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#### A REVIEW EDITORIAL



# The Analogy of Experience

These warfield lectures, delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in February of 1970, reveal their author once again to be one of America's foremost religious philosophers. This time, however, he speaks more as a Christian theologian than as the highly competent and stimulating philosopher he has shown himself to be in, e. g., his earlier Reason and God and Experience and God.

Basically, the lectures call for a reinterpretation of traditional Christian theism, Christology, Soteriology, and Ecclesiology. Given Professor Smith's impeccable credentials, I hardly expected the "reinterpretation" to end up being wanton, radical, or in any way irresponsible. Nor was I disappointed: the stance to which we are invited by the book is reassuringly yet refreshingly traditional, and wholly sound.

Why, in view of this unequivocal orthodoxy, a "reinterpretation" at all? In the Introduction, Professor Smith cogently insists that the contemporary Apostle simply cannot just "proclaim" the truth in terms alien to his own age and culture; he must "converse" with people even as Paul did, and this means engaging the people "where they're at."

The first lecture is addressed in historico-critical fashion to that perennial problem of "faith seeking understanding." Attention is given

The Analogy of Experience: An Approach to Understanding Religious Truth. By John E. Smith. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. xx-140. Cloth, \$6.95.

mainly to Saint Augustine and Saint Anselm, but secondarily to middle and later scholasticism, in a fine evaluation of reason's role with respect to theological truth. The matter is too complex for full exposition here, but one thing we can summarily reject is the theory of two distinct spheres for reason and faith. Among the many positive facets of the matter is reason's important function of elucidating what has been accepted on faith. This is what the author intends to do in this book: discover "analogies" in concrete experience, on the basis of which to make intelligible the traditional beliefs of Christianity. Such an "analogy" may be defined as "the use of experience as a means of understanding a faith content that is by no means derivative from such experience" (p. 30). A person's own experience is seen as the "medium through which (life's) religious meaning is to be understood" (p. 48). When Smith says that one must "start with man" (p. 43), therefore, he must not be misinterpreted to be implying a Feuerbachian sort of theological projection. Rather, it is a question of explaining what is clearly seen as "given" from beyond.

The third chapter is not a lecture in the series, but may fairly be taken as largely a succinct summary of the author's view of experience in general and religious experience in particular, as spelled out more fully in his Experience and God. (Experience, for Smith, is an emergent reality, neither simply subjective, nor wholly objective.) The chapter is not just a repetition of earlier work, however, as the author goes on to defend the ontological claim that experience can mediate the genuinely transcendent. (Here, as in the final chapter, I thought I found affinities with Paul Weiss which might bear some discussion in a larger context than that available in this review.) This addition to the series of lectures enables the author to proceed more powerfully than he might otherwise have done, in the last four lectures, to elaborate the experience of guilt ("Man's Circular Predicament"), of God as "transcendent Self," of Jesus as God's definitive concrete self-manifestation, and of the Church as locus of salvation.

(Continued on page 161)

## Vanity and Time

ROBERT C. NEVILLE

M Y TITLE, Valley and Image comes from the familiar first Y TITLE, "Vanity and Time," and third chapters of the Old Testament Book of Ecclesiastes:

Vanity of vanities, says the Preacher: vanity of vanities; all is vanity. What does man gain by all the toil at which he toils under the sun? A generation goes and a generation comes, but the earth remains for-

The sun rises, and the sun goes down, and hastens to the place where it rises.

The wind blows to the south, and goes around to the north; round and round goes the wind, and on its circuit the wind returns.

All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not filled.

To the place where the streams flow, there they flow again.

All things are full of weariness; a man cannot utter it.

The eve is not satisfied with seeing. nor the ear filled with hearing. What has been, is what will be; and what has been done is what will be done.

And there is nothing new under the sun.

Is there a thing of which it is said, See, this is new?

It has been already in the ages before us.

There is no remembrance of former things, nor will there be any remembrance of later things yet to happen, among those who come after (Eccles. 1:1-11).

For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under

A time to be born and a time to die.

A time to plant and a time to pluck up what is planted.

A time to kill and a time to heal. A time to break down and a time to build up.

A time to weep and a time to laugh. A time to mourn and a time to dance.

A time to cast away songs, and a time to gather songs together.

A time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing.

A time to seek and a time to lose. A time to keep and a time to cast away.

A time to rend and a time to sew.

A time to keep silent and a time to speak.

A time to love and a time to hate. A time for war and a time for peace. What gain has the worker from his toil? (Eccles. 3:1-9).

There is a profound truth in the religious person's feeling that his life is to be evaluated at once from two very different and incommensurable perspectives. On the one hand, he sees his life in terms of fulfilling or failing (or a little of both) his local obligations. That is, he does the right thing at the right time, or he fails to do the right thing at the right time. This is the truth in the

Robert C. Neville, an Elder of the Methodist Church, holds a doctorate in philosophy from Yale. Until recently he was chairman of the undergraduate department of philosophy at Fordham University. He was an Associate for the Behavioral Sciences at Hastings Center. Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y., and is now Associate Professor of Philosophy at SUNY at Purchase, Purchase, N.Y.

this and a time for that; and it fine finite order) has been comis appropriate to be doing one's duty, to be enjoying the blessings that appear at that time or to be grieving over the sorrows suffered. On the other hand, the religious person also sees those moral successes and failures not to extend to ultimate significance. Even virtue is vanity from the absolute point of view. There is a perspective from which nothing finite makes an ultimate difference. No matter how much money you make, how much you accumulate in goods, how wise you become—as the writer of Ecclesiastes was wont to say, in the end all men are dead. And so, while in the time of local obligations it is better to be wise than foolish, rich than poor, strong than weak, in the end all end up the same. In that sense, in the sense of looking at things from the standpoint of the ultimate end, all is vanity.

My thesis is that both sides are true: that there is a time for duty and that all is vanity. The experience of most of the great religious traditions acknowledges a root distinction between God as he is in himself, and the world in which we live. What is meant by "God in himself"? I cannot simply adopt the answer of one religious tradition, because this should approximate a thoroughly universal, empirical generalization. By "God in himself," then, I mean the ultimate Reality beyond which there is no further measure (whatever you might mean by measure"): an ultimate Reality reached when the process of ascending through

claim that there is a time for the finite order (however you depleted, at least symbolically.

#### God in Himself

CONSIDER SOME EXAMPLES of this. In our own Christian tradition, the notion of the Creator-God exemplifies the idea very well. In himself, God is the one who creates everything else, including the steps by which we might rise-in reason, in experience, or in whatever discipline we choose-to the appreciation of God in himself. The Christian God is ultimate because there is no reality beyond him that might measure him: and there are many ways within the tradition of distinguishing God from the world. Hardly anyone who claims God is Creator, would say that the world measures God. God is the ultimate Measure.

Perhaps just as attractive in the West as the Christian idea of God has been the idea that the cosmos as a whole is ultimate. Some have argued, even within the Christian tradition, that the cosmos is identical with God. On this assumption the cosmos as a whole is ultimate, and there is nothing beyond it that could measure it or put it in context. This cosmic Ultimate is arrived at only by extrapolation from finite steps within the cosmos (however we would interpret the ordinary scientific order, the order of beauty, or whatever order would be taken to be a sign or trace of the cosmos as an absolute Whole).

In Hinduism, particularly that of the Upanishadic period, the name for the Absolute is Brahman. I

The World of Duty

LET US TURN our attention now from a consideration of God in himself to the world as the context in which we live out our human lives and discharge our obligations. These obligations are finite and relative-relative not in the sense that the individual is free to determine his own set of obligations, but rather in the sense that their particular character derives from the individual's station in life. For instance, it is because I am a teacher that I have a whole set of obligations that other people who are not teachers do not have. It is because I am married to my wife that I have obligations towards her and our family that others don't have. It is because I am here, dealing with people here, that I have obligations that I would not have were I in California or China. Certainly there are universal obligations, but for the most part the obligations we have depend upon whom we're close to in contrast to whom we're far from. That is crucial: our perspective comes from the fact that we're closer to some than we are to others. Thus there is a kind of geometrical metaphor that articulates the locus of our responsibilities. And what holds for moral obligations also holds for the blessings of life and for the sorrows of life. I grieve more for the sorrows close to me than for those far away, though abstractly I know that the ones far away are sorrowful and I know that those close to those far away grieve the way I do:

Every religion has as it were a "bifocal" thrust. Let me call atten-

man really is a Creator-God, but Buddhas to draw forth the love that is in the world. The great Emptiness is obviously beyond create, but the fact that, consider- measure, like the Brahman without qualities; it has nothing to measure. and it stands beyond, as the onman can be considered as the tological ground for all the things that do have qualities.

The testimony to this God or Emptiness in all traditions is generally a kind of mystical experience with both affirmation and denial. God, or the ultimate Ground. is apprehended as being at the end of the quest for knowing, feeling, and uniting with the Absolute. This is an orientation to God through lities, because the qualities imply finite experience; and how one characterizes God then takes its form from the directions and orientations of the disciplines through which one tries to get to God. As a philosopher. I prefer the more dialectical kinds of disciplines. Some people are much better at praying; they have a different orientation to God. The fundamental point is that even as God is apprehended as at the end of the quest, it is also seen that the very meaning of the quest is that God is beyond the quest. He is the ground that supports the quest and must not be understood simply as \* a finite term after which there might be other finite terms, for he is that which gives rise to the whole "ladder" or "structure of rationality", or whatever metaphor you might use for the quest it-

> Returning to the idea of creation. suppose that you had searched through the created order for its ground. You could run through a

think it can be shown that Brah- the world and saves it by sending what is emphasized in the Upanishads is not his capacity to ing Brahman as absolute Reality, he has no qualities whatever. Brah-Lord of the world, the end of our striving, the germ from which the cosmos comes, the object of blinding illumination. But all of these are qualities that Brahman has relative to the categories within which we live. Those categories point to the fact that Brahman. apart from being the object of our cognitive endeavor, is without quaimperfection; and what is absolute cannot be measured by anything else.



In the Buddhist tradition the parallel religious belief is in the great Emptiness which is more real than any of the things that fill our lives. This Emptiness is considered ultimate, the ground out of which all the passing shadows come, to be sought as the fulfillment of the religious life. As Emptiness paradoxically, it loves

variety of medieval proofs; you could draw categories from presentday science. You will see that the very meaning of being the end of the quest involves the claim that the "creatorship" of God-God's quality of being Creator-is something that itself depends on his creating. God would not be Creator were he not to create, and so the determinate nature that we know of God, even as the object of our religious quest, is a nature that God has given himself in creating. And the meaning of the concept is that God himself stands ultimately beyond even that nature he has as Creator. This is not to say that God is not really Creator-he really is, because he has created.

One of the first religious conclusions to be drawn from this, is that God himself is beyond good and evil. When Job wanted to haul God into court and said, "You're not treating me well: I don't deserve anything like the suffering I've had, and therefore I'm suing," God replied, "Well, you can't sue me because I don't come to court; the categories employed in moral judgment are not applicable to me." Recall the question God put to Job: "Where were you when I set up the show-when I laid the foundations of the world, when I set the standards of moral judgment?" There is a similar teaching about God's transcending the categories of good and evil in the Bhagavad-Gita. Toward the end, Krishna is transformed into Vishnu, the God more radiant than a thousand suns, who transcends all the character of the finite world including the categories of good and evil.

tion to some facts evident in actual religions before spelling out the theoretical point involved here. To begin with, every religion emphasizes morality. You wouldn't think this necessary if religion's only truth were the mystical truth of God who fills the soul and lifts it out of the finite realm. But every religion does have something to say about suffering too-in fact, according to some historians of religion that is the one original and common point of all religions: making a response to suffering. Again, all religions articulate ways by which we can appreciate our resources. All religions articulate some form of respect for life. And all religions, depending upon their culture, honor crucial cultural connections. So in a culture that highly prizes relations within a family. that becomes a very serious moral obligation. In a culture that puts the relation to the ruler on a very high plane, that becomes a very serious moral obligation. In India, in some periods, one's most important human relation was to one's guru because it was from him rather than the parents that the really important things of humanity were handed down; so that was the most sacred relation. All religions depict life-styles in which we can legitimately strive for success in virtue. in wealth (however that may be counted), and in understanding or wisdom.

Now, an exclusive emphasis on the mystery of the transcendent God leads to antinomianism—the belief that there are no moral obligations. The feeling for the inner life becomes so intense that the individual thinks he transcends any moral obligations to his neighbor. Every religion falls into that trap from time to time.

On the contrary side, an exclusive emphasis on the moral obligations leads to pharisaism—the belief that you've exhausted your religion when you've figured out the rules and followed them. This is perhaps the greater danger. It takes hard work to become a mystic, but you can begin making pharisees out of kids when they're four or five years old. And unfortunately, it seems to me most of our religious education does what comes easiest—i. e., teaches the rules, the sense of moral obligation, without filling the heart with the more important things.

To return to my overall thesis: the religious is "bifocal." One lens deals with relative, moral affairs -i. e., affairs based on our relative moral position in the world such as being here and not there—and the other lens is for appreciating and interpreting divine transcendence. You cannot translate one of these into the other, at least not very easily, and certainly not in terms of the intensity of feeling aroused on both sides. To keep them together is the difficult challenge of genuine religion; and to meet it we need a feel for how God "in himself' faces the world, so that he is no longer considered "just in himself," and for how the world of obligations faces God. Having described the two lenses in our dialectical conception, let us now inquire how one pole may be said to view the other; and how the second views the first.

#### God in the World

OVER AND ABOVE his existence "in himself," God enters the world creating and caring. Forget for a moment the caring part, and concentrate on the creating. God creates everything which is, or Brahman is the germ of everything which lives, or every bit of the divine Cosmos has the divinity of the whole Cosmos in it, or the great Emptiness which is the true Buddha body becomes the Suchness of each thing so the Emptiness is in each finite thing. As a result, every finite thing is the locus of God. If God were an independent entity, off in another dimension, and not the Creator of the world, then we could not say that the world was the locus of God. Saying however that he does create the world, we understand that everything created is in fact the residence of God, or the terminus of the divine creative act.

The value elements of finite life have not only their finite dimensions, but also a divine dimension because they reflect the fact that they are part of God's world. Thus in the moral life "doing good" is also "glorifying God" because it acknowledges and enhances his presence in the finite realm. If we do good we enhance the value of something affected by our action. We glorify God because that object is itself God's presence in the world. Conversely, doing evil is not only doing evil; it is sin because it repudiates God's presence in the finite sphere, treating the finite situation which is offended in an evil action as if it were assessed

solely by one's own will, as lacking standing as the object of God's creation. The appreciation of the world's goods, in other words, is not only appreciation of what is there, but thanksgiving too because they are there as God's gifts and therefore are absolutely there. They do not "happen" to be there, but they are there because God is in them there. And suffering is not only pain (although it is at least that), but also a mark of finite, created existence. God has made a world with suffering in it, and suffering is part of what it means for us to be creatures. So suffering is to be taken up, in light of the relation between the world and God, with acceptance on the one hand and (paradoxically) thanks on the other. Of course we should avoid suffering if we can, we ought to get over it as soon as possible, and we ought to prevent it wherever we can. But because of the divine character of the finite world that presents the suffering, we ought not hide from it or deny it is really suffering, because it is as much a part of the world as joy.

The lesson of Ecclesiastes seems to be this: Finite life is always filled with finite sufferings and finite joys that are real and objectively there, however we might mistake them in the circumstance. It is filled with responsibilities arising from a host of relative positions in which we find ourselves. And it is filled with ambiguities, perhaps the most difficult thing to cope with: there is nothing in our world that is unambiguously good or bad, joyful or sorrowful. No matter how far we stretch our lives,

no matter how long we make them, no matter how comprehensive they are by virtue of our education. our travel, our capacity for experience-no matter how far our lives are extended, those things are there, perhaps not in the endless round that Ecclesiastes describes, but without being expunged. If you look for ultimate significance in finite life, no matter how far you stretch it, it will always look meaningless because there is no joy that is not stopped by sorrow; there is no moral success by strength of one's virtue that does not become alloyed with moral failure; and in the end all things turn away.

# The Religious Significance of Morality

CONVERSELY, the ultimate significance of life is not the unending accumulation of finite virtues and values. Some Christians argue that the doctrine of the Incarnation entails that God's ultimate fulfillment will be in the course of finite historical affairs—a literal kingdom on earth. Not a "mere spiritual" kingdom, but an historical one. There were times when Saint Paul expected the return of Iesus and the overthrow of the Roman Empire: and I suppose in our own day Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin has made popular the view that we are pressing onward toward the Omega Point. So the very course of evolutionary history must be interpreted as what in my Methodist tradition is called "pressing on to perfection." I think that most of the major religious traditions, including the spiritual heart of Christianity, testify against this interpretation of the Incarnation. Although I claim no certainty in these matters, let me cite several arguments.

First of all, it hasn't happened. The kingdom of God on earth seems to be at hand, and to be felt in the hearts of spiritual people; but it doesn't appear to be in office this year, historically speaking. And I would not want to transform the notion of the spiritual kingdom of God into the political realm in any case. Secondly, the world has made much progress since the time of Christ, but the progress seems to be mainly technological and institutional. I do not mean to denigrate that. People live now who would have died in infancy a thousand years ago. People live in good health now when they would not have before. People are cleaner now than they were before; they eat better diets, they have more energy, than they did before. I wouldn't want to live two thousand years ago after having tasted the luxury of middle class America, unless there were an important reason to do so. Technological progress has been great, and institutionally too we have made progress. We have few slaves now we had many slaves then. The difference between the rich and the poor is generally much less. And the difference in cultural possibilities between the rich and the poor is not as fixed now as it was before. Many more people have become educated, and many more people can learn languages other than their native tongue. All of these are improvements in the human condition by virtue of finding better

institutions. We have more institutional freedom now than ever before.

