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Introduction

By Scott Kline
St. Jerome's University, Waterloo, Ontario

Timothy Snyder, the Yale historian and author of the book *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, and America* (2018), thinks that somewhere around 2010 something fundamentally changed about our collective human character. Whether it was the proliferation of smartphones, our crawling out from under the weight of the Great Recession of 2008, the passing of the Greatest Generation (my words, not his), or a subtle realignment of global power among Russia, Europe, and America, we became more fragmented, and life became more elusive. He contends that Americans, Europeans, and Russians are no longer guided by the Cold War myths of "the end of history" (in the capitalist West) or technocratic utopianism (in the communist East). Collectively, Snyder calls these myths the "politics of inevitability." One defining characteristic of the politics of inevitability is that "inevitability" promises a better future for everyone. But by 2010, Snyder contends, inevitability had given way to the "politics of eternity," which is not so much future oriented as it is doom laden. Our institutions, especially government, fail us; once in power, eternity politicians manufacture crises and manipulate emotion.

While this issue of *Critical Theology* is not a direct response to Snyder's thesis, it does address topics central to it: the collapse of the post-1991 world order, the rise of nationalism and populism, redefinitions of "freedom," mistrust of facts, tepid responses to international conflict, and the search for hope-filled narratives to help us rediscover our core virtues. The first article, by Myroslaw Tataryn, a Ukrainian Catholic theologian, provides us with an introduction to the important role that the Ukrainian Catholic Church is playing in Ukrainian society in light of the Russian invasion. Next, Scott Kline discusses the history of the ecumenical Christian acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and what it means for our understanding of the Russian attack on Ukraine. Alan Davies takes up the topic of "freedom" in relation to the trucker convoy that paralyzed Parliament Hill in February 2022. Ending on a hopeful note, Don Schweitzer offers a renewed vision of Jesus' resurrection as a way to address historical injustices and to engage in restorative acts of social justice.

Scott Kline

Contents

Standing with the People in the Midst of an Invasion

By Myroslav Tataryn
St. Jerome's University, Waterloo, ON

In an interview on May 26, 2022, with *La Croix*, Borys Gudziak, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Metropolitan-Archbishop of Philadelphia, expressed the view of many Ukrainians worldwide when he said: "The presence of Pope Francis in Ukraine would be prophetic … Public interventions and declarations are one thing, but in our hours of suffering, we need the presence of the pope." Despite plans for a papal visit to Ukraine being in progress in the early part of this year, the visit has been postponed because of the russian invasion.[1] A Vatican source stated: "If he goes there and the war continues as if nothing had happened, what sign are we sending? What good is it?"[2] The two positions underline a significant difference in how these two branches of the Catholic Church have positioned themselves: not only in response to the russian invasion of Ukraine but also, in a certain sense, in the post–World War II world.

As a priest of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), I would like to reflect on my Church's role in Ukraine's defence of its existence and point out how that role reflects Pope Francis' call to a Church that serves by being in solidarity with, rather than simply providing aid to, the marginalized and disenfranchised. While aid is a laudable and, in fact, a life-giving response, it is, perhaps counterintuitively, only a step in the right direction. Solidarity is a position that recognizes equality and emphasizes an ethic of "walking with" one another, whereas providing aid suggests a position of superiority and "standing above" the other.

Diversity in Ukraine

First, a bit of context. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has not enjoyed state patronage. It suffered persecution within the russian empire; it was denigrated by the dominant Polish Roman Catholic Church in late 19th- and early 20th-century Galicia (Halychyna), and it was declared illegal and driven underground by the Soviet authorities. It has historically been the dominant Church of the Ukrainian peasantry in the westernmost provinces of Ukraine, and it is from there that most Ukrainians came to Canada in the 19th and 20th centuries. As a result, Ukrainian Greek Catholics are numerically more significant in Canada than Orthodox. However, in Ukraine, they constitute only around 9% of the total population. Approximately 67% of Ukrainians identify as Orthodox, although there are three different Orthodox churches existing in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Moscow Patriarchate; the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; and the Orthodox Church—Kyivan Patriarchate. Adherents to Protestant churches number approximately 3%, and about 1% identify as Roman Catholic (Latin). Ukrainians adhering to Islam make up about 2.5% of the population. Only 0.5% identify as Jews. There are, of course, also adherents of other religions. In other words, Ukraine has a diverse religious environment, and no religious group can honestly claim to be "the religion of Ukraine," as russian Orthodoxy does in the russian Federation.

Given Ukraine's diversity, it was not a surprise when, in 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, a russian-speaking Jew, was elected president. And yet, russian leaders continue to insist that Ukraine and its government are anti-Semitic Neo-Nazis (Ukraine's prime minister from 2016 to 2019 was also Jewish). It continues not to be a surprise that Zelensky has become a symbol of Ukraine's unity and identity (I note that it is a welcome surprise that President Zelensky has greatly exceeded expectations as a leader!). He represents not only political unity but also a cultural unity that embraces a religious diversity beyond Christianity. In this regard, President Zelensky both symbolizes and illuminates Ukraine's rich and heterogenous history and culture.

The UGCC has found its place in Ukrainian society within this respectful diversity. Historically identifying with the lower classes, its ethos and experience is of standing with the Ukrainian people. In the prelude to the events of 2014, it was remarkable that opinion poll after opinion poll showed that one of the most respected figures in Ukraine was the former head of the UGCC, Lyubomyr Husar. His stature, perennially one of the three most trusted figures in public life, had developed not because he represented his Church but, rather, because of his outspoken public voice, which called for Ukraine to be a society that recognizes individual rights, cultural and moral values, and social justice. Instead of being a lone voice, he joined a diverse group of other public intellectuals in an initiative called The First of December Group, established

December 1, 2011. Among the group's objectives was a commitment to develop a broad-based public discussion on the desired character of the Ukrainian state. Husar's role illustrated how the UGCC saw itself as an active and positive element in a pluralistic society without necessarily promoting itself as "the" only answer for Ukrainian society. Thus, in 2014, during the events of the *Maidan*, sometimes translated as "the Revolution of Dignity," the leadership of the UGCC, both clerics and laity, were present not as the lead voice, nor even perhaps as its most significant voice, but as one of the many participants representing the broad spectrum of Christian faiths. Rather than attempting to position itself as superior to other faiths and traditions, the UGCC is comfortable being one of many.

The atmosphere of the 2014 *Maidan* encapsulates the religious and cultural positioning of the UGCC. Together with leaders of the UGCC and various Christian denominations, the senior rabbi and senior imam of Ukraine were visible on the main stage. The *Maidan* pluralism, where all religious faiths were represented and welcome, continued after the crowds dissipated. Sadly, the internal Orthodox dynamic has been problematic between Ukrainophiles and russophiles. Unfortunately, as this broad ecumenical vision developed, the russophile Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow patriarchate chose to stand on the sidelines. Nonetheless, through the "All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and religious organizations," the others have found a common voice and an ability to engage in common action. This respectful diversity, which was the basis of a nascent unity, has been strengthened and enhanced since the russian invasion of February 2022. Many, many voices today witness to the fact that Ukraine has never been so united.

Ironically, Putin's attempt to destroy the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian identity has strengthened both. In the religious arena, some representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) have condemned the invasion, for the first time joining the larger community of voices. In March 2022, in Odessa, representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the UGCC, the senior rabbi in Odessa, and the assistant imam of Odessa produced a joint statement attesting that Odessa does not need to be liberated, contrary to russian claims. In Odessa, all religions and all cultures have been and are welcome. Many previously pro-russian communities have transferred their allegiance to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. On May 27, 2022, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) explicitly stated its disagreement with the russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill on the war in Ukraine.[3] Although short of breaking off ties, it is a move that would have been unthinkable six months ago.

Ukrainian Catholic Institutional Responses

The Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, an independent university created on the liberal arts model, has played a significant role in this united religious and cultural field. The university and its president at the time of the *Maidan*, Fr. Borys Gudziak (now Metropolitan of Philadelphia), supported and encouraged students, lecturers, and professors to participate in the protests. A professor from the university, Bohdan Sol'chanyk, was among those killed. Many students were present on the *Maidan* in Kyiv, supported morally and financially by their university. The Ukrainian Catholic University has established academic connections throughout Europe, which means it has been a vehicle for the message that Ukraine is a different kind of state, a different culture, a different religious environment than russia. It has worked assiduously to have people in Western Europe and North America recognize that the image of Ukraine promoted by russia is inaccurate and destructive. The university houses an Ecumenical Institute, which has fostered widespread dialogues throughout Ukraine among various groups (including secular) on important social and political issues. During the current crisis, it has become a focal point of resistance even while classes have continued. Journalism and IT students are active in online correction of misinformation generated by pro-russian sources. The general student body is coordinating and supporting various humanitarian efforts based on the campus and around Lviv. This university is not perceived as a narrowly denominational institution but as one including all voices striving to build an equitable and just Ukrainian society.

russia's invasion has brought to the forefront another important aspect of the UGCC: its humanitarian role. As in 2014, the UGCC is a critical actor in humanitarian assistance to the people of Donbas.[4] The UGCC is currently responsible for 36 Ukrainian offices of CARITAS, an international Catholic organization. Although there is a Roman Catholic arm of CARITAS in Ukraine, it is smaller in number. The UGCC structure is currently more robust and significant (for example, bringing assistance to people in Central and Eastern Ukraine). This aid is essential not just because of the invasion but also because Ukraine's social safety nets are minimal and, in some instances, wholly inadequate. I think specifically here of issues around persons with disabilities. Ukraine is struggling to dismantle old Soviet models; some areas have been more successful at this than others. Often, budgets are not allotted for services, etc. Historically, the UGCC has attempted to fill this gap. Even before World War II, the primate of the UGCC, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, built hos-

pitals, orphanages, schools, and so on in his Eparchy of Lviv, persistently contending that the Church's role was to "be with the people." Today, CARITAS is the arm of the Church that fulfills that ideal. Moreover, the UGCC is helping to house displaced people and to feed people in war zones. They are helping to transport people through the "green corridors" or driving them to safety. Although two offices have been formally closed (in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia), the personnel from both have simply moved west and continue coordinating humanitarian aid back to those centres—at times driving the over 1,000 kilometres to take food from the West to the East. Many churches have been opened to provide accommodation for refugees. Throughout the western regions, lay people have organized to raise, coordinate, and ship humanitarian aid to the east, often financially supported by the UGCC in North America.

Today, church life in Ukraine focuses on one simple priority: to stand with the people in their daily troubles. This is best exemplified by the Church's primate, Svyatoslav Shevchuk, who, on a daily basis, issues video messages to his faithful which focus, as one would expect, on messages of support. He makes very clear that the Church stands with the country and its people in defence of the land in seeking a peace that recognizes the right of all Ukrainians to choose their own future. Shevchuk is careful not to make any derogatory comments about the russian Church or people. The UGCC was instrumental in the creation of a chaplaincy for the armed forces, and those clerics have continued to stand with the military serving throughout the country and especially on the front lines. Churches have remained open throughout the country and pastoral care has continued.

