

August, 1974

ISSN 0010-8685

Vol. 24, No. 7

CONTENTS

BONAVENTURE: ROOTED IN FAITH A Review Editorial	234
THE HOLY SPIRIT: LOVE OF THE FATHER AND SON	235
CREATION	257
Welter D. Reinsdorf	
FAITH, REASON, AND	
CHRISTOLOGY David R. Griffin	258
BOOK REVIEWS	267
REGORD REVIEWS	275



by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University. Please address all subscriptions and business correspondence to our Business Manager, Father Bernard R. Greighton, O.F.M., at The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 14778. Manuscripts, Books for Review, and Editorial Correspondence should be sent to the Editor, Father Michael D. Meilach, O.F.M., or Associate Editor, Father Julian A. Davies, O.F.M., at our Editorial Office, Siena College Friary, Loudonville, N.Y. 12211. Second class postage paid at St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 14778, and at additional mailing office. Subscription rates: \$3.00 a year; 30 cents a copy.

COVER AND ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

The cover and illustrations for the July issue were drawn by Brother Thomas J. Kornacki, O.F.M., a third-year theologian at Holy Name College, Washington, D.C.



Bonaventure: Rooted in Faith

F YOU HAVE BEEN NOTICING, and savoring, the texts and commentaries L on Saint Bonaventure with which Marigwen Schumacher has been gracing our pages for the last couple of years, you will waste no time in procuring a copy of Bonaventure: Rooted in Faith.

In the book's Foreword, Father Peter Damian Fehlner, the widely respected Conventual Franciscan scholar, has supplied an eloquent and forceful, effective vindication of Bonaventure's relevance in our day. Miss Schumacher then, in her introductory essay, gives us a deft and succinct—fascinating—portrayal of Bonaventure the man, and a very competent, professional discussion of both the medieval homily and the prior development of its Latin linguistic and rhetorical vehicle.

The fifteen homilies follow, each of them carefully selected from the 700 that are extant, to illustrate the Saint's style in the most diverse circumstances of place, audience, liturgical season and theme. Subjects include prayer, thankfulness, the Eucharist, Easter, and friendship, among many others. The translator is absolutely right when she says that one must take one's time in reading these eloquent homilies: though the senorities of Bonaventure's Latin are irretrievably lost in translation, the striking symbolism and imagery, the subtle comparisons and paradoxes are, in a good translation like this one, very much retained, and the trick is to make oneself hear the effectiveness of such preaching, rather than rest content with seeing the printed words.

There is a useful pair of chronologies: one of Bonaventure's life, and one of his writings— and an equally useful annotated bibliography for use in following up the interest in Bonaventure that these sparkling homilies will doubtless enkindle in every reader.

Fr. Michael D. Mailad, of

Bonaventure-Rooted in Faith: Homilies to a Contemporary World. By Marigwen Schumacher. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974. Pp. xxxii-133. Cloth, \$5.95.

Saint Bonaventure's Theology of the Holy Spirit as Love between Father and Son

WALTER H. PRINCIPE, C.S.B.

love each other "by the Holy Spirit' and, if so, how this is true, were questions that interested thirteenth-century theologians for many reasons. Texts of Saint Augustine and the pseudo-Jerome on which the expression was based had been gathered by Peter Lombard in his Sentences.1 The Master of firming that the Father and Son the Sentences, however, saw prob- love each other by the love which lems in this way of speaking. If is not either of them but is the to love and to be are identical Holy Spirit, Peter Lombard simply in God, how can the Father and the confessed that the question was too Son be said to love each other difficult for him to unravel and inby the Holy Spirit without its be- vited his readers to try to find a ing implied that they have their solution.4 being by that love and so are by

W HETHER THE FATHER and Son the Holy Spirit? Moreover, had not love each other "but he Holy Spirit?" Moreover, had not expression, "The Father is wise by the wisdom he has begotten," because it would imply that the Father has his being from his begotten Wisdom?³ Having formulated these difficulties and vet being faced with clear texts from authorities af-

As was to be expected, the Lom-

Father Walter H. Principe, C.S.B., is Professor of History of Theology at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto: Professor of History of Ideas at the Graduate Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto; and Professor of Systematic and of Historical Theology at the University of St. Michael's College, Toronto. The present paper is a revision by the author of his paper of the same title in volume IV of the commemorative centennial volumes on St. Bonaventure, edited by Father Jacques Guy Bougerol, O.F.M., S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974 (Rome: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1974).

¹Sententiae in IV Libros Distinctae I, d. 10, cc. 1-3; and I, d. 32, c. 1. edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 3rd ed., Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV (Grottaferrata, 1971), I, 110-14, 232-33.

²Ibid. I. d. 32, c. 1 (I. 232-33), and c. 6 (I. 239).

³Ibid. I. d. 32, c. 2 (I. 234), and c. 6 (I. 238-39).

For the whole discussion see ibid. I, d. 32, c. 6 (I, 238-40): "1 admit that it is difficult for me to solve this question, especially since it takes its origin from statements [of the Fathers] that seem to be logically similar to it. These statements confuse my weak intelligence, which prefers to report statements of the Fathers rather than to contribute something of my own" (n. 2; p. 239). "Nevertheless, we leave that question to the diligence of our readers so that they may examine it more fully and solve it, being ourselves incapable of doing so" (n. 3; p. 239).

throughout the twelfth and early thirteenth century a whole series of opinions were advanced as solutions. There were, moreover, other reasons besides Lombard's invitation that served to heighten interest in the question. Influenced by Richard of St. Victor, theologians of the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries stressed the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as mutual love of the Father and Son. Thus the expression. "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," formed an integral although not exclusive component of the theology of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the expression is closely related to, and in some authors such as Saint Bonaventure, expressly linked with the role of the Holy Spirit as bond (nexus) of the Father and Son: this topic involved discussions about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son and at times was related to the debate with the Eastern church about this matter.6 Further, for theologians of the late twelfth and early thirteenth speculative centuries grammar constituted an important tool, a tool

bard's expression of helplessness they took pleasure in using in ways together with his invitation to his that might be found disconcerting readers spurred theologians to de- if we did not see in our day a vise their own solutions to his revival of interest in an analogous problem, with the result that type of linguistic analysis. An expression such as the one in question invited theologians trained in methods of speculative grammar to examine such items as the meaning of the ablative case to express the relation (habitudo) of the Holy Spirit as love to the Father and the Son, the importance of the reflexive, "each other" (se), in the expression, the possibility of substituting "through" the Holy Spirit (per Spiritum Sanctum) for "by" the Holy Spirit (Spiritu Sancto), etc. Again, the discussion of this question about the Holy Spirit, centering as it did on the somewhat obscure and still unclarified terminology of love, was the locus historically for clarification of Trinitarian theology with respect to essential, notional, and personal names. Finally because new concepts and terminology were entering theology through the advent of Aristotle and his Arabian commentators, this particular question provided for certain. authors a testing-ground for some of these concepts, especially those dealing with forms and causality.

So intrigued with this question were theologians such as Williams

⁶See Stohr, pp. 56-59.

of Auxerre and Saint Albert the Great, for example, that it formed the pivotal point of their discussion of the entire theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit.7 Although this cannot be said of Saint Bonaventure, it is nevertheless true that his discussion of this expression is an essential part of his theology of the Holy Spirit and also provides a good insight into his own theology, his relations with his predecessors, and his own personal contribution to the areas touched upon by this discussion. Here we shall examine Saint Bonaventure's explanation within his theology of the Holy Spirit related to the expression, and at the same time attempt to locate his discussion in its historical context.8

Some Historical Antecedents

By THE TIME Bonaventure came to our question, a number of opinions had already become standardized in

the schools. An early response to Lombard's problem about the identity of loving and being in God was the "appropriation" opinion: the love spoken of is really the essential love common to the three persons, but it is attributed or appropriated to the Holy Spirit because he is the common Spirit of the Father and Son. This solution was one of the earliest to be proposed; it occurs already in Gandolph of Bologna's Sententiarum Libri Quatuor, and appears to have been the solution favored by Peter of Poitiers. 10 It did not, however, satisfy the main body of theologians. Lombard's second problem, that of Augustine's rejection of the seemingly parallel statement, "The Father is wise by the wisdom he has begotten," was met by some theologians with the "retractation" opinion. The first work in which I have seen this mentioned is the Glossa in Sententias Petri Lombardi found in MS. Paris, Mazarine


⁵Remarks on the historical context will be based on a dissertation presented by the author a number of years ago in the Section des Sciences Religieuses of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, entitled: La question "Utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto" de Pierre Lombard à saint Thomas d'Aquin. See also Ludwig Ott, Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 34 (Münster i. W., 1937), pp. 624 - 31) and, for St. Bonaventure in particular, Albert Stohr, Die Trinitätslehre des heiligen Bonaventura, Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 3 (Münster i. W., 1923), especially (for our question), pp. 149-51.

^{&#}x27;See William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea I, c. 7, q. 7 (Paris: Pigouchet, 1500), foll. 18ra-19ra ("Concerning the procession by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son"), and Albert the Great, I Sent. d. 10, aa. 2, 4, 6-10 (ed. S. Borgnet, Opera Omnia [Lyons, 1893], XXV, 309-29). Despite such an extended treatment in d. 10, Albert gives another long analysis in *I Sent.* d. 32, aa. 1-2 (ed. Borgnet, XXVI, 121-28).

⁸Within the limits of this article the historical context can only be very brief. The dissertation mentioned above, n. 5. studied a wealth of unedited material in the 13th century (e. g., four questions on the topic in MS. Douai 434 alone), in addition to printed sources.

⁹See I, 98; ed. J. de Walter (Vienna, 1924), p. 66.

^{10&}quot;... Others put it better when they say that this word 'to love' is not used in that statement metaphorically but rather in its proper signification, so that the meaning is: 'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit,' that is, by their benignity, because benignity is attributed to the Spirit. Therefore, whether one should say, 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,' or 'The Son loves the Father by the Holy Spirit,' or whether one should say, 'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, it is the divine essence that is predicated.... They love each other by their proper gift, that is, by their essence, which is their proper gift to the Holy Spirit, or [they love each other] by their proper gift,



758. It reports the opinion of certain unnamed theologians who argued that because Augustine had first held that the Father is wise

by his begotten Wisdom but had then retracted this opinion, his retractation applied as well to the statement, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," because "the two statements are of the same reason." This solution was also found unsatisfactory by the generality of theologians.

A solution that is important for Bonaventure's analysis is the "sign" opinion, which seems to have originated with Simon of Tournai, although an important letter of Richard of St. Victor on our topic suggests the same idea. 12 Simon wished to deny that the Holy Spirit exercises any causal relationship toward the Father and the Son.

that is, by their own benignity, which is appropriated to their gift, that is to the Holy Spirit, although it is common to all, so that it becomes a simple relation." Sententiae I, c. 21; edd. P. S. Moore and M. Dulong (Notre Dame, 1943), I, 177-78.

11"If the Father is loved by the Son by means of the Holy Spirit and vice versa, then since it is the same thing for the Father to love the Son as it is for him to be, the Father also has his being by means of the Holy Spirit. In reply to this argument certain theologians say that Augustine retracted this statement when he retracted a similar statement. For in his book, On the City of God, he retracted what he had said elsewhere, namely, that because the Apostle says that the Son is the wisdom of the Father, the Father is wise by the Son. But it is the same for the Father to be wise as it is for him to be. It follows from this, therefore, that the Father has his being by the Son. Therefore, when Augustine retracts this statement, 'The Father is wise by the Son,' he consequently retracts this one as well, 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,' because these two statements are of the same reason." Fol. 14v mg. inf. In his Retractationes I, 26 (PL 32, 625; CSEL 36, 118), Augustine says: "In my book, 84 Questions, I said of the Father that he begot that wisdom by which he is said to be wise, but I treated of that question better in my later book, On the Trinity. See De Trinitate VII, 1-3, 1-6; PL 42, 931-39; CC 50, 244-54.