Nevertheless, we haven't improved, it seems to me, in our moral capacity. We do have more morally relevant facts. We may not make as great mistakes in an effort to do good. Nevertheless, when it comes to sinning, Hitler did just as well as Pharaoh. Realistically, and this is now my third argument, it seems to me that our technological progress may kill us off. I'm not saving it will, but it may. When the scientists were discussing the building of the hydrogen bomb, they were worried at first about the fact that they had to heat hydrogen to a temperature close to that of the sun. It occurred to a few of them, Oppenheimer for one, that this might mean igniting the earth's atmosphere. And so for several months they sat around and calculated to see whether or not the hydrogen in our atmosphere would ignite with the bomb and whoosh!-all of the atmosphere would be gone from the earth. Fortunately it didn't. And they weren't quite sure how big the boom would be when the bomb went off. The point is, advancing technology bears its risks—and one day we just might make that cataclysmic "mistake." There is no a priori guarantee that our technology will always lead us onwards and upwards. It might lead us downward. That is one of the ambiguities of life.

My fourth point is that we don't need to believe in perfection in the future in order to accept our moral responsibilities. Some

people, Teilhard among them, have argued that if there is no faith or guarantee that the future will bring success, then there is no ground for moral action now. That is a mistake: the ground for moral action is that we ought to do something now or refrain from doing something now. If there is something to enjoy, it should be enjoyed for its enjoyability. It should not be enjoyed because it's a step in the ladder toward higher and higher enjoyment. Life must be taken, in other words, as God gives it. And we do not need to believe in perfection in the future. to appreciate that true life comes from participating in the life and death of Christ, and that this is possible in the midst of finite joys and sufferings and ambiguities. One need not say that our future will be perfect in order to participate in that ambiguous life of Christ.

#### Maxims of Religious Life

LET ME OFFER, as the concluding section of this analysis, six maxims of religious life that pertain to the bifocal vision of the world I have been outlining. In each case I will also give a counter-maxim that is easy to believe in but runs contrary to the bifocular contrast.

1. "Do your duty for its own sake." That is, more generally, enjoy the blessings and endure the sufferings of life for what they are—nothing more. I take this maxim to mean that we ought to be objective. Of course we can't be perfectly objective; our per-

ception and discernment are always biased in some way or other, but we learn through education that there are ways to improve our course toward objectivity. We ought to learn to control ourselves, especially our subjective biases, so as to discern as well as possible the nature of things and to respond to what is presented, not to respond to what we would like to see or hear.

The counter-maxim to this is something like, "Do good that you may be saved." That is, treat the good things in the world as but steps to greater goodness, and the bad things as hindrances to God's plan. This means that we would never learn to accept the world in its own relative, finite nature, but would always be interpreting it as if we were nudging God. We try to get ultimate significance out of finite accumulations, and in so doing plunge headlong towards meaninglessness and despair because we will inevitably fail in some of our duties. The blessings of life cannot but prove to be transient, and the sufferings of life will equalize everybody—the good and the bad. If we were to seek ultimate significance here, therefore, we could only find meaninglessness.

2. "Embrace the vanity or meaninglessness of life as divine play." It has been a long time in the Western tradition since we have paid much attention to the notion of divine play—to the world as God's "game." But most of the other religious traditions have good words for that, and it is not in-

consistent with ours. Whatever the world is those respects in which it is meaningful and those respects in which it is meaningless (and there are enough of both to keep anyone satisfied)—whatever the world is, that is God's pleasure. And unless we can view the world as God's playing, we cannot embrace the meaninglessness it contains. Sometimes in the West we have had the feeling that God's creative principles ought to be doing what we would do if we were God and we were trying to make a perfect world. That is a mistake. It is unrealistic, and it misses the depths of the divine and the vanity

The counter-maxim here is to consider history to be directed by the Protestant Ethic. The "Protestant Ethic," you know, doesn't have all that much to do with Protestantism. It does have to do with subordinating all your play to the rational pursuit of some economic end, whatever kind of angelic currency one might imagine as being involved. God, I'm sure, does not act solely to become the richest one in heaven.

3. "Let God draw you from the world to his perspective and return you to the world with his creatorly outlook." This maxim expresses a twofold movement. On the one hand, there is the movement for the religious person from the finite life in which we live, where our positions are all relative, to the state of feeling ourselves "absolutely"—or, better yet, feeling the world absolutely. Of course we do not do that very well. I suspect



even the greatest mystics do not succeed perfectly at this. There is a tremendous amount of symbolism involved in being able to feel the whole world as God's world. The mystics do talk about feeling at one with everything, however, they talk about how their own individual, positionally defined, perspective is transcended for the divine perspective. They go from the relative to the "irrelative." God's perspective is as close to anything in the universe by virtue of the mediation of anything else, but is immediately present to everything.

That divine perspective differs from ours. We are related to everything other than ourselves by virtue of a whole host of mediators. It seems to me the first main step of the movement of the religious life is to develop a feeling for God's immediate "feeling" of the world. Having made that move in accord with whatever attractions God has proffered, we find that the way in which God "feels" the world is not neutral but is such as to put us back into the world as God is in the world. God does not just sit and look at the world; he loves and enters it. He creates in the world by a host of means, especially in human life by the very suffering and ambiguity we have been discussing. So. the second movement of the mystic is to return to considering the world as the object of God's pleasure,

"feeling" the world now, not as he did before in terms of its position relative to him, but rather as each thing in the world is loved by God. Again of course we do this symbolically. It is very difficult, if not plain impossible, to feel immediately close to everything in the world; and yet we abstract from our relative perspective and feel and act now in the universal ethical sense. We act in the world as God would love it.

This is a move from the world and a return to the world—a part of the religious experience of God. There is a counter-maxim here: Be either a devotee of mystical experience (which is one kind of religious life), or be a moral person (perhaps a religious moral person, but someone whose main energy is to get things done and changed). The counter-maxim suggests that one cannot be both. In New Testament terms, some religious people are like Mary and other religious people are like Martha. Mary and Martha can live in the same house. but when it comes time to have a big dinner-party for Jesus and his friends, Martha gets pretty peeved at Mary who sits around just enjoying it. I am suggesting that both personalities have to be incorporated into the religious experience.

4. "Be possessed of yourself." Know who you are, become acquainted with who you are, and be that one person well. Enjoy it; be yourself well. There is a kind of single-mindedness that goes with being a religious person. The pluralminded people are the ones who always wish they were someone else, even as they feel drawn to

many conflicting duties. They would like to have this talent and also that talent. In The Teachings of Don Juan, by Carlos Casteñada, Don Juan-the old Yaqui Indian sorcerer and a religious man-is trying to teach Castenada how to be properly religious, how to get down to the depths of the soul, how to find one's place, how to be single-minded. He says that kind of life is like being a warrior. It is seeing life as having a role for you, putting aside all the distractions, and concentrating on the act. That is exactly the same kind of advice Krishna gives to Arjuna in the Bhagavad-Gita: you should be who you are (Arjuna happens to be a strong hero of one of the sides in a war of ambiguous moral worth). The point is that one ought to focus on who one is and say, "Aha! that is who I am. How can that life be lived with a single minded intent?" Don't define yourself by your station; define yourself by yourself, and don't try to be God.

There's a counter-maxim here that is rather complex: Let yourself be defined by attachments to desirable things in the world or attachments to God. This is a deceptive maxim; it says, if there is a good cause" let that cause define you: be in the service of that cause—civil rights, Viet Nam, a war, anti-war, whatever. Or (and this is more tempting for religious people) let yourself be defined by your attachment to God. Forget about yourself-about being yourself-and let your pursuit of God define your character. The trouble with this counter-maxim is that it makes

you distort both the world and God: you come to see the causes defining you as being not good or bad under objective merits, but as playing roles in your own self-development. So you join the civil rights movement in order to get a good feeling from other people. You do succeed in that aim, but you also distort the real problems of assessing that moral situation. Or you enter into a pursuit of God and never let him be. You keep nudging him and assigning him the special duty of paying attention to you. But no—think—God made you; he has made you what you are, and you in turn must let God be who he is. You cannot define yourself by your attachment to God because that would define God in terms of the needs of your own personality. So be possessed of yourself and let God be, and pay attention then to what he is. One of the great teachers at Fordham University, Robert Pollack, once made the point this way: "If I were God and Kierkegaard took the leap of faith, I'd duck." I think there is a profound truth there.

5. "Take dying as the clue to living." I mean that in several ways. It is the basic orientation, first of all, in the death-resurrection theme of various religions. Most anthropologists have traced this theme to the celebration of life in the ancient primitive religious groups, as represented in the cycle of the seasons. There is death in the Fall, rebirth in the Spring, and for most primitive peoples that is the most profound symbol of that death can be skipped in its serious spark of life at the heart of everything.

take dying as the clue to living means that creativity in the divine sense is destructive as well as constructive. You know the figure of the deity, Shiva, in Hinduism-Shiva is the God of creativity, who destroys-kills off the old to create the new. The finite sphere is like a zero-sum game. For any new gain there has to be a loss someplace else. I do not know how far to stretch that metaphor in terms of physics, given the possibility of the truth of the steady-state theory; but it is certainly true in the religious sphere: there is as much pain as there is joy-as much falling apart as there is coming together. The way we fall apart, in fact, is the clue to the way we come together. In modern times, Heidegger and other philosophers have emphasized that living toward death, living with an eye toward dying, is the only authentic way of living. And to try to hide the fact that we die or to neglect it as we form our life style, is only to be inauthentic. We put on cosmetics to cover up our lives. Or to put it in a more scriptural way, you have to put down your life in order to gain it. The only way in which you can be possessed of yourself (as in the previous maxim), is to be ready to give yourself away. The only way by which you have become possessed enough to say, "I am this person," is if you can give it up. You don't have yourself until you can give yourself away.

On another level, the maxim to

The counter-maxim here is that aspects by the adroit use of religion. That's not a very profound

maxim. Visiting funeral parlors, however, as I do frequently in my capacity as a minister. I find very often the adroit use of religion to make death appear as if it hasn't happened. In many other respects also we tend to think of the adequate performance of religious rites as making death seem like sleep instead of itself. Christianity shows that even direct participation in the life of Christ involves taking part in his death. No matter how closely one follows Christ, one comes closer to the form of his death at the same time.

6. "Give thanks in all things." All things. And especially in the ambiguity of life, the moral disasters we seem so good at, and in our sufferings—those that are inevitable as well as those we bring on ourselves. We should also give thanks in the awful recognition of who we are. That's the scary thing about becoming possessed of oneself: Lord help me, I wouldn't

want to be possessed of this! And even for that we should give thanks. Thanks is the proper reverence that life gives to existence.

The counter-maxim in this case is the one that I began with: that God is to be brought to trial on the moral worth of this world, and that if we do bring God to trial on the moral worth of his world we find that the world is meaningless. Many people in the twentieth century have tried to do that. They probably are right in saving that the world is in many of the most important respects absurd. It is a mistake philosophically to say that therefore God is absurd or unjust. The religions of the world have recognized from the beginning that one does not judge God in the same way that one judges one's partner in a suit. Religious wisdom is to accept a time to be born, and a time to die; and also to accept the vanity of the world and to give thanks for both.



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January 1954, May 1965, October 1965, November 1965, and February 1971

## The Psalm of a Palm

I sprang from elemental ashes of the earth, To flourish for a while over field and fern. God's blast and black soil gave me birth; Exhausted now, to dust I must return.

From dust to dust, from powdery ash to ash I go: One sunlit hour upon life's plain between. But in that hour I shed my love, and know That love shall keep my branches ever green.

For nomad man I fanned the fever-heat away
And bowed him down a bunch of dates for food;
To God I gazed and swayed hosannas all the day
And for the Savior laid a carpet rude.

I sprang from elemental ashes of the earth, But love immortal in my leaf I stored. I die in dust but look for second birth To flourish in the courtyards of the Lord.

Robert J. Waywood, O.F.M.

32.62

312.1 A) : Yes, It is True:

# The Lord Has Risen and Has Appeared to Simon (Luke 24:34)

Translated by Marigwen Schumacher

N THESE WORDS, the reality of the Lord's resurrection is made evident for us in two ways: (1) the certainty of the fact, i.e., Yes, it is true: the Lord has risen; and (2) the witness of his own Person, i.e., and has appeared to Simon.

Reflect that this great celebration ought to be for us both an occasion for gladness and a model for action. It is an occasion for gladness because today our Savior has celebrated total victory over his enemies: "Arise, Yahweh, may your enemies be scattered and those who hate you run for their lives before you!" (Num. 10:35).

He has generously shared with us the perfected life of grace: "Christ has in fact been raised from the dead, the first-fruits of all who have fallen asleep. Death came through one man and in the same way the resurrection of the dead has come through one man" (1 Cor. 15:20-21).

He has fully pardoned us from all guilt: "Jesus who was put to death for our sins and raised to life to justify us... through our Lord Jesus Christ, by faith we are judged righteous and at peace with God, since it is

by faith and through Jesus that we have entered this state of grace in which we can boast about looking forward to God's glory" (Rom. 4:25, 5:1-2).

He has honestly encouraged us to hope for future resurrection: "Now if Christ raised from the dead is what has been preached, how can some of you be saying that there is no resurrection of the dead?" (1 Cor. 15:12).

Today must also be for us a model for action. By His example we rise again to seek out the Lord: "So I will rise and go through the city; in the streets and the squares, I will seek him whom my heart loves" (Cant. 15:12).

Today we rise again to give thanks to Him who has forgiven us: "... to the shouts of a rejoicing people gathered about the watering places, there they extol Yahweh's blessings, the blessings of his reign in Israel. Awake! Awake! Deborah! Awake! Awake! Declaim a song!" (Jdg. 5:11-12).

Today we rise again to accept the torch of divine grace by which He has pardoned us: But now you are light in the Lord." Try to discover what the Lord wants of you... any-

Miss Marigwen Schumacher, who translated this sermon from the Latin of Saint Bonaventure (Sermo X in Resurrectione Domini, Opera Omnia, vol. IX, p. 280), teaches classics at the Emma Willard School, Troy, New York.



thing by the light will be illuminated and anything illuminated turns into light. This is why it is said: "Wake up from your sleep, rise from the dead, and Christ will shine on you" (Eph. 5:9, 11, 14).

Today we rise again to concentrate upon Him who has gifted us with a certainty of resurrection: "After him arose Nathan to prophesy in the time of David. As the fat is set apart from the communion sacrifice, so David was chosen out of all the sons of Israel.... In all his activities he gave thanks to the holy One, the Most High, in words of glory he put all his heart into his songs out of love for his Maker" (Ecclus. 47:1-2, 8-10).

Reflect, too, that the risen Christ appears to those repenting as one who forgives generously. "But when the kindness and love of God our Savior for mankind were revealed, it was not because he was concerned with any righteous actions we might have done ourselves; it was for no reason except

his own compassion that he saved us" (Titus 3:4-5).

He appears to those advancing as one who listens gently: "That very day, two of them were on their way to the village called Emmaus, seven miles from Jerusalem, and they were talking together about all that had happened. Now as they talked this over, Jesus himself came up and walked by their side" (Lk. 24:13-14).

He appears to those persevering as one who comforts agreeably: "Then Yahweh answered and said, 'Write the vision down, inscribe it on tablets to be easily read, since this vision is for its time only: eager for its own fulfillment, it does not deceive; if it comes slowly, wait, for come it will without fail" (Habakkuk 2:2-3).

He appears to those arriving as one who rewards richly: "... now the life you have is hidden with Christ in God. But when Christ is revealed—and he is your life—you too will be revealed in all your glory with him" (Col. 3:4).

## Saint Francis and the Secular World—II Sister Rose Mae Rausch, O.S.F.

Francis of Assisi had the insight, the know-how, and the leadership which successfully faced and proposed practical solutions to the dilemma of the sacred and the secular at the beginning of the thirteenth century in western Christendom.1 God's hand is seen throughout this man's history and is beautifully attested by Francis' continuous sensitivity to the Lord's word in prayer and in all the events of his life, as well as by the Lord's "stamp of approval" at the stigmatization.

The main contours of Francis' conversion have been told at length by many authors, but it seems to this writer that the

W E ARE FACED WITH the Francis's solution to the relation astounding reality that of the sacred and the secular are to be found in his own account of how God inspired him "to embark upon a life of Penance," in his Testament. The following is a phrase by phrase commentary on the meaning of Francis' relationship to the lepers and its implications for the sacred/secular question.

When I was in sin, the sight of lepers nauseated me beyond measure. The Testament was dictated by Francis shortly before he died from the viewpoint of a man who knows what it is to be freed from whatever is not of God through renunciation and suffering in love. He therefore also knows the meaning of the opposite—sin. At first elements of his conversion it seems strange that, of all which point most clearly to the areas of experiences of

conversion, Francis should choose to draw attention, at the end of his life, not to the change from the disorderly life of his youth, nor to the change of heart about wanting to be a knight, but to the change of heart concerning the lepers. Part of his being "in sin" had. evidently, to do with his lack of love for the lepers.

