
Emotional Sources of 'Chills' Induced by Music".

Now the pleasure associated with such "chills", where
there is such, is clearly of a sort we can label physiologi-
cally-centered. That is to say, musical pleasure in such
cases revolves around a particular physiological effect,
in the present instance, the skin-suffusing chill in
question, where such effect is an integral part of the
pleasure experienced. One reason the "musical chills"
phenomenon is philosophically interesting is this.

How can a mere tingle or shiver, so to speak, a mere
bodily disturbance, be of appreciative significance?
Any number of philosophers of art, most famously
Goodman, have accustomed us to view as ridiculous
through the ridicule they have heaped on it - the idea
that sensations might as such have a legitimate role
in aesthetic response. What good is a mere sensa-
tion, even an agreeable one, in the context of art?
What does it tell of or testify to? Does it inform us of
some matter of artistic fact? Does it illuminate some
artistic relation of ideas? If neither then consign it, if
not to the flames, then at any rate to the dustbin of
appreciative theory. Such is the prevailing post-
Goodmanian wisdom on this score. But it is not one I
completely share, hence my interest in musical
"chills".

Turning to Panksepp's study, let us begin with some
of his attempts to characterize the target phenome-
on: "...the tingly somatosensory feeling that can be
evoked by certain kinds of music..." (172); "...the
provocative and often delightful bodily experiences
that deeply moving passages of music arouse in many

6 See Music in the Moment, op. cit., for support of this.
7 Recall Schumann's apostrophe of 'heavenly lengths'.
8 Music Perception 13 (1993), pp. 171-207. All page citations to this article are given in parentheses.
9 See his Languages of Art, Indianapolis 1968.
people...’ (173); ‘...a bodily “rush” commonly described as a spreading gooseflesh, hair-on-end feeling that is common on the back of the neck and head and often moves down the spine, at times spreading across much of the rest of the body...’ (173). Panksepp notes that, despite its intriguing nature, ‘...the prickly skin response usually called “shivers”, “thrills”, or “chills” in English has not received the experimental attention it deserves...’ He observes further that ‘...people rarely discuss the experience, and there is no unambiguous lexical referent for it...’ (173).

To take up that last point, there is indeed a terminological problem for what we wish to discuss, in that none of “chill”, “thrill”, or “shiver” seems entirely apt to denote the phenomenon under investigation, each carrying connotations, whether of coldness (“chill”), or risk (“thrill”), or tremor (“shiver”), that are in some degree undesired. Possibly the term “frisson” - a partly nativized immigrant from French - is the best of the designations available for this phenomenon. At any rate I will often speak in what follows of musical frissons, though in discussion of Panksepp’s studies I will call them musical chills, in deference to Panksepp’s preferred term for the experience in question.

Experiments were conducted by Panksepp on undergraduates at a small midwestern university in the U.S. Panksepp employed as his test material popular music of the seventies and eighties, items having been proposed by his subjects themselves as chill-inducing. Thus with few exceptions, the test selections were songs, mainly of the soft and hard rock variety. Ideally, of course, one would have preferred for such experiments textless selections devoid of program - what Peter Kivy calls “music alone” - but the design of the experiment, in which selections were elicited from the student population, obviously did not conduce to that. Panksepp seems surprisingly unconcerned about the possible collateral effects of song lyrics, with the articulate ideas and sentiments they contain, on the phenomenon under study, but naturally it is a possible source of reservations about some of his results.

Here is one specific experimental result, rather emblematic of the study as a whole: ‘The highest rate of reported chills was .5 chills/min/person for the beginning 3-min segment...from Pink Floyd’s album Final Cut, which, on average, yielded essentially the same number of chills as one’s own song [that is, the selection provided by the subject himself/herself]...it was clear that the majority of the chills to this piece occurred in response to the dramatic crescendo at the beginning of the second minute.’ (178-9) As regards the most important general result of the study, it would seem to be this: ‘Overall, the data support the thesis that sadness or melancholy is an emotional dimension more significantly related to the production of chills than is happiness.’ (187) In other words, it is negative, rather than positive, emotion in music that appears more efficacious in inducing the chill experience.