¹²Richard says: "Therefore, the Father is said to love by the Holy Spirit not that he has love through him, but that he shows forth, not that he receives love from him, but that he expends love through him." Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est amor Patris et Filii, ed. J. Ribaillier, Richard de Saint-Victor: Opuscules théologiques, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, 15 (Paris, 1967), p. 165. Also in PL 196, 1012A. The letter is dated by Ribaillier as after 1157 and before Richard's De Trinitate, which he judges to be one of his last works. This leaves it uncertain as to whether it precedes Simon's works. In any case, as we shall see, this letter does not seem to have an immediate influence whereas the "sign" opinion appeared soon after Simon in other writers who attribute it to him.

Thus in a text of his Summa or Institutiones in divinam paginam he says that the Father does not love the Son by the Spirit nor does the Son love the Father by the Spirit. Yet the Holy Spirit is called the love of the Father and Son because, being spirated by them by one act of spiration, he is the sign but not the cause of their indissoluble love. As lovers join their kisses in such a way as to seem to breathe the same breath (spiritus), so the Holy Spirit is the sign of the Father and Son in their love.13 A longer text in Simon's Disputationes is even clearer:

Although the Spirit is the love of the Father and Son, or the delectation which the Father has toward the Son or the Son toward the Father, nevertheless neither loves the other by the Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is called the love or delectation of the Father and Son not in an effective but in a signifying way. For in that he is spirated by the same individual spiration from them, he signifies but does not bring it

about that they love each other mutually.... For the Father and the Son do not love each other by a person but by the [divine] essence.¹⁴

These texts deserve to be quoted at length because, as we shall see, Bonaventure in his rejection of this opinion still sees some elements of truth in it.

An opinion associated with the name of Praepositinus of Cremona is given as saying that the statement indicates the "subauthority" (subauctoritas) of the Holy Spirit with respect to the Father and Son in the act of loving. That is, the Holy Spirit is said to receive his ability to be an "author" of love from the Father and Son, who are principal authors of love in God, so that the Holy Spirit's derived authorship is really a "subauthority." In Praepositinus himself the love in question is in fact the love of the Father and Son for human creatures rather than for each other "by the Holy Spirit,15

14Disputationes, d. 65, q. 1; ed. J. Warichez, Les "Disputationes" de

Simon de Tournai (Louvain, 1932), pp. 181-82.

^{13&}quot;Neither does the Father love the Son nor the Son love the Father by the Spirit, and yet the Holy Spirit is called the love of the Father and the Son, because, by the very fact that the Spirit is spirated by them by one act of spiration, he is the sign, not the cause, of their indissoluble love, and this is what Augustine says: 'They preserve in the bond of peace the unity of spirit by their own gift' as a sign, but not as an efficient cause. And since sacred theology borrows vocabulary from every other discipline, it borrows these terms from comic poets. For clearly those who love each other join their kisses in such a way as to seem to breathe the same breath." Ed. M. Schmaus, "Die Texte der Trinitätslehre in den Sententiae des Simon von Tournai," RTAM 4 (1932), 279.

^{18&}quot;... Sometimes [the oblique case in grammar denotes] authority, and this in two ways: authority from him or of him. From him [when it is said]: 'The Father operates through the Son'—there it denotes that the Son has authority to operate from the Father; or of him: if I were to say: 'The Son operates through himself,' it denotes that the authority of operating is [the authority] of the Son but it does not show from whom he has it. Again, when I say, 'The Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit,' the oblique case denotes that the Holy Spirit has authority to love from

but later authors such as William of Auxerre interpreted his opinion as also referring to the love of the Father and Son for each other. In any case, criticisms of this opinion made by William and others minimized its importance, and it is mentioned only once in Bonaventure's exposition.¹⁶

William of Auxerre himself, writing in the early thirteenth century, advanced a bold solution. He did not hesitate to say that because love properly informs the lover in whom the love is found, the Holy Spirit, the love by which the Father and Son love each other, properly speaking informs the Father and the Son.¹⁷ The only earlier use of the

concept of form that I have found is that in the previously mentioned Glossa of MS. Paris Mazarine 758, which says that the ablative, "by the Holy Spirit," is to be understood neither in a causal or quasicausal manner nor in a formal manner but in a "quasi-formal" manner, as when one savs that the Father is Father "by paternity." 18 William of Auxerre, however, says that the love in question, which for him is the properly personal love which is the Holy Spirit, "properly speaking informs" the Father and Son. 19 It should be noted, however, that William avoids using the word "cause" or the expression "formal cause," although

the Father and the Son. But if I should say, 'The Holy Spirit loves us by the Holy Spirit,' it denotes that the authority to love is [the authority] of the Holy Spirit." Text established from MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 13, 420, fol. 39vb; MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 14, 526, fol. 14rb; MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 15, 738, fol. 21va; MS. Paris Mazarine 1, 004, fol. 106va.

¹⁶I Sent., d. 10, dub. 3; I, 206.

17" Again, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of benignity and so as gift and as first gift. But the first gift is love. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son and vice versa. But love, properly speaking, informs the lover in whom it exists. Therefore, properly speaking, the Holy Spirit informs the Father and the Son. Therefore, when one says, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," that ablative is properly formal: which some grant who say that 'love' (dilectio) is said properly of the Holy Spirit." Summa Aurea I, c. 7, q. 7; ed. P. Pigouchet (Paris, 1500), fol. 18rb-va.

18"Again, when one says, 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,' that ablative 'by the Holy Spirit' is taken formally or quasi-formally, or causally [or] quasi-causally. But [it is not taken] causally or quasi-causally. Therefore [it is taken] formally or quasi-formally. But not formally. Therefore [it is taken] quasi-formally, as when one says, 'The Father is Father by paternity.'" Fol. 14v mg. inf. That the Gloss is reporting an opinion which it does not accept is shown by the words which follow at once: "In this way, then, this is true, 'The Father is paternity'; by the same reason this too [is true], 'The Father is the Holy Spirit,' and so the persons are mixed up" (loc. cit.).

slight qualification later on in the same question: "To what has been said above we answer without prejudice to a better opinion that this is true, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," according as that ablative is formal or quasi-formal." Summa Aurea I, c. 7, q. 7; Pigouchet, fol. 18vb.

later authors will say that he taught a doctrine of "formal causality" in giving his solution to this question.²⁰ Bonaventure quite rightly avoids saying this of William and although he criticizes William's opinion, he finds some element of the truth in the concept of form.

To complete the picture of the background against which Bonaventure approached this problem, three other important developments should be noted. The first is the elaboration of three senses of the meaning of "to love (diligere), a task which was completed in the years before Bonaventure, and which distinguished love or diligere as essential, as notional, and as personal.

Although the distinction between love as essential and as personal was easy to grasp, it required a number of decades for theologians, working within the discussion of this very question, to distinguish the notional act of love from the essential act of love. Hints of this distinction appear already in Robert of Melun, writing between 1155 and 1160,21 and appear in a number of other authors such as Peter of Poitiers, Praepositinus of Cremona, and William of Auxerre, who find some concept of relation or procession or spiration in the term diligere when it is used of the Father and Son's love for each other by the Holy Spirit.²² As for the

²⁰Although they do not name him, Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas seem to have William in mind when they describe the opinion which understands the ablative as understood according to a "formal cause." See Alexander of Hales, Glosse in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, I, d. 32, n. 2e; edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1951), I, 322. For Thomas Aquinas, see Summa Theologiae I, q. 27, a. 2c.

²¹"There is, as I have said, a question proposed that must be removed from its state of doubt through [the use of] the proper notion of love. It is proper to love to proceed from one person to another, and this procession is clearly shown when one says, "The Father is loving by the Holy Spirit." For when Augustine said this, he wished to show forth the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and not that the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit." Sententiae I, pars 6a, c. 53; edd. R.-M. Martin and R.-M. Gallet, Oeuvres de Robert de Melun, t. III, vol. II (Louvain, 1952), p. 378.

²²Peter of Poitiers says: "When therefore one says, 'It is the same thing for the Father to love as it is for him to be; the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit; therefore he is by the Holy Spirit,' there is a fallacy of equivocation, for this word 'I love' in the first instance predicates the divine essence, but afterwards, when it is used in the minor proposition of the syllogism, it signifies a relation. For when it is said by itself, 'The Father loves by the Holy Spirit,' the statement is false because the essence is predicated, but when the accusative ['the Son'] is added ['to love'] is transferred in meaning to signify a relation." Sententiae I, 21; Moore-Dulong, I, 180-81.

Praepositinus: "This verb 'to be wise' is an absolute verb and signifies, as it were, an innate reception. Hence if I were to say, 'The Father is wise through the Son,' it would more correctly be understood that the Father would have wisdom from the Son than the other way round. But this word 'to love' is a transitive verb. Hence when one says, 'The Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit,' it is more correctly understood that the Holy

term "notion" (notio) itself, Alexander of Hales is the first author I have found using it to distinguish the Father and Son's spirating the Holy Spirit from their common essential love. He says: "When one says, 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,' one denotes the common notion of the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, namely, spiration."23 So too an anonymous author whose question is found in MS. Douai 434 and who seems to depend on Alexander of Hales makes a distinction between an absolute sense of the word "to love" (diligere) and a transitive sense: the former refers to the essential love in God, the latter (as used in the expression under consideration) refers to the "no-

the love by which they are united in the common act of spirating the Holy Spirit.24 In various forms this distinction became widely used among theologians in the period after Alexander of Hales; we find both Albert the Great and Bonaventure referring to it as a commonplace, although each gives his own personal interpretation of the distinction.25

A second important development was the entry of an argument contained in a letter of Richard of St. Victor concerned with the expression we are examining. In this letter Richard first gives a long argument using the methods of speculative grammar; he then adds an argument based on the human psychology of loving. The tional love" of the Father and Son, substance of this latter argument is

Spirit has love from the Father than the other way round." Text established from MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 13, 420, fol. 36rb; MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 14, 526, fol. 14rb-va; MS. Paris Nat. Lat. 15,738, fol. 21rb-va; MS. Paris Mazarine 1, 004, fol. 106va-vb.

William of Auxerre: "The solution: Something is said to be predicated relatively in many ways Fourthly, from the mode of signifying or when by the nature of the thing itself there is implied a relation from the mode of signifying; as when one says, 'He is,' indicating the Father, by reason of the indication there is signified a relation distinguishing [the Father]. For from the nature of the thing a relation is sometimes signified through the noun 'love' just as it is through the noun 'gift.'" Summa Aurea I, c. 7, q. 7; Pigouchet, foll. 18vb-19ra.

²³Glossa I, d. 10, n. 10h; ed. cit. I, 134.

24"I reply: The word 'loving' is understood in three ways, sometimes absolutely, sometimes transitively, and the latter in two ways, either from a person to a person, or from a person to a created thing. It is understood absolutely when one says, 'The Father loves himself But the case is different when the word 'loving' is posited transitively, for then it receives a determination from the ablative, as when one says, 'The Father's loves the Son by the Holy Spirit'; and then the word 'to love' is not taken for the love which is essential but rather for that which is notional and then it refers to the common notion of the Father and Son in comparison with the Holy Spirit. Hence the meaning of this expression, 'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit,' is that the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit and are one in will with respect to that common act." Vol. II, fol. 70rb.

*For Albert, see his I Sent., d. 10, a. 4 ad 4; Borgnet XXV, 316. For Bonaventure, see infra, pp. 245-46.

that just as in human love one can Father and Son, they saw real value be said to love by the love proceeding from him, so the Father and the Son can be said to love not only by themselves (for they are love) but also by the love which proceeds from them, the Holy Spirit who is the love of each.26 This psychological analogy played no part in the discussions until it was quoted and used by Alexander of Hales in his Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum. From then on it is quoted regularly in this debate, although it is mistakenly attributed to Hugh of St. Victor.27 The importance of this argument is that it suggested the way to the final solution agreed upon in one form or another by most of the major theologians of the thirteenth century. Although they rejected William of Auxerre's concept of love as informing the

in the concept of love as a form proceeding within or from the activity of loving. Richard of St. Victor's psychological analogy was brought in at this point to clarify the notion of love that proceeds from lovers in their act of love and that can be thought of as a kind of form without its being a formal cause to the lovers of their love. Alexander of Hales, describing what kind of relation is indicated in the expression by the ablative, "by the Holy Spirit," says that it is not the "relation of a formal cause, but of a quasi-form coming into existence from those things of which it is, as it were (quasi) a form. For a fetter or bond is to be understood through the concept of form for those things of which it is fetter or bond."28 He then, in a kind of textual appendix to his discussion.