God himself led me into their company. To enter into the company of lepers was for Francis to dissociate himself from the class system to which he belonged. This system designated certain people as "in" and other people as "out," with little chance for the love and peace of God's kingdom. It meant precisely that some people did not count. As Francis was to find out more and more clearly, God slights no one "in the world," and therefore he, Francis, would not do so.

without someone to care for for his experience with the them, the lepers had been lepers. He did experience a abandoned by society. As Jesus cleansing from the forms and the Crucified had suffered for formalism of the world of sin us, Francis would suffer with this second time. Francis could

these sick and weak and unattractive fellow men.

I became acquainted with them. In fact, Francis returned there and went to other lazarets as well and later sent his friars there.2 He found them to be real people, as real as the colorful companions of his youth. Did he not come to experience a love for people a reverence and awe and thankfulness—and to discover that he, Francis, was the lesser brother, the one who received?

They became a source of spiritual and physical consolation for me. In his experience with the lepers Francis probably found a living answer to the question of the voice at Spoleto: "Tell me, from whom can you expect most, the master or the servant?"3 Francis had had a previous experience identifying with the outcasts when he had exchanged his clothing with a beggar in Rome and may have I had pity on them. As sheep been partially disposed thereby

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In the light of the place of Francis of Assisi in history, how inadequate is the presentation of Francis by Henri Focillon, The Art of the West (New York: Phaidon Publishers, 1963), p. 119, where he says, "But the universe, which the makers of images enumerated in their statues, he saw with a poet's eye, with all its tenderness, its eternal insubstantiality, and gave it no other contour than that of his wandering songs, dedicated to God's creatures..."

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>O Englebert, Saint Francis of Assisi, 2nd English ed., revised and augmented by Ignatius Brady and Raphael Brown (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1965), p. 73.

<sup>32</sup> Celano 6, ed. Placid Hermann, O.F.M., in Marion A. Habig, ed., St. Francis of Assisi: Writings and Early Biographies—English Omnibus of the Sources for the Life of St. Francis (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), p. 366. In the following notes, page references without source refer to this Omnibus.

fully from Him from whom Francis could expect "the most." It was through his association with the lepers that he became really free to love others and to give himself completely to the Father in heaven.4

AFTER THIS the Gospel message on the Feast of Saint Matthias, 1208, became a seal for the basic change of heart that had already taken place in Francis. To preach the message that the kingdom of God is at hand is to bring love and respect to all human beings, recognizing that God is active in the world and cannot be held back by forms and institutions based on the selfish pursuits of men. It seems that here we have a key to the understanding of the secular in the life of Francis. All things, all people belong to God and must freely go back to God. Sin is what stands in their God.

ishes the explanation of how

now receive freely, simply, and wait long before leaving the world." It would be profitable to know what Francis meant by "leaving the world." We know that he did not become a monk, entering into an established and recognized "religious state." Yet it seems that in his mind he had clearly made the step to enter the religious state, for a few paragraphs further on in the Testament he says that "when God gave me some friars, there was no one to tell me what I should do; but the Most High himself made it clear to me that I must live the life of the Gospel. I had this written down... and his holiness the Pope confirmed it for me." Francis would not have needed the Pope's confirmation for some kind of private enterprise. The Life of the Gospel was to be lived publicly, with the approval of the Church, and therefore was to one of those forms of life desigthe way of creatures praising nated traditionally as "religious life."5 In the "Letter to All the In the Testament Francis fin- Faithful" Francis again alludes to the religious life: "Reli-God inspired him to embark on gious... are bound to make \* a life of penance with the greater efforts, without neglectwords, "After that I did not ing the duties of ordinary Chris-

In some places the word "world" is used by Francis and the early biographers as merely referring to "place" (meaning "everywhere") and to "people" (meaning "everybody"). Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a simple spatial or quantitative sense is meant, or whether persons holding certain system of values is also meant. The biblical quotation used by Francis in the "Letter to All the Faithful" shows this twofold meaning: "Father, all those whom you gave me in the world, were yours, and you gave them to me.... I am praying for them, not for the world."7 The first usage here seems to be the spatial and quantitative sense; the second, a sense referring to those who have rejected God, who have a system of values which does not put God first in their lives.

There are references in Celano's First Life, too, which seem to point to the world as

tians, because they have left the place or people in a spatial and quantitative sense and which at the same time seem to connote a certain kind of place, a certain kind of people. "Go . . . two by two into the various parts of the world."8 "[The Order which thel hand of the Lord had so kindly planted in the world. . . . "9 Francis was to bear witness to the truth "throughout the whole world" in accordance with the example of the Apostles. 10 Celano speaks of the "battlefields of this world," and the "crowds of the world."11 He writes of Francis as one who "filled the whole earth with the Gospel of Christ,"12 who mirrors the Passion of the Lamb who washed away the sins of the world and reconciled the world to his Father,13 and whose life illumined the world.14 He refers to the Poor Clares as "dead and buried to the world,"15 and, finally, he says that Francis has most gloriously "renewed the whole world by his word and example, his life and his teaching."16

In these passages "world"

world."6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>This brings us to reflect on the meaning of the scene before Bishop Guido's tribunal, where Francis disrobed and said, "From now on I can advance naked before the Lord, saying in truth no longer: my father, Peter Bernadone, but: our Father who art in Heaven!" Cf. Englebert, p. 78.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Cf. C. Esser, Origins of the Franciscan Order, tr. A. Daly and I Lynch (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1970), pp. 19-29. 203-08.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Omnibus, p. 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>In. 17:6-24; *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>81</sup> Celano, 29, p. 252.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>1 Celano 74, p. 291.

<sup>101</sup> Celano 88, 120; pp. 303; 334.

<sup>. 111</sup> Celano 93, 91; pp. 308, 306.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>1 Celano 97, p. 311.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>1 Celano 112f., pp. 325-27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>1 Celano 118f., pp. 332-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>1 Celano 117, p. 331; cf. 122, p. 336.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>1 Celano 151, p. 355.



seems to refer to persons who are without the "truth" and are in need of "light." In the "Letter to All the Friars," Francis tells his brothers that "this is the very reason he has sent you all over the world, so that... you might bear witness to his message and convince everyone that there is no other almighty God besides him." This, no doubt, is the "truth" and the "light" that the "world" needs. In the Rule of 1223 Francis

says, "I counsel, admonish, and exhort my brethren in Jesus Christ that when they go out in the world they neither quarrel nor dispute nor judge others...."18 Here the "world" seems merely to designate the place, but C. Esser points out the importance of this phrase for a decisive understanding of the Rule "for the friars in the whole world."19 After having received verbal approval of the First Rule in 1209, Francis and his friars "all conferred together, as true followers of justice, whether they should dwell among men or go to solitary places." The decision Francis reached through prayerful meditation was, Celano concludes, "not to live for himself alone, but for him who died for all, knowing that he was sent for this that he might win for God the souls the devil was trying to snatch away."20

This brings to mind the dramatic incident recorded in the

<sup>17</sup>Omnibus, p. 104.

<sup>18</sup>The translation of the Rule of 1223 used in this paper is that given by C. Esser in "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," Round Table of Franciscan Research 34 (1969), nn. 1-2.

19Ibid., p. 36. Esser sees the concept of the presence of the friars "in the world" as very important to the interpretation of the Rule of 1223. As the monks had a monastery in which to live their lives, so obedience would be the "place" where the friars would live their lives. A friar who is ill (§25) and a friar who is sick in soul (§26) are to be understood to be friars who are on a journey and what should be done in each case is suggested by Francis. It is the general chapters and the provincial chapters which are to serve as the framework of the Order's life.

Sacrum Commercium where Lady Poverty asked the friars to be shown the cloister. "Taking her to a certain hill, they showed her the whole world, as far as she could see, and said: "This, Lady is our cloister.'" Corroborating this in a later document is the story of "How God Revealed to St. Clare and Brother Sylvester that St. Francis Should Go and Preach." 22

Francis did not promote for himself and the friars a presence among the people of the world in an unqualified sense. In "Religious Life in Hermitages" he forbids the friars who are taking the part of "Mary" and are spending time in prayer in the small hut to allow anyone to enter the enclosure where they live.23 There were times when Francis himself wanted to refrain from speaking to lay people who would come, and gave a sign of this with the words from Psalm 118-11: "Thy words have I hidden in my heart." But his main reason for doing this was probably to avoid receiving uncomplimentary talk about others, "for he had found some who outwardly agreed ... but inwardly disagreed... who acquired credit for themselves, but made the upright suspect to him..."24

Evidence accumulates, nevertheless, that the "world" of people is significant to Francis. He addresses "all magistrates and consuls, all judges and governors all over the world" in his "Letter to the Rulers of the People."25 In Chapter 23 of the Rule of 1221, he addresses "the whole world." and then goes on to enumerate absolutely every kind of person he can think of-every age of person. every kind of worker, "the little and the great, all peoples, tribes, families and languages, all nations and all men everywhere, present and to come...."26 An amazing thing about Francis and his attitude toward the people "of the world" is that he saw all people as called to the same gospel life as himself, and thus he considered anyone who lives a life of penance, of conversion to God, as in fact a "religious."27 This is certainly to be seen as a different approach from that of the monasteries. In Chapter 23 of the Rule of 1221, referred to above. Francis calls everyone to "persevere in the true faith and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>1 Celano 35, p. 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Sacrum Commercium, §63, p. 1593.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Fioretti, I, 16; pp. 1334-35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Omnibus, pp. 72-73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>1 Celano 96, p. 311.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Omnibus, p. 115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>See Esser, Origins of the Franciscan Order, pp. 205-06.

in a life of penance." The Order is to be "open to the world in the biblical sense, entirely dedicated to the service of the kingdom of God. And it remains thus in its entire way of life, not just in its outward activity. Francis even dared to identify profession of the Rule with qualification for the kingdom of God...."28 It doesn't seem that Francis was terribly concerned about a distinction between "religious" and "laity", although he saw his fraternity as having a special service—that of announcing the kingdom of God to others-and he sought approbation for his way of life from the authorities in the Church.

IN THE PERSONAL life of Francis and in the origins of the Order, then, a principle, carefully arrived at, became clarified: that Francis and his friars were not to separate themselves from "the world." Along with the non-separation principle, however. Francis at the same time radically, in life-style and without "looking back,"29 lived what the First Life of Celano seems to portray as the vita angelica, a life completely dedicated to God and eschatological in

character. Like the angels, the friars sought to be messengers to men, but with a note of solitude. This was the life lived by the early desert Fathers: a separation from the world in a sense, bodily and spiritual asceticism, given to prayer.30

The motive for this "separation" and asceticism was not the attainment of these conditions as such, but rather love. The following sequence is given in 1 Celano 71: "Francis had been taught not to seek his own but (1) to seek especially what in his eyes would be helpful toward the salvation of others; (2) but above everything else he desired to depart and to be with Christ. (3) Therefore, his greatest concern was to be free from everything of this world...."31 The points stressed are (1) love of neighbor, (2) love of Christ, and (3) freedom from the world. Francis' allegiance to Ladv Poverty, e.g., was not an allegiance to her as his spouse, for she was the spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was born, lived, and died in poverty. Francis' "commercium" with poverty was as a loyal knight, faithful to the Lady of the King. Francis' love of poverty was not for poverty itself, but for love of the Lord who was poor.<sup>32</sup>

It is evident, then, that Francis did not have the reluctance to be among people and mingle with them that characterized the monastic systems with the institution of the cloister. In fact no "separation" was made between the friars and the world—only a distinction of mode of life. It would be well to examine here some evidence as to how this principle of non-separation was applied in Francis' daily life and in what he asked of the friars.

The observances in poverty and self-denial were not absolutes, but were practiced according to circumstances, as we see in the following instances. "With all zeal, with all solicitude," Celano tells us, Francis "guarded holy Lady Poverty, not permitting any vessel of any kind to be in the house, lest it lead to superfluous things, when he could in some way avoid being subject to extreme necessity without it."33 Bernard was instructed by Francis to

not to his parents.34 Apparently Bernard's parents were not poor. The condition of being without property was for the sake of not claiming anything against someone else. "No matter where they are [they] must . . . not claim the ownership of any place, or try to hold it against someone else. Everyone ... must be made welcome."35

The Rule of 1223 has a number of directions regarding use of things of the world arising from the friars' presence in the world. "They shall not ride unless compelled by manifest necessity, or by infirmity."36 To ride a horse was to show oneself as wealthy or of the noble class, not a sign of being non-ascetical.37 "And according to the Holy Gospel they may partake of whatever food is set before them."38 This, a directive for not doing one's own ascetical thing, calls attention to the ideal of adapting uncomplainingly to the concrete circumstances in which one finds oneself. Francis strictly enjoined "all the friars that they by no means receive give his money to the poor, but coin or money,"39 and yet he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule," pp. 57-58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Rule of 1223, §9.

<sup>30</sup> See C. Esser, "Francis, Man of the World to Come," in Repair My House (ed. L. Mély, tr. M. D. Meilach (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1963), pp. 15-45.

<sup>31</sup>Omnibus, p. 288.

<sup>32</sup>See Esser, "The Mystery of Poverty." Repair My House, pp. 73-92; idem, Origins of the Franciscan Order, pp. 233-34.

<sup>331</sup> Celano 51, p. 272. Emphasis added.

<sup>341</sup> Celano 24, p. 248.

<sup>35</sup>Rule of 1221, ch. 7, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup>Rule of 1223, §15, ed. cit.

<sup>37</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," pp. 37-38.

<sup>38</sup> Rule of 1223, §17.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., §18.

went on immediately to insist that "the "Minister and Custodes . . . shall take special care to provide for the needs" of those under their charge."40 This care is to be in proportion to the needs of the brothers in given situations.41 The friars have "one tunic with a hood, and another (if they wish) without a hood. And those who are compelled by necessity may wear shoes. And all the friars shall wear coarse garments."42 This last statement is important to show that the quality of garment is what indicates the distinctive dress as well as number of garments and kindbut no "absolute" in the modern sense of religious habit seems to be indicated here. In the section on fasting, the last statement is: "In cases, however, of manifest necessity, the friars are not obliged to observe corporal fasts."43

Francis called his fraternity the "Order of Friars Minor," and, Celano continues, "indeed they were lesser brothers, who, being subject to all, always sought a place that was lowly...."44 The Gospel Way of going about among the people of the world would be to go as "servant," as the least, as "minores." This lesson, however, was for the people of the world as well. To persons in power Francis said, "The more wisdom and power they enjoyed in this life, the greater the torments they will have to endure in hell."45 The man in authority . . . should become the least ... and serve. We should not want to be in charge of others . . . but subject to every creature for God's sake."46

As for the friars themselves, Francis wrote that they should "do their best to humble themselves at every opportunity... [and not] take pride in any good which God says or does or accomplishes in them and by them".<sup>47</sup> There are a number of points in the Rule of 1223 which exhort the friars in detail always to act as genuine minores on their journeys,<sup>48</sup> that "their coming to men should always be in the service of peace."<sup>49</sup>

The friars were not, them-

selves, to use coercive power. If they were not welcome in a certain area, they were to flee to another country. Francis forbade them, moreover, to petition the Roman Curia for a papal brief which would require their acceptance by local authorities.<sup>50</sup> In fact, Francis did not want to coerce anyone, for it is the Lord's desire that is to be followed. He wrote in his "Letter to Brother Leo": "In whatever way you think you will best please our Lord God and follow in his footsteps and in poverty, take that way with the Lord God's blessing and my obedience."51 In the "Letter to All the Faithful" Francis said, "It is not for us to be wise and calculating in the world's fashion; we should be guileless. lowly, and pure."52

As the friars travel through the world they will be confronted by the cares and anxieties of the world, which would naturally touch them by the fact of their presence in the world. Their freedom from these cares and anxieties will come from acknowledging that God loves them, that he is good, and that every good they have comes from him. This sense of interior

poverty and of God as the source of all good is brought into very strong relief by Francis in his "Admonitions" and his "Praises of God," as well as in his "Praises before the Office." with this concluding doxology: "All powerful, all holy, most high and supreme God, sovereign good, all good, every good, you who alone are good, it is to you we must give all praise, all glory, all thanks, all honour, all blessing; to you we must refer all good always. Amen."53 It was "the wholly poor Francis who possessed such a rare and fine sense of the immediate activity of God in the life of men. He realized that it was precisely this which makes God the owner of all the good things in our life."54

SAINT FRANCIS HAD a number of close friends, and women were among them. The secular world, of course, puts a great value on heterosexual relationships. If the friars were not to be "cloistered" and therefore separated from women, what was Francis' solution to the mingling of the sexes as far as his brothers were concerned? In the Rule of 1221, chapter 12, he says that the

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., §19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," pp. 37-38.

<sup>42</sup>Rule of 1223, §10. Emphasis added.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., §13. Emphasis added.

<sup>441</sup> Celano 38, p. 260.

<sup>45&</sup>quot;Letter to the Rulers of the People," p. 116.

<sup>46&</sup>quot;Letter to All the Faithful," pp. 95-96.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>Rule of 1221, ch. 17, p. 44.

<sup>48</sup>Rule of 1223, §§ 14, 37a, 37b.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," p. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Testament, p. 68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Omnibus, pp. 118-19.