Raising Fundamental Questions

The invasion of Ukraine has crystallized two fundamental questions. For me as a pastor and priest, I am being asked: First, what does it mean to be a priest in this situation? How does one witness the presence of Christ now, not only in words but in actions? And second, what does it mean to be church? I do not pretend to have an answer, but I suggest that one response is seen in the *Maidan*, in "the Revolution of Dignity." The witness of the *Maidan* demonstrates that the Church is bigger than we allow it to be: too many of our historic anxieties have not allowed us to recognize the Church as it is.

Speaking as a Catholic priest, I need to comment on the Pope's role in russia's aggression. I know that much concern has been expressed by some that the Pope has never expressly condemned russia or Putin as the aggressor. But this should not surprise anyone who is familiar with Vatican diplomacy. Since the 1960s, the

Vatican has vigorously sought to have a positive dialogue with the Moscow patriarchate—a position that at times was very painful for the UGCC.[5] Nonetheless, it is astounding how active Pope Francis has been on this issue. He has made it clear that he stands for peace and against the invasion. Twice now—once prior to the invasion, and once subsequently—he has asked for all Catholics around the world to pray for peace in the world. One of those occasions was Ash Wednesday, a symbolic and powerful day in and of itself. Catholics around the world responded in immense numbers to that call. Further on the diplomatic front, he has made a number of important gestures, among them sending two senior cardinals to Ukraine as a symbol of his support. On March 16, he had a video conference with Patriarch Kirill during which he literally lectured Kirill, reminding him that as church leaders, in his words, we should use the words of Christ, not the words of war. That message was both powerful and clear. Many people around the world have applauded it. However, the legacy of Vatican diplomacy constrains the Pope from recognizing that standing with the marginalized may mean opting for solidarity over diplomacy.

In fact, on two occasions, I believe Pope Francis has chosen diplomacy over solidarity: Church as state, rather than Church as witness to the Gospel. The first instance was when the Vatican proposed that a Ukrainian woman and a russian woman (friends) carry the Cross during the annual Good Friday Way of the Cross in the Coliseum. His Beatitude Svyatoslav expressed his consternation: "I consider such an idea untimely, ambiguous and such that it does not take into account the context of russia's military aggression against Ukraine. For the Greek Catholics of Ukraine, the texts and gestures of the 13th station of this Way of the Cross are incoherent and even offensive, especially in the context of the expected second, even bloodier attack of the russian troops on our cities and villages."[6] Even the Papal Nuncio to Ukraine, Archbishop Visvaldas Kulbokas, in a media interview declared that he would not organize such a prayer at this time because peace must come first: "Peace will come when aggression ceases. When Ukrainians will once again be able to save their lives and their freedom. And of course, we know that peace comes when the aggressor admits his fault and seeks forgiveness."[7]

For half of the 20th century, the UGCC was illegal in the USSR. Its primate, Josyf Slipyj, released from a Soviet camp and thus able to attend the Second Vatican Council, asserted that his Church was the silent Church of the Martyrs: a Church that was silenced by the Soviets, of course, but even at times instructed to be silent by Vatican diplomats. The Vatican decision concerning the Way of the Cross evoked for Ukrainians the historic Vatican approach of deciding for the UGCC what it considered best, rather than

demonstrating solidarity with those who are suffering. Similarly, when a papal visit to Ukraine seems to have been postponed indefinitely because of uncertainty over what good it might bring if "nothing happens," Ukrainians recognize that Rome prefers the calculus of Vatican diplomacy to the embrace of solidarity. Prioritizing diplomacy most certainly does not reflect the current ethos of the UGCC to be with and among the people, nor is it consistent with Francis' call to walk with those who suffer.

Myroslaw Tataryn *is professor emeritus, Department of Religious Studies, at St. Jerome's University, in Waterloo, Ontario.*

1   I am here following the practice begun in Ukraine during the russian invasion of using a lower case "r" in reference to the invading country, which is denying Ukraine's right to exist.

2   Alice Clavier, "'We need the pope!' says Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishop," La Croix International, May 26, 2022, https://international.la-croix.com/news/religion/we-need-the-pope-says-ukrainian-greek-catholic-bishop/16139.

3   "Changes to the Statute of Independence instead of cutting ties to Moscow: The UOC-MP holds a Council," Religious Information Service of Ukraine, May 27, 2022, https://risu.ua/en/changes-to-the-statute-of-independence-instead-of-cutting-ties-with-moscow-the-uoc-mp-holds-a-council_n129641.

4   The two eastern provinces invaded by russia in 2014 and currently mainly occupied by russian forces.

5   Many in the UGCC were very disappointed with the discussions at the Havana meeting of the Pope and Patriarch in 2016. See https://credo.pro/2016/03/153483 (in Ukrainian).

6   CNA, "'An untimely idea': Ukrainian Catholic leader concerned by format of Pope's Good Friday Via Crucis," April 13, 2022, https://risu.ua/en/an-untimely-idea-ukrainian-catholic-leader-concerned-by-format-of-popes-good-friday-via-crucis_n128293.

7   See https://credo.pro/2022/04/317001. My translation.

The Attack on Ukraine and the Responsibility to Protect

By Scott Kline
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia would engage in a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine. Putin stated that any bloodshed would be entirely on the conscience of the regime ruling over the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after Putin announced Russia's intentions, the Russian Ministry of Defence warned Ukraine's air traffic control units to halt all flights in and out of Ukraine and to close Ukrainian airspace to all civilian air traffic, which signalled that the space was about to become an active conflict zone. As expected, explosions were soon reported in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas. Ukrainian officials confirmed that Russian troops had landed in Mariupol and Odessa and that the Russian military had launched missiles at airfields, military headquarters, and military installations in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro.

On the morning of February 25, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russia of targeting civilian sites. Cynical observers of international conflict, and defenders of the Russian invasion, could dismiss Zelensky's accusations as a routine script that accompanies armed warfare. Indeed, it is common in the "information war" for countries being invaded to highlight attacks on civilians and civilian casualties.

In this case, however, Zelensky accusations were, by any objective standard, completely justified. On March 3, 2022, a succession of Russian airstrikes levelled a small village near the Ukrainian-Russian border. Accounts of this village's destruction did not use the clinical language of "collateral damage," which means something in military law. According to news reports, there were no military institutions nearby, nor did observers report any Ukrainian army unit in the area—under the general rules of military engagement, Russian attacks on any such Ukrainian military targets could be reasonably justified. But again, there were no military targets present. The attacks were directly on civilian populations—on hospitals, apartment blocks, and schools. The intention was clear: to put fear in the hearts of the Ukrainian population, an act outlawed by international humanitarian law. As in Chechnya in the 1990s and in Syria in 2016, Putin's strategy is to bomb people into submission.

In March 2022, shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, the editors of the Jesuit magazine *America* asked the Catholic theologian and scholar of international conflict Drew Christiansen whether the Ukraine war is one where the international doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, might apply as a remedy for the "savagery," to use his preferred term. Christiansen's conclusion: R2P does apply, because "Ukraine needs assistance in protecting its citizens, but it probably does not apply in the direct sense of armed military intervention to rescue those threatened civilians."[1]

The question posed by *America*'s editors is indicative of a fundamental shift in the way mainstream Christian churches in general and the Catholic Church in particular think about international conflict. Had the question been posed at any point during the Cold War, the question would have likely focused on what actions would be morally justified following the criteria in the just war tradition. With the UN adopting R2P in 2005 as a mechanism (some say "doctrine") to ensure that the international community is better equipped to halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning, and other conscience-shocking crimes against humanity, Christian ethicists associated with strong just war roots encountered a complementary framework that, in many respects, refined just war criteria to meet the modern realities of conflict. Indeed, Christian ethicists with an interest in international conflict have spent more than two decades coming to terms with R2P. What follows is an account of how the ecumenical Christian community became among the first to advocate for R2P.

The Origins of R2P

In his Millennium Report *We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the UN General Assembly to establish basic guidelines for future interventions into countries and regions where defenceless populations had become the targets of gross human rights violations or, as in the case of Rwanda in 1994, a genocide.[2] Acting on that challenge, the Canadian government, with the support of several major foundations,[3] launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

Between January and June 2001, the Commission held a series of consultations around the globe in an attempt to "forge consensus" around the dilemma of breaching the sovereign borders of a state to protect a vulnerable population. In December 2001, ICISS released its report, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect.* As its foreword indicated, one impetus behind R2P was to provide an alternative to the popular, though highly ambiguous, idea of "humanitarian intervention." At the core of the ICISS report was a new conceptual framework and vocabulary for addressing the moral, legal, and political questions surrounding intervention and the problem of state sovereignty. It concluded that states, including their agents, are responsible for the welfare of their citizens and for their actions, both within their borders (to protect their own citizens) and beyond (to protect others in the international community) through the mechanisms of the UN.

Ramesh Thakur, an ICISS commissioner and one of the principal authors of *The Responsibility to Protect*, argued in his book *The United Nations, Peace and Security* (2006) that R2P has three core objectives: (1) to change the conceptual language from "humanitarian intervention" to the "responsibility to protect"; (2) to pin the responsibility on state authorities at the national level and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the international level; and (3) to ensure that interventions are "done properly."[4] As Thakur noted, ICISS did not think of R2P as an "interveners' charter" or as a checklist that ensures legitimacy if an intervener meets specific conditions. Rather, the Commission wanted to identify certain "conscience-shocking situations"[5] that provided a compelling case for international intervention and, at the same time, proposed international protocols that "enhance the prospects of such interventions."[6]

The first and most radical change proposed by ICISS was the change in the conceptual framework and language: from the right and duty of "humanitarian intervention," which was typically associated with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other international aid organizations to the "responsibility to protect." This shift addressed a central concern of humanitarian organizations and some military experts who maintained that armed military personnel are ill suited to supply humanitarian assistance. At the mission training level, few, if any, militaries provided a comprehensive training regime for soldiers who are tasked with both military and humanitarian assistance duties. At the level of mission objectives, the conflation of humanitarian and military interventions creates confusion in the theatre. In his discussion of this issue, Thakur cited the example of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Despite being framed mainly through a discourse of "*humanitarian* intervention," the Kosovo intervention consisted primarily of three months of bombing. "If that was humanitarian intervention," Thakur concluded, "then it must necessarily have been humanitarian bombing."[7]

The language of "responsibility to protect" was also supposed to address the concerns of critics, particularly in the global South, who charged that the language of "humanitarian intervention" functioned as a mask for commercial and geopolitical interests among the powerful states. As Thakur rightly noted, "humanitarian intervention" was a discourse that assumed a moral ground so high that it could easily be used to trump state sovereignty and to delegitimize dissent by labelling it "anti-humanitarian." As a political tool, the language of "humanitarian intervention" could easily become a mobilizing discourse that provided moral legitimacy to an armed intervention, even when the intervention was more about power politics, economics, and state interest than the protection of vulnerable populations. Proponents of R2P argued in turn that interventions should not be based on moral and political sophistry or state interest—which often resulted in a "coalition of the willing"—but on a legal obligation that members of the international community shared as signatories to the UN.