²⁸Glossa I, d. 32, n. 2g; ed. cit. I, 321. The Summa Fratris Alexandri makes practically the same statement: "But if it is asked what kind of relation is denoted in the ablative, it must be said that it is not [the

^{26&}quot;If the Holy Spirit is the love of each, why is the Father not rightly said to love by the Holy Spirit, that is, by his love? Why is not the Son also rightly said to love by the Holy Spirit, that is, by his love? The human soul is not love, but love proceeds from it, and therefore it does not love by itself but by the love proceeding from it. But the Father is love, and his Holy Spirit is love, and therefore the Father loves by himself and he loves by the Holy Spirit. He loves by himself, being himself love, and he loves by his love. Who does not know that the Son of Blessed Mary and the son of Nun [i. e., Josue] are called 'Jesus' equivocally? Likewise, if your love and divine love were spoken of equivocally, and if the Holy Spirit were said to be the love of your heart just as the Holy Spirit is said to be the love of the Father and Son, who, I ask, could deny that you love by the Holy Spirit, that is, by your love? If you are rightly said to love by the love which proceeds from you, why are the Father and Son not rightly said to love by the love which proceeds from them?" Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est amor Patris et Filii; Ribaillier (see above, n. 12), pp. 165-66.

²⁷Ribaillier, in his excellent "Etude littéraire" introducing the letter (pp. 157-61), discusses the authenticity of the letter. Although there are some slight problems in the manuscript tradition and in the contents, there can be no serious doubt that it is indeed Richard's work, as the general manuscript tradition indicates; see p. 160.

gives a long quotation from Richard's letter containing the psychological argument.²⁹ Although Alexander makes no explicit link between his own position and Richard's arguments, it seems that Alexander's original view was influenced by Richard's letter.

Albert the Great says that "the ablative is construed according to the relation of something existing from a principle which has the act of a form in uniting." He draws a parallel between the Father's speaking all things by the Word (the Word also "existing from a principle by the act of speaking, that is, as a kind of effect of speaking") and the Holy Spirit as a "kind of effect of the Father and Son in their loving." And when he comments on the Richardian argu-

ment, he explains that the love by which anyone loves is not a form resting in the subject but is a kind of effect having the act of a "quasiform." In this way, he says, the analogy suits the Father and Son's loving each other by the love which is the Holy Spirit.³¹ Some of these themes will reappear in Bonaventure.

A third important development was the growth of interest in the question of the Holy Spirit as bond (nexus) of the Father and Son. The text from Alexander of Hales that has just been seen mentions this role of the Holy Spirit as bond of the Father and Son. This theme had always been present in the discussion because of the texts gathered by Peter Lombard immediately ahead of the presentation of the

relation] of a formal cause, but of a quasi-form coming into existence from* those things of which it is, as it were [quasi], a form in so far as they love. For a fetter or bond or connection is to be understood through the concept of form with respect to those things of which it is a fetter or connection." I, q. 67, m. 3, a. 3 (n. 460); edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1924), I, 657.

*"from": the editors read "in" but give, among the variants, the reading "from" (ab), which makes the best sense and corresponds to the earlier

text of Alexander's Glossa.

²⁹Glossa I, d. 32, n. 15; ed. cit. I, 329-30.


**Source **S

31For when it is objected that by everything that is truly love someone loves something, it must be said that it must not [be understood to love] by it as by a form resting in the subject but as by an effect having the act of a quasi-form: the latter manner is very fitting in God." *Ibid.*, ad 6; Borgnet XXVI, 126.

problem we are considering.³² This topic, however, seems to have taken on greater importance in the thirteenth century and to have been incorporated partially within the question we are examining. The separate history of this theme is interesting and important, but it would be too complicated to go into at this point. Suffice it to say that Bonaventure, as we shall see, bases on this concept of the Holy Spirit as bond much of his analysis of the Father and Son in their love by the Holy Spirit.

Saint Bonaventure's Analysis

WITH THESE PRELIMINARIES in mind we turn to Bonaventure's treatment of the expression, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit." After reading the meandering and somewhat disorganized discussions of the subject in earlier authors such as William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales in his Glossa, the Summa Fratris Alexandri, and Albert the Great, one is struck by the clarity of organization achieved by Bonaventure, an organization that eliminates many repetitions of the kind found in the earlier authors. In Book I, distinction 10, of his Commentary on the Sentences Bonaventure lavs the theological foundations of his reply to our problem when he discusses the procession according to love and the role of the Holy Spirit as bond of the Father and Son. He reserves for distinction 32 of the same book his grammatico-logical analysis of the expression, "The Fa-



ther and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," and his own attitude towards the various opinions. Bonaventure's separation of the ontological and the grammatical aspects marked an important advance towards a clearer and more critical solution of the problem.

In Book I, distinction 10, having spoken in the first article about the procession of the Holy Spirit by way of liberality, by way of love, and by way of mutual love, 33 he lays the theological foundations of his position on our question when he asks at the start of the second article whether love or charity is something proper to the Holy Spirit. In a very personal way he distinguishes in God three types of love: essential love, by which each of the persons loves by himself, and which can be called "complacency"; notional love, by which the Father and Son are in concord in spirating the Holy Spirit, their concord being named "love" or "delectation"; personal love, which

:14104004600460046004600460

³²Sententiae I, d. 31, c. 6; ed. cit., I, 232.

³³ Sent., d. 10, a. 1, qq. 1-3; I, 194-99.

is the Holy Spirit, because he who is produced by way of perfect liberality cannot be other than love or delectation.34

distinctions with the example of is not proper to the Son, so neither the love of bride and groom. Their is love proper to the Holy Spirit.³⁷ social love directed toward living together corresponds to the essential love in God; their mutual conjugal love for each other directed toward begetting a child, corresponds to the concord of the Holy Spirit as love is the Son's Father and Son in spirating the name, "Word." Although "Wisdom" Holy Spirit; and if the child were implies no relation in its meaning, produced solely from their will in both "love" and "word" imply a concord (and not, he implies, also relation in their meaning: "love" by bodily generation), it would be a relation to those joined by love. love (amor), whereas in fact the "word" a relation to the one child is the loved one (amatus) speaking the word. Bonaventure inunless he can be called love dicates here that he will show later (amor) by using an emphatic mode on that this is why the Father of speech.35 Bonaventure sees that and the Son love each other by his example is imperfect and the Holy Spirit without the Father's hastens to point out that because being wise by his begotten Wiswhat proceeds in created love is not dom.38 a person, it differs in this respect from what takes place in God. In God, he says, that which proceeds in the concord of the Father and Son is "truly and properly love [amor], having the reason both of love and of person [hypostasis]". He is love because he first proceeds from a most liberal will by way of perfect liberality; he is person because, being distinguished from those who produce him and vet being unable to be distintinguished essentially, he is distin-

guished personally; this is not the case in created love.36

An argument is made that wisdom is to the Son as love is to the Saint Bonaventure illustrates his Holy Spirit and that since wisdom Bonaventure prepares the way for later precisions by rejecting the parallel of wisdom and love and by insisting that the true parallel for the Son with respect to the

> The fact that love has a relation to another person had already been used by Bonaventure earlier in distinction 10 precisely to indicate that this is why the Holy Spirit is the love by which (quo) the Father loves the Son. An argument had pointed to this relational aspect of love and had said that because a person exists perfectly in itself and as distinct and not tending to another, no person could proceed by way of love.39 Bonaventure distinguishes

types of proceeding, the first of which looks to the other as an object. Because in God it is fitting that there be a relation to another person, this first mode of procession is suitably present and is found in the Holy Spirit as the love by which the Father loves the Son.40

One of the most important questions within distinction 10 for the later discussion in distinction 32 is the question whether the Holy Spirit is the bond (nexus) or unity of the Father and Son. In his basic reply to this question Bonaventure teaches that the Holy Spirit is properly called the bond or unity of the Father and Son because the Father and Son communicate in one Spirit, so that he is the unity of both of them. Beyond his oneness of person is the fact that he is love. Since the Spirit is love, their communication in him is in one love, and since love is most properly a bond, the Holy Spirit is properly a bond for the Father and Son in that he is their mutual love, he is a unique and a "substantified" love.41 This_constitutes a forceful argument for the Holy Spirit as bond not only in terms of his being one person in whom they communicate but even more in his being love, a love that is unique and at the same time mutual for the Father and Son. Bonaventure's envisaging the Holy Spirit's role as bond in terms of love is crucial for his later position on the Father and Son's love by the Holy Spirit.

Important precisions are brought forth in the Seraphic Doctor's replies to some of the arguments. One argument holds that a bond is needed only for things that are separated, and since neither Father nor Son is separated from the other, no bond is needed for them. 42 Bonaventure replies by distinguishing three kinds of "separation" in which a bond can be found: local separation; substantial separation or difference in essence: difference in relative property (called properly not a separation but a distinction). The Father and Son are distinct in this third way and therefore can rightly be said to be connected.43

The following reply introduces further clarifications: the bond Bonaventure is speaking about with reference to the Holy Spirit is the agreement of the Father and Son in being at the origin of the Holy Spirit, for the one person of the Holy Spirit originates from each of them in one and the same way.44 The reply to the fourth argument is most precise. The Holy Spirit's being bond of the Father and Son does not mean that the Holy Spirit exercises any active role with respect to them. When it is said that he joins together the Father and the Son, it means that he proceeds from each of them. Some verbs in their active voice really signify a passion, and "to join together" (nectere) is such a verb. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is bond of the Fa-

³⁴Ibid., a. 2, q. 1, Sol.; I, 201.

³⁵Loc. cit. 36Loc. cit.

³⁷Ibid., arg. 3 a; I, 200.

³⁸ Ibid., ad 3; I, 201.

³⁹ Sent., d. 10, a. 1, g. 2, arg. 2 a; I, 197.

⁴⁰Ibid., ad 2; I, 198.

⁴¹I Sent., d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, Sol.; I, 202.

⁴²Ibid., arg. 1 a; I, 202.

⁴³Ibid., ad. 1; I, 202.

⁴⁴Ibid., ad 2; I, 203.

ther and Son in that he proceeds in a passive manner from these two acting in common, not giving anything to them but receiving from them.45 This discussion of the Holy Spirit as bond through love shows that Bonaventure is oriented toward seeing the role of the Holy Spirit as mutual love of the Father and Son in terms of the Holy Spirit's being a kind of effect rather than cause of the Father and Son in their love. This fundamental view will govern his approach to the question whether and how the Father and Son love each other "by the Holy Spirit."

The discussion of this question within distinction 32 of Book I of the Sentences is divided into two carefully articulated questions whose clarity and precision again aid the analysis. The first question asks whether the expression, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," is to be accepted; the second asks what precise relation (habitudo) is to be construed in the ablative, "by the Holy Spirit" (Spiritu Sancto).

The first question opens with a series of authoritative texts in favor of the proposition: texts from Augustine, the pseudo-Jerome, saint Bernard, and the important passage from Richard of St. Victor's letter.48 Two arguments are also given in favor of the expression, one a long dialectical elimination of other possibilities, the other an appeal to

the parallel already mentioned between the spoken word and love. Just as the Father speaks himself and all things by the Word proceeding from him in that he declares himself and all things, so the Father and the Son love each other by the love that proceeds from them.47 Here too we see that Bonaventure's orientation is toward seeing the Holy Spirit as love after the manner of some kind of effect.