<sup>52</sup> *lbid.*, p. 96.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-87, 125-26, 139.

<sup>54</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," p. 56

to allow any women to profess obedience to them."55 He thus sought to prevent them from taking positions of prestige and power. They are also to "avoid the sight or company of women. when it is evil."56 Commenting on the injunction "not to have suspicious dealings or conversations with women" in the Rule of 1223. C. Esser says it means they should guard against that which could lead to unchastity.57 A guide to relationships with women in general could be taken from the directive: "Neither shall they be godfathers,"58 which has for its purpose avoidance of ties and obligations deriving from kinship, in order that the friars can be totally free for their particular calling.59 Fornication is punished by dismissal. 60 Francis seems to have the important insight here that sexual intercourse with a woman necessarily establishes ties of responsibility with her; and in case of fornication by a friar, he should leave the Order to take care of his new responsibility. To his sisters in the Lord,

friars are "absolutely forbidden Francis says, "I desire and promise you personally and in the name of my friars that I will always have the same loving care and special solicitude for you as for them."61

> It is of interest that in his "Praises of the Virtues" Francis does not mention chastity, but speaks of "Lady Holy Love" instead: "Lady Holy Love, God keep you, with your sister, holy Obedience.... Holy Love puts to shame all the temptations of the devil and the flesh and all natural fear."62

For the fraternity for whom the world is its cloister, Francis did not stipulate any special kind of work, except preaching. From the beginning the friars apparently worked alongside lay people, but Francis had some guidelines for this kind of involvement. Those "who are engaged in the services of lay people for whom they work should not be in charge of money or of the cellar. They are forbidden to accept positions of authority in the houses of their employers."63 The purpose of their work, as shown in the Rule

of 1223, is not to lead to owner- Brother Sun" Francis calls on ship of property, but to "receive whatever is necessary for the bodily support of themselves and their brethren."64 Study, too (as any other kind of work), fits in with the gospel life "as long as it does not extinguish the spirit of prayer and devotedness."65

Although the Catholic lav people of the time were developing an anti-clericalism stemming not only from personal abuses of the call on the part of the clergy, but from a system which brought wealth and secular power to the clergy. Francis did not in any sense try to "put down" desacralize clergy Church. On the contrary, he showed extraordinary reverence and obedience to priests and officials of the Church. Perhaps the most powerful witness that could be given to the clergy was the humility and poverty of Francis and his friends.

Francis' affirmation of the world, his refusal to place it at a distance, is manifest in exquisite simplicity in his praise of God through creatures. In adapting himself usefully to the the beautiful and almost majes- behavior of all.... Among tic phrases of the "Canticle of sinners he was as one of them."69

the "Most high, All-powerful, all good Lord," and praises him through his own creatures. "my lord Brother Son... Sister Moon and Stars," etc., culminating with praise of the Lord God through people who "grant pardon... who endure sickness and trial."66 Francis saw that all things are God's, that God is the Creator and Ruler of all things, and he saw in creatures the power, wisdom, and goodness of their Creator. Therefore he loved all creatures and (in the symbolic personification characteristic of the age) preached to creatures as if they were rational, and exhorted them all to love God and serve him willingly.67 Celano says that Francis was "helped not a little by the things that are in the world."68

In regard to respect and reverence toward other persons, Francis was "unbending with himself. understanding toward others, and discreet in all things.... And because he was very humble, he showed himself all mildness to all men.

<sup>55</sup>Omnibus, p. 42.

<sup>56</sup>Rule of 1221, p. 42. Emphasis added.

<sup>57</sup> Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," pp. 48-49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>Rule of 1223, §38c.

<sup>58</sup> Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," pp. 48-49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>∞</sup>Rule of 1221, ch. 13, p. 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup>Forms of Life for St. Clare, p. 76.

<sup>62</sup>Omnibus, p. 133.

<sup>63</sup>Rule of 1221, ch. 7, p. 37.

<sup>64</sup> Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," p. 39

<sup>65&</sup>quot;Letters to St. Anthony." p. 164.

<sup>66</sup>Omnibus, pp. 130-31.

<sup>671</sup> Celano 58-61, 80-81; pp. 277-80, 295-97.

<sup>682</sup> Celano 165, p. 494.

<sup>691</sup> Celano 82, p. 297.

Francis couldn't stand to see a poor person reproached, or to hear a curse hurled upon any creature.70

HOW IS THE RELATIONSHIP of world and the sacred to be understood? What was the insight of Francis of Assisi into the question? How can the problem of the "sacred and secular" be solved? Does Francis' solution give any direction for today?

The genius of Francis was, not that he was a great ascetic. seeking the perfection of self in the sense of "self-control" and "self-denial" which are generally abhorrent to contemporary persons, but that he was a great lover, of God and of man and of other creatures. It was. however, the poor Francis who possessed such a great awareness of the immediate activity of God in the life of the world. He realized that it was precisely this activity which "makes God the owner of all the good things in our life."71 In the context of

God seen active in the world, God's will was to be sought unhindered by egoism.

Francis' discovery in the kiss of the leper of the love of the great God in the human world and his discovery of the lowliness of himself had opened up to him a new world of the sacred and an insight into what is properly secular. What he saw of God's activity as he, Francis, stood free of attachments, and what he saw of the nothingness of the world (of and by itself) on his journey toward God, gave Francis a penetrating and rather comprehensive understanding of the order of the world-God's order, not understood by carnal man. It was on this dynamic order, as first lived out in the gospel by the human Christ, that Francis based his way of life for himself and for the friars.

The "world" presents no obstacle to one who attributes all good to God. Instead of a divi-

secular, Francis' vision focuses erful, all holy... God, sovereign on a unity which sees the good, all good, every good, you "secular" in view of God's dy- who alone are good, it is to you namic ownership of all things. It we must give all praise, all remained for Francis to give glory, all thanks, all honour, all, himself completely to this great blessing; to you we must refer God, whose love became so real all good always."72 And the closto him through the human ing prayer for the "Office of the Christ. Francis' prayer is God- Passion" is yet another excentered prayer. The "Canticle ample: "Let us bless our Lord of Brother Sun" is an example and God, living and true; to him of such prayer, for it is ad- we must attribute all praise, dressed to God, seeking only glory, honour, blessing, and that he be praised through his every good for ever. Amen."78

sion between the sacred and the glorify him for ever. ... All powcreatures. The "Praises before Francis had found a way to love the Office" illustrates the same the world and to love God attitude: "Let us praise and above all things."

## Spring

Howling winds surround us Metal rains depress us Spring has not yet sprung.

A blade of grass A robin's chirp Sustains our snowed-in hope.

Morning darkness lightens Sunshine alimmers coolly Spring begins to spring.

SISTER BRENDAN MARY RONAYNE

<sup>72</sup>Omnibus, pp. 138-39.

<sup>78</sup>Omnibus, p. 142.

<sup>701</sup> Celano 76, pp. 292-93.

<sup>71</sup>Esser, "The Definitive Rule of the Friars Minor," p. 56. A van Corstanje has written in this regard: "Francis lived in his times. He lived in the present ... He is said to have given his heart to the historical Christ of the synoptic gospels.... But with Francis it was always a matter of Christ being present." ("Francis of Assisi in Quest of His Identity," Franciscan Herald 50 [1971], p. 180). J. Basetti-Sani writes that "to limit his [Christ's] scope as fulcrum and pivot of the human race solely to the activity of divine, preparatory intervention (worked out instrumentally in the course of Bible and ecclesiastical history) is to unduly shrink the reigning function of Christ in history." ("The Primacy of Christ and the Existence of the Non-Christian Religions," Franciscan Studies 27 [Annual 5, 1967], p. 37).

## The Two Poles of Saint Bonaventure's Theology

**EWERT H. COUSINS** 

F ONE WERE seeking a perspective to grasp the essential elements of Bonaventure's thought, he would naturally turn to the theological dimension. The primacy of theology in Bonaventure's thought has been widely acknowledged; yet in practice it has been obscured by two tendencies. At times scholars have extracted philosophical elements and studied them in isolation from the theological context that shapes their meaning. Such a procedure would do violence to any medieval theologian, but especially to Bonaventure, who has woven philosophy and theology into an integral texture. Others have not fallen into this trap but have examined philosophical elements against the background of Bonaventure's theology. Yet their emphasis has kept this theology precisely in the background, allowing its contours to remain vague, without the sharp delineation their importance deserves. The rise of neoscholasticism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—with its strong emphasis on medieval philosophy—gave great impetus to these two tendencies. To counteract these tendencies, one must back away, as it were, and view Bonaventure's thought as a whole—on its own terms, with

its own structure, and with its own distinctive outlines. Like many of his medieval contemporaries, Bonaventure elaborated a system that has the intricate harmonies and the complex unity of a Gothic cathedral. To examine the apse or the choir of a Gothic cathedral in isolation would provide only a partial and perhaps even a distorted view. We must withdraw and observe from a distance, where we can grasp the master design and discern the contours of the whole.

When we do this, the outlines of Bonaventure's thought become clear. We observe that theology provides his unifying theme, and further that his theology has a distinctive design. In this theology two elements stand out sharply - like the towers of a Gothic cathedral—giving the ultimate shape to the whole. These two elements are his Trinitarian theology and Christocentricity. In his doctrine of the Trinity and of the centrality of Christ, Bonaventure's thought reaches its culmination and achieves its distinctive design. It is here that all the lines of his thought converge and reveal their ultimate meaning.

Yet if we look more closely, we will observe that these two towers are not symmetrical, as are,

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for example, the towers of Notre Dame of Paris. Rather they are like the towers of Chartres, developed in different periods and reflecting diverse styles. The design of Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology was present from the beginning, from his writing of the Commentary on the Sentences. It was inherited from his teacher Alexander of Hales and from the Victorines, who, in turn, received it from the Pseudo-Dionysius and ultimately from the tradition of the Greek Fathers. Even from the beginning Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology was systematic, self-reflective, and intricately elaborated.

On the other hand, his Christocentricity emerged gradually, from Bonaventure's Franciscan roots. reached self-consciousness in his meditation on Francis' vision at La Verna and concrete literary form in the Itinerarium. It reached its highest development in the Collationes in Hexaëmeron. Yet unlike Chartres, this tower is left unfinished. The foundations, the design, and even the beginnings of the superstructure are there; but they lack the systematic analysis and critical self-reflection that is characteristic of his Trinitarian theology. That Bonaventure's work here is unfinished may be a cause of regret to the historian; yet to the systematic theologian it presents a challenge, for Bonaventure's Christocentricity calls for completion in the light of his system. The contemporary theologian who follows the lines Bonaventure has sketched will not only move deeply into the mystery itself but will find

himself vitally in touch with some of the most pressing religious problems of our day.

The present study will analyze these two distinctive features of Bonaventure's thought both from a genetic and from a typological perspective. From the genetic point of view, we will describe the evolution of each and indicate its sources. From the typological perspective. we will analyze each as a theological model or Gestalt, attempting to lay bare their distinctive structure and at the same time seeing them in dynamic tension. Hopefully such a study will throw light on the structure of Bonaventure's thought as a whole and draw into focus some of its tensions. It is further hoped that this study will throw Latent in the early period, it light on some of the major tensions of Christian theology throughout history. Bonaventure provides an extraordinary case in point for seeing in evolution and tension some of the basic elements of the Christian tradition. His Trinitarian theology is characteristic of the Trinitarian vision of the East as developed by the Greek Fathers. On the other hand, his Christology, with its Franciscan emphasis on the sensible and the concrete, is characteristic of the Latin West. In Bonaventure's thought as in a microcosm, we can see these elements as distinct and yet integrated into a synthetic whole. Since these tensions are not relegated to past history but persist to the present day, Bonaventure's dealing with them can throw light on contemporary issues. Because Bonaventure explored so deeply the mystery of the Trinity and the centrality of

and relevant to today's crises and challenges. As we will see at the conclusion of our study, Bonaventure can enter into dialogue with such twentieth-century theologians as Paul Tillich, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Raymond Panikkar as they explore such questions as the relation of Christianity to secular culture, the impact of Christ on history and the future, and the relation of Christ and world reli-

In dealing with the evolution of Bonaventure's thought, we will divide his writings into three periods:1 The first period, during his teaching years at Paris from 1248 to 1257, reflects the academicscholastic world of the university. Here we will concentrate on the Commentary on the Sentences, the disputed questions De Musterio Trinitatis, and the Breviloquium. In the second period, from 1259 to 1267. Bonaventure composed his mystical works. Here we will draw chiefly from the Itinerarium and the Lignum Vitae. In the final period, 1267-1273, he was engaged in controversies through his three series of collationes. Our chief focus of attention here will be the final series, the Collationes in Hexaëmeron.

#### Trinitarian Design

EVENAIN THE first period, during

Christ, his thought appears fresh University of Paris, 1248-1257, his Trinitarian theology is found in its essential features. As early as the Commentary on the Sentences (1250 - 1252), the basic elements are present and systematically developed. Aspects of his teaching on the Trinity are elaborated in greater detail in the disputed questions De Trinitate and De Scientia Christi (both in 1254). In the Breviloquium (1254-1257), which draws this period to a completion, the Trinitarian theology is again integrated in a summa structure, similar to that of the Commentary. Although reflecting the refinement of the intervening years, the design of the doctrine remains substantially that of the Commentary.2

This Trinitarian design contains the following elements: (1) The Trinity is conceived according to the Greek model and not the Latin model. Like the Greek Fathers, Bonaventure focusses on the Father as dynamic source and not on the persons as relations as Augustine had done. Bonaventure also integrated the Latin or Augustinian model of the Trinity into his thought, but it always remained subordinated to the Greek model. (2) The Trinitarian processions, then, are seen as the expression of the Father's fecundity. In this perspective, Bonaventure developed a highly elaborated doctrine of the generation of the Son, as Image and Bonaventure's teaching years at the Word of the Father. (3) Bonaventure

Father as "Fontalis Plenitudo" BONAVENTURE'S characteristic notion of God is that of dynamic and fecund source. This fecundity is realized not only in God's act of creation, but within his inner Trinitarian life. Hence the mystery of the Trinity is seen precisely as the mystery of the divine fecundity rooted in the Father as source. This basic elements in Bonaventure's Trinitarian design is present at the very beginning of the early period. In the second distinction of the Commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure relates fecundity not only to the divine nature

makes a self-conscious link between but to the Trinity itself.4 According ty of persons in God. At the base of these reflections is the notion of self-diffusive, self-transcending, self-communicating love that Bonaventure inherited from Richard of St. Victor and the Pseudo-Dionysius.5 In his fourth point, namely primacy, Bonaventure makes the formal connection between self-diffusive fecundity and the person of the Father, although this connection is understood also in the case of happiness, perfection, and simplicity. He writes of primacy:

> ... but the more primary a thing is, the more it is fecund and the principle of others. Therefore just as the divine essence, because it is first, is the principle of other essences. so the person of the Father, since he is the first, because from no one, is the principle and has fecundity in regard to persons.6

Later, in distinction 27 of the first book of the Commentary. Bonaven-

¶ Sent., d. 2-34 (I, 46-596); M. Trin. (V, 45-115); Sc. Chr. (V, 3-43); Brevil. p. I, c. 2-6; p. II, c. 12 (V, 210-15; 230).

the Trinity and creation. The world to Bonaventure, supreme happiness, issues ultimately from the fecundity perfection, simplicity, and primacy of the Trinity and reflects the all demand that there be a plurali-Trinity, according to various categories of representation: vestige, image, similitude. (4) This Trinitarian theology is the basis for Bonaventure's spirituality, in which the soul as image of the Trinity returns to its Trinitarian source.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>On Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology, cf. Théodore de Régnon, Etudes de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, vol. II: Théories scholastiques (Paris: Retaux, 1892), 435-568; A. Stohr, Die Trinitätslehre des Hl. Bonaventura (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1923); J.-M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin selon Bonaventure (Paris: Vrin, 1929); Titus Szabó, De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente doctrina S. Bonaventurae (Rome: Herder, 1955); Luc Mathieu, "La Trinité créatrice d'après Saint Bonaventure," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculté de théologie de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 1960): Winthir Rauch, Das Buch Gottes: Eine systematische Untersuchung des Buchbegriffes bei Bonaventura (München: Max Hueber, 1961); Alexander Gerken, Theologie des Wortes: Das Verhältnis von Schöpfung und Inkarnation bei Bonaventura (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1963); Olegario González, Misterio trinitario y existencia humana (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1965).

<sup>41</sup> Sent., d. 2, a. un., q. 2 (I, 53-54). <sup>5</sup>Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate; Pseudo-Dionysius, De Caelest. Hierarch., c. 4, n. 1; De Div. Nom., c. 4, n. lff.

<sup>41</sup> Sent., d. 2, a. un., q. 2 (I, 53-54). <sup>5</sup>Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate; Pseudo-Dionysius, De Caelest. Hierarch.., c. 4, n. 1; De Div. Nom., c. 4, n. lff.