Yet clearly some positively toned music in the study was found capable of inducing chills. This prompts Panksepp to the following speculation, one that would, if sustained, preserve a role for negative emotion in the generation of chills in all cases: ‘Although not addressed here it will be worth considering whether the chills provoked during happy music are caused by segments where happiness and sadness are inextricably entwined in bittersweet feelings.’ (187)” I will return to this conjecture a little further on.

4. Panksepp’s studies targeted a number of different features plausibly thought to bear on the incidence of musical chills. These included a) the gender of listener, b) the degree of familiarity with the music, c) the degree of liking for the music, d) the emotional quality of the music, and e) the dynamic and tonal contour of the music. Panksepp observed a strong correlation between chills and degree of both familiarity and liking, a strong correlation between chills and both rise in volume and rise in pitch, a fairly strong correlation, which we have already noted, between chills and music of sad-melancholy-nostalgic character, and a weak correlation between chills and being female.”

To my mind, there are probable determinants of the chill experience that Panksepp’s experiments did not target, ones that would admittedly be hard to investigate quantitatively. Two that might be mentioned are the music’s fineness of expression and the music’s pattern of expressiveness over time. Panksepp seems not to have considered the possibility that fineness of expressiveness, whether glossed as depth or intensity or exquisiteness of expression, is what crucially triggers the chill experience, rather than expressiveness of negative emotion per se. Panksepp seems also not to have considered the likelihood that a piece’s tempo-

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10 Panksepp expands on this thought later on in the following manner: ‘...happiness and sadness work together, and the most moving music allows the two processes to be blended in such a way as to magnify our sense of ourselves as deeply feeling creatures who are conscious inheritors of the tragic view...’ (198) I think there is something right about this, as my own reflections below will suggest.

11 That is, female subjects were generally more susceptible to chills than were male subjects - or at any rate, they were more likely to report having them.
eral expressive structuring, that is, the pattern of succession of its individually expressive bits or segments, contributes importantly to its chill potential.

Recall now Panksepp's suggestion that music with the greatest capacity for inducing chills may well be of an emotionally hybrid or compound nature - that it is music in which positive and negative affects are in some manner or other interwoven. This connects to what I am inclined to propose, on the basis of my own musical encounters, as perhaps the crucial determinant of chill-inducingness, namely poignancy of expression, or perhaps better, expression of poignancy.

The profound truth about life - or at least one profound truth - is that almost all situations, experiences, conditions actually encountered are in fact of mixed character. One is aware of the bad, if only peripherally, even when solidly engaged with the good, and one glimpses the good even while soundly mired in the bad, intermingled as they are in virtually anything. Nor is this necessarily regrettable. For the mutual focussing of positive and negative elements that results arguably ends up enhancing the appreciation of whatever good is being enjoyed. The essential poignancy of human life, one may suggest, resides in its mixed nature, in the indissoluble union of its joys and its ills, its pluses and minuses. Thus, assuming the prime determinant of musical frisson to be poignancy of expression/expression of poignancy, it would not be surprising to discover that the music most reliably able to induce such frisson was not that of unmitigated despair, nor that of untroubled gaiety, but that in which there was some admixture of the two, some recognition of the bitter in any indulgence of the sweet, some acknowledgment of the sweet in any endurance of the bitter.

5.

Here is a list of pieces conducive to the production of "frisson" or "chills", at least in my experience:

Brahms, String Quintet in G, Op. 111, first movement; Brahms, Piano Trio in B, last movement; Brahms, Intermezzo, Op. 118, No. 1; Schubert, Piano Sonata in C, D. 958, last movement, middle section; Scriabin, Etude Op. 42, 5; Sibelius, Symphony No. 5, first movement; Fauré, Violin Sonata in A, first movement; Franck, Violin Sonata in A; Schumann, Piano Concerto, first and third movements; Saint-Saëns, Piano Concerto No. 2, first and last movements; Poulenc, Sonata for Flute and Piano, first movement; Mahler, Symphony No. 5, fourth movement; Mahler, Symphony No. 6, first and third movements; Strauss, Four Last Songs, first song