In his main reply to this question Bonaventure first mentions in order to eliminate some of the opinions we have seen given in the schools. The "retractation" solution cannot stand, he says, because other authorities than Augustine have taught the doctrine involved in this expression, and Augustine could hardly have been said to have retracted their statements!48 The "appropriation" solution cannot stand, either, because then one would have to say that since goodness is also appropriated to the Holy Spirit, the Father and Son are good by the Holy Spirit, which is in no way to be conceded.49

Bonaventure arrives at his own position by applying his earlier distinction of essential and notional love. If the verb "to love" (diligere) in the expression is taken essentially, it refers to the complacency of the will which has been seen to be common to all three persons; in this case it would be false to say that the Father and the Son

love each other by the Holy Spirit because then they would be by the Holy Spirit.⁵⁰ If, however, love is taken notionally, it then refers to the fecundity of the will to produce a person from itself, a fecundity that is found in only two persons: in this case the statement is true. The Father and Son love each other in the sense that the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, and since the love which is the Holy Spirit is a love joining the Father with the Son and the Son with the Father, the statement is then true.⁵¹,

The doctrine of the Holy Spirit as bond through love stands as the key to Bonaventure's acceptance of the expression at this point. It also allows him to show how the statement is true without requiring him to accept another statement he considers false, namely, "The Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit." When "to love" (diligere) is taken essentially, he says, the reflexive pronoun (se) is construed with the verb "they love" reciprocally. By this Bonaventure means that if "to love" refers to the essential love in God, the statement. "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," really means "The Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit" and "The Son loves himself by the Holy Spirit" since "they love," taken essentially, would indicate the very divine essence that is identical with the persons and by which each person loves himself. These state-

ments he would not accept. But when "to love" is taken notionally, he says, the reflexive pronoun (se) is conscrued with the verb "retransitively." This means, as has been seen, that the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, and since the Holy Spirit is the bond of this mutual love, the expression can be accepted with this understanding of "to love". 52

The importance of the idea of the Holy Spirit as bond of love as the basis for Bonaventure's acceptance of the expression comes out again in his reply to an argument stating that "to love" cannot be understood notionally.53 In a delicate and subtle analysis in which he uses the parallel notions of "to generate" and "to speak" as an example for his analysis of "to spirate" and "to love," Bonaventure distinguishes two elements signified by a notional name. These are the simple fact of proceeding (emanatio) and the mode of emanation (modus emanandi). Thus "to generate" expresses only the emanation, or procession, whereas "to speak" signifies more by expressing something about the person, that is, "to speak" implies not only the act of generating but also that of declaring or expressing. Thus one can say that the Father speaks himself by his Word. In parallel fashion, "to spirate," like "to generate," designates only the emanation or procession, whereas "to love" adds something more, the mode of procession. "To love" im-

⁴⁵ Ibid., ad 4; I, 203.

⁴⁶ Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, args. 1-4 f; 1, 556-57.

⁴⁷ Ibid., arg. 5 f; I, 557.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Sol.; I, 557-58.

⁴⁹Ibid., Sol.; I, 558.

⁵⁰Loc. cit.

⁵¹Loc. cit.

⁵² See texts cited supra, nn. 50-51.

⁵³Ibid., arg. 3 a; I, 557.

plies the act of connecting or of being in concord in spirating. It is by reason of this act of connecting that the Father and Son are said to love each other by the Holy Spirit. That is, by being in concord with each other they spirate the Holy Spirit, or again by spirating the Holy Spirit they are connected with each other.54 Here grammatical analysis combines with Bonaventure's fundamental theological viewpoint on the Holy Spirit as bond of love to justify the use of love in a notional and not only an essential way. This particular reply is also important because it points out the richness added to the theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit by the expression in question; to speak only in terms of spiration would fail to indicate the modality of love and union involved in the Holy Spirit's procession.

At this point Bonaventure, with remarkable ease and dispatch, disposes of the two arguments that troubled Peter Lombard. To the argument that since to love is the same as to will good and to will is the same as to be, therefore the Father and Son are by the Holy Spirit if they love by the Holy Spirit. Bonaventure replies that this argument takes "to love" as referring to essential love whereas in the expression it must be understood notionally, in which case the argument does not hold. 55 When the parallel between the expression and "The Father is wise by his begotten wisdom" is urged, Bonaventure simply replies that "to be wise" is not said notionally as "to love" is, but is either a common or an appropriated name. The clarification of the terminology of love accomplished over the preceding decades renders Lombard's problems almost insignificant for Bonaventure.

In the second question of this article concerning the expression, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit," Bonaventure, having accepted the expression on the basis of his doctrines of the Holy Spirit as bond of love and of "to love" as a notional term, now turns to the other part of the expression, the ablative "by the Holy Spirit." How is this ablative to be construed, he asks? At this point he introduces two of the other opinions described earlier, the opinion of sign and the opinion of love as informing the Father and the Son. When the ablative is construed under the notion of a sign, Bonaventure says, the Holy Spirit is related after the manner of something produced with respect to the love of the Father and Son, and therefore, according to this opinion, the Holy Spirit is the sign of that love. The expression would mean that the Father and Son love each other and the sign of this is that they spirate in concord the Holy Spirit, who is unique and undivided-love.57 This opinion, Bonaventure argues,

is insufficient because according to it the Father and Son could be said to love each other by created love since created love is a sign of their love. Moreover, it would mean that begotten Wisdom would be a most special sign of wisdom in the Father who begets: in that case, it would be true that the Father is wise by his begotten Wisdom, a proposition that has constantly been rejected. Bonaventure explicitly identifies this opinion as that of Simon of Tournai. 59

Bonaventure now turns to the opinion which he says is that of William of Auxerre, namely that the ablative "by the Holy Spirit" is to be understood under the reason of a form. This opinion is false, Bonaventure says, because it would mean that the Father and Son would receive something from the Holy Spirit when he is their bond. According to this opinion, he says, "to love each other" means that the Father and Son are formally joined or linked by a bond which is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, according to them it is true, formally speaking (and "formally" must be taken in a strong sense here), that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit in the same way as it is formally true that they are joined by a bond.60

Bonaventure pursues this argument with dialectical force, and

again it is his doctrine of the Holy Spirit as bond that is involved. When the Father and Son are said to be joined by a bond (nectuntur nexu), "being joined" expresses either something that is in them from the Holy Spirit or something that is in them in so far as they are the principle of the Holy Spirit. The former alternative is impossible because it would mean that they receive something from the Holy Spirit—in fact, because of the simplicity of God, they would receive everything, including their being, from the Holy Spirit, which is evidently false.81

The second alternative is the only one possible. The Father and the Son's "being joined" expresses something that is in the Father and the Son as principle of the Holy Spirit. (Here Bonaventure repeats an earlier idea that although the phrase "they are joined" is passive in its form, it is active in reality.) Therefore the Holy Spirit is related to their joining as to his own principle and not in any way by the notion of a form that could give them something.⁶²

As a good teacher, Bonaventure now draws out the element of truth in each of the opinions he has rejected. The sign-opinion understates the reality but it does express one element of truth by affirming that the Holy Spirit is related to the Father after the manner of a product; the former

⁵⁴Ibid., ad 3; I, 558.

⁵⁵ Ibid., ad 1; I, 558.

⁵⁶Ibid., ad 2; I, 558.

⁵⁷I Sent., d. 32, a. 1, q. 2, Sol.; I, 560.


⁵⁸Loc. cit.

⁵⁹Loc. cit.

⁶⁰Loc. cit.

⁶¹Loc. cit.

⁶²Loc. cit.



opinion overstates the reality but it does express another element of the truth by saying that the relation of love to the lover is according to the reason of a form.63 Bonaventure now draws these elements of truth together in his own position. The middle position, he says, is both sober and sufficient, namely, that the ablative is to be understood according to the reason

of a formal effect (in ratione effectus formalis)-if, he hastens to add, one may call "effect" that which is from a principle. (Here Bonaventure is evidently concerned to eliminate any idea that his use of "effect" would imply that the Holy Spirit is "caused.") In a clear allusion to Richard of St. Victor's letter he says that this was the position of Hugh (sic) of St. Victor, who saw this truth clearly and reproved those who think this guestion insoluble. Hence, Bonaventure continues, he declared that when it is said that I love you by the love proceeding from me, the grammatical form is according to the reason of a formal effect, and the same is true of the statement about the Father and Son loving each other by the Holy Spirit.64 Richard, of course, did not use the technical term, "formal effect"; it is Bonaventure's own original and happy terminology, by which he gathers together, synthesizes, and clarifies the groping ideas of his predecessors.65

63Loc. cit.

64Loc. cit. 85 See the text of Alexander of Hales, the Summa Fratris Alexandri, and Albert the Great quoted supra, pp. 243-44. Alexander uses the concept of "quasi-form" and Albert that of "quasi-effect." It was Bonaventure who united the two in one complex concept. Guiard de Laôn, writing between the time of Alexander's Glossa and Bonaventure's Sentences, draws together, as Bonaventure does, the two opinions of sign and "quasi-formal cause": "Solution: As has been said, that ablative has the relation of a quasi-formal cause and also of a sign because the Holy Spirit is the sign of the love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. And he is not only the sign, but he is the love by which the Father and Son love each other, and the fact that he proceeds from them in their concord is a sign that the Father and Son love each other." MS. Douai 434, I, fol. 123ra. But Guiard does not use the term "formal effect."

Pierre de Bar, writing about the same time, denies the notion of form or quasi-form but uses the concept of effect or quasi-effect about the Holy Spirit (though not of "love"): "Further, that ablative cannot be formal or quasi-formal. For the Holy Spirit is not a form or quasi-form of the Father and Son.... This name 'Holy Spirit' sometimes signifies the reality it stands for as an effect or quasi-effect of the Father and Son, for example, through

dicating the difference between the Bonaventure replies that this prinformal effect in created love and ciple is true only if the formal in the notional love of the Father loving by another is by essential and Son. The love proceeding from love. But in the case of the Father the human lover rests in the lover and Son it is loving by another to unite him to the beloved; it as a person and therefore it is not inheres in him as an accident. But a participated love. Bonaventure inin God, although the love pro-vokes Richard of St. Victor's letter ceeding from the Father and Son rests in them as uniting them, it does not inhere in them because it is not an accident but rather a substance and hypostasis. Therefore, Bonaventure concludes, love proceeding in God has less of the notion of a form than is the case in human love.66 For this reason he rejects a statement of one of the opening arguments saving that every whiteness and every love is a form. Every whiteness is a form. he agrees, but not every love is a form: in God there is Love that is not a form but a hypostasis.67

With this view clearly and firmly established, Bonaventure easily disposes of the arguments rejecting every kind of "formal" interpretation of the role of the Holy Spirit. To love formally by another, the first argument says, means loving by love) which is to unite. 71 But do not participation, and this would be the forms precede the subjects whose case with the Father and Son if they forms they are? This is true when

Bonaventure concludes by in- loved formally by the Holy Spirit. 68 to confirm this reply: the Father, the letter says, loves both by himself (and therefore not by participation) and also by the Holy Spirit. 69 Bonaventure adds against another argument that for the same reason the Father can be understood to love even if the Holy Spirit were not considered, for the Father would still have his essential love. 70

> The other replies repeat the same teaching about the difference between ordinary forms and the way in which the ablative "by the Holy Spirit" designates a partial idea of form. Other forms inhere in a subject and so are not hypostases; the Father and the Son love by the Holy Spirit, but this does not mean that the Holy Spirit inheres in them as a form: the ablative expresses the act of the form (of

the noun 'the one proceeding'; sometimes it signifies this reality as a quality for example, through the noun 'love.' And that ablative is taken in this last manner when one says, 'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit,' so that the meaning is: the Father and the Son love each other by the love which is the Holy Spirit." MS. Douai 434, II, fol. 146rb. Thus Pierre has some elements of what was to follow, but he does not use the term "formal effect."

⁶⁶ Ibid.: I. 560-61.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Sol.; I, 561.

⁶⁸ Ibid., arg. 1 a; I, 559.

⁶⁹ Ibid., ad 1; I, 561.

⁷⁰Ibid., ad 2; I, 561.