<sup>9</sup> Sent., d. 2, n. un., q. 2 (I, 53). The English translations of Bonaventure are my own.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For the dating of Bonaventure's works and his teaching period, we follow the chronology given in S. Bonaventura 1274-1974, vol. II (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), 9-16; cf. also John F. Ouinn, "Chronology of St. Bonaventure (1217-1257)," Franciscan Studies 32 (1972), 168-86.

ture deals with the fecundity of the Father in greater detail.7 He analyzes the Father's personal property of innascibilitas, which means that the Father cannot be begotten nor proceed from another. Bonaventure claims that innascibilitas has both a negative and a positive meaning. Negatively it indicates a lack of source; but positively it indicates fecundity. Once again he applies the principle, which this time he cites from Aristotle. The more primary principles are the more powerful or fecund they are. Therefore the Father, as absolutely primary, is absolutely fecund. Bonaventure refers to this absolute fecundity of the Father as fontalis plenitudo, or fountain-fullness. This focusing on the Father as fecund source situates Bonaventure within the tradition of the Greek Fathers, who called the Father the puge, the primordial fountain-spring of the divinity.9

Thus in the first book of the Commentary on the Sentences, we see Bonaventure's characteristic Trinitarian theology: dynamic fecundity associated with the inner Trinitarian life and grounded in the person of the Father. This design is not only present, but is highly self-conscious and analyzed with a precision that will not be equalled in his later works. Undoubtedly his Trinitarian theology

was highly developed so early in his career because he had inherited an ancient tradition. Stemming from the Greek Fathers, this tradition reached Bonaventure in a highly developed form, with distinctly Western embellishments made by the Victorines and his teacher Alexander of Hales. To this tradition Bonaventure made his own creative contributions, but these are visible at the outset and do not show a significant growth.

In the other writings of his early period. Bonaventure's basic Trinitarian design is present in various ways. In the disputed question De Scientia Christi, the notion of Father as fecund source remains largely a silent presupposition behind the explicit issues, which deal with the Word in relation to the world. In the disputed questions De Musterio Trinitatis, Bonaventure treats the themes of fecundity and primacy explicitly and at considerable length. Finally in the Breviloguium, he sketches this basic Trinitarian design with remarkable conciseness and clarity. 10

In his later writings Bonaventure will not change or substantially develop his dynamic view of the Trinity, based on the Father as fontalis plenitudo. His Trinitarian synthesis of Chapter 6 of the Itinerarium (1259) presents the same view with a remarkable blend of

compactness and complexity.11 Yet even here his basic position is not more self-conscious than in the Commentary. In fact, the notion of primacy is not explicitly mentioned, nor does he speak of the Father's fontalis plenitudo. Rather the mystery of Trinitarian fecundity is presented through the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of the good as selfdiffusive. This notion of the selfdiffusive good is the basis for his exploration of the Trinity in Collatio XI in Hexaëmeron (1273).12 In the later writings one can detect a shift from the notion of primacy and fontalis plenitudo to the notion of self-diffusive good. If one holds, as does this writer, that the notion of primacy and the Father as fontalis plenitudo are prior to the notion of self-diffusive good, then he can say that the basis of Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology was more thoroughly explored in his earlier than in his later writings.

#### Son as Image and Word

THE SECOND element in Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology consists in the dynamic Trinitarian processions, with special focus on the generation of the Son as Image and Word. This element derives directly from the fontalis plenitudo of the Father. Because the Father is the fecund source—the good that is absolutely self-diffusive, he expresses his fecundity absolutely in the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit. Thus the divine fecundity is realized in an absolute way within the inner of all limitations and realizes it-

life of the Trinity. This frees God's fecundity from dependence on the world, since God does not have to create in order to realize his fecundity. Bonaventure's position has profound theological and metaphysical implications, for it allows for a transcendent God who is not static or removed from the world. His transcendence consists precisely in his dynamic self-communication, but this self-communication is realized fully only at the heart of the divinity itself. His is a fecundity that breaks the bounds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>I</sup>I Sent., d. 27, p. 1, a. un., q. 2 (I, 468-74); cf. I Sent., d. 11, a. un., q. 2 (I, 214-16).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>I Sent., d. 27, p. 1, a. un., q. 2, ad 3 (I, 471); the source is not Aristotle but the Liber de Causis.

Cf. de Régnon, I, 335-65; Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio II, 38; Basil, Homilia XXIV, Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomoeos, 4; Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. Nom., c. 2, n. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>M. Trin., q. 8 (V, 112-15); Brevil. p. I, cc. 2-3 (V, 210-14).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Itin., c. 6, n. 2 (V, 310-11). <sup>12</sup>Hexaëm., XI, 11-25 (V, 381-84).

self adequately only in the genera- he will state this point more forcetion of the Word and the spiration fully; yet the position itself will of the Holy Spirit. Thus God's fecundity does not have to be fitted on the Procrustean bed of creation. At the same time, his transcendent fecundity is the well-spring of creation and of his immanence in the world. The problem of how to balance God's fecundity, his transcendence, and his immanence has throughout the history of thought plagued such thinkers as Plotinus, Avicenna, Hegel, and Whitehead. By seeing transcendence itself as fecundity and by situating fecundity within the Trinity, Bonaventure has safeguarded God's transcendence and at the same time has provided a solid basis for God's immanence in the world.

That the divine fecundity is fully expressed in the Trinitarian processions is stated early in Bonaventure's writings, for example, in the first book of the Commentary:

It can nevertheless be said . . . that the Father's power is manifested in the production of the Word, and consequently the entire divine power, since the power of the Son and the Holy Spirit is one and they are equal in power.13

Bonaventure develops this theme in greater detail in the disputed questions De Mysterio Trinitatis. In dealing with problems over infinity and the Trinity, Bonaventure states in several ways that the divine fecundity is perfectly expressed in the Trinitarian processions.14 Later, in the Itinerarium,

remain essentially the same as found in the earlier writings. In the Itinerarium he proceeds by stating that God must be selfdiffusive in the highest degree. This means that there must be within the divinity Trinitarian processions. since no other diffusion would meet the demands of maximum self-diffusion. Bonaventure writes:

For a diffusion in time is like a mere point in relation to the immensity of the divine goodness. Hence another diffusion can be conceived greater than this, namely that in which the one diffusing communicates to another his entire substance and nature.15

The boundless fecundity of the Father expresses itself in the generation of the Son, as Image and Word. This is the focal point of Bonaventure's entire theology. It was in treating the generation of the Son that Bonaventure made his famous observation: "This is our whole metaphysics: emanation, exemplarity, consummation."16 It is in the Son that the fecundity of the Father finds its perfect Image; and it is from the Son, as Word, that all creation issues, and it is to him. as exemplar, that it reflects back and returns. In his early writings Bonaventure develops these themes in great depth and detail. Throughout the Trinitarian sections of the Commentary, Bonaventure discusses the Son as perfect Image and the most expressive Word of the Father.17 In the disputed questions De Mysterio Trinitatis, he states a theme that will occur often in his later writings:

The Father . . . generates the Word, which is the Father's likeness equal to him in all things. Hence just as the Father in understanding himself understands whatever he can understand, so in speaking the Word, he says whatever he can say and whatever can be said in the deity. Hence neither he nor any other of the persons in the Trinity, has another word to say in view of the fact that in that Word was said whatever can be said.18

The Son is the complete and adequate expression of the Father, his first and final Word. In the Son the Father expresses himself and all he can make. This position requires a doctrine of the divine ideas and their relation both to the Word and to creatures. This doctrine is developed with great precision in the Commentary and in the disputed questions De Scientia Christi and becomes the matrix of all of his later writings.19

#### Trinity and Creation

AS WE HAVE just seen, we cannot discuss Bonaventure's doctrine of the Word without touching the relation of the Word to creation. Yet it is wise to draw this point into sharper focus. The connection between the Trinity and creation cannot be overstressed since it is the cornerstone of Bonaventure's entire world view. It is why he

sees universal exemplarism and vestiges of the Trinity everywhere. For Bonaventure creation is not a mere external act of God, a making of an object on the fringe of the divine power. Rather creation is rooted in the fecundity of the inner Trinitarian life. True, the divine fecundity cannot express itself adequately in finite creation; yet in generating the Word as adequate Image of himself, the Father expresses in the Word all that he can make. The act of creation ad extra-while remaining free and not dependent on creatures-springs ultimately from the eternal fecundity of the Father and is an overflow of that fecundity. This connection between the Trinity and creation is already quite self-conscious in Bonaventure's early writings. For example, we find a sharp formulation in the disputed questions De Mysterio Trinitatis where he speaks of two types of fontalitas, or dynamic source of production: one at the source of the Trinitarian processions and the other at the source of creation. For Bonaventure the prior is the root of the latter:

But this fontalitas is in a certain way the source of another fontalitas Because the Father produces the Sor and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit, therefore God the Father through the Son with the Holy Spirit, is the principle of all creatures. For unless he produced them from eternity, he could not through them produce in time.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>I Sent., d. 43, a. un., q. 3 (I. 773). 14M. Trin., q. 4, a. 2, ad 4-9 (V, 86-87).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Itin., c. 6, n. 2 (V, 310-11).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Hexaem., I, 17 (V, 332)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>I Sent., d. 6-7, 9, 12-13, 27, 31 (I, 123-46, 176-92, 218-41, 464-9

<sup>18</sup>M. Trin., q. 4, a. 2, ad 8 (V, 87).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>I Sent., d. 27, p. 2, a. um., q. 2 (I, 484-87); d. 35-36 (I, 597-632 Sc. Chr. (V, 3-43).

<sup>20</sup>M. Trin., q. 8, ad 7 (V, 115).

By connecting the Trinitarian processions with creation. Bonaventure provides the background for the vestige-image doctrine which he develops so richly in the Itinerarium and the Collationes in Hexaëmeron. All of the finite world of creation reflects the power, wisdom, and goodness of God and hence is a vestige of the Trinity. Rational creatures reflect God in a special way since they have him as their object; they are also images of the Trinity in their memory, intelligence, and will. Although the panorama of creation as vestigeimage is sketched in striking colors in Bonaventure's later writings, the elements of the doctrine are sharply analyzed in his early period. The classical source for Bonaventure's divisions on this point is found in the first book of the Commentary.21 Here Bonaventure distinguishes umbra, vestigium, and imago according to:(1) the manner of representing God, whether from a distance and obscurely or from near at hand and distinctly; (2) the aspect of God that is involved, whether as general cause, or as efficient, formal, and final cause. or as the object of the memory, understanding, and will; whether general aspects of God are grasped or personal properties; (4) the classes of creatures, namely, all creatures reflect God as cause and as triple cause, but only rational creatures have God as object. This division, which is merely summarized here, is remarkably precise and can be used to answer questions of interpretation that arise over passages in the later writings, e.g., in the *Itinerarium* or the Collationes in Hexaëmeron.

This exemplaristic Trinitarian vision forms the context for Bonaventure's spirituality. In Collatio I in Hexaëmeron, he describes his vision as: creation emanating from the Word, reflecting the Word, and returning to the Word—and through the Word to the Father.<sup>22</sup> In the disputed questions De Mysterio Trinitatis, he expresses the same vision. Although the stages of the soul's ascent are not sketched ou so systematically as in the Itinerarium, the generic outlines of the vision are present:

Hence this alone is eternal life: that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is an image of the Trinity, return by way of an intelligible circle by memory, understanding, and will, through divine likeness of glory to the most blessed Trinity.<sup>23</sup>

This brings to a close our treatment of the Trinitarian pole of Bonaventure's theology. As we suggested in the beginning, his Trinitarian theology stands like the tower of a Gothic cathedral, giving distinctive shape to the contours of his thought. The Trinitarian pole reveals the following design: At the base is the notion of the Father as fontalis plenitudo, from whose fecundity the Trinitarian processions flow as the absolute expression of the self-diffusive fullness of the divinity. Creation is

an overflow of this goodness and has its roots within the dynamism of the Trinitarian life. The world, then, reflects its archetype as Trinitarian vestige. As images of the Trinity, rational creatures have God as their object and are in a process of return to their divine source. This design was present from the outset of Bonaventure's writings. Although the Trinitarian theology of the later period shows the marks of a mature mind, with enriched depth and complexity, yet in his early writings the basic Trinitarian design is explored in an analyticcritical manner that in certain areas is not equalled later.

#### **Evolution of Christocentricity**

IN CONTRAST with his Trinitarian theology, Bonaventure's Christocentricity does not emerge into prominence until the middle period, and then undergoes a development that reaches its climax in the Collationes in Hexaëmeron. In order not to overstate our case, we must distinguish two dimensions of Bonaventure's Christocentricity: the Trinitarian and the Incarnational. His doctrine of the Trinity itself contains a strong Christocentric dimension, or it might be more accurate to say a strong Logoscentered dimension. The Son is the center of the Trinity, the

persona media, the exemplar of all creation, the light illumining human knowledge and the medium of man's return to the Trinity.<sup>24</sup> We are not claiming that this Trinitarian dimension emerged late or that it underwent a significant evolution. Since this dimension is essential to the design of his Trinitarian theology, we maintain that it was present and, in fact, was richly developed during the early period.

If, however, we shift our attention to the Incarnational dimension, we can detect an evolution. But again we must distinguish. One dimension of Bonaventure's Christocentricity deals with the hypostatic union as such and is concerned with the mystery of Christ as the union of the divine and the human. The hypostatic union is explored as the basis of Christ's mediatorship between God and man and as the root of the doctrine of redemption. This dimension of Bonaventure's thought is, of course, developed extensively in his early writings, e. g., in the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences, in the Breviloquium, and in the disputed questions De Scientia Christi.25 This first dimension of Bonaventure's Incarnational Christocentricity forms the basis for the second dimension, which sees Christ as the

<sup>25</sup>III Sent., d. 1-22 (1II, 6-466); Brevil., p. IV (V, 241-52); Sc. Chr., q. 5-7

(V, 27-43).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>I Sent., d. 3, a. un., q. 2, ad 4 (I, 72-74).

Hexaëm., I, 12-17 (V, 331-32).
 M. Trin., q. 8. ad 7 (V, 115).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Hexaëm., I, 12-17 (V, 331-32); Red. art., 24 (V, 325). On Bonaventure's Christology, cf. references in n. 3, above; also W. Detloff, "'Christus tenens medium in omnibus': Sinn und Funktion der Theologie bei Bonaventura," Wissenschaft und Weisheit 20 (1957), 28-42, 120-40; Bernardo Aperribay, "Christologia mistica de San Buenaventura," Obras de san Buenaventura, vol. II (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 1957), 3-90; Nicolaus Simonelli, Doctrina christocentrica Seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae (Iesi: Scuola Tipografica Francescana, 1958).

dynamic center of the soul's journey into God, the center of the universe, and the center of history. It is this latter dimension that we claim emerged at the middle period, underwent a development, and reached its climax in the final period.

IT IS NECESSARY to specify more precisely what we mean by the second dimension of Christocentricity. In this dimension Christ operates as a dynamic center drawing into an integrated whole all the elements of the individual soul, of the physical universe, and of history. This dynamic center is the incarnate Christ in his concrete particularity, in the mystery of his humanity, involved in the process of transformation through death and resurrection. We can call this a cosmic Christocentricity since Christ is the center of the three major dimensions of the created cosmos: the soul, the physical universe, and history. All lines of the cosmos converge in Christ the center and through him are transformed and return to the Father. This cosmic Christocentricity presupposes the other two Christological poles— the Trinitarian Logos and the hypostatic union-and brings these to an integrated completion. The Trinitarian Logos-centricity is universalistic in the sense that the entire cosmos reflects the Logos. On the other hand, the mystery of the incarnate Logos is particularistic in the sense that it occurs in a particular place and time. Cosmic Christocentricity unites these two poles, for it is

precisely the particularity of the historical Jesus that integrates into an organic and dynamic energy system the entire cosmos—the physical universe, history, and the spiritual energies of mankind.

The dimension of cosmic Christocentricity is of paramount importance to the historian and systematic theologian. First, for the sake of clarity, since it is a distinctive dimension of Christology, it must be carefully distinguished from other dimensions. Secondly, cosmic Christocentricity is as ancient as the New Testament. appearing, for example, in the cosmic hymn of the letter to the Colossians.26 In the twentieth century it has emerged in a new form in the evolutionary vision of Teilhard de Chardin. Throughout the intervening history it has been prominent in certain theologians and lacking in others. Thirdly, from a systematic point of view it can serve as a link between the universalistic and particularistic tension in Christology. In my opinion, cosmic Christocentricity always remains implicit as a necessary logical link between the universalistic and particularistic poles of Christology, and will tend to emerge in the thought of a theologian even if he is unconscious of its presence or resists its force. Hence, I believe, a number of tensions in theology both in the past and today can be clarified and in certain cases resolved through the dimension of cosmic Christocentricity. In this task Bonaventure's contributions can be especially helpful.

In previous studies I have claimed that Bonaventure's cosmic Christocentricity can be most fruitfully explored under the category of the mandala and with the logic of the coincidence of opposites.27 It would be impossible here to review these studies in detail. Suffice it to say that the mandalawhether taken as a symbol or as a set of dynamics—consists in a center that integrates according to the logic of the coincidence of opposites the diverse elements of the soul and the cosmos into an organic and completed whole. By using the research of Jung, Eliade, and Tucci on the mandala,28 we can come to a heightened selfconsciousness of the role of Christocentricity in Bonaventure's thought. Presupposing this analysis of Bonaventure's theology through the mandala, we can focus here on the stages of development in his Christocentricity and examine its relation to his Trinitarian theology.