From the list so far it might appear that only highly charged music of the Romantic or early Modern period is capable of inducing frisson in this listener, but that is not the case. Here are some other effective items, of earlier vintage: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in E, Op. 109, Alberta; Mozart, Piano Concerto No. 20 in D minor, first movement; Mozart, Piano Concerto No. 23 in A, second movement; Vivaldi, Concerto for Four Violins in A minor or Concerto for Two Violins in a minor, Op. 3, first movements; Schütz, "Saul, Saul, was verfolgst du mich?"; Bach, "Erbarme dich" from the St. Matthew Passion; and somewhat surprisingly, Haydn's sunny Piano Sonata No. 60 in C, first movement, where certain chromatic bridge passages occurring in the exposition, recapitulation and development, often produce the effect in my hearing of them. It is interesting that passages with the capacity to induce chills need not even be heard, strictly speaking, for such capacity to be realized: it suffices in many cases for them merely to be run through vividly in aural imagination, courtesy of the mental CD player, for frisson to be produced. I was able to confirm this recently in my own case with the Scriabin etude mentioned above. It also seems likely that, as a general rule, when one actively seconds music one is auditing, by a sort of inner singing, frisson are more likely to occur. If so this stands as yet another of the many rewards of active involvement with music - the appreciative stance to music universally advocated by music educators - though the reward itself, as has been noted, is rather more passive in nature, being a sort of sufferance or submission.

The opening Allegro movement of Brahms's String
Quintet in G, op. 111, probably affords me the most sustained "chill" experience of any piece that I know. Now, why does one particularly relish and cherish this chill, as it steals up one's spine and pervades one's body, suffusing it with a sort of oxymoronic warmth? It is, perhaps, pleasant and relaxing in itself, but arguably no more so than having one's hair stroked, settling into a well-stuffed armchair, or devouring a nice apple tart.

No, what makes this musical chill something particularly lovely must be more than the mild bodily comfort it conveys. It seems rather to be an attendant sense of surrendering control, letting go, of delivering oneself to a powerful force, a musical guide to the terror and mystery of existence. Chills of this sort often announce themselves, for those of us who are susceptible to them, as the mark of a confrontation with some fundamental truths of life, voiced by the music that moves us. Thus they are received, not as mere physiological disturbances, but as ones fraught with significance.

The echoes of religious experience here are fully intended. As has often been observed, the greatest music seems to provide, if not intimations of immortality, at least a passable substitute for the sacred, for those who find themselves doctrastically challenged in regard to the traditional demands thereof. For many music lovers the listening room is a kind of chapel, at least when certain items are on the order of service. Contrast that movement by Brahms with a roughly contemporary piece such as the Russian Easter Overture of Rimsky-Korsakov. Though colorful, nicely put together, fairly imbued with feeling, and exhibiting a degree of kinetic energy comparable to that of the Brahms, it is not, I would wager, a piece capable of inducing the "chill" experience. Though enjoyable, even absorbing, as music it is simply too superficial. Its energy does not speak to or tap into anything profound in human nature. Thus it does not summon from the depths of the soul, as it were, these frissons that seem so full of import.

6.

Let us return to Panksepp's study and consider now Panksepp's evolutionary-developmental speculations on the underlying cause and biological significance of musical chills. My interest here is not so much in whether these speculations are well-founded but in whether, if they are, this must necessarily affect the way in which we at least who are susceptible to musical chills need regard them. 'It is clear that people are most likely to have chills to music that has moved them in the past...however, since unfamiliar sad music was more likely to provoke chills than unfamiliar happy music, the evidence suggests that there are more primitive instinctual neuropsychic components that underlie the phenomenon...I will argue that the chill ultimately reflects a property of ingrained neural systems of our old mammalian brain that monitor emotions related to social proximity and separation.' (195)

'We presently know a great deal about the neural circuits for separation distress that lead young animals to cry out when they are lonely and lost...Internal feeling of coldness and chills when parents hear separation calls may provide increased motivation for social reunion. Thus the separation call may have been designed, during the evolutionary construction of the brain's emotional systems, to acoustically activate a thermally based need for social contact...To put it another way, perhaps the "chill" that we experience especially intensely during sad and bittersweet songs occurs because that type of music resonates with the ancient emotional circuits that establish internal social values. Sad music may achieve its beauty and its chilling effect by juxtaposing a symbolic rendition of the separation call (e.g. a high-pitched crescendo or a solo instrument emerging from the background) in the emotional context of potential reunion and redemption.' (198-9)

Here then is the issue: once we have scientific insight into the causes - neurophysiological, biochemical, evolutionary, or what have you - of musical frissons, what impact does or should this have on one's pleasure in experiencing them or being subject to them? Need such knowledge have a deflationary effect, serving to undermine our satisfaction? Once we realize the responses in question are just, supposing Panksepp's speculations to be on the mark, a legacy of our evolutionary past, an artifact of a mammalian brain still sensitive to the separation calls of errant young, must we rationally desist from regarding them as sources of satisfaction, or as bearers of significance beyond the biological?