The shift from the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect required a reconceptualization of state sovereignty: that is, a concept of sovereignty that was not reducible to absolute authority. Following the work of Francis M. Deng,[8] the former representative of the UN Secretary-General on internally displaced persons and the current director of the Center for Displaced Persons at Johns Hopkins University, the Commission sought to define sovereignty in terms of a state's responsibility to protect the people within its borders. Consistent with post-Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty, R2P holds that a state is primarily responsible for the protection of its own citizens (a sticking point remains to this day whether a state must also be responsible for illegal inhabitants within its borders). The radical proposal of R2P is that "where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."[9] Sovereignty thus implies a two-fold responsibility: (1) a primary responsibility for the protection of a state's own population and (2) an international responsibility to intervene when a state fails on a massive scale to protect its inhabitants. In effect, R2P operates with a contingent and limited concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is maintained only insofar as a state is acknowledged by the international community—primarily through the mechanism of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council—as being willing and able to protect its population from

extreme violence. Based on the principles of R2P, then, when a state fails to meet its protective obligations, member states of the UN have a *legal* responsibility to intervene for the protection of human life. Moreover, in cases where a state and its agents are complicit in serious crimes against humanity, member states have a responsibility to hold specific parties accountable for their actions or inactions (e.g., through the International Criminal Court).

As a matter of international relations, the R2P framework involves three specific responsibilities:

1. The responsibility to **prevent**: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made [*sic*] crises putting populations at risk.

2. The responsibility to **react**: to *respond* to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

3. The responsibility to **rebuild**: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. [Included here is the close communication with humanitarian organizations.][10]

Among these three, the responsibility to prevent is given the highest priority, even while recognizing that international buy-in on prevention was and will continue to be a "tough sell."

Assuming that prevention fails, R2P identifies a two-pronged "Just Cause Threshold."

1. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

2. large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.[11]

This threshold is complemented by what ICISS calls "precautionary principles."

1. **Right intention**: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

2. **Last resort**: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

3. **Proportional means**: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. [Including a principle of incrementalism and gradualism in the use of force, the objective being the protection of a population, not the defeat of a state]

4. **Reasonable prospects**: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.[12]

In addition to these four precautionary principles, R2P spells out in some detail the principle of **right authority**. To nobody's surprise, R2P locates the authority to mount a military intervention for human protection in the Security Council, largely under the conditions that currently exist, including the possibility of having the Secretary-General seeking authorization under Article 99 of the UN Charter. The radical proposal in R2P concerns the role of the Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council when hearing a case for intervention. The text reads: **"**The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support."[13] In cases where the UNSC rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, the options remaining are those that currently exist under UN protocols; that is, making an appeal for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly or—and this is truly the last resort—mounting an action with regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, with the proviso that the intervening states will seek UNSC authorization after the fact.

Ecumenical Support for R2P

Although many of the proposals in and discussions surrounding R2P were put on hold in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing declaration of the "war on terror," a number of humanitarian aid organizations, policy think tanks, and ecumenical bodies joined the UN diplomatic corps in advocating the acceptance of R2P in international law. One of the early advocates of R2P was the former General Secretary of the World Council of Churches (WCC), Konrad Raiser. In 1999, Annan invited Raiser to take part in a UN discussion about the problems of "humanitarian intervention" and possible alternative strategies for delivering hu-

manitarian assistance.[14] Under Raiser's leadership, the Central Committee of the WCC adopted a document in February 2001 entitled "The Protection of Endangered Populations in Situations of Armed Violence: Toward an Ecumenical Approach" (PEP).[15] Following Central Committee instructions in PEP, the Committee on the Churches in International Affairs (CCIA) submitted a report in September 2003 entitled "The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections," which affirmed the basic principles found in *The Responsibility to Protect*. These principles provided the foundation for subsequent WCC statements and initiatives regarding small arms trade, the intervention in the Solomon Islands, and emergent tensions in central Africa and Sudan.

Along with Raiser and the WCC, Project Ploughshares, an ecumenical agency of the Canadian Council of Churches devoted to policy analysis and the promotion of nonviolent conflict resolution, became a driving force behind early theological reflection on R2P. Starting in 2003, Ploughshares conducted three consultations with representatives from the various member churches of the Canadian Council of Churches and commissioned theological responses from each of the traditions represented on the Council. Moreover, Ploughshares expanded the discussion of R2P and humanitarian aid in Africa by partnering with the Africa Peace Forum, African Women's Development and Communication Network (Femnet), and the Africa Institute of South Africa. The initial results of this ongoing discussion were published in a working paper entitled "The Responsibility to Protect: East, West, and South African Perspectives on Preventing and Responding to the Humanitarian Crises."[16] The former director of Project Ploughshares, Ernie Regehr, a Mennonite, was an influential figure in drafting a WCC Public Interest Committee document entitled "Vulnerable Populations at Risk: Statement on the Responsibility to Protect,"[17] which was adopted by the WCC General Assembly in its 2006 meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil. This historic decision by the WCC General Assembly came on the heels of the World Summit on UN Reform in September 2005, which saw the UN General Assembly adopting specific elements of R2P (UN 60/par. 138–40).

In spite of their historical reluctance to take sides on international policy debates, a number of Christian development and aid organizations were remarkably public in their support of R2P. For example, World Vision, a Christian humanitarian organization focusing on child poverty, issued several statements in support of R2P, including one that publicly affirmed the UN decision to embrace certain R2P measures.[18] Other organizations, including the Mennonite Central Committee, Development and Peace, Misereor, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, and Lutheran

World Relief, to name a few, hinted publicly that they affirm some aspects of Responsibility to Protect. However, their statements tended to be so guarded that it would be inaccurate to conclude that these organizations were early adopters of R2P as one of their guiding sources on international affairs or as a point of policy advocacy. Indeed, the variety of responses to R2P, especially in light of the conflict in Darfur, which began in winter 2003, indicated a certain ambivalence among many of these development organizations about whether to embrace it as a step forward in the defence of vulnerable populations or to denounce it as realist statecraft on the part of the world's major powers. On the one hand, R2P addresses a number of long-standing concerns among development agencies around the "old" doctrine of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, it assumed a much more integrated role on the part of humanitarian organizations in international conflict resolution, meaning that these organizations would, at some point, be required to be part of strategic planning, including military planning.

Although the report itself never used the terminology, many Christian ethicists will recognize these principles of military intervention as traditional just war criteria. Indeed, Sturla Stålsett, a Norwegian theologian who played a crucial role in providing theological and ethical background on R2P at the WCC, argued that the ICISS Report depended to a large degree on just war criteria as a means to limit the use of force. According to Stålsett, we should understand R2P as a mechanism that carries on the just war tradition insofar as it affirms the relevancy of just war criteria for contemporary international relations.[19]

Stålsett was right to draw this conclusion. However, R2P provides a fairly radical revision of the "right intention" criterion. According to the R2P framework, right intention is fundamentally a teleological concern: namely, to "halt or avert human suffering." Other considerations or motivations, such as love of neighbour, national interest, or regional stability, for example, are largely irrelevant. The notable exception to this rule would be when a state proposes to join an intervention with both motive (such as access to natural resources) and power that would be sufficient to threaten the success of a mission. In these cases, the right intention principle may provide reason enough for a state to be excluded by the UN. As a matter of general application, though, the right intention principle in R2P attempts to minimize moral and political motivation to avoid the kind of political moralizing that too often characterized international posturing in the era of "humanitarian intervention."

As a way to think constructively and to analyze some of the finer points of the ICISS Report, I want to identify at least four interrelated reasons why R2P was

so attractive to ecumenical bodies and faith-based humanitarian organizations. To be clear, the issues I identify and address in this section tend to be pragmatic, rather than theoretical or theological. Consequently, I will focus on those features in R2P that have broad appeal among various Christian organizations.

First, R2P avoids the language of war, in particular the language of "just war." This is not merely an issue of semantics. Rather, it has the practical effect of uniting the adherents of both the just war and the peace traditions. As Stålsett correctly argued, R2P's language of "responsibility to protect" and its acknowledgement of both *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello* criteria mean that churches in the just war tradition—Lutheran, Reformed, Presbyterian, Anglican, and even Catholic, to name a few—find much in R2P that resembles their own understanding of international politics and the moral use of force. To my mind, it is no coincidence that the Lutheran World Federation[20] was a driving force behind the WCC's acceptance of R2P or that the Christian Reformed Church in North America, in a 2005 policy statement on war and peace, affirmed the direction of the R2P framework.[21]

Due to the changing nature of war in the latter half of the 20th century, a number of just-war churches have displayed a tendency to reassess a tradition that considers war a means to justice. Because war entails the use of certain weaponry and operates with certain rules of engagement that foster advancement as well as containment, serious debates have arisen whether war should ever be considered a moral discourse in a nuclear age. In the Catholic tradition, for example, Pope John XXIII's encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963) and the 1983 US bishops' letter *A Challenge to Peace* helped develop a widespread consensus within the church that Catholic social teaching contains a "presumption against war."[22] To be sure, this "presumption against war" doctrine has not yielded a broad theological ethic of pacifism within the church. For instance, Pope John Paul II, in his 2000 World Peace Day message, made it clear that, in extreme cases of humanitarian need, the use of military force should be used to alleviate suffering. Although still operating with the language of "humanitarian intervention," Pope John Paul's guiding criteria for intervening on humanitarian grounds were, at root, the same as those contained in R2P. In October 2006, the Holy See's permanent observer to the UN High Commission on Refugees, Monsignor Silvano Tomasi, appealed to the "responsibility to protect" framework in the Vatican's official statement on the status of refugees.[23] In my estimation, this statement marks a fundamental shift in the Church's thinking on the protection of vulnerable populations, which may well lead to the Church taking an active role in promoting the R2P framework within the faith-based development sector.