Cosmic Christocentricity emerges strikingly in the *Itinerarium*, the piece that ushers in the second period of Bonaventure's writings. Retiring to La Verna in 1259 for peace and spiritual renewal, Bonaventure meditated on Francis' vi-

sion of the six-winged Seraph.29 In a flash he realized that the vision symbolized both the goal of the soul's ascent into God and the stages of its progress. For our concerns here, it is important to note that the vision is Christocentric (for the Seraph is in the form of the Crucified) and that the Itinerarium unfolds in a Christocentric perspective. For example, in the prologue, Bonaventure states that, in the soul's journey into God. the way is only through a most ardent love of the Crucified.30 Later after presenting the tabernacle as a symbol of the soul, he meditates on Christ as the mercy seat at the center of the Holy of Holies. or the innermost chamber of the soul. In Chapter 6 and 7, he depicts Christ the center as the medium of the soul's passage into the seventh or mystical stage. Gazing on the mystery of Christ the center, we see united in an extraordinary way cosmic opposites; and thus we are drawn into the seventh

... looking at the same time upon the first and the last, the highest and the lowest, the circumference and the center, the 'alpha and omega,' the caused and the cause, the Creator and the creature, 'the book written within and without.'

<sup>27</sup> Ewert Cousins, "Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bonaventure," University of Toronto Quarterly 40 (1971), 185-201; "La 'Coincidentia Oppositorum' dans la théologie de Bonaventure," Actes du Colloque Saint Bonaventure, Etudes franciscaines 18 (Supplément annuel, 1968), 15-31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>C. G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, vol. XII, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 91-213; Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 51-56; Giuseppe Tucci, The Theory and Practice of the Mandala, trans. Alan Houghton Brodrick (London: Rider, 1961).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Itin., prol. (V, 295-96). <sup>30</sup>Ibid., n. 3 (V, 295).

<sup>31</sup>*bid.*, c., 6, n. 7 (V, 312)—the quoted phrases are from Apoc. 1:8; 5:1; cf. c. 7 (V, 312-13).

<sup>26</sup>Col. 1:15-20.

The Christ of the Itinerarium is the center of the soul and the center, the focal point, and the means of the soul's journey into God. He is the center around which all the activities of the soul are focused: sensation, memory, understanding, willing. It is through Christ as center—as crucified, incarnate Logos—that all our activities are led back to their root in the eternal Logos. And it is through Christ the center—as goal and medium of passage—that the soul progresses on its journey into God. In the Itinerarium Christ can be considered as the center of the universe as well as the center of the soul, since two of the wings of the Seraph symbolize the material world. However, when we analyze the *Itinerarium*, it becomes clear that the emphasis is on Christ the center of the soul and not as center of the universe. And it is only by extending the journey of the soul to the history of the universe that we can see in the Ltinerarium Christ as the center of history.32

The notion of Christ the center of the soul is developed in great detail in the Lignum Vitae (1260), written not long after the Itinerarium. Christ crucified is depicted as the tree of life, which branches out and blossoms in rich foliage, flowers, and fruit, symbolizing the moral virtues. By meditating on the humanity of Christ and the events

of his life, by learning from him. and identifying with him, our souls can blossom forth in the virtues of humility, piety, confidence, patience, constancy.33 Thus in the Lignum Vitae Christ is the center of the moral life of the soul, just as in the Itinerarium he had been depicted as the center of the mystical life of the soul. In each case the Christocentricity is presented in a symbol: the six-winged Seraph and the tree of life. By analyzing these symbols in great detail, Bonaventure draws the moral and mystical energies of the soul to focus on Christ the center and through this centering to develop towards a rich and integrated spiritual life.

In the middle period, Bonaventure developed the theme of Christ the center of the soul. In the final period the emphasis shifted to Christ the center of the universe and history. In the Collationes in Hexaëmeron, Bonaventure's crowning piece of the final period, his Christocentricity comes to full flowering and receives its strongest rhetorical expression. In the first of the Collationes, which serves as an overture of the entire series. Bonaventure develops the theme of Christ as universal center.34 He is the center of all the sciences: metaphysics, physics, mathematics. logic, ethics, jurisprudence, and theology. The sciences study the entire expanse of reality-from the generation of the Son in the Trini-

It is interesting to compare this Christocentric vision with the panorama of the universe presented from the viewpoint of the Trinity in the Itinerarium, Chapter I, n. 14.36 In the Itinerarium Bonaventure contemplates creation from seven vantage points and in each discerns the divine power, wisdom, and goodness manifested in creatures. Thus the treatment of the universe in the Itinerarium remains within the Trinitarian vestige pole of Bonaventure's thought and is not explicitly subsumed into the Christocentric pole, as is richly done in the first Collatio in Hexaëmeron.

In the first Collatio Bonaventure depicts Christ as the center of both the universe and history. He is the center of history in the great events

carnation, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, and judgment. This notion of Christ the center of history unfolds as a basic theme throughout the Collationes and plays an important role in Bonaventure's eschatology. Ultimately the notion of Christ the center of history derives from the Trinitarian and the Incarnational dimensions of Bonaventure's thought. As Ratzinger says:

It is precisely the figure of Jesus Christ, the middle person of the Trinity as well as the mediator and middle between God and man, who gradually becomes the synthesis of everything that is expressed for Bonaventure in the concept of center. Christ becomes the center. And as a consequence of this general interpretation of Christ from the notion of center, He becomes also the "center of time."37

Because Christ is the center of history, Bonaventure's notion of time differs from that of Aristotle and the Joachites.36 His Trinitarian dimension of Christocentricity differentiates him from Aristotle. For Bonaventure time is involved in the emanation and return of creatures. All things emanate through the Logos and all things return through the Logos to the Father. Since the Logos is the Alpha and the Omega. time must have a beginning and an end. Hence the world cannot be eternal, as Aristotle had held,

36Itin., c. 1, n. 14 (V, 299). <sup>37</sup> Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, trans.

ty, through creation, to the return that shape salvation history: his inof creatures to the Father. On every level, Christ is the center: metaphysical center in his eternal generation, physical center in his incarnation, mathematical center in his passion, logical center in his resurrection, ethical center in his ascension, juridical center in the final judgment, and theological center in eternal beatitude. Although the notion of Christ the center of the soul is present within the collatio,35 the emphasis here is on the panorama of the universe and the crucial events of salvation history.

saCf. Ewert Cousins, "Teilhard de Chardin et saint Bonaventure," Etudes franciscaines 19 (1969), 184.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Lign. vit. (VIII, 68-87). 34Hexaëm., I (V. 329-35); cf. also F. Delorme, ed., S. Bonaventurae Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta (Quaracchi, 1934), pp. 1-19.

<sup>35</sup>Hexaëm., I, n. 13, 24 (V, 331, 333).

Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), p. 110.

<sup>38</sup> For a study of Bonaventure, Aristotle, and the Joachites, cf. Ratzinger; cf. also E. R. Daniel, "St. Bonaventure: Defender of Franciscan Eschatology," in S. Bonaventura 1274-1974, ed. J. Guy Bougerol, O.F.M. (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1974).



nor is time merely the measure of motion in an endless series of generation and corruption of forms.

While the Trinitarian dimension of his Christocentricity differentiates Bonaventure from Aristotle, it is chiefly the Incarnational dimension—developed into its cosmic Christocentric form—that differentiates him from the loachites. To explain the ages of history the Joachites used a Trinitarian theory. After the ages of the Father and of the Son, a third age will come - the age of the Spirit, which will dissolve the forms of the previous age and usher in a spiritual era. In contrast, for Bonaventure Christ remains the middle person of the Trinity, the dynamic center of the Trinitarian processions. The Logos is completed, not superseded in the Spirit. And as incarnate Logos, he is the center through which the incarnational structures of history are not dissolved, but transformed. Thus for Bonaventure the historical process remains at its core Christocentric.

This brings to a close our brief survey of the Christocentric pole of Bonaventure's thought. His Christocentricity is profoundly conceived, forcefully presented, and comprehensively expanded: Christ is the center of the soul, of the universe, and of history. Yet one wishes that he had given to his cosmic Christocentricity the same self-reflective, analytical. critical scrutiny that he gave to his Trinitarian theology. There are, of course, many reasons for this lack. First, he did not have the leisure or the academic setting in his last years that he enjoyed during his period at the University of Paris. Secondly, the literary genres

collationes do not lend themselves to the type of analytic-critical reflection that characterizes the scholastic genres of the early writings. Thirdly, although his Christocentricity arises in the meditative calm of La Verna, it becomes caught could find a series De Christo up later in polemic turmoil in the Collationes in Hexaëmeron-against the Averroists and the Joachites. In the heat of controversy the polemic side of his position emerges rather than the crytical-analytical. Fourthly, his Trinitarian theology had come to him as a developed tradition, with sharply formulated positions, questions, and analytic tools —in one tradition from the Greek Fathers, in another from Augustine, and with the technical embellishments that emerged out of the twelfth century Trinitarian discussions. His cosmic Christocentricity did not come to him in that way. What he inherited from the past was not accompanied with critical apparatus. And the distinctive quality of his Christology arose out of the much more recent tradition of Francis. In Bonaventure's time it had not yet been shaped into a synthetic vision and formulated as an intellectual position. In this Bonaventure himself was a pioneer. He took two elements found in Francis: the sense of the universal presence of God in nature and the imitation of Christ. These he fused into a doctrine of universal Christocentricity. Although one can appreciate the many historical forces that shaped Bonaventure's Christocentricity, one wishes that after reading the Collationes in Hexaëmeron, he could turn back to the

of the mystical treatises and the Commentary and find a series of distinctions on Christocentricitywith sharply defined terms, divisions, and critical dialogue with objections. And one wishes that as a companion piece to the disputed questions De Scientia Christi, one Medio.

If Bonaventure had given his Christocentricity such an analyticalcritical treatment, his synthesis would have been more complete. And he would provide us with more effective tools to solve some of the speculative problems that are inherent in the Christian vision: How relate the Trinitarian mystery to the mystery of Christ? What are the implications of a thoroughgoing Christocentricity? For systematic theology? For Christian spirituality? For the relation of Christ to culture and Christ to time? For the relation of Christianity and other religions? To see the significance of these questions, we will examine them not within Bonaventure's system directly, but within the present-day problematic. This will underline both their universal significance and their contemporary relevance.

#### Dialogue with Contemporary issues

A MAJOR CONCERN of contemporary theology has been the relation of religion and culture, or more specifically the relation of Christ and culture. This issue gives rise to the categories of the sacred and the secular. What is the religious significance, if any, of secular culture? Some would see a sharp cleavage between the sacred and

the secular, between religion and humanism, between Christ and culture. Two theologians who fall into the opposite camp are Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.39 Both see a blend, a harmony, an interpenetration of the religious dimension and the forms of secular culture. They both see secular culture in its depth as religious, sacred, and involved in the divine mystery. Both move in a universalist direction, drawing all of secular culture into the sphere of religious meaning and grounding its ultimate dimension in the sacred. Paul Tillich bases his solution on a Trinitarian theology that is remarkably similar to Bonaventure's and on a doctrine of participation that approximates Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarism.40 For Tillich the forms of culture participate in their depth in the Logos. In this vein Tillich's treatment of the religious dimension of culture is trikingly similar to that of Bonaventure in the De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam. Tillich's approach to culture, then, is Trinitarian, Logoscentered, and universalist. But what of the other pole of Christian theology? What of the Incarnational, particularist pole? What of the sig-

its cosmic form? Tillich has been criticized for having a weak particularist Christology and for losing the historical Jesus in the Logos. Furthermore, he has not developed a doctrine of cosmic Christocentricity.

Teilhard de Chardin, on the other hand, focuses his entire vision on cosmic Christocentricity. Teilhard calls the Logos of traditional theology the Omega of evolution the dynamic center drawing all of the energies of the cosmos to a creative union and ultimate fulfillment. Because of the universal action of the Omega, Teilhard can see a universal religious significance in secular culture. For him nothing in the universe is truly Although Teilhard's profane. thought is strongly Christocentric, the Trinitarian pole of his theology is underdeveloped, and the aspect of his Christology that deals with the historical Jesus is, for many critics, too weakly stated.

the De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam. Tillich's approach to culture, then, is Trinitarian, Logoscentered, and universalist. But what of the other pole of Christian theology? What of the Incarnational, particularist pole? What of the significance of the historical Jesus? And what of Christocentricity in

the theology of Tillich and Teilhard. Bonaventure's Christocentricity-both in its particularist and in its cosmic form-has been integrated with his Trinitarian theology. Trinitarian theology, then, could serve as a rich resource for a contemporary theologian taking up the task of completing the rudimentary Trinitarian theology of Teilhard's system. With both Teilhard and Bonaventure, one could guestion Tillich on his lack of cosmic Christocentrism. In such a dialogue, certain questions would inevitably emerge that would reveal the lack of self-consciousness of Bonavencosmic Christocentricity. Here the contemporary theologian would have to launch out on his own and attempt to complete this level of Bonaventure's system.

Another contemporary closely allied to the secular question, is the theology of history. What is the relation of God to time? Of Christ to time? What is the theological meaning of the future? What role does eschatology play in the Christian vision? This issue has arisen sharply both from theology itself and from secular culture. Biblical research over the twentieth century has drawn into focus the centrality of salvation history and of eschatalogy in the Christian vision. In secular culture the forces of change have accelerated so rapidly in the last ten years that modern man is bewildered and numbed by "future shock." On the horizon he sees a pending ecological crisis and the threat of nuclear destruction;

at the same time advances in science and technology augur a creative, utopian-like future.

These issues were explored in a recent conference held in New York City, with such theologians as Pannenberg, Moltmann, Metz, Cobb, Ogden, Mooney, and Hefner.41 The theme of the conference was Hope and the Future of Man, and it drew together in dialogue three strands of contemporary theology seriously concerned with the future: American process theologians, Teilhardians, and theologians of hope. The discussion centered on alternate models of the future: How did each group conceive the future, and what basis of hope did it discern? Underlying many of the points discussed, in my analysis, lay the basic issues of Christocentricity raised in this paper: What relation, if any, does Christ have to the structure of the universe and to time? Does the mystery of Christ, as Teilhard holds, have a physical effect upon the universe and direct the forces of evolution towards a successful outcome? Or is the cosmological structure more God-centered, as the process theologians maintain, with the result that the future is less affected by the mystery of Christ? From another perspective, is the mystery of Christ to be situated in the realm of history and not nature, as some eschatological theologians hold, liberating man from oppression rather than activating a cosmic process of growth? At this point of the dialogue Bonaventure would

<sup>30</sup> Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963); Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Oeuvres de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (10 vols.; Paris: Seuil, 1955-1969).

<sup>\*\*</sup>Ocf. John Dourley, O.M.I., "God, Life, and the Trinity in the Theologies of Paul Tillich and St. Bonaventure," in THE CORD 24 (1974), 68-77 (reprinted from J. Guy Bougerol, ed., S. Bonaventura 1274 - 1974 [Grottaferrata (Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1974], vol. IV); cf. also idem, "Paul Tillich and Bonaventure: An Evaluation of Tillich's Claim to Stand in the Augustinian-Franciscan Tradition," unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York: Department of Theology of Fordham University, 1971.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Cf. the Proceedings of this conference, Ewert H. Cousins, ed., Hope and the Future of Man (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).

have much to contribute. Through his reading of the thirteenth-century problems-in the face of the Greek and Islamic notions of history—we can see that the issue of cosmic Christocentricity is embedded deep in the structure of Christian belief and will inevitably surface whether in the Middle Ages or in the twentieth century. As one of the major articulators of cosmic Christocentricity in the history of theology, Bonaventure can enter the contemporary dialogue to clarify issues and to contribute towards solutions even in the highly accelerated time world of the twentieth century.

The significance of Christocentricity becomes even clearer when one moves into the contemporary issue of ecumenism. If one were looking for a foundation of union among the Christian churches, he would naturally seek it in Christocentricity. Here Bonaventure offers a rich resource, since he has developed the level of the Trinitarian Logos, the historical Jesus, and cosmic Christocentricity. Each level can be exploited as a basis of union. Yet when one moves out of the Christian sphere—especially out of the Western sphere and into the Orient-what had been the greatest asset becomes the greatest problem. For it is precisely Christ that divides Christianity from other phenomenal world-even indivi-

religions of the world. Bonaventure's thought can be of assistance in clarifying the issues here; for he reveals the broad universalist resources in Christianity at the same time that he warns us against making too facile a solution since he maintains the particularist elements as well.

In the tension between universalism and particularism the ecumenical theologian faces his greatest challenge. Basing himself on the transcendence of the religious dimension, Robley Whitson has developed a theory of ecumenical pluralism of world religions that reflects the Franciscan respect for radical individuality.42 Raymond Panikkar has approached the interrelation of world religions through a Trinitarian model that has much affinity with Bonaventure's Trinitarian design.43 As the task of theological construction continues, I believe that the ecumenical theologian will have to face the question of particularity precisely from the perspective of cosmic Christocentricity. Does the mystery of the Trinitarian and Incarnate Logos so affect the structure of space and time that the Christian lives in a radically different universe from the Buddhist and Hindu? The difference could be so profound that it would affect all the basic categories of the

duality, identity, and difference. If the issue comes to this point, then Bonaventure will have much to contribute both towards clarification and towards what might be one of the greatest challenges for theological construction in Christian history.