16 According to anecdote, in composing this resplendent music Brahms was thinking of time spent at the Prater, a nature and amusement park on the outskirts of Vienna, and the simple joys of life to be had there - including, as he was supposed to have remarked, "the pretty girls". But that sounds perhaps too earthbound a note for the almost superhuman affirmation and exhilaration bodied forth in the music.

17 'Nietzsche realized that, for many people, the concert hall and the art gallery have replaced the church as places where the "divine" can be encountered.' Anthony Storr, Music and the Mind, op. cit., p. 155. See also Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music, Oxford 1997, ch. 15, for remarks on the connection between the aesthetic and religious impulses.
I think not. Supposing the underlying cause of musical frissons to be an approximation to the separation call of lonely adolescent mammals, this need not invalidate the other dimensions of such frissons in which their value seems to reside. For first, the pleasure in being so affected by the music, whatever its remote causes, is real, and can be justified in terms of the beauty or depth or poverty of the music to which it remains a response. And second, that a reaction has certain underlying causes of an evolutionary sort in no way precludes its taking on also a certain significance for us, in no way prevents it from reflecting as well, on occasion, a listener's recognition of something important about human existence as some music seems to embody it.

But I would in fact suggest that the specific evolutionary reduction of our susceptibility to frissons proposed seems rather unlikely, at least as applied to the sort of musical frisson that I have had primarily in view in this essay. For there are really two species of frisson that need to be distinguished. On the one hand there are those of relatively short duration, that are for the most part timbrally/dynamically induced, that is, produced by sound quality as such, and typified by the effect on many of us of a strong and beautiful soprano voice. On the other hand there are those, of relatively long duration, that are for the most part melodically/harmonically/rythmically induced, that is, produced by sound structure, and typified by certain kinds of thematic intensification or harmonic progression. That the former work their effect through resemblance to piercing calls of separation is perhaps plausible, but that the latter do so as well is rather less plausible. For the latter sort of frisson exhibits more in the way of temporal shape, of tension accumulated and released, of buildup and overflow, and thus seems harder to put down merely to a particular timbre and volume of sound.

Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from these brief responses to Panskepp's causal speculations is this. The value of frissons produced by music is highly dependent on one's construal of that physiological response, on what one takes one's response to a passage of music to mean, e.g. that one has indeed plumbed its expressive depths, or on what in the music one takes oneself to be responding to, e.g., its manifestation of some singular attitude or state of mind. That said, there are then two possibilities in a given instance. Either the construal is reasonable and justified, e.g. the music has expressive depths and you have indeed plumbed them, or it is unreasonable and unjustified, e.g. the music has no expressive depths or at any rate you have not plumbed them. In the first case the claim of value for musical frissons seems sustainable, for in that case such frissons constitute direct acknowledgment of a quality inherent in the music. But I am not sure that a claim of a thing of value, though naturally a lesser one, is entirely out of the question in the second case. It seems that it is a thing of value for individuals to find experiences of being strongly affected by artworks to be of significance, even where such claims of significance cannot, in the last analysis, be upheld. There is, it seems, no harm and arguably some gain in listeners investing such experiences with such significances, even when such significances cannot in fact be demonstrated, in that life, of which appreciative experiences are a part, is thus made, in a familiar sense of the word, more meaningful for those listeners. It seems clear, at any rate, that it is one's construal of musical frissons, whether ultimately justifiable or not, that is critical in giving them what status or value they have. It is perhaps helpful to compare the ordinarily delectable musical chills with which we have been concerned with the obviously far from delectable chill that runs through you when you suddenly think, rightly or wrongly, that you have deleted a computer file on which you have been working for no small amount of time, or that which occurs when you sense that a burglar has just broken in through a ground-floor window of your house. It indeed appears to be the cognitive construal of the frisson - or the thought accompanying the frisson - that makes most of the difference between the cases.