⁷¹ Ibid., ad 3, 4: I, 561.

the forms are causes, Bonaventure replies, but in the case of the Father and Son loving by the Holy Spirit no causality is implied since the ablative is understood after the manner of a formal effect. That is why there is in it in some way the reason of sign. This, Bonaventure concludes, is the key with which to reply to all the questions that have been put.72

Summary and Conclusion

IN SUMMARY, Bonaventure builds his acceptance of the statement that the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit on a theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit by way of mutual love from the Father and Son through their loving concord in spirating the Holy Spirit. Thereby the Holy Spirit is also the bond of union between the Father and Son, a bond not in the sense that he causes their union or gives them anything, but in that he proceeds from them in their concord of love or their common spiration. The Holy Spirit is, if we may express it thus, a "passive" bond, a bond forged in and by their loving concord, a bond that

is a "product" of their common love. On the basis of this theology, Bonaventure explains his understanding of love in God as essential, notional, and personal. For him the statement that the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit is true if one understands the love in question as the notional love whereby the Father and Son in their mutual (as opposed to their self-reflective) love produce the person of the Holy Spirit as their bond and union.

The ablative "by the Holy Spirit" in the expression refers not to any causality or merely external sign role on the part of the Holy Spirit, but rather to his being an "effect" of the love of the Father and Son with the role of a "form" uniting the Father and Son as passive bond but not as active formal cause. Thus the Holy Spirit is a "formal effect" of the mutual love of the Father and Son. Just as the Father speaks and declares both himself and all things by his Word, so the Father and Son love each other (and us, Bonaventure explains in a dubium within distinction 10) by the Holy Spirit.⁷³ What is the value

72Ibid., ad 5: I, 561.

73"Again, the question is about this expression, 'The Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father and Son love each other and us.' The question is whether the Father and Son love us by the Holy Spirit ... [This] seems entirely false and improper. For when it is said that the Father and Son love us, etc., it is clear that the word 'love' is taken essentially. Therefore, if they love by the Holy Spirit, they exist by the Holy Spirit . . .

I reply that... it should be remarked that 'to love' is sometimes taken purely essentially, as when it is said, The Father loves himself." Sometimes [it is taken] as referring only to persons [notionaliter], as when it is said, 'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit.' Sometimes [it is taken] partly essentially and partly as referring to persons, as when it is said, 'They love us by the Holy Spirit,' and this is evident because it is the same thing for the Father and Son to love us by the Holy Spirit as it is for them to send or breathe the Holy Spirit upon us. Now 'to send' and 'to breathe upon' imply both a personal and an essential

of this expression? It enriches our Alexander of Hales, Guiard of Laon, understanding of the procession of Pierre de Bar, and Albert the Great.⁷⁵ the Holy Spirit. To say that the Father and son spirate the Holy Spirit indicates only the fact of his procession from them, but to say that the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit adds to the fact of his procession from them the mode of his procession. That is, it points out that the Father and Son are joined or connected with each other in the loving concord by which they spirate the Holy Spirit and that the Holy Spirit is the bond produced in their joining of love.⁷⁴

Only if one has followed the discussion of these topics through the authors between Peter Lombard and Bonaventure can one fully appreciate the advance in precision and clarity that Bonaventure brings to this question, complicated as it was because it involves so many aspects of the theology of the Holy Spirit. Most elements of Bonaventure's position can be found in his immediate predecessors, especially

But Bonaventure cuts through their complicated, repetitious, and sometimes overly subtle disputes by separating out the fundamental theology of the Holy Spirit as love and bond from the grammaticological discussions about the expression itself. He eliminates such subtleties as Alexander of Hales' acceptance of the expression only in the form, "The Father and the Son love each other by the love which is the Holy Spirit," and not in the form, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit."76 His personal development of the theology of the Holy Spirit as bond of love is rich in itself and is better integrated into this discussion and in the whole theology of the Holy Spirit than it is in his predecessors. Bonaventure drew out the truth of the more important opinions and groping intuitions of his predecessors by his original concept of the Holy Spirit as the "formal effect" proceeding in

74This, it will be recalled, was the conclusion to be drawn from the important text (I Sent, d. 32, a. 1, ad 3; I, 558) summarized and commented on supra, pp. 249-50.

⁷⁸See the text quoted *supra*, p. 243 and in nn. 28, 30, 31, and 65.

act, because their meaning is that [the Father and Son] bring forth the Holy Spirit and confer His gift upon us; hence [the statement] expresses at the same time the bringing forth of the Holy Spirit and the conferring of grace. And although the ablative ['by the Holy Spirit'] is not accepted as correct when it is used with reference to an essential act, it is accepted as correct by reason of a personal act, as in this statement, 'The Father expresses Himself by His Word; the Father also expresses creatures by His Word.' The present statement is to be understood similarly." I Sent., d. 10, dub. 3; I, 206. Here we see one of the most beautiful fruits of this sometimes arduous discussion, that is, the mission of the Holy Spirit and the conferring of grace can be expressed in personal Trinitarian terms and not only in terms of a common activity ad extra.

⁷⁶See Glossa I, d. 32, n. 2 e-f; ed. cit., I, 320-21. Cf. Summa Fratris Alexandri I, q. 67, m. 3, a. 3 (n. 460); ed. cit., I, 657. This distinction is in Pierre de Bar's mind in the text quoted supra, n. 65.

this complicated question.77

clarity of Saint Bonaventure's the- Blessed Trinity.

the mutual love of the Father and ology of the Holy Spirit, one could Son. This concept was to serve only wish to have been present at as the best expression and guide that culminating point of his theolfor later theologians such as Thomas ogical endeavor, his work at the Aguinas, Peter of Tarantasia, and Second Council of Lyons, in order John of Paris when they discussed to hear his personal contributions to the deliberations at that time Seeing the richness, warmth, and concerning the third person of the

⁷⁷See Thomas Aquinas, I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, Sol. (ed. P. Mandonnet [Paris, 1929], I, 743), and Summa Theologiae I, q. 37, a. 2c. For Peter of Tarantasia, see his I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. A. Colomerius [Toulouse, 1652; reprint, Ridgewood, N.J., 1964], I, 256-57). For John of Paris (Jean Quidort), see his I Sent., d. 32, q. 1 (ed. J.-P. Muller, Jean de Paris (Quidort), O.P.: Commentaire sur les Sentences: Reportation [Rome, 1961], pp. 330-32).



Creation

God the Father reached forth his hand, Creating in a single instant both water and land. Through primeval dark, inchoate mass. a hollow universe but empty still. He forces His timeless will by flinging forth through empty space a Word which harrowed Hell. hallowed earth, wombed within a shrouded birth.

WALTER D. REINSDORF

Faith, Reason, and Christology A Response to Father Meilach

DAVID R. GRIFFIN

that Father AM FLATTERED ■ Michael Meilach considered my book worthy to be made the subject of a review article. I will limit my responses to what seem to be the major objections he raises. From my perspective, these fall rather naturally into four categories: (I) misunderstandings, (II) the wish that I had written a different book, (III) differences of opinion on substantive issues, and (IV) a difference of opinion on the relation of faith and reason. I will treat these four in order.

I

THE MOST serious error in Meilach's interpretation of my position is the claim that I say that soteriology precedes Christology proper, and hence deny that "what Jesus can do for us as Savior depends upon what he himself is" (152). I am puzzled how he could come to this conclusion. since much of my formal argumentation was devoted to arguing the opposite. The phrase which he quotes to support his interpretation was contained in a paragraph in which I was granting the element of truth in the position of those who do insist that soteriology precedes Christolo-

gy proper: it is true if one is using "soteriology" in a purely descriptive sense to refer to the way people have in fact apprehended Jesus as significant. For this apprehension will provide the motive for Christological reflection, and will also influence its form and therefore the content of this reflection. But, as I stated in the immediately following paragraph, if one uses "soteriology" in the normative sense to refer "to the way that one thinks they

[people] should apprehend Jesus as significant . . . then Christology proper must precede soteriology" (PC 198). And it is soteriology in this sense with which I am concerned.

A second misunderstanding is reflected in Meilach's statement that I write "as though salvation were simply a matter of gaining the requisite knowledge" (152). Actually, my position is the fairly traditional one that the noetic dimension of faith is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Christian salvation or wholeness. I stated that a meaningful salvation must involve all dimensions of experience, not just the cognitive (PC 233); that Christian faith is primarily a mode of existence.

and that the cognitive beliefs con-knowledge" (159). This is a very inof existence (PC 24). And the priority presence of one actuality in another, cognitive dimension of our experience is only logical priority (PC 17).

Closely related is a third misunderstanding. Meilach says I believe that "unless an individual grasps cognitively the divine purpose for him, he cannot be affected by that God was objectively present in Jesus, purpose" (157). Such a view would severely limit the sphere of God's influence in the world, and would be so distinctively un-Whiteheadian that I wonder what could have led Meilach, who is so conversant with Whitehead's thought, to suppose that I hold such a view. As Meilach knows. Whitehead's position is that all actual occasions, even those without the possibility of knowledge, are affected by an "ideal aim" derived from God. I accept this notion and the related notion that an occasion's ideal aim is that possibility which would be best for that occasion, given its concrete circumstances. I infer from this that in human occasions of experience these concrete circumstances include the vision of reality and explicit beliefs held by the person in question; hence I maintain that our cognitive beliefs will influence the way in which God can affect us (PC 237, 241, 265). But I never state the position Meilach attributes to me, and in fact explicitly state the opposite (e.g., PC 236).

Closely related to this third misunderstanding is a fourth: Meilach says that in my position "God is present in Jesus only as an object of

tained in it are primarily important adequate explication of the Whitefor the support they give this mode headian notion of the "objective" I give to Jesus' significance for the since such objectifications occur prior to conscious knowledge of them, and most objectifications do not even involve conscious knowledge. Furthermore, Meilach's summary statement is especially inadequate to the attempt I made to indicate the special ways in which which includes the idea that Iesus' selfhood was constituted by his prehension of God (PC 227-31).

The above points are simple matters of misunderstanding. I have bothered to correct Father Meilach's interpretations so as not to appear to condone them by silence. But now I must turn to those criticisms that are not based simply on misunderstandings, but reflect differences of opinion.

As DR. GRIFFIN points out, the last three topics reduce practically to one. But to take the first one first, I gladly stand corrected as to his contention that he really means Christology to precede soteriology. The reason I could not clearly perceive this is that I did not (and I fear I still fail to) grasp the force of his distinction between normative and descriptive soteriology. Hence 1 cannot understand the senses in which the statement would be, for him, true and false respectively. And his Christology continues to appear to me to be excessively functional.

I still feel, to turn to the other main topic in this First Part, that salvation must end up, for Griffin, as exclusively noetic. I do regret, however, the elliptical way in which I presented that verdict. I should have explained that I don't think either Whitehead or Griffin would want to say that human prehensions are

^{1&}quot;Jesus and Process Philosophy," THE CORD 24 (1974), 150-161, is a critical review of my book, A Process Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). References in the text to my book will be preceded by PC, whereas numbers standing alone will refer to Meilach's article.

David R. Griffin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the School of Theology at Claremont, and Executive Director of the Center for Process Studies.

merely noetic—that this is a conclusion I have reached from my study of Whitehead: viz.. that given Whitehead's metaphysical principles. I don't see how they can say anything else.

It is of course true that objectification is not universally and fundamentally noetic. It is the presence in a new occasion (here-now), in vital immediacy of concrescence, of a former occasion or aspect of a former occasion (therethen). The vital immediacy is that of the new concrescing subject. What enters into its constitution is a "datum" which does not have its own immediacy any longer, but has "perished." In a panpsychist sort of view, absolutely everything real is seen as "alive." as an experiencing subject prehending data. In the ordinary, everyday sense, however, we speak only of plants, animals, and human beings, in varying degrees, as "alive." Now, to the extent that human beings share with plants and animals and inorganic matter a dimension of materiality. I have no problem seeing how physical aspects of other beings are prehended, not cognitively, but physically, and enter into the constitution of the physical human reality.

A difficulty arises for me, however, when it comes to the human soul, which I cannot help conceiving as spirit. Whitehead conceived it as a distinct actual occasion-or better, as a temporal society of such occasions, wandering in the spaces within the brain. I tried to argue in my dissertation for a rather radical revision of this view: I think that the human soul should be conceived as different not only in degree but also in kind from all other actual occasions. The purpose of this radical suggestion was to restore the possibility of mutual communion of persons in vital immediacy. Without this communion, which I take to be a datum of experience, I feel that we are reduced to the prehension of one another, through the long bodily routes, as dead data which have "perished." And since I cannot see the soul as having a "physical pole" like other actual occasions, I cannot, either, see it as prehending anything physically. Hence my conclusion that all it can do with these dead "data" is know them. Granted the knowledge may have all sorts of different affective tones. I must emphasize that for me it is still knowledge.