To be sure, the historic peace churches have the most obstacles to overcome before they can endorse the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Unlike previous intervention proposals, R2P enables peace churches to remain partners in conversations about human security and protection, since the protection of a population does not necessarily mean the use of military force or the declaration of war. Of course, R2P does maintain that force may be used if certain criteria are met. This places peace churches in a situation where they publicly affirmed the prevention and rebuilding components of R2P even though they are not in a position to endorse the use of force. In short, what R2P does is promote the idea of a just intervention for human protection, which the ecumenical movement and a growing number of Christian aid organizations accept as part of protecting the dignity of the human person.[24]

Second, because R2P does not privilege military intervention in the prevention phase or advocate a standing military force as a matter of course in the rebuilding phase, a number of ecumenical and humanitarian organizations see space for alternative intervention strategies, namely policing and peacekeeping. At the World Council of Churches, the Mennonites, primarily through the Mennonite theologian Fernando Enns, played an important role in emphasizing prevention through non-violent conflict resolution methods and peacebuilding alternatives to military intervention.[25] At the Canadian Council of Churches, the Mennonites actively promoted the prevention and policing model as a means to protect vulnerable populations. In response to the Canadian government's 3-D policy of diplomacy, development, and defence, which was current in 2005, the Canadian Mennonites found a role for the Mennonite Central Committee in the prevention phase of R2P and even expressed limited support for policing as a means of providing human security.

Third, the ecumenical movement and a number of humanitarian organizations expressed early general support for the prevention and rebuilding framework contained in R2P. Historically, the churches and faith-based relief organizations have played a crucial role in the prevention and rebuilding phases of conflict. Because prevention, in particular, has been given such short shrift in international law and international politics, organizations such as Development and Peace, World Vision, the Mennonite Central Committee, and other faith-based NGOs have often conducted their work in relative isolation. The promise that R2P held (and continues to hold, to some degree) was that, with the aid of relief organizations and local NGOs, international governance structures would become more immediately and actively aware of conditions on the ground, thereby providing necessary support to stem further escalation of violence. In both the prevention and rebuilding phases, the R2P framework meant that

civil society organizations would play an increasing role in providing information to international bodies authorized to monitor unstable regions. In effect, R2P operated with the understanding that prevention and rebuilding are not exclusively, or even primarily, military or political issues. Rather, both required an active and open partnership with local and international civil society as well as international governance organizations.

And fourth, the minimalist principle of intervention contained in the Responsibility to Protect framework was consistent with recent declarations by various ecumenical bodies and faith-based humanitarian organizations in regard to international conflict resolution. For instance, the World Council of Churches, through its International Affairs, Peace, and Human Security division, publicly affirmed the principles of incrementalism and gradualism in international conflict resolution. For many humanitarian organizations, these principles, which may lead to measures such as economic sanctions or frozen foreign bank accounts, were generally preferable to practices involving the weapons of war. In cases where there is an ongoing humanitarian crisis, military interventions might actually increase the level of long-term human suffering. While the failed invasion of Iraq could be cited as a case in point, development organizations looked instead to the failed humanitarian-military interventions of the 1990s, including in Somalia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. What faith-based NGOs found in R2P was an attempt to correct the top-down, militarist approach to protection. For these organizations, the most important principle concerning crisis-meeting resources was the prioritization of local and regional bodies. In theory, at least, R2P could operate with a bottom-up approach to intervention.

Ongoing Concerns with R2P

From the outset, and especially when the UN adopted the R2P framework in 2005, the churches and faith-based NGOs raised concerns about R2P, even as they supported it as an alternative to human intervention and just war approaches. For the sake of brevity, let me highlight at least three serious concerns posed by R2P.

The first concern focused on UN reform and the UN's inability to provide consistent enforcement of its resolutions. Those who work in international development and international governance understand that the UN is not an independent body that has the unilateral authority to conscript troops or to infringe upon a country's sovereign boundary, including its domestic affairs. Because the UN is a forum consisting of individual states, with individual interests, the formal leverage mechanisms at the UN are not only few, but also it is quite weak. Obviously aware of the UN's limitations and ambiguities, the ICISS Commission conceived of R2P as an initial attempt to situate R2P within international law, thereby legally (not morally!) obligating states to act on behalf of vulnerable populations. Although the entire R2P framework assumed that states would meet their responsibility to protect, both locally and abroad, it remained highly uncertain what specific actions were required to meet their obligations—especially when the humanitarian crisis is abroad—and, moreover, what measures were in place to "encourage" or punish states that choose not to meet their obligation to protect vulnerable populations, however ambiguous they might be. Indeed, the R2P principle adopted by the UN in 2005 contained only vague prescriptive language: "We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability." In short, not only does the UN have a difficult time enforcing current obligations; under the R2P framework, it has no substantial criteria to apply when making a case that a country's obligation is not being met.

A second and related concern focused on national interest. As an issue of enforcement, concerns over national interest were raised in cases where powerful states "cherry pick" from international norms to compel the UN to enforce a resolution that suits that state's interests. In the early years of R2P, the most notable case concerned the US and its insistence that the UN enforce Security Council Resolution 1411 regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq while at the same time blocking any enforcement of resolutions against Israel. This incoherent enforcement policy created a situation where developing countries might toy with the idea of pulling out of the UN because it seemed to be acting as a front for American dominance over much of the world.[26] R2P provides no apparent remedy to this problem. To the contrary, in the days surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Tony Blair and George W. Bush attempted to justify their military activity by formulating humanitarian arguments based on R2P principles. In a speech in March 2004, Blair boldly stated: "Containment will not work … The terrorists have no intention of being contained. Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to military action. But we surely have a right to prevent the threat materializing; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation's people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam's." Although Blair's argument was a clear misapplication of the R2P framework, it did signal the possibility that R2P could become yet another tool that enables major powers to pursue their interests under the cover of UN legitimacy.[27]

The third concern, and in many ways the most serious one for development agencies, involved the changing relationship between civil society, states, and the military. At the core of R2P is a call for a more integrated relationship between all actors involved in the protection of vulnerable populations. This call for a new, integrated relationship had several consequences. As a matter of Christian ethics, the real or perceived coordination with military actors might contravene the mandate of certain Christian relief organizations (such as Christian Aid) and, as in the case of Mennonite organizations, violate a number of core theological principles. As a matter of logistics, military and humanitarian actors alike are keenly aware that the religious overtones in many conflicts serve to complicate both the decision to intervene and the objectives of the intervention itself. For instance, interventions into identity-based conflicts often raise the spectre of a "religious war" or a "clash of civilizations," which might increase regional volatility and further complicate international relations. Likewise, maintaining a military presence in a country long enough to establish democratic political structures and a non-partisan judicial system might bring about charges of occupation and neo-colonialism, especially when "soft power" actors such as aid workers, missionaries, entrepreneurs, teachers, and construction workers arrive. Although this is not an entirely new concern for development organizations, the implementation of R2P meant the re-evaluation of many policies and practices.

Conclusion

In a post-1989 (not 9/11) world, we continue to face the reality of failed states, non-state actors, and a sole superpower, even if that superpower is in a state of apparent decline. The reality is that non-state actors, from multinational corporations to local warlords, have amassed enough "violence"—I'm thinking of Hannah Arendt's definition of violence, which requires weapons or "implements"[28]—to destabilize many states, putting innocent populations at risk. Moreover, the reality is that certain states have turned on their populations and then sought the protection of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.

Pope Francis, in his encyclical *Fratelli tutti* (2020), writes: "It is very difficult nowadays to invoke the rational criteria elaborated in earlier centuries to speak of the possibility of a 'just war.'" Francis' statement follows a series of pronouncements by Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XV expressing skepticism about the continued viability of just-war thinking in light of the mounting incidence of civilian deaths. In turn, Pope Benedict, in particular, affirmed the principle of R2P. Pope Francis, however, has been more circumspect, even as he has acknowledged that countries, such as Ukraine, have a right to defend themselves against un-

just attacks.[29] In general, churches recognize that there is a level of complicity when they do not advocate for preventative, responsive, and rebuilding measures. While this advocacy risks challenging long-held theological and ethical principles, including the thorny issue of the moral use of force, R2P has provided churches and Christian humanitarian organizations with an alternative, one rooted in law, that recognizes the responsibility of sovereignty and the real need for innocent populations to be protected.

This leads us back to Drew Christiansen's conclusion regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine: that is, the UN R2P framework does apply to the invasion of Ukraine, but it does not mean that direct military intervention is currently warranted. At a minimum, Christiansen argues, preventative measures should continue to protect the further loss of civilian life and to prevent further violence. Moreover, the responsibility to react must include appropriate responses, particularly economic sanctions, diplomatic restrictions, as well as travel restrictions on Russian citizens and oligarchs. The US and NATO countries must continue to provide weapons to Ukraine, which will be used to defend the country against Russian forces. If, however, Ukraine were unable to defend itself, and after considering the precautionary principles in R2P, it would be appropriate to consider direct military intervention. In effect, this is the position of the many churches and Christian development organizations that were among the earliest proponents of R2P.

Scott Kline *is Chair of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Waterloo.*

1   Drew Christiansen, "We Have a Moral Duty to Protect Ukrainian Citizens—But That Doesn't Mean Going to War with Russia," *America* (May 2022), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2022/03/08/r2p-responsibility-protect-nato-ukraine-242537. The article went online on March 8, 2022, and was printed in the May 2022 issue.

2   Kofi Annan, *We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (New York: The United Nations, 2000), esp. ch. 4, "Freedom from Fear."

3   For a complete list of participating organizations, see ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y.

4   Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 247.

5   In the mid-1990s, the language of "conscience shocking" became the preferred manner of speaking about crimes against humanity, genocide, and other gross violence on a population. For example, see the Rome Conference (1995), which established the International Criminal Court.

6   Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security*, 247.

7   Ibid., 250.

8   For example, see Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1996).

9   This phrase appears in the synopsis of R2P, under Basic Principles. See ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*.

10   The full ICISS report develops these three responsibilities in some detail. The three quoted here are from the R2P summary, found at the beginning of the report. See Ibid.

11   Ibid.

12   Ibid.

13   This quote has appeared in various forms. This one comes from the R2P synopsis, under the section "The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention," subsection "Right Authority." See ibid.

14   Konrad Raiser, "Humanitarian Intervention or Human Protection?" *The Ploughshares Monitor* (Spring 2004), https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/humanitarian-intervention-or-human-protection.

15   WCC Central Committee, "The Protection of Endangered Populations in Situations of Armed Violence: Toward an Ecumenical Approach" (2001), Doc. Nr. PI 2rev, https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/the-protection-of-endangered-populations-in-situations-of-armed-violence-toward-an-ecumenical-ethical-approach.

16   For the document, see https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/the-responsibility-to-protect-ethical-and-theological-reflections.

17   WCC Public Issues Committee, "Vulnerable Populations at Risk: Statement on the Responsibility to Protect," Document Nr. PIC 02-2, 2006, https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/2-vulnerable-populations-at-risk-statement-on-the-responsibility-to-protect.