On the other hand, it is not entirely plain that the chills in question are precisely the same, phenomenologically speaking. Those that occur in the course of musical engagement seem to blossom more slowly, to suffuse the organism more gently, to have softer edges, whereas those prompted by sudden perceptions of danger or loss seem more sudden and piercing - more truly "chilling", as it were. Thus even

18 Other musical features that might be mentioned that seem conducive to frissons of this latter, i.e. relatively extended, sort include pedalpoints, suspensions, delayed cadences, sustained tremolos. But of course most such instances will not produce frissons, for the specific musical embedding of such a feature, its interaction with other features constitutive of a given passage, is absolutely crucial.

19 Compare Guy Sircello, Love and Beauty, Princeton 1983, p. 35: "...an enjoyable experience of a quality need not be a veridical experience. For example, even though I may enjoy dancing in part because of the feeling it gives me of my own sexiness, I may not be sexy at all when I dance; I may actually just be klutz - however it may ultimately be determined or determinable whether I am "in fact" sexy or klutzy."
among bodily-based frissons to which we are subject there may be phenomenological differences that suit certain of them to a role in experiences of value, while others are debarred, on the same grounds, from so taking part.

8.

What position do we seem to have arrived at, then, on the appreciative standing of musical chills? More or less this: that it is chill sensations to which certain thoughts attach, or to which we accord a certain significance, that are of appreciative value, and not chill sensations per se. Such chill experiences might thus reasonably be described as having a derived value, one derived from what they are, or are at any rate thought to be, sensings of, e.g. the music's depth of expression, or its poignancy, or its vehiculing of some fundamental truth of life, etc.

But if so one might very well object that it is really the thoughts that count, not the sensation, thus ultimately acceding in, rather than challenging, the Goodmanian position according to which the sensation as such is both without value and irrelevant to value. If musical frissons are only valuable when conceptually framed in a certain way by the haver of them, to wit, as registrations or reflections of the quality or power of the music, then does not all the value in fact reside in the conceptualization - the thought that one is recognizing the quality or power of the music - apart from whether frissons accompanying such recognition take place?

Not quite. For what is important, and what registering chills while listening underscores, is the "whole person" response to music of which such sensations are a part. Responses to music of the "whole person", that is, ones that are cognitive, emotional, sensual, and behavioral at once, are arguably of greater value than more partial and isolated responses to the substance of the music being heard. Thus, even if such chills are valuable only when viewed or regarded in a certain way by their experiencers, those chills remain essential to the full experience of value in question.

The chills are essential to the value of the response as a whole, one might say, because they represent a bodily seconding, a bodily confirmation of what is being registered intellectually at the same time. The marking of abstract recognitions by felt frissons arguably imparts a kind of "added value" to musical experience. Such frissons stand as corporeal endorsements of what is concomitantly grasped in cognitive terms; they are valuable partly in virtue of the affirmation of wholeness they afford, of body and mind resonating in concert in response to a given musical utterance."

9.

I wish now to contrast the "chill" experience from music and a related, though distinguishable, experience I will label the "uplift" experience. What do I mean by being "uplifted" by music? Something like this: being transported, transfigured, swept up, carried away, by the power of its movement and progression, by the force of its gesture. This experience is distinctly from the "chill" experience, on which we have dwelled for some time, though clearly it may coexist with it. Yet in what does the specific pleasure of such experiences of uplift consist, beyond that afforded by good music generally?

I suggest that it may often be a pleasure in being reminded of and made to dwell on the seriousness and substantiality, the incomparable preciousness of life. And I mean that rather literally: what, especially when it is threatened, seems remotely tradable against the good of living, of being alive, with at least some capacity for enjoyment or satisfaction? Certain music seems capable of having this effect on us, and through its musical content, that is, the specific complex of its form and expression. It is of course possible that different music will have this power for different listeners, according to their particular sensibilities or receptivities, but it is unlikely that such power attaches, for anyone, to music that is less than formally compelling and highly expressive.