These issues can only be hinted at here and raised by way of questions. A full treatment of any one of them would require much exposition and analysis. Our intention has been simply to show their relation to the design of Bonaventure's theology and indicate how he could take part in the contemporary dialogue. With a sureness of aim. Bonaventure's thought has penetrated to the heart of the mystery of the Trinity and of Christ-

the two mysteries that provide the architectonic design of Christian belief. Bonaventure is both the bearer of a rich theological tradition and a genius who has creatively shaped this tradition into an available synthesis. Because of this he can take his place in dialogue with the theologians of our day as they engage in their own creative enterprise. For although the shape of our cosmos has changed through scientific and political revolutions, the ultimate questions of the relation of God to the world and of Christ to the universe and time still challenge the theologian. It is here that Bonaventure's vision of the dynamic Trimity and the Christocentric cosmos can contribute to the on-going theological task.



He who turns his full countenance toward the Mercy-Seat above the Ark of God, and with faith, hope, and love, devotion, admiration, joy, appreciation, praise and rejoicing, beholds Christ hanging on the Cross, such a one celebrates the Pasch, that is, the Passover, with Him. Thus, using the rod of the Cross, he may pass over the Red Sea, going from Egypt into the desert, where it is given to him to taste the hidden manna; he may rest with Christ in the tomb, as one dead to the outer world, but experiencing, nevertheless, as far as is possible in this present state as wayfarer, what was said on the Cross to the thief who was hanging there with Christ: "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise."

> SAINT BONAVENTURE Itinerarium VII, 1

<sup>42</sup> Robley Whitson, The Coming Convergence of World Religions (New York: Newman Press, 1971).

<sup>48</sup> Raymond Panikkar, "Toward an Ecumenical Theandric Spirituality," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 5 (1968), 507-34; cf. also Ewert H. Cousins, "The Trinity and World Religions," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 7 (1970), 476-98; "Bonaventure and World Religions," THE CORD 22 (1972), 55ff, reprinted in J. Guy Bougerol, ed., S. Bonaventura 1274 - 1974 (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), vol. 3, pp. 697-706.

#### A REVIEW ARTICLE

# Jesus and Process Philosophy

MICHAEL D. MEILACH, O.F.M.

NE OF THE MORE interesting experiences which recurs in teaching philosophy in a religiously affiliated college is the eruption of a fideist attitude on the part of a student. The world-view such a student had assimilated from his parents and grade-school teachers seems so obvious to him-so evidently objective—that he sees no reason to raise a question about, say, the ultimate nature of things: the existence of God, the relationship between God and creatures, or his own origin and destiny. There are likewise many readers of such religious periodicals as this one, who prefer a more or less comfortable repose in the simple verities of their earliest instruction to the admittedly taxing and sometimes disconcerting quest for understanding.

Of course it is possible to go to the opposite extreme: with Heidegger, to make man essentially "the questioner" and deprive oneself of any fundamental answers. But there is a reasonable middle ground, on which the Christian stands who has firmly embraced the truth of Revelation on the one hand, and has expended a certain minimum of intellectual effort, on the other, to attain a coherent and consistent perspective on that Revelation, both in itself and in relation to the remainder of his life as a human being and a member of society.

The particular difficulty experienced by so many of our contemporaries in attaining this coherent and consistent perspective stems from the fact that new world views have proliferated in recent de-

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cades. Each of them, whether based on physical science or on psychological introspection, on economic laws or utopian vision, clamors for the Christian's allegiance; and sometimes real defects are revealed in an outlook long cherished as objectively true and impregnably valid.

Such defects, however, often turn out to be less substantial than the innovators and critics claim. And herein, precisely, lies the pressing need for the educated Christian to come to grips with both the critical and the creative theological efforts of his age. His Christian "sense" is indeed correct, that the presumption lies with the tradition; and yet, especially in an age as culturally and religiously diverse as our own, he has both the right and the duty to expect from such studies an increased understanding and more adequate expression of that tradition's content.

Dr. David R. Griffin, of the Claremont School of Theology, offers us a fine example of the kind of study I have in mind. Dr. Griffin is Executive Director of the Institute for Process Studies, and he suggests that the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead is a better vehicle for Christology than such earlier systems as Platonism and Aristotelianism.1 This suggestion immediately implies two things: (1) that there is some difficulty inherent in the Christology we now have, which makes it advisable to adjust, correct, or reinterpret some or all of it; and (2) that Whitehead's philosophy contains the interpretive power to remedy that difficulty. Besides making a case for these two claims, of course, Dr. Griffin must himself, if he wants to make a positive contribution, (3) furnish at least the basic outline of the more consistent, more coherent, and more adequate Christology he sees as feasible in Whiteheadian terms. After giving a brief description of the book's contents, I would like to address each of these three points in turn.

A Process Christology is, in the author's words, an effort to "bring together... (1) the new quest for the historical Jesus, (2) the neoorthodox emphasis on God's selfrevealing activity in history, and (3) the theology based primarily on the process philosophy of Alfred North

David R. Griffin, A Process Christology. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973. Pp. 273 including a good, full index. Cloth, \$10.95.

Whitehead and Charles Hartshome" (p. 9). It is made up of a short introductory chapter setting up the basic problematic, and three main Parts. Of the latter, the first is historico-critical, comprising a discussion of four recent Christological systems; and the last two are constructive, furnishing, respectively, a general theological foundation and a specific Christological development.

#### 1. The Critique

JESUS CHRIST is, according to the faith of those who believe in him, the God-man: God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God. It is essential to Christian faith that it is the God-man who saves us from our sins; and, in addition, the Scotistic current of thought which has been so steadily gaining ground in our age, maintains that the same God-man grounds the entire creative process—that it is in, through, and for the Word made flesh, that all things have been created.

There have traditionally been two distinct theological doctrines elaborated on the basis of this fundamental belief: Christology, which has to do with the very being (ontological structure) of the Godman; and Soteriology, which has to do with his saving activity, by which he ransoms us from the bondage of sin (according to the Western emphasis) and, more importantly according to the Eastern emphasis, divinizes us with God's own life. It would seem clear, even from these sketchily outlined considerations, that what Iesus can

do for us as Savior depends upon what he himself is. Not so for Griffin, however, for whom "soteriology... precedes Christology proper" (p. 198). And this methodological confusion pervades much of the otherwise superb material in the introduction and the first Part.

The author argues quite rightly, in the Introduction, for a proper understanding of revelation as a central element of Christianityand more particularly for its objective, noetic dimension: there must be meaningful content to our religion, and not merely some vague sort of affective allegiance. But here (p. 17) as well as elsewhere throughout the book, Griffin writes as though salvation were simply a matter of gaining the requisite knowledge. There are reasons for this imbalance, which we shall see later on, but it should be noted, for now, that Griffin's critique of Christologies past and present is carried out for the most part in apparent indifference to the fundamental claim that Iesus is the God-man. This ontological claim, in fact, is systematically subordinated to the author's preoccupation with showing that God can do something unique in lesus. (The importance of this latter fact is that only on its basis does it become prudent for other men to follow Jesus, to embrace the life-style he advocated, and to recommend it on objectively valid grounds to others.) In order to show this, of course, Griffin must first show that God can act at all, and that he can perform the specific activity involved in revealing objective information.

It may come as something of a surprise to the Roman Catholic reader that God's agency or efficient causality should need any defense. Especially if this is the case, but whether it is or not, every reader should derive great intellectual satisfaction from close attention to Griffin's critiques of Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. His technique is defastatingly effective. He first sets forth each theologian's basic position on God's nature and creative and revelatory activity, and then proceeds through the use of extensive quotations to lay bare the internal inconsistencies and fundamental inadequacy of each system. Since I have nothing but praise for his procedure here, let me simply summarize the main point in each case.

For Paul Tillich, God is ineffable, absolute Being-itself; our knowledge of him ends up, despite various distinctions Tillich draws, so purely symbolic that it is devoid of definite content, and God cannot be understood as doing anything either general or specific (in Iesus). Niebuhr's distinctions between internal and external, objective and subjective historical interpretation do not work either, in the long run, and he cannot avoid making the non-relativist, specific claim for Christianity that a Christian ought to make. Rudolf Bultmann, similarly, would like to strip Christological and theological affirmations of definite, literal content; yet he too is forced to violate his own norm and, as a



Christian, speak "as if" God actually has done this specific saving act in Christ. Oddly, Griffin delays his consideration of the "seminal influence" on all three of the above, until last. Friedrich Schleiermacher has indeed, through his acceptance of the Kantian subjectivism, caused most of the epistemological problems so rampant in the works of recent liberal theologians. The critique in this case is very subtle and ramified-basically it comes down to the valid reproach that Schleiermacher's Kantian agnosticism implies a docetic Christology. Griffin is right, but it is not clear, from all that has preceded, why

docetism should bother him. (I of paragraphs.)

In the concluding chapter of his first Part, Griffin distills the positive contributions made by these four theologians in an effort to "point the way forward." His first recommendation is one I heartily second: that we construct a Christian philosophy appealing to our contemporaries for its enhanced Consistency, adequacy, and illuminating power. What I do not see is that such a philosophy is incompatible with apologetics conceived along more or less traditional lines, with its indispensable appeal to authority and tradition (cf. pp. 139).

Secondly, he advocates a reformulation of the hellenized notion of God on which he blames much of the current impasse. But it is simply not true that the Christians of earlier centuries adopted Greek notions uncritically. Quite the contrary, close study of the conciliar deliberations shows a conscious and deliberate effort to avoid technical philosophical meanings and to give a specifically Christian sense to the terms of which they could and did make quite fruitful use. I am not saying that there are no difficulties with the concept of God elaborated, say, by Saint Thomas Aquinas; but the difficulties are neither as numerous nor of the same type as Griffin would have us think. (I shall return to this in a later context too.)

In the third place, Griffin credits the theologians he has studied with showing the crucial need for phil-

osophically consistent and meaningshall return to this in a couple ful categories for stating what God has done in Jesus. His main statement only skirts the ontological question: "Unless the assertion that Iesus was fully human, although God was uniquely present in him, can be shown not to be a selfcontradiction, then no real assertion has been made at all" (p. 142). But that ontological question finally emerges in all its stark clarity as he elaborates the Ebionite solution -the "only possible one," he says. which does not identify Jesus' selfhood with a pre-existent divine person:

> ... that traditional view clearly presupposes an outdated conception of the Bible . . . [and was ] designed to support a quite different soteriology than is proposed in the present essay.... [So ] there is no reason to try to reconcile our modern knowledge of the Scriptures with the traditional doctrine of the subjective presence in Jesus of "God the Son." as some have done, by emptying this doctrine of all meaning through a doctrine of radical kenosis [143].

What follows this third recommendation is good: the fourth, that we must carefully safeguard the bond between Iesus as objective historical revelatory act of God and the believer as subject appropriating communication saving God's through Iesus; and the last, that we elaborate a valid, forceful exposition of the Christian life as superior to all others, specifically with reference to God's power, human freedom, and the fact of evil.

But let us dwell a while longer on that third suggestion: it contains, modetly tucked away in the book's sixth chapter (Chapter Five excludof Griffin's complaint against postatic union-in process categotraditional Christology. All that has preceded was, for all its brilliant erudition and flashy logic, an epistemological game with the Kantians. Here, at long last, is the Christology accusation against properly so-called; and now that it has come, there is disappointingly little defense offered in its support, the implication being that no sensible person would accept so mysterious a doctrine as the hypostatic union, which cannot be rationally elucidated in universally valid categories.

Earlier, on p. 19, Griffin had shown a similar historical insensitivity when he accused nameless "traditional soteriologies" of having been limited in scope and of having implied that "Jesus' benefits are relevant only to a few of the many spiritual ailments actually experienced by human beings." Is it, perhaps, a similarly undeveloped sense of history which blinds the author to the central importance of Jesus' resurrection in the context of Christian faith (cf. p. 12 and to the essential nature of what has always been "man's fundamental spiritual problem" (p. 18)?

To summarize, then, Dr. Griffin has not shown the existence of any real flaw in the traditional Christology as expressed in our Creeds and held to in Christian faith. We may be grateful to him for showing what so many knew already in less developed ways: the inviability of the Cartesian and Kantian epistemologies. But what he should have shown and did not, is the desirability of restating the traditional

ing the Introduction) the real meat doctrine of the Incarnation—the hyries. The Athenians of Saint Paul's day expressed incredulity; that some people do so today is no more reason now than there was then. to repudiate the doctrine itself. The desirability of restating the doctrine in process categories stems, not from any putative flaw in the doctrine itself, but rather from the greater interpretive power inherent in process categories, than in those of substance metaphysics, for the understanding of reality's underlying structure.

#### II. Process Theology

THERE ARE, quite literally, scores of monographs easily accessible to the interested reader, which either advocate or reject Whitehead's process metaphysics as a vehicle for Christian theology. This review is hardly the place for me to embark on a sustained defense of my own position. I do want, nonetheless, to make two points rather briefly here under this second heading, and then proceed to discuss at greater length the main difficulty with Griffin's uncritical use of Whitehead.

First, Griffin has done a good job in his sixth chapter of showing what is meant by the philosophical elaboration of a "vision of reality." The "vision" in question is essentially something pre-rational: a way the individual has of structuring his experience and seeing the world. At this profound level the "visions" of the philosopher and the theologian tend to become somewhat isomorphic. But Griffin

is wrong when he concludes from this that "any difference in pcinciple between the philosopher and the theologian disappears" (p. 153). The philosopher's job is to give a rational account, and the theologian elaborates doctrines accepted as revealed. Griffin thinks he can avoid "the objections raised by the idea of revealed doctrines" (p. 159), but then he denies the reality of Christianity as it has been known through the ages and ultimately becomes entangled in some of the same difficulties he exposes so mercilessly in Tillich and Bultmann. The positive point to be made here is that the thinking person does indeed need to elaborate at least to some minimal degree his prerational "vision of reality," and Whitehead has in fact elaborated one that does far better justice to contemporary man's knowledge of his world than could be done by earlier systems of thought. Griffin gives a quite serviceable account of Whitehead's system in his seventh chapter, but instead of showing why it is preferable to a substance metaphysics on its own terms, he is content with a simple exposition with a view to Christological application. Had he made a good, strong case for process over substance as an interpretation of experience in general, then he that "Whitehead's iustification philosophy represents the major breakthrough thus far in Christian faith's search for a metaphysics that would explicate its fundamental

notion of reality" (p. 161). As it stands now, that assertion, valid though it is, lacks the support it needs in this context.

In the second place, one should distinguish the adequacy of Whitehead's system as interpretive of reality as a whole, from the concept of God that Whitehead actually managed to elaborate. There is an annovingly scholastic spirit abroad among Whiteheadians which often leads them to perform a reverential sort of exegesis of Whitehead's writings as though the latter were endowed with inerrancy. (In connection with this spirit, I might mention Griffin's conclusion to his chapter-long critique of Niebuhr's Kantianism, where suddenly in the last sentence of the chapter Whitehead's name occurs as though he were the founder of philosophical realism—p. 74). But, as Whitehead candidly admitted to his student, A. H. Johnson, he "did not get all his insights adequately organized in his idea of God. In any case, he wasn't primarily interested in God: 'Just brought him in to show he belonged." It would be surprising, then, if we were to find, ready made in the philosophy of organism, a viable concept of God. We ought to approach the Whiteheadian notion of God critically and see whether it needs more or less could conclude with even stronger profound revision before it can be said to be suitable for use in Christian theology.

> Before we can go on to consider the adequacy of Griffin's process Christology, then, we must pause

here to examine what he has done with the concept of God taken from Whitehead's system. And before that can be done, we must state the main features of that system (I hope the reader will forgive the extreme brevity necessitated by space limitations). For Whitehead there are no massive, enduring substances; the ultimate building-block of reality, as it were, is a pulse of experience called an "event" or actual occasion." There are higher and lower grades of such occasions, from the divine down to the trivial component of an electron, all interrelated in the space-time continuum. One influences another, not by exerting force upon it, but by being grasped as a datum in the latter's free self-constitution. The immediately prior occasion in the temporal series is generally the dominant influence on its successor. but there is also the influence of every other occasion (with gradations of relevance) in the spacetime continuum, as well as the influence of God, the "atemporal actual entity" who is thus seen as only one cause among many in the occasion's autonomous self-creation at each instant.

The Whiteheadian view of man is frankly dualist. A human individual is a soul, which is to say. not an enduring spiritual substance, but (somewhat like William James' successive pulses of consciousness) a series of high-grade events or occasions. The body is composed of countless myriads of other such occasions, all organically interrelated and related to the soul through the brain. A cardinal systematic principle here is that one

occasion must, in attaining its completion or "satisfaction," perish in order to be graspable by its successor or another, proximate occaion: or, to put it another way, there is no mutual immediacy of contemporaries. Now it is perhaps clearer why for Griffin the influence of God and of Jesus in man's salvation must be seen as primarily cognitive in nature: unless an individual grasps cognitively the divine purpose for him, he cannot be affected by that purpose.

It is this principle of the mutual exclusion of contemporaries from one another's experience, that has led John B. Cobb, Jr. (Griffin's mentor) to modify Whitehead's concept of God as a single, everlasting actual entity, making it instead the notion of a series of actual occasions, analogous to the human person. For God to do anything is for him to be grasped as datum by some actual occasion in its self creation; but to be grasped, the divine occasion of the preceding moment has to perish. And God remains one cause among many, whose influence the occasion is free to accept or reject. So God can be understood to be related to the world in somewhat the same way as a human soul is to its body. He does not create the world, but he is its "companion." He furnishes a "lure" for each actual occasion's self-creation, and his causality is thus not coercive but persuasive.