18   World Vision, "Children Are Still Counting on Canada to Act" (15 September 2005).

19   Sturla Stålsett, "Notes on the Just War Tradition," in *The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections*, ed. Semegnish Asfaw, Guillermo Kerber, and Peter Wiederund (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2005), 28–30.

20   For a statement by the LWF that integrated the "responsibility to protect" into a theological understanding of politics, see "Reclaiming the Vocation of Government: A Statement from a LWF Consultation," in *LWF Documentation: Communion, Responsibility, and Accountability* (2004), 215, https://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/LWF-Doc-50-Economic_Globalization-EN.pdf.

21   Christian Reformed Church of North America, "Committee Report on War and Peace" (Grand Rapids: CRNA, 2005). See Appendix I, "The Responsibility to Protect," written by the Canadian social activist Kathy Vandergrift.

22   See, for example, Drew Christiansen, "*Fratelli Tutti* and the Responsibility to Protect," Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs (October 14, 2020), https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/fratelli-tutti-and-the-responsibility-to-protect.

23   http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2006/documents/rc_seg-st_20061004_unhcr_en.html

24   See Ernie Regehr, "Comments from Ernie Regehr," in *The Responsibility to Protect*, 103–105.

25   See Fernando Enns, *Friedenskirche in der Ökumene. Mennonitische Wurzeln einer Ethik der Gewaltfreiheit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003). Enns was a delegate to the WCC 9th Assembly in Porto Alegre and one of the pivotal voices raising concerns about the WCC embracing the basic principles of R2P.

26   Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security*, 291–92.

27   Jean Bethke Elshtain, in a debate with Glenn Stassen at the 2006 meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Washington, DC, cited Blair's appeal to R2P as a move forward in humanitarian intervention theory. Tellingly, she incorrectly referred to the doctrine as the "right to protect," which is the language of "humanitarian intervention" post–Cold War and not R2P.

28   See Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 56.

29   For the news story on Pope Francis' comments, see Inés San Martin, "Pope Francis Confirms Right to Defence but Insists on 'Rethink' of Just War Doctrine," *Crux* (July 1, 2022), https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2022/07/pope-francis-confirms-right-to-defense-but-insists-on-rethink-of-just-war-doctrine.

"Mass Man" and the Mob

The Ottawa Freedom Convoy

By Alan Davies
University of Toronto

What Canadian can forget that most un-Canadian of spectacles: the truck and transport invasion and occupation of Canada's capital earlier this year? Maple Leaf flags en masse, non-stop cries of "freedom," non-negotiable demands for the overthrow of an allegedly freedom-suppressing government, demonization of a democratically elected and properly appointed prime minister,[1] defiance of local authorities, forced closure of local businesses, civic paralysis, and the trampling on the rights of others—in short, a highly organized and extremely well-funded political insurrection almost certainly inspired by and connected to the violent assault on the United States capitol the previous winter. Who can forget it? Who can have failed to notice the less than heroic figure of the 45th president of the United States lurking in the shadows? Did Donald Trump not express his support publicly for the north of the border as well as the south of the border attempt to seize the reins of state power? If the Ottawa invasion was less violent than its American counterpart, if it featured a fun side in the form of winter hot tubs and street festivities, it was no less anti-democratic and dangerous. It was an equally dark moment in North American history. Dark moments, however, raise serious questions that call for careful examination. What exactly is freedom? What did the convoy protesters mean or think they meant by freedom? Why do so many people in our age twist and distort one of the great concepts in our intellectual and political history? What inspires ugly deeds in its name?

Freedom not to be vaccinated, freedom not to have to carry vaccine passports, freedom from governmental mandates that interfere with one's personal life, perhaps freedom from government per se, was the rallying cry of the so-called Freedom Convoy, at least on the surface.[2] What lies below the surface? The answer seems to be a radical individualism or the doctrine that the state exists primarily to serve the individual, a conviction that one's personal good far transcends any possible public good. Does not modern Western society, especially the American valorization of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (remember the American link to the Canadian protest), elevate individual rights over social or public or state rights?

Here we tread in deep waters. One of the great debates of antiquity was between the raw individualism taught by the Sophists—"man is the measure of all things" (Protagoras)—and the more collectivist views of Plato and Aristotle, for whom the state was paramount.[3] It was and is a legitimate debate. In a civilized society, it is a debate that never ends. Are not individualism and collectivism, freedom and necessity both virtues and vices at the same time? Is not freedom, especially political freedom, not to mention intellectual, artistic, and religious freedom, easily distorted to mean what many self-styled freedom lovers want it to mean, namely, licence and libertarianism? This concept of freedom, which is rooted in an elevated sense of my own consummate importance, has scant respect for public laws and political dictates, which at best are defined as secondary. The law of the land is good if it happens to serve my personal interests but not good if it interferes with matters and concerns of cardinal significance to me and others like me. There can be no compromise between my autonomy and the heteronomy of the state or the collectivity. I cannot, of course, commit murder or engage in other evil acts, but I do not need the government to tell me that. I am good as well as autonomous, a totally free entity. Trust me.

There is more to the subject. In his study of political tyranny throughout the ages, the English author Maurice Latey speaks of the "atomization of society" as a necessary prelude to the rise of tyrannical rule.[4] Atomization means the absence of any social cohesion, an utter breaking down of the social fabric that binds a community or a nation together, an end to public consensus, an erosion of familiar unifying values and symbols intrinsic to our sense of personal identity. For various reasons—economic troubles, war, raging pandemics, other misdemeanours and misfortunes—the current system of rulership no longer commands our allegiance. So, we listen to voices, usually charismatic voices, that shout dangerous slogans, as, for example, quite recently in the United States, "Make America Great Again." (Remember the Trumpian red MAGA caps!) In this way, we slowly become what has been famously dubbed "mass man" or the type of lonely, unhappy, atomized, and deeply alienated individual that modern society, with its multiple disorders and world wars, has produced in large numbers and who seems to populate no small part of our familiar world.[5] Mass man is no longer a mere memory of the

bad past, a relic of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s; he is starting to reappear in the 21st century in various guises. Think of Proud Boys, QAnon, and other white nationalist and racist cabals that are now visible features of our body politic. They are extreme examples, of course, but mass man also shows his face in the general populace. He shows himself in the anger of ordinary citizens who for one reason or another have lost faith in their democratic institutions and made themselves susceptible to more strident appeals. He especially reappears on the anonymous social media of our day with its never-ending stream of misinformation and lies. Only too easily does mass man turn into "mob man,"[6] and we now know only too well, even in Canada, what mobs are capable of.

Mobs require leaders as well as symbols, including flags, especially national flags, which are particularly powerful. A symbol, the late Paul Tillich liked to point out, is more than a sign. A sign merely points to something else, he argued, but a symbol in some mysterious way participates in that to which it points.[7] In material terms, flags are ordinary objects, but ordinary objects become more than ordinary once they are transformed into symbols. They stir emotions. They acquire a sacred or semi-sacred aura. People die for them. They personify nations. This bestows on them a numinous power, especially in times of stress when nations turn against other nations and peoples are divided against each other. Once flags were only dynastic, but with the rise of nationalism (the ideology of the nation) since the French Revolution, they acquired a much larger signification. When the American insurrectionists stormed the U.S. Capitol in January 2021, waving a multitude of national flags (Old Glory), they were clearly legitimating themselves as true patriots, true Americans; their antagonists were seen as otherwise. When the Canadian insurrectionists planted themselves in downtown Ottawa in February 2022, also waving a multitude of national flags (Maple Leaf), they were following suit.[8] Defining themselves as the real Canada, by implication they defined their antagonists in opposite terms. Despite a historic difference between the American and Canadian flags and their public perception, the protest message in the two countries was essentially the same.

Mob man stands on a slippery slope, a slope that can lead to dangerous ground even in a democratic society, creating a spiritual as well as a political vacuum. Let us label it nihilism. Nihilism, from the Latin *nihil*, literally means belief in "no thing," whether mental, spiritual, or material; it means, as defined by the late German Protestant theologian Helmut Thielicke, the "absolutization of nothingness."[9] When employed in modern philosophical discourse, it usually signifies the total denial of all objective values, cultural and historical, rational and religious. There is no valid *a priori* knowledge of anything; a true nihilist manufactures his own values, thus, in effect, deifying himself. As more than one historian has pointed out, nihilism is a mood fully compatible with totalitarianism since, if nothing is really true, anything can be turned into a "truth" and utilized accordingly.[10] Modern history supplies many examples, some of them deadly. We become, in effect, the authors and manufacturers of our own being, as, incidentally, Friedrich Nietzsche long ago conceived in his notorious depiction of the "overman" or *Übermensch*.[11] "Nihilism" is a strong word and not one that most members of contemporary society, including our Ottawa demonstrators, would likely apply to themselves, if they even understood it. Are they not patriots; do they not believe in freedom? That, of course, is the point—they believe in freedom: their own freedom, subjectively determined. Freedom on their lips acquires the character of a code word that contains the "charged magic" that mass or mob leaders like to use to elicit the desired reactions.[12] The nihilist clearly is not a Christian even if they claim to be one. How should Christians respond to this distemper of our times?

The importance of the individual looms large in Christian and biblical faith, but not as large as the radical individualists who parade in convoys and wave the banners of freedom like to think. We are certainly individuals; but we are also "persons-in-community," to cite the Christian ethicist Roger Shinn.[13] As Christians, we recognize and should recognize the claims of the social order as well as the rights of the person. Love, *agape*, is the rule of life, and *agape* has a social as well as a personal dimension. In order to fully realize our humanity, therefore, we must learn to live in communion with others; only in a community can our true individuality emerge. Community, we should note, entails political organization, especially when community is on a large scale; and political organization or statecraft, even in the best of worlds, is never without its hazards. States exercise power—and power, even in the best of hands, is always both impersonal and morally ambiguous. Because of this ambiguity, it is usual to define the state, even the best of states, as a necessary evil. No state is more important and more exalted than the populace it represents and serves. To deem otherwise is the perennial misstep taken by dictators and despots both past and present.

Seeing ourselves in both individual and communal terms has another benefit. It becomes a profound argument for political democracy. Democratic states normally think twice before imposing restrictions on freedom, and only do so under unusual circumstances, such as the exigencies of war. The Dominion of Canada, with its constitutional monarchy, is a democratic state.[14] Canada is also a state with a Christian heritage (both Catholic and Protestant), even if it has

never had a state church and its actual population is religiously diverse, especially in the 21st century.[15] Canadian freedom therefore has biblical-Christian roots that undergird the freedom of the individual conscience or the God-given right of the individual citizen to speak out when tyranny threatens. To be a Christian is surely to obey God rather than any human authority (Acts 5:29). Religious freedom implies political freedom, which in turn posits a state constituted to serve its citizenship rather than a citizenship rendered subservient to the state. But religious freedom does not imply religious licence to overturn the state at will in the name of a divinely inspired anarchy, as some Christian sectarians have claimed, most famously the 16th-century Münster Anabaptists.[16] Freedom has its limits. It honours the rights of others. It respects the rule of law. "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities," declares the apostle Paul in a famous and much-cited passage (Rom. 13:1). Inevitably, a tension exists between the interlocking claims of the individual and the body politic, the voice of conscience and the voice of rulership. But in a democratic society, they do not drown out each other. Rather, they engage in debate.