I offer some examples of music capable of furnishing what I call an "uplift" experience, though not necessarily one accompanied by "chills": Bach, St. Matthew Passion, opening chorus; Mozart, Jupiter Symphony, finale; Beethoven, Emperor Concerto, opening movement; Beethoven, Seventh Symphony, outer movements; Mendelssohn, Italian Symphony, outer movements, and Octet, outer movements;

20 At the end of his article Panksepp offers a terminological suggestion worth pondering. "In several seminar presentations of this work I chose to label the chill phenomenon as a "skin orgasm" on the basis of the assumption that there are underlying neurochemical similarities between the two phenomena (...) if we wish to generate a scientific term for the chill phenomenon, the skin orgasm designation may have some merit." (209)

The suggestion indeed seems a happy one, and not just on the assumption of an underlying similarity in the neurochemical underpinnings of the two phenomena. There are, rather, significant resemblances of an experiential sort: salient in the case of both is this clutch of characteristics: passivity, involuntariness, a threshold aspect, an afterglow aspect, a welling-up aspect... One might add that the value of both experiences is dependent on the cognitive positioning of the experience on the part of the subject, even if this is probably more marked in the case of musical 'skin orgasms' than in the case of orgasms proper.
Haydn, almost any of the opening allegros in his later symphonies; and to switch genres, John Coltrane's Giant Steps.

On the other hand, there is yet other music, undeniably pleasurable and valuable, even exhilarating, that reliably provides, I suggest, neither the "chills" nor the "uplift" experience; for example, almost any of Scarlatti's fast tempo harpsichord sonatas, almost any of Rossini's opera overtures, and switching genres once again, almost any of the early songs of the Beatles. Whether such pleasurable-but-neither-chilling-nor-uplifting music might usefully be divided into further categories remains an open question.

This is an apt moment at which to remark that some music—perhaps all good music—is capable of giving pleasure on occasion merely by reinforcing the marvel that music exists at all, filling in the interstices of ordinary life, surging from radios and cassette players at the touch of a button, any time of day or night, filling the public squares through the auspices of street musicians, and thus combining with all sorts of quotidian things so as to transform them and surround them with an aesthetic glow...

10.

Before closing I want to bring into view some other distinctive, if not physiologically distinctive, musical pleasures. Consider this one: the pleasure of savoring comparatively certain musical "expressive pairs", that is, themes or passages that display strikingly similar, if not identical, expressive characters, even though far from structurally or perceptually the same. Here are some pairings that have always struck me in this light: Wagner, Lohengrin, Act 3 Prelude, opening/Strauss, Don Juan, opening; Brahms, Violin Concerto, finale, main theme/Bruch, Violin Concerto, finale, main theme; Brahms, Piano Trio in B, finale, main theme/Franck, Piano Quintet, first movement, second theme; Vaughan Williams, Fantasia on a Theme by Thomas Tallis, main theme/Saint-Saëns, Organ Symphony, finale, second theme; Beethoven, Eroica Symphony, Marcia Funèbre/Strauss, Metamorphosen.

The pleasure involved in remarking and mulling over such resemblances is perhaps not far to seek, and has indeed a traditional pedigree. To recall the formula for beauty associated with Hutcheson, it is a matter of appreciating uniformity-amidst-variety. What is distinctive in such cases, of course, is that it is an interwork, rather than an intrawork, uniformity-amidst-variety that is in question. It is also one of a rather elusive sort, one that resists, perhaps more than most, reduction to a rule or principle, or to some small number of elements at which one can point and say, 'the resemblance resides just here, or here'. This is perhaps a reason why such pleasures of comparison are fairly durable, and remain available even when primary pleasure in the passages being compared is relatively in eclipse.

Finally, to cross over into the perhaps irredeemably individual, consider the pleasure of realizing that one has followed and enjoyed, hence arguably understood, an extended piece of music without consciously focussing its large-scale form or explicitly attending to any of its large-scale relationships. Admittedly, this is a peculiar sort of pleasure, both idiosyncratic and, in a rather strong sense, theory-dependent. But offering it at this late juncture answers to at least three purposes.