I am more prepared now, however, than I was when I wrote the dissertation, to concede the force of the pre-rational motivations which make it quite impossible for me to structure my "vision of reality" in unmitigatedly Whiteheadian categories. If these motivations have made it appear that I've misinterpreted Griffin's actual aims and meanings, then I apologize to him, and I admit candidly my willingness to live with the accusation of "error" on these points.

II

ONE OF MEILACH'S criticisms concerns something that is absent in the book that he believes should have been included. He points out that I do not show the existence of any flaw in the traditional Christology. which identifies Jesus' person with a pre-existent divine person. Nor do I show why a process metaphysics is preferable to a substance metaphysics as an interpretation of experience in general. Meilach believes I should have done both of these (155, 156).

Since Father Meilach lives in a context where substance metaphysics and traditional Christology are still live options, it is understandable that he finds it to be a major flaw in my presentation that I do not argue these points, but simply presuppose them. However to address these issues would have required a complete volume in itself. Hence Meilach's complaint is finally

the one most often made in reviews. that the author should have written a different book. But an author must presuppose many things if he is to move on to what seem to him to be the crucial questions of his time. The general superiority of process to substance metaphysics has been argued extensively by Hartshorne, to whose writings I refer the reader interested in the question of the general philosophic excellence of process philosophy (166).

In regard to the type of traditional Christology in which Meilach is interested, it is true that I do simply presuppose its problems rather than arguing them. But these arguments have been made countless times, and I know of no solutions to them that satisfy the criteria of rationality to which I am committed. Of course, it is always possible that someone may perform this task. and then it would be incumbent upon me and others like me to enter into serious dialogue with this position. But it is unreasonable to expect every constructive christological attempt to rehearse the problems of traditional christology. Also, given Meilach's apparent views on faith and reason, it is doubtful that the type of Christology he would advocate would meet the criteria to which I am committed. More on this in Part IV, below.

As an editor who has frequently objected to reviewers' apparent desire that an author had written a different book. I find myself particularly sensitive to the charge that I myself have now done this! But here too, the two objections Dr. Griffin raises seem to be extremely close and to come down to a single major objection. I think it is because I cannot

countenance Griffin's facile dismissal of traditional "high" Christology, that I allowed myself to insist that he should indeed have written some justification of his Ebionite Christology. I cannot agree that this would have demanded another entire volume.

III

Part of Meilach's objections reduce to the fact that we hold different opinions on substantive matters. Here his criticisms become purely external, as he criticizes my position for not conforming to what he considers to be true Christian faith. The central doctrine is of course Christology proper. He takes it as axiomatic that it is of the essence of Christian faith to see Jesus as the God-man (152). Since he regards the position that I reject, that God as a presently-experiencing subject is present in Jesus, as "precisely what Christian faith requires us to say" (159), he says that I deny the reality of Christianity (156), and he evidently cannot regard my enterprise as "Christology properly so-called" (155). These are bold claims. Of course, every Christian theologian needs to decide what he considers the minimal definition of Christian faith (whether he decides to work this out for himself, or to allow someone else to do it for him). But I wonder if contemporary Catholic theologians really want to insist that someone is not a Christian if he denies that Jesus is God, especially in light of the fact that docetism was proscribed by the ancient church, and no one to my knowledge has shown how the statement that Jesus is God, if intended in a non-Pickwickian sense and within a theistic position, is compatible with a

non-docetic Christology. Of course, one can reply that this is a "mystery" exceeds human which prehension. Hence this substantive issue presupposes a formal difference on the relation between faith and reason, which will be discussed below. A second substantive issue raised by Meilach concerns the centrality of the resurrection of Jesus, and hope for a future life in Christian faith. Meilach obviously takes these to be essential to Christian faith. He assumes that, since I do not, I must be historically insensitive, and must regard the question about a future life trivial, and the concern for it, immature and selfish. Since I did not deal with these issues in the book, I am thankful for this opportunity to do so.

First, regarding the historical centrality of the two-fold belief in the resurrection of Jesus and a future life, I agree with practically every one who has written on this topic that Christian faith would never have developed without this belief. Pannenberg has, in my opinion, made this case in an especially convincing manner. But one can give full recognition to this historical fact without including this belief within one's minimum definition of Christian faith. And since I do not believe that Christian faith is logically or even psychologically dependent upon this belief, I felt it incumbent upon me to develop a Christology and some of its soteriological implications without including this belief.

Second, never have I said that the question is trivial, or that the concern

with this issue is necessarily immature and selfish. I enjoy existence, and will be quite pleased if I discover that I will be able to continue enjoying it in another form of life, especially if it is qualitatively a higher form of existence. And I will be especially happy if I learn that those who had little chance for a fulfilling human life are able to have this chance beyond the grave, for example my wife's brother who was killed at a young age in the Vietnamese war, of which he wanted no part. Furthermore, although I do not regard belief in a future life to be essential to Christian faith as such, I do believe that Christian existence which includes this dimension is or at least can be quite different from Christian existence without it. This can, of course, reflect immaturity and selfishness. But this need not be the case. It may lead to a greater freedom, joy, and zest for life in the present, and a greater respect, concern, and love for other people. Finally I might add that I myself have written on the possibility of personal (or "subjective") immortality in Whitehead's philosophy.2 So I meant seriously the statement that discussion of the resurrection of Iesus was omitted from my book "not because of skepticism regarding the ontological possibility of such an event," but for other reasons (PC 12).

Like the question of the relation of the divine and human in Jesus, the question of the essentiality of the resurrection finally reduces to the question of faith and reason, to which I now turn

A brief word about immortality and the resurrection: I am glad to be enlightened as to just what Griffin does believe. but from my viewpoint his explicit belief is less important than his motive for believing it. I do not see the resurrection and everlasting life as attractive speculative options, but as articles of faith that Christians believe if they are Christians. This gets us back to the main, underlying issue of this Third Part. I did, before writing my review, entertain the possibility of dealing with Griffin's essay internally--"on his ground," as it were. But as he clearly understands only too well, precisely because of our diametrically opposed views on the nature of theology, that was not a viable alternative for me. Here again, I want to be brief. because the same issues emerge in Part IV.

IV

THE BASIC objection which Meilach raises against my procedure involves the relation of faith and reason in theological reflection. My own self-understanding as an aspiring theologian is one in which theological reflection is not different in principle from philosophical (especially metaphysical) reflection. This is basically because both the theologian and the philosopher begin with a particular preconceptual "vision of reality" which is pre-rational and hence func-

tions as a faith-perspective. And the philosopher as well as the theologian for the most part inherits this perspective from a particular tradition, which thereby functions as a "community of faith."

The major difference between the philosopher and the theologian is that the latter is more conscious of his indebtedness to a particular tradition for his basic way of seeing things, and specifically reaffirms this perspective, while the former intends to free himself from what he considers all partial because particular perspectives and to achieve a universality which regards all data impartially. This formal difference leads to great differences in the subjects treated, since the theologian gives explicit treatment to those events which have been central in forming the faith-perspective of his tradition; and if one event is seen as the high-point, a "christology" is developed. Also, the theologian tends to focus on matters of "ultimate concern," whereas the philosopher tends to treat a much wider range of issues. But these are all differences of degree, not differences in principle.

Now, Meilach announces that this understanding of the relation of philosophy and theology is "wrong" (155f.). This is somewhat puzzling, since I presume that definitions can be more or less useful, but cannot be right or wrong. Surely Meilach does not mean that his own definition, according to which "the theologian elaborates doctrines accepted as revealed" (156), is itself a revealed truth.

In any case, the basic issue is the self-understanding of the theolo-

²"The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead's Philosophy," The University of Dayton Review 8 (Winter, 1971), 43-56; to be reprinted in The Modern Schoolman, Nov., 1975.

gian. Meilach says that I need to decide where my "primary allegiance does, in fact, lie" (161). I am not sure what he intends the alternatives to be. One of them is clearly "the theological tradition" or "the Christian tradition" (161). Of course, determining the referent of such expressions is, I take it, something that not even all Catholic theologians agree upon; so I am not sure what opting for this alternative would mean. The other alternative Meilach has in mind is perhaps Whitehead's philosophy. But if this is so, then I would refuse to give primary allegiance to either, since there is another alternative, i.e., truth itself. And if this is the other alternative Meilach has in mind, I would give my primary allegiance to it rather than "the theological tradition."

answer, given in response to an over-simple demand. In my book, I distinguished between being "committed" and being "convinced." I am using these terms in the sense defined by Bartley in The Retreat to Commitment. To be "committed" to a position is to be determined to hold to it, no matter what contrary evidence might be advanced. To be "convinced" of a position is to hold it while allowing it to be subject to criticism. I believe that, in regard to cognitive matters, we should be committed only to seeking truth chapter entitled "A Whiteheadian -this should be our "primary al- Doctrine of God," which follows a legiance"—and that we should hold any substantive ideas because we are Doctrine of God." "convinced" that they point us in the

available alternatives. I wonder if Father Meilach would really want to oppose this position.

In this connection he advances a rather strange argument. On the one hand he chides me for my "uncritical use of Whitehead," and says that "we ought to approach the Whiteheadian notion of God critically and see whether it needs more or less profound revision before it can be said to be suitable for use in Christian theology" (155, 156). On the other hand, on the major point at which my position involves a critical revision of Whitehead's doctrine of God. Meilach rejects the proposed view partly because it diverges from Whitehead's. That is, I accept the idea long advanced by Charles Hartshorne, and more recently and with more detailed argumentation by John B. Cobb, Jr., that God should Of course, this is an over-simple be conceived as a "living person" rather than a single actual entity. It is argued that this is more consistent with Whitehead's own principles. And Cobb explicitly states that the direction of his questioning was influenced by his Christian point of view.3 Meilach rejects this move by saying that "there is no warrant whatever in Whitehead's explicit characterization of God for Cobb's interpretation . . ." (157). But Cobb did not mean it as an interpretation of Whitehead's view, but as a critical revision—it appears in a chapter entitled "Whitehead's

So, the issue is not whether one's direction of truth better than any use of Whitehead is critical or un-

the criticism is. This comes out in the remainder of Meilach's sentence partially quoted above, as he adds that the view of God as a single actual entity is to be preferred since it, "more importantly, conforms to the requirements of the Christian faith" (158). Cobb's view, with which I agree, is that, although the questions the theologian raises will be influenced by his Christian position. the revision of a philosophy which is to serve as a natural theology must be undertaken so as to make the resulting position conform more fully to philosophical norms. No philosophical doctrines are to be justified by Christian convictions.4

I wonder if Meilach really wants to reject this position. For if he does, the value of a "natural theology" becomes questionable. That is, if at crucial points the supposedly philosophical position is in fact based not upon philosophical criteria but upon historical authority, then how genuine is the purported appeal to the criteria of consistency, coherence, and interpretive power? Meilach evidently believes that we need to affirm certain doctrines in the form that they were historically enunciated, even if these doctrines "cannot be rationally elucidated in universally valid categories" (155). But I can do no other than agree with those who say that, if a combination of phrases cannot be assigned some reasonably understandable meaning, then no asssertion has been made at all. In any case, if when pressed to explain

critical as such, but what the norm for in Jesus, the Christian's ultimate appeal is to "mystery," it is difficult to see how the Christian position can be said to excel others in consistency, coherence, and interpretive power.