Debate is not what occurred during the Ottawa siege. Instead, the federal, provincial, and civic governments were confronted with a barrage of angry and largely disjointed ultimatums.[17] Even as the protestors demanded to meet with government officials, ostensibly to present their demands, there was little in their behaviour to suggest that discussion and debate were in their minds. Radical individualism in any case does not lend itself to the give and take of rational encounter. The clamour of loud cries drowns out everything else. There was also nothing democratic in the utter indifference shown by the group's leaders to their practical and human effects, especially on the citizens of Ottawa caught up in the turmoil. Whether they or any of their followers identified themselves as Christians, I do not know. But if such was the case, they badly misunderstood the basic precepts of the Christian faith. So do politicians who wish to make Canada the "freest" country on earth. So do we if we fail to oppose the nihilistic voices that clamour daily to overturn the democratic consensus that has enabled our society to grow and flourish in a far from democratic world.

Alan Davies *is an emeritus professor of Religious Studies at the University of Toronto and an ordained minister in the United Church of Canada.*

1   The popularity or unpopularity of Justin Trudeau is beside the point.

2   A leading candidate for the federal leadership of the Conservative Party in Canada at the time of writing, Pierre Poilievre, according to *The Globe and Mail* (April 9, 2022, A22), is cited as saying that he wants to make Canada "the freest nation on Earth." Poilievre was also a strong supporter of the Ottawa invasion and occupation, although, of course, he did not see it in these terms. He was not the only politician to praise the convoy.

3   Sir Ernest Barker employs this term in his classic study, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Dover, 1959), 86. The great Greek philosophers believed that the purpose of the state was to promote virtue.

4   Maurice Latey, *Tyranny: A Study in the Abuse of Power* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), 111.

5   A term derived from Jose Ortega y Gasset's 1930 book, *The Revolt of the Masses*.

6   A term employed by Hannah Arendt in her famous book *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Arendt's examples of mass man and the mob ("mob man") are drawn from the Hitler and Stalin eras, the classic examples of modern totalitarian societies in her own lifetime.

7   See, for example, Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; 1957), xxiii.

8   Significantly, some American flags and even a swastika flag or two were featured as well.

9   Cf. Helmut Thielicke, *Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature: With a Christian Answer* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), chap. 1.

10   "After the vanishing of European Fascism and Bolshevism … we see that nihilism is hidden at the core of Totalitarianism – in its essence, its nature, its genes." David Ohana, *The Dawn of Political Nihilism* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 10.

11   A notion that Nietzsche linked to the "death of God," meaning the decline of public faith in the God of Christianity. See *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, especially part 4, "Of the Higher Man." I do not think, however, that Nietzsche, were he alive today, would have approved of the Ottawa cavalcade. He was not an admirer of mass man and his utter mediocrity. His overman (sometimes mistranslated as "superman") is a much more noble and independent creature.

12   Thielicke, *Nihilism*, 33.

13   See Shinn's article on individualism in *Dictionary of Christian Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), 164–65. Shinn, incidentally, was one of my professors at Union Seminary, New York, during my long-vanished graduate student days.

14   The Ottawa mob leaders seemed to think that the Governor General, Mary Simon, possessed the arbitrary power to remove a government at any time for any reason. This is a bad misunderstanding of the role of the Canadian Crown.

15   I am speaking historically. Tolerance and respect for other religions is also a Christian virtue.

16   Led by John of Leyden, these fanatical "freedom-loving" sectarians claimed to establish the kingdom of God on earth, overturning all earthly rule. What they really created, however, during their short-lived ascendancy, was a proto pre-modern totalitarian state.

17   The "Rolling Thunder" cavalcade of motorcycles in April 2022 attempted with less success to repeat the February intimidation. The mob mentality, however, clearly persists.

Jesus' Resurrection Enlarges Our Hearts

By Don Schweitzer
St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon

Over several decades, the German social philosopher Jürgen Habermas has diagnosed a moral illness in North Atlantic societies and suggested that religious resources can remedy it. In a remarkable development in his thought, he has argued that if secular reason in North Atlantic societies is to avoid becoming cynical and self-serving, it must open itself to moral sources provided by world religions like Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.[1] What follows will summarize and discuss Habermas' diagnosis and then examine the therapeutic relevance that Jesus' resurrection can have in relation to it.

Centuries ago, Augustine argued that Jesus' resurrection can enlarge Christians' hearts by expanding and redirecting their vision of the moral good and empowering them to pursue this.[2] It is a theme that runs throughout Western Christian theology, from Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 15 to some sermons of Martin Luther King, Jr., which invoked Jesus' cross and resurrection to inspire participation in the civil rights struggle.[3] More recently, Shawn Copeland has observed that Jesus' resurrection empowers struggles to overcome white racist supremacy.[4] It also undergirds the Black Christian Principle that all life is "precious and sacred" and enables people to forgive radical sin.[5] Jesus' resurrection emerges here as a moral source that can move Christians and perhaps others to build communities, seek greater social justice, and work for peace.

The Moral Sickness of Secular Reason and the Ambiguity of Religion

According to Habermas, secular reason lacks the spiritual and moral resources needed to maintain the unenforceable solidarity that sustains democracies and struggles for justice and peace extending beyond one's self-interests. Its moral resources in these regards are being depleted, while the functional differentiation of contemporary societies and the integrative mechanisms of globalized capitalism tend to "reward forms of social interaction oriented to individual success."[6] The result is a "dwindling sensitivity to social pathologies … to social deprivation and suffering in general"[7] in North Atlantic societies. Secular reason also has difficulty coming to terms with the horrors of modernity. In the face of events like the Holocaust, the "lost hope for resurrection is keenly felt as a void."[8]

Meanwhile, world religions continue to be present in North Atlantic societies. Their religious practices, scriptures, and traditions can promote solidarity, compassion for others, and concern for the victims of society. According to Habermas:

> Religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. In corresponding political debates, this potential makes religious speech into a vehicle for possible truth contexts, which can then be translated from the vocabulary of a particular religious community into a generally accessible language.[9]

Philosophy "has not yet fully exhausted"[10] the potentials of meaning that world religions harbour in this regard and should open itself to them.

Decades ago, the German-Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer argued that the church shouldn't divest itself of faith in things like Jesus' resurrection, which it could not relate meaningfully to a world come of age. Instead, he suggested that it should maintain such beliefs internally through an arcane discipline until the time when they could be meaningfully communicated to surrounding society.[11] According to Habermas, that time may have come. North Atlantic societies are no longer Bonhoeffer's "world come of age," able to cope with the crises facing them on the basis of their own immanent resources. They are now caught up in a process of "modernization spinning out of control"[12] and need transcendent sources of meaning to sustain their emancipatory ideals and commitment to universal solidarity.

Habermas' argument has been widely discussed.[13] It has been objected that while religion can be a source of moral ideals, it can also be a source of powerful and dangerous illusions.[14] Religion is inevitably ambiguous. The biblical traditions describe it as continually in danger of producing "idolatry, superstition, hypocrisy, legalism and collective blindness."[15] Still, the appropriate response to this for Christians is not to repudiate religion but to remain "open to an ongoing critique"[16] of its perversions. When religion becomes perverted and destructive, what is called for is conversion to the truth: a recognition of the evil being perpetrated, an acknowledgement of the sin involved, "and a willingness to return to greater fidelity to the divine promises."[17]

That religion can be a source of harm does not invalidate it as a moral source that can move people to do the good.[18] There is no denying the dangers that come with religion. There is also no denying what Habermas points to: that religions have provided inspiration and guiding ideals for numerous constructive social causes in the modern era, from the anti-slavery movement on.[19] Though religions often manifest destructive tendencies, outright repudiation of them risks robbing humanity of important moral sources.[20] While religions remain ever imperfect and potentially dangerous, they have shown themselves to be capable of generating self-critique and able to respond to their perversions and failures by regenerating themselves on the basis of their central truths and symbols so as to remove their harmful manifestations.[21] The ambiguity of religion does not invalidate Habermas' argument.

Habermas' understanding of religion is not the only one that churches should reckon with, and translating the meaning of Jesus' resurrection into generally accessible language remains a challenging task. Still, his diagnosis provides an insightful social analysis that suggests that articles of faith like Jesus' resurrection can offer a moral vision and inspiration that can counteract the cynicism and self-centredness that infect secular reason in North Atlantic countries. We turn now to Jesus' resurrection to see how this is so.

Jesus' Resurrection as a Source of Hope

Jesus' resurrection can only be properly understood in relation to his cross and public ministry, for these three are intrinsically connected. In proclaiming God's coming reign, Jesus claimed to speak for God. His crucifixion was intended to refute this.[22] For Christians, Jesus' resurrection vindicated his claim to speak for God. In doing so, it illuminated his person, public ministry, and cross, giving each additional and sometimes contradictory meanings. Jesus' public ministry and cross in turn give meaning to his resurrection. In Jesus' death and resurrection, "new unimaginable life" broke "out through death itself and as a corrective to death."[23] This gave rise to a far-reaching hope. As Jesus' ministry was characterized by a preferential option for the poor, his resurrection helps shape an understanding of God's immanence and transcendence characterized by this and oriented toward a more just and humane future. This established a hope for the final overcoming of evil that can empower struggles for justice. The feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson characterizes this hope in the following terms:

> If Holy Wisdom is in compassionate solidarity with suffering people in history, a future is thereby opened up through even the most negative experience. This is because we are speaking about God, than whose power of love nothing greater can be conceived. If there be God, then there are parameters to evil, and a terminus. The human struggle can go forward in hard-won hope against hope that the compassion of God will overcome chaos and death and set limits even to the unfathomable mystery of evil … and so energy to resist despair arises.[24]

By shaping the understanding of God in this way, Jesus' resurrection provides an ultimate hope for the overcoming of evil, sin, and death. This can counter cynicism and despair on personal and communal levels.