One, it serves to remind us of the great variety of musical pleasures of which we avail ourselves, which may thus keep us from foreclosing prematurely on that variety in our theoretical reflections. Second, it illustrates the point that some musical pleasures are generalizable, in the sense of legitimately presupposed of or imputed to all, to echo Kant, and some not; otherwise put, some musical pleasures testify fairly straightforwardly to music's proper value as music, and some not. Third, it allows us to see, perhaps, that some pleasures, while not signaling the presence of or serving as measures of musical value, are not automatically appreciatively illegitimate ones. They may or may not be, this being a question not entirely reducible to that of whether they are generalizable in the Kantian sense or not. Pleasure in reflecting philosophically on the nature or ground of one's more basic pleasure in music, of which the peculiar pleasure confessed to above is an instance—-as well as a paradigm example of a meta-pleasure—need not detract from one's aesthetic involvement in music; it might in fact even be considered a part, if a fairly remote part, of the appreciation of music as art.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^\text{21}\) I am of course aware that in this case the later work is partly modeled on the former, and even incorporates at the end an allusion the reto, but the expressive resemblance achieved right from the beginning, though with rather different musical materials, remains both striking and intriguing.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^\text{22}\) It depends on accepting something like the (possibly idiosyncratic) theory of musical understanding advanced in my Music in the Moment op. cit.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^\text{23}\) I want to thank audiences in London and Amsterdam during the spring of 1998, and especially Raf De Cierco, for helpful comments on and reactions to an earlier version of this essay.
Rotterdams Conservatorium en de Vereniging voor Muziektheorie

Vierde Europese Conferentie voor Muziekanalyse
Analysis in Europe Today

21 t/m 24 oktober 1999
Rotterdam

Oproep voor bijdragen

De vierde Europese Conferentie voor Muziekanalyse zal worden georganiseerd door het Rotterdams Conservatorium onder auspiciën van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Muziektheorie (i.o.) en zal plaatsvinden in Rotterdam van 21 tot en met 24 oktober 1999. De conferentie wordt gedragen door negen verenigingen voor muziektheorie en muziekanalyse uit Engeland, België, Frankrijk, Spanje, Italië, Duitsland, Griekenland en Nederland.

Het thema van de conferentie - ‘Analysis in Europe Today’ - zal worden uitgediept in een aantal symposia, paneldiscussies en andere sessies. Daarnaast vindt er een plenaire dagsessie plaats rondom het thema ‘Analysis in Europe Today: The Different Traditions’. Tijdens deze dagsessie zullen o.a. de resultaten van een enquête over onderwijsmethoden en theoretisch en analytisch onderzoek in Europa worden gepresenteerd.

Voor de deelnemers aan de conferentie is het mogelijk een aantal concerten bij te wonen, waaronder een uitvoering van het Violconcert van Ligeti door Irvin Arditti met het Rotterdams Philharmonisch Orkest o.l.v. Reinbert de Leeuw. Tevens zal ten tijde van de conferentie het Internationale Gaudemus Concours voor jonge componisten en uitvoerenden van hedendaagse muziek plaatsvinden.

Voorstellen voor bijdragen kunnen worden ingezonden voor de volgende sessies:

- Fragmentatie en integratie in de Begatten op. 126 van Beethoven
- De Trois Poèmes de Mallarmé van Debussy en Ravel
- Ligeti’s Violconcert: historische reflectie als moderne muziek
- Nicolas Gombert en de parodie
- Interacties tussen akoestische en elektro-akoestische muziek
- Structuuranalyse van geïmproviseerde muziek

De programmacommissie ziet met belangstelling ook andere bijdragen op het gebied van muziektheorie en analyse tegemoet (vrije bijdragen).

Individuele bijdragen - bij voorkeur in het Engels, of anders in het Frans of het Duits - mogen niet meer dan twintig minuten duren. Samenvattingen (maximum vijfhonderd woorden) moeten op diskette of via e-mail worden ingediend en moeten uiterlijk 1 februari 1999 in het bezit zijn van de conferentie-coördinator Patrick van Deurzen, op onderstaand adres.


Programmacommissie
Jean Michel Bardaz (Frankrijk),
Mario Baroni (Italië),
Rossana Dalmonte (Italië),
Patrick van Deurzen (Nederland),
Ludwig Holtmeier (Duitsland),
Nicolas Meleus (België),
John Rink (Engeland),
Jean Jaques Nattiez.

Voor nadere informatie kunt u zich wenden tot

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