> Meilach writes as if Whitehead's own philosophy provides a basis for the kind of appeal to the authority of the Christian tradition that he wants to make. He points out that Whitehead stresses the importance of the past (159f.). But Whitehead's meaning is only that the past does in fact exert tremendous efficacy on the present, so that our freedom is always limited. There is nothing in this description to warrant the jump to the claim that, insofar as we have the freedom to repeat or not repeat the past, we ought to repeat the theological assertions of the past. Furthermore, Meilach would presumably be very selective in regard to which aspects of the past he would want us to repeat. For example, even if we stay within our own philosophicaltheological tradition, there are aspects of Platonic philosophy that still exert efficacy upon us that Meilach would presumably not want us explicitly to reaffirm. So, if he wants to provide some philosophical rationale for an appeal to authority. he will have to look elsewhere.

The criticism which most closely brings Meilach's formal views on faith and reason together with his substantive views is his charge that my denial of omniscience to Jesus is inconsistent with my alleged desire "to eschew all relativism (cf. p. 147) and to assert Jesus' unique status the relation of the divine and human and finality as God-man (cf. pp.

³John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), p. 269.

227)" (158). However it should be gradually approach agreement on clear from the above that I do not use these issues, but this will not come the notion of a "God-man" (partly easily. I hope our exchange has at since I do not know what it would least contributed a little to clarifymean). Also, I expressed no desire ing some of the basic issues. to eschew "all relativism," but only a "complete relativism." Furthermore, there is no necessary connection, to say the least, between maintaining that a particular philosophical-theological position is the best pointer to the truth about reality and the claim that a particular person's ideas were infallible. Also, considering the current state of Catholic discussions regarding the historical Iesus, and the development of dogma, I am somewhat surprised that Meilach apparently wants to make Jesus' infallibility at the level of the history of ideas a test of Christian faith.

In conclusion, let me state again that I am pleased that Father Meilach took my work seriously enough to devote so much attention to it. Some of his criticisms were perhaps caused in part by my failure of clarity, and I appreciate the opportunity to try to state my position more clearly. Other criticisms are due to significantly different value judgments as to which positions are today live options, and hence admit of no easy solution. Other criticisms are based upon radically different understandings of what is essential to Christian faith, and these are in turn partly rooted in differing understandings of faith and reason. The difference of opinion in regard to what type of ultimate commitment is appropriate is not unrelated, of course, to the different Christian traditions in which we stand. It is to be hoped that Christian theologians can

LET ME BEGIN by insisting that definitions are not merely useful, but in the main either true or false. And I want to insist. too, that I consider Griffin's definition of false erroneoustheology auite wrong. That he finds certain Catholic theologians (alluded to vaguely in both Part III and Part IV of his present rebuttal) somewhat congenial to his viewpoint is no embarrassment to me. I never conceived my discussion along confessional lines, and I am aware of how much bad Catholic theology (both biblical and systematic) is available today, as well as of how much good, responsible Protestant theology is available.

What I see as wrong with Griffin's view is the same thing, basically, that I find fault with in Tillich and in Bultmann—a combination of rationalism and relativism. Tillich thinks theology can answer the questions raised by philosophy without supplying any data of its own. Bultmann thinks there need be no content to faith as long as one feels oneself "grasped" by the Word as it is preached. And Griffin thinks one can commit oneself to "truth," without admitting that the truth in question has emerged in an absolute way in historya way which we are not at liberty to undermine in deference to some ephemeral criteria of rationality or some new philosophy which attracts our fancy.

I find it difficult to see anything "strange" about the argument I gave, to the effect that Whitehead's notion of God has to be tailored to the demands of faith rather than vice versa because God's revelation is normative-God is an agent, has spoken to us, and has said some very determinate, clear things to us. Griffin seems to consider it a (contradictory) part of the same argument, that I alluded in passing to the importance of the past in Whitehead's thought. Surely he does not think that I meant to argue on Whiteheadian premises for orthodoxy! The historical place I would look for a defense of historical orthodoxy is in Whitehead's writings! There is no "jump" involved because there is no argument involved only a rhetorical obiter dictum brought in to show that some of Whitehead's disciples can be even more rationalistic and less theologically responsible than he!

Nowhere, finally, did I maintain, that philosophical doctrines need to be justified by Christian convictions. Here again, I see in Dr. Griffin's implied charge, the same confusion to which I have al-

ready called attention, between philosophy and theology. With all due personal respect. I must insist that his writing is indeed historically insensitive and imperceptive: that he is not at liberty, in the 20th century, to decide what the tradition has meant from its inception. I do maintain, however, that theological doctrines need to be justified by Christian convictions. This means the docile retention of mystery and the renunciation of Promethean ultra-rationalism. And at this point, I fear, Dr. Griffin and I part company. I join him in the expression of grateful satisfaction that this opportunity has been offered us for what I sincerely hope has been a clarification of some basic issues and of the quite opposite positions we have adopted on those issues.

FRANCISCAN LITERATURE Needed

The Franciscan Sisters of Assisi have established a Novitiate here. If you have any books relevant to Franciscan spirituality, the Sisters would appreciate your sending them to the Novitiate for their use. Please address them to

> The Franciscan Sisters of Assisi Granby, Massachusetts 01033



Abortion and Social Justice.. Edited by Thomas W. Hilgers and Dennis J. Horan. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1972. Pp. xxv-328. Cloth, \$6.95; paper, \$1.95.

Reviewed by Margaret Monahan Hogan, M.A. (Philosophy, Fordham University), a free lance writer and mother of three who resides in Green Bay, Wisconsin.

Abortion and Social Justice is a fairly complete collection of essays focusing on the medical, legal and sociological aspects of abortion. The contributors include some of those who have been in the vanguard of the pro-life movement in this country and abroad.

burg, and Hilgers detail the biological portrait. Dr. Bart Heffernan states the case for the unborn as an autonomous human being. From fertilization onward the unborn is living; it is human and it is individuated. In sum and substance rights (including rights in torts, it is a living, human individual. property, and equity cases) which Dr. Albert Liley, the father of the courts have upheld for the unfetology, easily deflates the feminist born child are detailed and myth of "It is my body and I have documented. This was obviously

the right to dispose of it in any way I see fit," by his description of the fetus in charge of the pregnancy and the mother as the passive carrier. Dr. Fred Mecklenburg puts to rest the myths surrounding the incidence of rape and incest, and legal abortion as a solution to the problem of criminal abortion. Dr. Tom Hilgers begins his essay with an attack on the integrity of some segments of the medical profession. He then does a superb job of examining the statistics-some real and some spurious -that are always part of the abortion debate. These statistics include subsequent complications of abortion as well as maternal mortality.

The legal prief for the unborn is presented in a single article prepared by attorneys and law professors Dennis J. Horan, Jerome A. Frazel, Jr., Thomas M. Crisham, Dolores B. Horan, John D. Gorby, John T. Noonan, Jr., and David W. Drs. Heffernan, Liley, Mecklen- Louisell. The article is incredibly compact and almost complete. It begins by discrediting the notion that abortion is simply a private matter and that prohibition of abortion entails interference of the state with marital rights. Then various

written prior to the Supreme Court to one problem (this pregnancy) decision on abortion and is sup- may well be the cause of a further plemented in an epilogue.

These concluding remarks en- problem. titled "Abortion and the Supreme Court: Death Becomes a Way of are not treated in Abortion and Life" were prepared by Horan, Gorby, and Hilgers along with a crop up in almost every abortion contribution by Robert Byrn. They do a nice job of laying bare the troversy revolving around the learned ignorance that went into the separation of sexuality and procreawriting of the majority opinion in the Supreme Court decision. Included in the faulty reasoning At first glance they seem somewhat which brought forth this misinterpretation of the Constitution is a devaluation of the Hippocratic Oath, a misreading of common law and past American statutes, a biased examination of the "medical facts" concerning the alleged safety of induced abortion, and an inaccurate notion of viability.

The third section of the book. under the subtitle "social," deals with such problems as abortion and population, positive alternatives to abortion, abortion and minority groups, sex as one function of an intelligent creature, individual rights vs. group rights, and abortion and ethics. The concluding article in this section was written by a young lady who had an abortion. \ It is entitled "But Nobody Said Think." The message that it seems to carry is that what appears to be a quick efficient solution (abortion)

deterioration of a total larger

There are two problems which Social Justice but which seem to debate. One of these is the contion. The other is the floundering about for a definition of person. unrelated. The latter is simply a problem that occurs in a nominalist frame of reference that ignores the entailment of the notion person and the reality, human individual. The former is simply the debate between those who dogmatically affirm that the separation of sexuality and procreation will wreak havoc and bring about the decline of civilization, and those who dogmatically affirm that sexuality must be separated from fecundity and every act of intercourse must be accompanied by some positive form of contraception.

Both problems would fare better in the presence of an adequate ontology of person. This philosophy would be inclusive and open-ended in its attribution of the notion of person. The notion would apply to all instances of humanity from fertilization (unless some radical

change or ontological shift or discontinuity in development be detected) to natural death. But it would remain open to the inclusion of possible new and perhaps superior forms of rational creatures. They may be products of molecular herding or inhabitants of other planets. Humanization or hominization (Donceel) or acculturation (Montagu) would be viewed as a time-conditioned unfolding of the personality—a process fulfilling the possibilities given at the moment of fertilization. The human person is an open, unfinished being creating what he is by developing his given potentialities in response to his total Completeness environment. achieved only in union with God in the Beatific Vision. The seeming dilemma concerning sexuality and procreation is less difficult when marriage is viewed as a process that is to be fulfilled on various levels. On the level of life, the level of nature, the goal of marriage is a horizontal goal—the procreation and education of children. This fulfills the essential end of marriage, the orientation of fecundity to offspring. On the level of the good life, the level of reason, the goal of marriage is achieved in a vertical upthrust, the personalist development and self-actualization of each member of the family. This fulfills the more excellent end of marriage. And finally, on the level of transcendent reality there is a movement toward eternal life, and the goal of marriage is union with God in the Beatific Vision.

Abortion and Social Justice provides a good review and a good reference source for those who are involved actively in the abortion debate. It should also provide a prod for the "lukewarm."

The Commandments and the New Morality. By Nicholas Lohkamp, O.F.M. Cincinnati: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 1974. Pp. ix-172. Paper, \$1.85.

Reviewed by Father Iulian A. Davies. O.F.M., Ph. D. (Philosophy, Fordham University), Head of the Philosophy Department at Siena College and Associate Editor of this Review.

We have in this little work a well written explanation and defense of a shift which has as a matter of fact taken place in the writings of many moral theologians and in the teaching of many CCD programs—the movement away from a morality of acts and their relation to human nature, toward the consideration of persons in their own particular state of moral development. The emphasis is on the values behind the commandments rather than the particular commands or prohibitions the commandments embody. Such an emphasis by no means does away with objective morality, for the various moral laws do represent boundaries within which one must live. In the areas of religion, sex, and human interrelationships, the standards we all learned continue to be applicable. but the attitude of negative thinking

views of these standards ought to be book for detailed answers to moral done away with. After all, the fun-questions damental commandment is love; and answers. But it will be helpful in love is positive, liberating, and forming attitudes, the communicaresponsible.

A good deal of emphasis—perhaps too much—is placed on the difficulty of determining whether or not one actually does sin mortally by performing certain seriously and objectively sinful practices. Certainly the personal character of all actions is relevant in assessing guilt, but it does not seem to me that we have to be as lenient as we think God is in judging our own guilt. And it doesn't seem particularly helpful to realize. that the man who took the silver may not have sinned mortally though he did something seriously wrong. The view of mortal sin as sign of separation from God already existing is psychologically acute, but it does seem to me that the wide-awake person who has opted against a commandment in a serious matter is thereby testifying to his having reached this state, and this is a consequence I do not see stressed enough in the text.

The Introduction to the work sets the stage nicely; the description of the shift in focus is done fairly: the concrete applications of the various values are done unevenly—a very good job being done on life, sexuality, and religion; and a less adequate job on justice and truth. What Father Lohkamp's book does is not tell us what we should or should not do, so much as inspire us to act. A work like this does not, in my judgment, replace

that may have colored many of our a manual for teachers as a source demanding tion of which should help the Christian community to grow.

> To Live is to Love: Meditations on Love and Spirituality. By Ernesto Cardenal. Trans. by Kurt Introduction Reinhardt; Thomas Merton. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Image Books, 1974. Pp. 156. Paper, \$1.45.