Habermas observed that a gap exists between what secular reason can comprehend and articles of faith like Jesus' resurrection which remain opaque to it. This opaqueness of Jesus' resurrection to human reason is not denied by Christian faith. Instead, it is taken up into it. No New Testament writing claims to know "what 'actually happened' in the raising of Jesus."[25] These writings clearly affirm "that God has acted and that God has raised Jesus."[26] But this transformation is never described on the level of secular knowledge. The fragmentary nature of the Easter narratives and the differences in their accounts of the Easter appearances signal that this event is difficult to apprehend and that its surplus of meaning can never be fully grasped. These narratives agree that Jesus' resurrection was a shocking surprise to its first witnesses and that faith in it seldom comes easily. They portray the Easter appearances as typically "accompanied by fear, uncertainty and even doubt."[27] The strangeness and incomprehensibility of Jesus' resurrection have not diminished over time. It remains difficult to conceptualize and it continues to challenge "the adequacy of our understanding of reality and history."[28] The novelty, uniqueness, and technically inexplicable nature of Jesus' resurrection make astonishment at it an abiding characteristic of Christian faith.[29]

This opaqueness of Jesus' resurrection is connected to the radical nature of the hope that it brings. Jesus' resurrection is impossible for secular reason to assimilate because it was not an event of the kinds occurring in nature or history that human reason can grasp, analyze, and explain in universally accessible ways. The New Testament witnesses emphasize its transcendent aspects. They interpret it not as "a possibility within the world and its history … [but as] a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history."[30] They describe it as an eschatological event that broke into history, giving rise to hope even for the dead. Paul likened it to creation from nothing (Rom. 4:17). Confronted by the risen Jesus, early Christians described what had happened to him with the formula "God raised Jesus from the dead."[31] To understand Jesus' resurrection, one must follow their

lead and speak of "the nature, existence and activity of God."[32] Otherwise, it remains enigmatic. Though secular reason cannot explain Jesus' resurrection, human reason can understand it in the sense of receive, appreciate, reflect on, and respond to it. Jesus' resurrection is opaque to secular reason because it is a revelation of divine transcendence. It reveals "that God is radically other than human beings, that God has the ability to achieve what is completely impossible for them: absolute liberation and salvation."[33] The divine transcendence operative and revealed here is central to the radical nature of the hope that it brings: that God is able to act where the forces that secular reason can harness cannot. This divine transcendence is such that God can offer hope even in the face of death.

As Jesus' resurrection overcame his death and vindicated his proclamation of the coming reign of God, it was interpreted as a revelation of God pointing forward to an eschaton in which God's divinity would be revealed in the universal transformation and fulfillment of all creation.[34] The appearances of the risen Jesus were experienced and interpreted as the in-breaking in the midst of history of this eschatological future that was expected at the end of time. The risen Christ was the "first-fruits" (1 Cor. 15:20) of the dead who will be raised at the eschaton. Jesus' resurrection is thus "the harbinger of things to come,"[35] a source of hope for the final overcoming of sin, evil, and death.

This hope is both general and specific in its outlook. It is general in that it brings hope for the resurrection of all. 1 Corinthians 15:24-28 describes the overcoming of death that it looks forward to in universal terms. Everyone and everything will be redeemed. This provides the kind of holistic outlook that Habermas argues can strengthen commitment to solidarity and expand the moral parameters of secular discourse. This hope also has a historical specificity. God raised not just a dead body to new life but a victim of injustice. Here "justice has triumphed over injustice."[36] Jesus' resurrection thus gives hope for the victims of society.

Some years ago, the German-Catholic theologian Helmut Peukert argued that the lack of this kind of hope was a significant lacuna in Habermas' thought.[37] Critical theories tend to be guided by utopias that shape their critique and provide norms by which they judge the present.[38] However, most utopias depict the present as a situation of radical estrangement and indicate that "they want to lead out of this situation, but they do not say how it is possible if estrangement is radical."[39] Habermas' appreciation for religions may have developed out of a growing recognition of this ambiguity. Secular reason, by its nature, is confined to demonstrable, immanent arguments and so lacks transcendent principles of expectation that can bring hope in the face of radical estrangement. As noted above, Habermas now acknowledges that this lack leaves a void that secular reason cannot fill.[40] Jesus' resurrection can fill this void. It provides hope for the ultimate overcoming of sin and evil that secular reason lacks and needs to sustain its emancipatory commitments. Jon Sobrino expressed this meaning of Jesus' resurrection in a generally accessible way by adapting Max Horkheimer's notion of the longing for a totally other. The resurrection of the crucified Christ brings the hope that the executioner will not finally triumph over their victim.[41]

Jesus' Resurrection and Historical Hopes

Jesus' resurrection also brings hope for life within history. As it vindicated his claim to speak for God, it affirmed his proclamation of God's coming reign. This affirmation gives Jesus' resurrection a critical, revolutionary impulse. The reign of God was to end human want, inequality, exclusion, and injustice. In many critical theologies it functions as a concrete utopia guiding the praxis inspired by the hope springing from Jesus' resurrection. This hope and the praxis of the reign of God have a dialectical relationship. Only by continuing Jesus' praxis of God's reign in ways appropriate to one's own context can one adequately express the hope his resurrection brings. Conversely, such praxis is essential to understanding the nature and meaning of Jesus' resurrection. As it vindicated his praxis of God's reign, continuing this praxis provides the standpoint from which to properly understand his resurrection within the conflicts of history.

This hope sustains such praxis through providing a transcendent principle of expectation that can empower moral action. A broad range of testimony from the New Testament to the present describes how faith in Jesus' resurrection can lead to people's "lives being newly opened to and directly empowered by divine life."[42] When the connections between Jesus' public ministry, cross, and resurrection are properly appreciated, faith in Jesus' resurrection produces creative love open to self-sacrifice for the sake of others.[43] The narratives of Jesus' death and resurrection and the kerygma proclaiming it make a claim about the nature of ultimate reality that can inspire people to struggle against external forces of oppression. This claim can be a life-changing power that gives rise to constructive and creative resistance to "political theatrics of terror" intended to keep the marginalized and oppressed docile.[44] It can strengthen compassion for others and quests for justice and reconciliation by reinforcing people's resolve and empowering them to resist temptations to indifference or self-indulgence. To be "'born again' through the Spirit of the resurrection" is to be "called to the liberation of suffering creation and … made alive for that purpose."[45] This gives faith in Jesus' resurrection an activist bent.

Jesus' resurrection also sustains such praxis through the peace it brings. This peace stems from the proleptic nature of Jesus' resurrection, the way it overcomes sin, evil, and death in principle and promises an ultimate future in which "all shall be well … and all manner of things shall be well."[46] The hope and love that Jesus' resurrection gives rise to come from something transcendent that has already occurred, from a fullness already received. It engenders a desire to further express what one has already been given. This gift releases people "from having to maintain their righteousness or (its mirror opposite) from having to excoriate themselves and others."[47] A Christian's identity is established for them by Jesus' death and resurrection. It is not something one needs to struggle for or grasp at in competition with others. One is called to actualize it as one can, and for many this is through struggles for justice, liberation, and recognition. Christians are called to live out their faith. Yet, ultimately, Christian identity remains a gift for which one gives thanks.

If Jesus' resurrection was only a calling to achieve, the identity of Christians would depend on how well they fulfill this and how diligently they seek to do so. If Christian identity depends on what Christians do, then their actions are done out of a need to prove themselves as well as out of love and hope, and other people become objects by which Christians achieve their salvation.

Charles Taylor, the Canadian philosopher, has argued that there is a permanent danger here. The high moral standards that Habermas rightly wants upheld can be dangerous if they become demands laid on people without strong moral sources to empower the attempt to meet them. "Morality as benevolence on demands breeds self-condemnation for those who fall short … [as most people do] and a depreciation of the impulses to self-fulfillment [which most people have]."[48] As noted above, the mission springing from Easter is not an external demand but a passion for what the new reality created in Jesus' resurrection makes possible. While this mission requires commitment, struggle, and sacrifice, it is accompanied by a sense of peace born of this new reality. This peace enlarges one's heart so that one can accept oneself and others: those who fail to live out their moral duties and those who hold different views of what is right and/or good. Moral debate, admonition, correction, and opposition continue but are set within a more encompassing framework of recognition and ultimate acceptance. The struggles for liberation and recognition that Jesus' resurrection empowers have reconciliation with one's opposition as their final goal after justice is achieved because it brings an inclusive hope for the transformation and fulfillment of all creation.

This sets the moral impulses of Jesus' resurrection apart from ideologies "of universal love and freedom [which] can mask a burning hatred, directed outward onto an unregenerate world and generating destruction and despotism."[49] The New Testament has many images of judgment involving a final separation of the righteous from sinners. These images indicate that perpetrators of sin diminish their own humanity and creation as a whole by such acts. But there is a creative dimension to Jesus' resurrection that is trans-moral. It brings a promise of new life not only to the just and the victims of society, but also to their oppressors. As it vindicated Jesus' message of God's grace for sinners and led his cross to be seen as a self-offering securing forgiveness and reconciliation to God, it breaks down absolute moral dualisms and points toward universal salvation. In this way, the peace that Jesus' resurrection brings can prevent struggles for social justice from becoming perverted by hatred of others.

The peace and hope that Jesus' resurrection brings combine to produce an active equanimity that can accept life, its changing circumstances, oneself, and others with their gifts and frailties while still resolutely seeking God's coming reign. Hemmed in by Gestapo restrictions yet committed to seeking a regime change in Nazi Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeffer described the influence of the hope and peace that Jesus' resurrection brings as follows:

> Where, however, it is recognized that the power of death has been broken, where the miracle of the resurrection and new life shines right into the world of death, there one demands no eternities from life. One takes from life what it offers, not all or nothing, but good things and bad, important things and unimportant, joy and pain. One doesn't cling anxiously to life, but neither does one throw it lightly away. One is content with measured time and does not attribute eternity to earthly things. One leaves to death the limited right that it still has. But one expects the new human being and the new world only from beyond death, from the power that has conquered death.[50]

Here Bonhoeffer argues that the hope and peace that Jesus' resurrection brings can stabilize human reason in situations which tempt people to despair or reckless action. The hope inspires social action while the peace prevents it from becoming idolatrous and fanatical. In this way, the Easter hope strengthens "all the little, limited hopes with its assurance, freeing them both from arrogance and from resignation."[51] As Jesus' resurrection brings both hope and peace, it generates and sustains compassion for others that works against the diminishing of sensitivity to suffering and injustice that Habermas detects in North Atlantic societies.

Jesus' Resurrection, Guilt, and Failure

Jesus' resurrection also generates hope within history by addressing guilt and failure. Not only does it overcome in principle sin and evil pressing down upon people and expand people's moral vision; it also addresses shame and guilt stemming from what people have done and cannot undo.

Running through the Easter narratives in the gospels of Mark and John is the theme of the rehabilitation of the disciples after their abandonment of Jesus during his trial and execution.[52] This rehabilitation happens through forgiveness and a renewed calling being extended to them by the risen Christ. As Jesus' resurrection addressed the disciples' failure and commissioned them to a new vocation, it makes the church "both a penitent and a hopeful community,"[53] one that can face and confess its sins, past and present, yet still look hopefully to the future and act on that.

White settler Christians in Canada inherit a history of colonialism that has dispossessed, impoverished, and denigrated Indigenous peoples. The colonial view that Indigenous lands should be available for settlers' use and Indigenous peoples assimilated into the settler state still permeates settler society.[54] A prominent part of this colonialism involved some Canadian churches partnering with the federal government to run residential schools for Indigenous children from approximately 1870 to the 1990s. This did incalculable harm to these children, their families, and communities. The legacy of residential schools and colonialism has burdened white settler members of these churches with shame and guilt. If unaddressed, this guilt can lead to moral paralysis and cynical self-defensiveness.

Jesus' resurrection addresses such guilt through the way it combines with his death to establish and communicate God's absolute forgiveness.[55] This can enable white settler Christians to acknowledge the damage done by colonialism and residential schools and forestalls "settler moves to innocence"[56] which seek to relieve settler guilt "without giving up land or power or privilege."[57] This forgiveness means that while churches must take responsibility for their past and continued participation in colonialism, they are not trapped in it. Despite their guilt and shame, the future remains open to a new relationship between them and Indigenous peoples.

However, white settlers will only reach a post-colonial future by unsettling the settler within themselves.[58] This journey, which some churches and white settlers have committed themselves to, will be by the way of the cross. It will involve dying to white privilege, persisting colonial identities, social structures, practices, and racism in order to be born anew to a different sense of self and vocation. It will require ma-

terial reparations to Indigenous peoples and seeking nation-to-nation relationships with them which respect their Indigenous rights as defined by their own legal traditions.[59] The forgiveness and renewed calling that Jesus' resurrection offers can enlarge the hearts of white settler Christians so that they undertake this as a quest for justice and peace and as a journey of healing for themselves.

Jesus' Resurrection as a Source of Receptivity to Others

Jesus' resurrection can enlarge people's hearts in yet another way. According to the Protestant theologian Karl Barth, it creates a sense of community in which a fundamental recognition is due to all others. Barth developed this idea in his doctrine of the other lights. According to Barth, Jesus' resurrection reveals that "all that lives and moves … lies in the sphere"[60] in which the risen Christ addresses the church through his prophetic work. Barth argued:

> We may thus expect, and count upon it, that even among those who are outside … [of the church] and its particular orders and conditions He will use His capacity to make of men, quite apart from and even in face of their own knowledge or volition, something which they could never be of themselves, namely, His witnesses, speaking words which can seriously be called true.[61]

Thus, for Barth, a corollary of Jesus' resurrection is that true words are spoken outside of the church that are addressed to it. Such 'words' need to be tested "by the witness of Scripture."[62] Barth never gave specific examples of these true words. Still, the church must be open to hearing them if it is to be faithful to the risen Christ. From such words can come "enrichment, correction, or reformation" of the church.[63] Jesus' resurrection thus enlarges Christians' hearts by putting them into a dialogical relationship with people outside of the church. Faith in Jesus' resurrection should thus engender humility and openness to others as well as hope. Christians must be open to being prophetically addressed by the risen Christ through secular organizations, other religions, or non-Christian individuals.

In Canada at this time, one can identify the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* as such a "word," though lack of space prevents arguing this here. In March 2016, eight Canadian churches committed themselves to accepting the Declaration as a framework for reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada's Call to Action #48. In Indigenous perspectives, adopting the Declaration means accepting "the full implementation of [Indigenous] self-determination and of Aboriginal

and treaty rights."[64] In light of Barth's theory, these commitments can be seen as warranted by faith in Jesus' resurrection.

Conclusion

Jesus' resurrection is a source of hope and ethical vision that can speak to the moral illness Habermas has diagnosed in North Atlantic societies. It addresses in several ways the resignation, despair, self-centredness, and complacency that can afflict the downtrodden and the affluent. The transcendent principle of expectation it provides can guide and stabilize human reason. The hope it gives always needs to be interpreted through remembrance of Jesus' cross and proclamation of God's reign and concretely focused by contextual analysis. Jesus' resurrection can enlarge our hearts when understood in this way.[65]

Don Schweitzer *is McDougald Professor of Theology at St. Andrew's College, Saskatoon, University of Saskatchewan.*

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2   Augustine of Hippo, *Sermons III/10 (341-400)*, (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1995), 225.

3   Martin Luther King, Jr., *A Testament of Hope* (New York: HarperCollins, 1986), 257, 277.

4   M. Shawn Copeland, *Knowing Christ Crucified* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2018), 176.

5   Ibid., 172.

6   Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 238–39.

7   Ibid.

8   Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Malden: Polity Press, 2003), 111.

9   Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 131.

10   Jürgen Habermas, *Religion and Rationality* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 162–63.

11   Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography* (rev. ed.) (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 882.

12   Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, 211.

13   Habermas et al., *An Awareness of What Is Missing,* 24–71; Richard Bernstein, "Naturalism, Secularism and Religion: Habermas' Via Media," *Constellations* 17 (2010), 161; *Habermas and Religion*, ed. Craig Calhoun et al. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013).

14   Amy Allen, "Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Habermas's Genealogy of Postsecular Religion," in *Habermas and Religion*, 141.

15   Gregory Baum, *Religion and Alienation* (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), 72.

16   Ibid.

17   Ibid., 73.

18   Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 519.

19   Craig Calhoun, "Afterword: Religion's Many Powers," *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*, ed. and introduced by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 120, 122.

20   Taylor, *Sources of the Self,* 519–20.

21   Baum, *Religion and Alienation*, 257.

22   Edward Parish Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 281.

23   Elizabeth Johnson, *She Who Is* (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 268.

24   Ibid.

25   Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope* (London: SCM Press, 1967), 197.

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65   I thank Christine Jamieson and Paul Gareau for helpful comments on a previous version of this article.

Book Review

Women's Studies in Religion: Yes, It's Still Necessary

Helen Boursier, ed. *The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Women's Studies in Religion.*
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. 402 pp.

Many volumes exist on women and religious/spiritual traditions, but readers would be mistaken if they think this new volume is unnecessary. They could also be forgiven.

In the final chapter, Cynthia L. Rigby reflects on her long-time but erroneous "assumption that—slowly, slowly but surely, surely—women would gain ground in theological and ecclesiological circles, and we wouldn't have to spend as much time making the case and making a space for women's perspectives, gifts, and leading" (355). She was not alone in thinking that theology would just become better theology, without the need for explicitly feminist commitments, and that the grand narratives of religious studies would evolve. Progress is not inevitable, but Rigby and her fellow contributors call for hope.

I recommend two ways into the *Handbook*: starting at the end or sampling to learn something new. Starting at the end, the experienced reader can survey new developments in the field: Helen T. Boursier's two chapters on defining femicide in a global context and focusing on femicide at the US–Mexico border; a Mohawk feminist response to the colonial doctrine of discovery (Dawn Martin-Hill); the expansion of feminist digital communities (Gina Messina), including vibrant discourse on women's mosque spaces online (Krista Melanie Riley); queer disruptions of the role of women's bodies in "liberal" and "democratic" discourses (Ludger Viefhues-Bailey); and a "nomadic spirituality of home" for survivors of childhood violence (Denise Starkey). Readers who wish to sample topics will find an assortment of both introductory essays and case studies. Essays that provide overviews of established topics include the importance of women's experience in religious contexts (Jacqueline J. Lewis); inclusive language for God (Yudit Kornberg Greenberg); methodological interdisciplinarity (Natalie Kertes Weaver); growing edges of ecofeminism and religions (Heather Eaton); Asian "transpacific" diaspora networks (Keun-Joo Christine Pae); Jewish feminism (Yudit Kornberg Greenberg); and Muslimah approaches (Zayn Kassam). The volume's case studies cover Latina art and border activism (Rebecca M. Berru-Davis); economic sustainability and social enterprise (Sharon D. Welch); the harm caused by "credibility excess" in perpetrators of sexual harm (Candace Jordan); systemic discrimination against Black women in health care (Anjeanette M. Allen); and the difference women's preaching makes for Christian preaching styles and leadership (HyeRan Kim-Cragg). Marie M. Fortune contextualizes the #MeToo movement in relation to the FaithTrust Institute's work with religious institutions; and Antoinette E. DeNapoli documents a female guru's response to sexual inequality and violence in Hindu traditions.

Perhaps it is the activist impulse in women's and religious studies that accounts for an overrepresentation of Christian feminist theologians in this volume. Compared to other traditions, Christian feminist critique has enjoyed large institutional support in the academic world. This ongoing hegemony is reflected in an awkward section titled "religious diversity." Essays on the internal diversity of traditions other than Christianity would be welcome. Rosemary Carbine does highlight interfaith women's collaborations in US social justice movements, but the topic should receive more attention in the context of current intersectional coalitions. Nevertheless, this section includes some of the volume's strongest interventions. For example, Michelle Mueller documents how feminist theologians' construction of Wicca as a "women's religion" has shaped an erroneous public perception that "contribute[s] to the fiction that only women can be interested in a theological tradition that acknowledges deity in female form and ordains women" (137). Departing from the field's disproportionate focus on (white) women's ordination and feminine images of the divine, Amy Holmes-Tagchungdarpa investigates female-identified practitioners' agency and animating concerns in the spiritual practice of Chöd in Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist monasteries.

By integrating grassroots and activist perspectives, raising consciousness of gendered norms, and increasing literacy related to women's diverse religious and spiritual contexts, this *Handbook* has something for everyone—whether one needs to update a syllabus or simply to brush up on the indispensability of feminism.

Michelle Voss *Roberts, Professor of Theology, Emmanuel College, Toronto School of Theology*

Come Dance with Me

A Medicine Wheel Practice of Anishinaabe Catholic Interculturation of Faith

This book, the first volume in the series New Paths for the Churches and Indigenous Peoples, explores interculturation of Anishinaabe Roman Catholic faith through a mutually respectful and culturally appropriate dialogue process.

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Sponsored by the Centre on the Churches, Truth, and Reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples (CCTR) of the Faculty of Theology at Saint Paul University in Ottawa, Canada, the purpose of the series New Paths for the Churches and Indigenous Peoples is to publish academic theological research that contributes to the work of reconciliation and healing with Indigenous Peoples in Canada and beyond. The volumes in this series will promote theological research and investigation in service of truth, reconciliation, and healing.

"In *Come Dance with Me*, Sr. Eva offers her readers an important prophetic message based on her spiritual journey. Her life reflects a deep understanding of her Anishinaabe roots and the gifts they render to the Catholic worldview."—Deacon Harry Lafond, Plains Cree

Eva Solomon CSJ, ssm, DMin, currently lives in Winnipeg. In her traditional way, she is a Sacred Pipe Carrier and has worked for several decades with the Canadian bishops on Indigenous ministry and on the development of a truly Indigenous Catholic church.

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