> Reviewed by Father Michael D. Meilach, O.F.M., Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Siena College, and Editor of this Review.

> This is a set of exquisitely poetic and mystical reflections or meditations, each only two to three pages in length. The author was a novice at the Trappist monastery of Gethsemani under Thomas Merton, whom he impressed even then with the "Franciscan" mystique that pervaded his prayer life and the "notebooks" that novices were accustomed to keep for recording their insights and impressions. He has since gone to Central America where he has founded a new and badly needed (for the area) contemplative community.

> As Merton also observes, the simple yet very deep spirituality set forth in these glowing pages is also redolent of the positive, infectious optimism of Teilhard de Chardin. If there is any single theme that runs

through the meditations, it is that of God's loving presence at the heart of every creature—but especially within us, who have been made in the divine image and likeness. All that we do, we do out of love, and if we only realized when and to what extent that love of ours is distorted-diverted into fruitless paths—we should find it that much more possible to rectify the distortion—to render explicit the oft-hidden call of God within our every action, our every attraction and determination.

It seems to me that the use of these meditations themselves. together with a certain minimum of good will and resolve, could well be a superb aid to the kindling of new fervor-fervor of the very sort that thei glowing words reveal to characterize their author's spirituality.

I've Met Jesus Christ. By Michel Quoist. Trans. by J. F. Bernard. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973. Pp. 168. Cloth, \$4.95.

Reviewed by Peter F. Macaluso, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History at Montclair State College, Montclair. New Ierseu.

Michel Quoist has added another unique work to his earlier spiritual studies: Prayers, The Meaning of Success, and Christ Is Alive. In I've Met Jesus Christ, his theme is that the only true revolution will begin in the depths of man and realize its aims only in Jesus Christ. After all, Jesus came into the world, vesterday and today, for that single purpose. The author's task is to help the Christian to recognize Jesus; and to encounter Him and join Him in His work of saving the whole man and the whole of mankind.

Each section of the book begins with a general problem, based on actual personal experiences of people with whom Ouoist has been involved, and is presented in their own words. This is followed by Quoist's reflections on the situation, which he concludes with a prayer. These profoundly moving reflections cover a wide range of problems besetting the "now" Christian in his day-to-day existence—such things as neighborly love, marriage and family strife, failure vs. success, discouragement, human injustices, and the prevalent concern over housing and ecology.

Iesus is a real person waiting for us in life. In integrating faith with life. Ouoist brings the reader from static, cultured Christianity to real spirituality. This work is a call for us to ratify our baptism, to still the basic spirit of disbelief and self within us, and to share in Christ's work. This can be done only through the recognition that Jesus is someone and not something. He is visible and encountered in his Body in the Sacrament: but he is also present in the coming together and sharing of faith with life.

Walk in Beauty: Meditations from the Desert. By Murray Bodo, O.F.M. Photographs by Gregory Fryzel. Cincinnati: St. Anthony Messenger Press. 1974. Pp. vi-106. Paper, \$3.00.

Reviewed by Capistran J. Hanlon, O.F.M., Ph.D., Priest-anthropologist, who has lived in the Southwest with the Papago Indians, has travelled throughout the Land of the Navahos on several occasions, and is an amateur photographer.

This is a pleasing book and serves well its purpose as a collection of memories gathered by the author throughout his experiences with the Navahos. It certainly should stimulate further thought and reading on the part of the reader, because it whets the appetite for more knowledge about the noble dwellers of the southwest desert and their awe-inspiring homeland. Some of the selections are poetic, some reveal a keen insight into the Navaho life-way, while others mirror the love and service rendered by the sons of Saint Francis to the Navahos.

There is one particularly poignant passage describing a "visit" with a Navaho:

We speak of the Gospel, and he says. 'It is like Blessingway. There is no Gospel, no Blessingway without social justice.' I am stunned by the use of a formal term like 'social justice,' and he sees my surprise. If you are in need and I hold my corn bundle and pray for you, but give you nothing to fill your need, there is no blessing for you or for me. There is no Blessingway if I am selfish with my material goods.' His concept of social justice is so basic and so intimately related to his spiritual life that I can see the two are inseparable. Religion and life for him are one [pp. 46-47].

one of his sheep: "He has not driven off the bear. He has done nothing. And he learns very young the power of nature and the helplessness of a boy alone" (p. 59).

The photographs with a few exceptions are of fine quality. Occasionally they do not correspond exactly to the text; on page 56, e.g., a picture of a Navaho boy standing in front of a stone wall is accompanied by text referring to the boy's "leaning against the cedar posts of his summer house. But on the whole the photographs capture the spirit of the meditations and memories. As a joint effort of author and photographer this book is a fine beginning.

Friendship in the Lord. By Paul Hinnebusch, O.P. Notre Dame, Ind.: Ave Maria Press, 1974. Pp. 144. Paper, \$2.25.

Reviewed by Sister Mary Seraphim, P.C.P.A., a contemplative nun at Sancta Clara Monastery, Canton, Ohio, and a frequent contributor to our pages and to other Catholic periodicals.

Friendship in the Lord is a totally positive presentation of Christian friendship. The accent is placed on the phrase "in the Lord," but the human, warm, affectionate elements of friendship are admirably recognized and esteemed.

Father attributes a part of the book to conversations and letters he And there is a moving story of a exchanged with Sister Mary Ann young Navaho sheepherder who Fatula, O.P., dead of the Departstands by helplessly as a bear steals ment of Religion, Northwest Catholic

in a de a de la compansión de la definitación de la definitación de la definitación de la definitación de la d

The book is written for all Christians, ship makes us tender and more sensilay or religious, married or single. It tive to others and therefore to God: is based on the belief that Christian friendship is a ministry of Christ's redeeming love that is more important than even preaching or catechizing because genuine friendship touches and opens the human heart to hear and believe the Word of God more effectively than any other means.

Father Hinnebusch has divided his book into two parts of six chapters each: the first deals with the human elements of friendship, and the second relates these more directly to friendship with the Lord. Throughout the book, however, the content "seesaws back and forth between aspects of human friendship and divine friendship" (preface).

This reader found two chapters especially good: Chapter 5, "Loving Appreciation in Adult Friendships" where it is stated: "For full maturity in the life of the Spirit, one needs to be loved in friendships with people who live fully in the Spirit"; and chapter 8, "Friendship: Symbol of God's Infinite Love" where Father says the experience of human friendship in the Lord can bring us to a fuller awareness of God's workings in our heart in at

High School, West Hartford, Conn. least two ways: first, human friendand secondly, human love is a symbol or sacrament of God's love."

> Throughout his book, Father only alludes to the possible pitfalls that human weakness or selfishness could cause friends to fall into, because he is centering his ideal of friendship on the mutual striving of the two friends to grow "in the Lord." Perhaps a line from the chapter on "The Friendship of Catherine and Raymond" sums it up best: "It is faith in the truth that God wills to save us through our special love for one another." He sees the whole Christian economy as a vast network of friendships in the Lord.

Although I find this book to be a beautiful presentation of ideal friendship, it strikes me that is its one weakness: its idealism. Certainly all our friendships will be such holy companionships by the Parousia; but it does not seem likely that Christian friendship will often reach the heights Father advocates in our present state of pilgrimage.

Still, the book is well worth reading, pondering over, and praying —that more of its positive appreciation of friendship in the Lord will permeate the Christian community.



Records

Watch with Me. By Joe Wise. 12inch stereo LP disc. Cincinnati: North American Liturgy Resources (Fontaine House Production), 1973. \$4.95.

Reviewed by Timothy J. Shreenan, a junior in the Franciscan Formation Program at Siena College, active in student liturgical work.

When the time came to implement the various documents of Vatican II there were many gaps to be filled, especially in the area of liturgical music. Composers were given a difficult task to perform: to create music which was worthy of the praise of God, to make it meaningful, and above all, to make it singable by the average congregation which was content to sit back and continue to belt out such age-old hymns as "Praise to the Lord" and "Holy God, We Praise Thy Name."

Now there seems to be a plethora of music coming from every corner of the publishing business. Some composers have already become as old-hat as "Praise to the Lord" (one thinks of Ray Repp and his wellworn "Sons of God"-but it is interesting to note that it was James Thiem, not Ray Repp, who gave us "Sons of God"; Repp just "immortalized" it (for lack of a better term) with his recording of it.

Among this type of guitar-strumming C-Am-F-G7-C musician is Joe Wise, best known (or should I say infamous?) for his trite "Take Our Bread." But Wise has improved over experimentation at Liturgy that we

the years (and probably a few workshops in composing) to come out with some very beautiful works, such as "Lord, Teach Us to Pray."

One thing which is very characteristic of Wise's songs is that almost all of them are written in a minor key. Even his songs of praise, which we usually associate with a bright, major key, are written in minor keys. This seems to be one problem which Wise has never been able to solve.

Thus we have his recording Watch with Me, which came out last year. It includes seven songs along with a memorial acclamation and a Doxology/Amen (written in a minor

I thoroughly disliked the first side of the album. It was filled with insipid lyrics and trite melodies. The worst cut was "Song for Tommy," sung by a group of screeching and off-key first-graders. A song for the mature Christian it's not, but it might prove popular with the very young.

I had to force myself to listen to the second side for fear that it would be more of the first. However, I was pleasantly surprised: the instrumentations which included several guitars, bass, piano, and violin, were remarkably well done.

The last cut, "Go Now in Peace," is my favorite, because I can envisage the celebrant at Mass actually singing this as a final blessing with the congregation joining him on the second verse. It is this kind of need, and I think Wise gives us the opportunity to do it.

One other comment which I need to express is that these songs are quite long for the average learning ability of a congregation. Some of them ran for eight to nine minutes with a lot of unnecessary and boring repetition.

On the whole, this album leaves quite a bit to be desired, but it does have some redeeming qualities. I would recommend it, not for use at Liturgy, but as a source of quiet background music for personal reflection and meditation.

Songprints. By Joe Wise, Dave Duffin, and John Pell One 12-inch stereo LP disc, with a booklet containing poetry and photographs. Cincinnati: North American Liturgy Resources (Fontaine House Production), 1973. Record and booklet list for \$6.95.

Reviewed by Stephen Garnet, a seventh-grade CCD teacher at St. Clare's Parish, Albany, New York, and a Franciscan student at Siena College, Loudonville, New York.

When I was asked to review Songprints it was at a time of what you might call a "heavy academic load," and the time taken to review it proved to be a pause that refreshed. The record included has music composed and performed by John Pell, and poetry composed and read by Joe Wise. Along with that there is a booklet which includes the poetry and appropriate photographs in black and white by Dave Duffin. Listening to the music and the poetry and seeing the photos was, for me, an extraordinary experience. And I have the feeling that the experience of this work will be as unique as every person who takes the time to give it a "look-see."

It would, I believe, prove to be a fruitful addition to any parish library's section on meditation. With the aid of an opaque projector it might also prove useful in the classroom, either presented in its intended manner or by using the flip side of the recording (which is the Songprintsmusical background only) as background music during a class project.

Personally, I do not think that this would be suitable for use at a liturgical celebration, not because the material is not appropriate, but because it does not seem to be adaptable for the purpose.

However you find it useful, I believe you will see that Songprints has a great deal to say about the values and attitudes of a growing Christian: the child's need for the experience of love and community support, the necessary pain of growth, and the reverence (not subservience) due to creation.

Through Songprints Jesus speaks to his world in words such as these:

"Walls will be to play on Not to divide. Walls will be to share the joy of scaling."

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Matura, Thaddée, *The Crisis of Religious Life*. Trans. by Paul Schwartz and Paul Lachance. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973. Pp. x-122. Cloth, \$4.95.
- Winter, David, Closer than a Brother. Wheaton, Ill.: Harold Shaw Publishers, 1971. Pp. 160. Paper, \$1.45.
- Winter, David, Hereafter: What Happens after Death? Wheaton, Ill.: Harold Shaw Publishers, 1972. Pp. 92. Paper, \$1.25.
- Winward, Stephen How to Talk with God: The Dynamics of Prayer. Wheaton, Ill.: Harold Shaw Publishers, 1973. Pp. 149. Paper, \$1.45.