Now, it must be pointed out that there is no warrant whatever in Whitehead's explicit characterization of God for Cobb's interpretation, whereas the contrary one

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>A. H. Johnson, "Whitehead as Teacher and Philosopher," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29, n. 2 (March, 1969), p. 365.

given, e.g., by William A. Christian, Lewis S. Ford, and A. H. Johnson,3 not only happens to conform to Whitehead's own characterization of God, but more importantly, conforms to the requirements of the Christian faith. That Whitehead's system must conform to the Christian faith, rather than vice versa, is one of the points to be made, all too briefly, in Part III, below. Here I want to indicate that there is ample precedent in Whitehead's system for introducing the needed distinctions and modifications so that there can be the needed mutual immediacy of contemporaries in the case of God and the human soul, without compromising the general norm proscribing this in the spatiotemporal continuum.4

#### III. Griffin's Christology

GRIFFIN'S Christological reconstruction takes place in the book's final Part, comprising three chapters. The first of these (Chapter 8) is perhaps excessively dense since a good deal of the biblical documentation had to be omitted for economic reasons. Its basic thrust is to show the centrality of the Kingdom-of-God theme in Jesus' own "vision of reality." In keeping with the author's heavily epistemological emphasis, much is made of terminological distinctions here, between

(1) Jesus of Nazareth, (2) the historical Jesus, (3) the Jesus of Faith, and (4) Jesus as the Christ. What Griffin says here is generally good, and it should prove helpful for those theologians who persist in confusing history, epistemology, metaphysics, and theology. But more to the point here, I find the conclusion disappointing:

There is a certain tension between the view of God implied in Jesus' underlying vision of reality and his own role, and the conception of God which was presupposed in his notion that the present form of existence, with all the obstacles that qualify its goodness, would come to a sudden end [p. 204].

Earlier, Griffin had conjectured that "accepting Jesus as the supreme revelation of God need not mean accepting all his views" (p. 48). Now, it seems to me that he cannot have it both ways and that he ought to make up his mind. If he really wants to eschew all relativism (cf. p. 147) and to assert Jesus' unique status and finality as God-man (cf. pp. 227f), then he has got to stop compromising this orthodox stance with the "thousand qualifications" that threaten to demolish it.

The advantage Griffin sees in the Whiteheadian process view for Christology is spelled out in the ninth Chapter: Through the use of

process categories, God can intelligibly be said to act uniquely in Jesus. Recalling what was said above about the soul being able to act through the body (meaning that the soul's purpose is freely grasped by the bodily occasions), we can extend this consideration and say that in some cases a bodily occasion may be particularly receptive to the soul's purpose. And, as some bodily occasion may embody in a particularly transparent way the soul's influence, so Iesus may be seen as incarnating with minimal opacity the divine influence, purpose, or character. This view is especially congenial, of course, to a view of human personality like Schleiermacher's, which sees the self as constituting its own reality by the specific way in which it selects and organizes elements of its experience. The main problem with this as a Christological solution, however, is that God's presence in Jesus is merely "objective"-i.e., God is present in Jesus only as an object of knowledge. Jesus' own being cannot be said to be "subjectively" divine, which, as we have seen, is precisely what Christian faith requires us to say.


The tenth and last chapter spells out some of the implications of the reconstructed, process Christology for Christian life. The chapter contains some good material as far as it goes (whatever became of the principle of sacramentality?); but for reasons of space I want to comment only on the author's decision to take no stand on subjective immortality (p. 234). This decision, implying that the question itself is trivial, is consistent with Griffin's failure to see the importance of Jesus' resurrection; and this lack of concern for a future life does seem to be something many followers of Whitehead have taken docilely from their master.<sup>5</sup> My own reaction is that this grotesque exaggeration of altruism, which considers it immature and selfish to look forward to life everlasting, is yet another instance of many process theologians' insensitivity to the weight of tradition and of the testimony of human nature.

The remarkable thing is that there is ample stress in Whitehead himself on the importance of the past. From the exquisite allusions in Science and the Modern World to the brooding permanent presences of nature, to the technical exposition of the past's weight upon the present in Process and Reality, to the poetic appreciation of history in Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead everywhere gives the lie to those who seek to make his philosophy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See, e. g., A. H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), p. 69; Lewis S. Ford, "The Non-Temporality of Whitehead's God," a paper which, the last I heard, was under consideration for publication by the Philosophical Forum; William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), e.g., pp. 331-32.

These distinctions and modifications are the burden of the fourth and fifth chapters of my doctoral dissertation (unpublished): Religious Encounter and the Philosophy of Organism (Bronx, N.Y.: Fordham University, 1971).

The puzzled reaction of the audience at Whitehead's Ingersoll Lecture on "Immortality," is proverbial; the text is published in Paul A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 682-700; cf. Donald W. Sherburne, "Responsibility, Punishment, and Whitehead's Theory of the Self," in George L. Kline, ed., Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 179-88. But see the ambivalent comment of John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), p. 66.



one of superficial clamoring after novelty. Accepting the modern scientific insight that reality is indeed processive in nature, therefore, the theologian ought to be thankful that in so up-to-date a metaphysical characterization of that processive reality, such ample and emphatic provision is made for the importance of the past.

The endeavor to accord due weight to the theological tradition with its authentic demands in the life of faith might, e.g., have prevented the cheap and gratuitous distortion of neo-platonism on p. 44; and it might have lent to Griffin's whole project a respectabi-

lity and balance that it lacks at so many critical points.

But even though Griffin's depiction of the traditional concept of God is, like that of Leslie Dewart, distorted: even though his global accusations of hellenism are exaggerated, he is saying something important. Like Whitehead before him, he sees clearly that there does have to be a finite aspect to God. There does have to be the possibility of God's experiencing his creation. And, if there is to be literal sense made of the Judeo-Christian claims, there does have to be an admission of some sort of distinction in the Creator's own reality.

What Whitehead lacked in his endeavor to give coherent philosophical expression to all this, was an appreciation of the real meaning of ontological creation: the production from nothing of the universe's total reality, in which productive act the Absolute Godhead makes himself precisely the Creator of "this sort of universe," with finite. determinate relationships to it. This surely is not the place to elaborate this alternative interpretation adequately, but such an elaboration is indeed possible, and it is needed as a prolegomenon to the sort of Christology Griffin seeks to present.

There is no point in faulting Whitehead for not having done everything himself. Whitehead had two full careers behind him as physicist and mathematician by the time he applied his prodigious talents to the elaboration of a metaphysical system. Scholars like Griffin and Dewart, by contrast,

are specialists in theology. They ought, therefore, to pay closer attention to the theological tradition and decide once for all where their primary allegiance does, in fact, lie. Whitehead'skphilosophy does indeed offer Christian theologians just about all the advantages Griffin enumerates: added consistency, coherence, and interpretive power. A Process Christology is, therefore, replete with exciting possibilities

in addition to the fine groundwork its author has laid. It remains, now, for someone to reverse the current practice and go to work on Whitehead's concept of God taking the Christian tradition as normative. In the course of such a project, the one who undertakes it will perhaps be surprised to find that some deep inconsistencies within Whitehead's own theology are resolved into a satisfying harmony.

#### THE ANALOGY OF EXPERIENCE

(continued from page 99)

ReELIGION IS NOT a cop-out, as so many have claimed, which would be seen as diverting man's attention from what matters, off onto dreamy ideals. It is a hard-headed endeavor to diagnose a situation in which any honest human being acknowledges something is dreadfully wrong, and an endeavor to seek and implement a solution to that situation. A deft and succinct analysis of the Christian, the Marxist, and the Buddhist responses to this predicament yields the conclusion, in chapter IV, that what ails man is within hinself and so not manageable through his own resources. He needs deliverance, and cannot therefore be his own deliverer.

A major problem faced by the contemporary evangelist is, of course, the blindness of so many people to their own and the world's collective guilt; so much of our catechesis must be given over to

arousing in them a sense of sin. One of the "analogies of experience" Smith suggests for the purpose is that of deviation from a standard. A person can be brought to see that such a standard exists, that he knows of it at least implicitly, and yet culpably falls short of it. Redemption need not and should not be presented, today, as a cosmic drama in which man is passive. It must be an immanent affair taking place within himself, a rectification of his own inmost freedom; and yet we must not perpetuate the Protestant/nominalist error of excessive individualism.

In Chapter V, God is portrayed as the infinite transcendent Self who expresses himself in creation but in his own being transcends that creation. The analogy with the human self is obvious— I express myself in words and deeds but remain a center of "overarching," enduring purpose or intention

throughout my life. I thought I detected resonances of Macmurray, Berger, and Gordon Kaufman in all this, and wondered in reading it whether specific references to them might have clarified still further Professor Smith's already clear exposition. The discussion really is handled quite well; and yet paradoxically Smith's claim to be writing theology with a solid philosophical component raises questions as to the adequacy of his conceptual analogue for God. The theologian would feel very comfortable, to be sure, with this analogy of the transcendent Self said to be "definite" and yet not "finite." I am not saying that the opposition between "definite" and "finite" cannot be defended, but I think much more defense of it is needed than this simple assertion. And it is needed precisely in this sort of context, where an apologia is being presented to "modern man" for the conceivability of the divine Reality.

God, at any rate, has three privileged points of entry into history, at which he expresses himself: the voice of the prophets, the voice of conscience, and the Word's Incarnation. The sixth lecture is given to the subject of Christ as definitive, concrete expression of Godthe manifestation in whom the expression and the transcendent Reality become one. I delight in the frankly ontological claim which is so often lacking today, but I am equally pleased with the economical, orderly transition to the exemplary dimension of the Incarnation, as Jesus is said to teach us (1) the need for self-surrender, (2) the importance of others as ends

in themselves, just as dear as we are to God, and (3) the indispensability of the Father's power and presence in himself as in us for our deliverance.

The Church is shown forth in the final lecture as (in Royce's striking term) the "Beloved Community," in which salvation is communicated from Jesus in the Spirit to his disciples. Besides the phenomenological dimension which reminds me so much of Paul Weiss. there is evident here the same sort of participatory metaphysic that characterizes Schillebeeckx's Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God and so much Catholic ecclesiology that has been based on that masterpiece. That there are also strains in common with Part III of Robert Neville's God the Creator is hardly cause for surprise, since the latter studied under Smith's mentorship at Yale.

It is a constant temptation, with me, to bemoan the impossibility of conveying adequately in a review the content of almost any book under consideration. With Smith's work, however, the temptation becomes overpowering and I must give vent to the ensuing sense of frustration. John E. Smith is one of the best writers it has been my privilege to read, and even where he is simply rehearsing matters of common knowledge one invariably finds the nugget of original expression, of concrete detail, which makes reading him such a rewarding experience. Don't miss this one!

Fr. Middel D. Mailad, of

#### THE TREE OF FREEDOM

Through the sufferings you experienced at your trial, By the tree which you carried and died upon—Lord, by your mercy, you set all men free.

On your journey to your death you fell that man may rise to life; With Mary your Mother and Simon from Cyrene, With Veronica and the women of Jerusalem, With gentle people who aided you and the way—Lord, by your mercy, you set all men free.

By the humiliation you witnessed when your clothing was stripped from your body,
Through the fastening of your hands and feet to the Tree of Life, in which you restored new strength to our members—
Lord, by your mercy, you set all men free.

At your death all men are freed, that they may dwell eternally with the Trinity;
With sorrow those who loved you released your torn body from the Cross and made it ready for burial—
Lord, by your mercy, you set all men free.

Your body was placed within another man's tomb; in poverty you were born into the world, At death you left it without having fortune or possessions; But owning everything, Lord, you set all men free.

Anthony Savasta, O.S.F.



The Human Face of God. By John A. T. Robinson. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973. Pp. 268. Cloth, \$7.95.

Reviewed by Father Dominic V. Monti, O.F.M., S.T.M. (Union Theological Seminary), a member of the theological faculty of Christ the King Seminary (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.) presently on leave to pursue doctoral studies at the Catholic Theological Union at Chicago.

"Jesus is Lord" is the most primitive confession of Christian faith. How one can truthfully and meaningfully make that same confession today is the concern that has motivated Bishop Robinson's latest book. He writes as one who makes that confession yet who is acutely aware of the difficulty of doing so today. That difficulty, Robinson realizes, is often increased by the "decaying deposit of religious images superimposed on each other" by the Christian tradition: the pictures "of a Christ who was God in disguise and of Jesus the perfect man. Both have removed

him from 'the likes of us'..." (p. 3). With his usual combination of level-headed scholarship, feel for the times, and puckish iconoclasm, the Bishop largely accomplishes his aim.

Although one may not personally agree with all of Robinson's concrete solutions, one must sympathize with his concerns and his treatment. In the vocal complaints of many against Jesus Christ Superstar or Godspell because these presentations make Christ "too human," or in prayers like, "Christ, we know we are not like you; we are weak and human," a fundamental attitude of many Christians is betrayed. This latent Docetism or Monophysitism which Karl Rahner has often spoken of, is the refusal to admit the full dimensions of Jesus' human-ness-"like us in all things but sin." It is this refusal which paradoxically blocks the truly divine significance of Christ, our sharing in his experience of his Father, which he wished to share with us in human form.

In the first chapter, Robinson explains that Jesus must be "our man." "The mystery of the Christ is primarily a matter of recognition -not, can you believe this individual to be the Son of God? but can you see the truth of your humanity given its definition and vindication in him?" (p. 16). This entails his constructing a Christolo

Jesus' human reality, seeing precisely in this humanity the manifestation of God in the world.

In the next two chapters the author explores the dimensions of Jesus' humanity. In doing so, he moves against any image of Christ which would remove him from the flesh, from "his solidarity with the entire order of nature and history" (p. 45). For him the image which perhaps has most effectively removed the person of Jesus from the human process is that of the "virgin birth." Although I do not agree with Robinson's resolution of this question (and here the deeper issue of the normative role of ecclesiastical tradition arises for the Catholic, as it does throughout the book), I certainly am in agreement with his analysis of the scriptural record. Its purpose, as Raymond Brown has also pointed out, is not to separate Jesus' humanity from the rest of the human mess, but to assert the divine initiative in this human birth. If the doctrine is interpreted to make Jesus appear as the supreme biological freak of nature, then our faith has been reduced to mythology. Robinson more compellingly explodes the myth of Iesus as "the man who had everything." Being perfect man does not require having every physical, intellectual, or psychological perfection. Yet in discussing this, Robinson will poke many a sensitive Christian nerve.

In turning to Jesus as "Man of God." Robinson moves to the Lord's significance as representation of the mystery of God. In this connection he rightly points out the

gy "from below," beginning with many equivocations in the patristic treatment of Christ, in which the human and divine natures seem to be competing at the same level in the person of Jesus-some things he does as man, others as God. Robinson makes it clear that what he is presupposing "is not one superhuman person with two natures human and divine, but one human person of whom we must use two languages, man-language and Godlanguage" (p. 113). "The fact that Iesus is 'called of God' does not deny that he is also 'taken from among men': the initiative 'from above' does not cancel the solidarity 'from below'" (p. 121). It is in his humanity-and nothing more-that Jesus is the revelation of God.

In the next chapter, "God's Man," Robinson probes how Jesus can be the revelation of God. Here the concept of Incarnation plays an important role; as traditionally understood, this has meant that a divine person, the pre-existent Word of God, "became man" and took upon himself our human flesh. Robinson would scrap the concept of a pre-existent heavenly Being, believing that the word "incarnation" can just as truly and just as biblically" be applied to another idea: that a man "so completely embodies what was from the beginning the meaning and purpose of God's self-expression," that it can be said that this is "God for us" (p. 179). Robinson attempts to avoid the tag of "adoptionism" by emphasizing that "the birth of Jesus was an act of the divine initiative from the moment of his conception" (p. 198), and that the divine indwelling in Christ "was by personal union and not just by intermittent grace" (p. 205).

In any case, Robinson's main point is to assert that Jesus is both a genuine product of the created process and the word of God to it, the "supreme exemplification" of the process of creation yet uniquely constituted as a person by his relationship to the Father. This thought is very similar to Rahner's later essays on Christology, although Robinson's lack of metaphysics sometimes muddles his thought. However, he scores a point on Rahner by his clarity of English and his biblical orientation.

I found this book a real contrast to another that I had occasion to review recently, Gabriel Moran's The Present Revelation (see THE CORD, October, 1973). First of all. Robinson is tentative; he is not being dogmatic or a priori in his questioning. Rather, he is simply creating options, hopefully more expressive ones. Secondly, he writes as a believer, no matter how iconoclastic a one. "The centre is thankfully given, but the edges and the ends are teasingly and liberatingly open" (p. xii). This is the attitude of the Christian liberal, one who has found his identity in Christ, yet who is confident to explore the darkness of the untried, believing that the Light is its own best argument. The liberal may belong to a vanishing breed. Too many writers in theology no longer care whether they are "christian." Their norm is much more what makes sense to the everchanging culture than what conforms to the light they have found in Christ. Robinson deserves a careful hearing from this group,

but perhaps he has addressed himself to another and declining audience.

This Is the Word of the Lord: 34 Liturgies of the Word. By Rev. William J. Freburger. Notre Dame, Ind.: Ave Maria Press, 1974. Pp. 152. Paper, \$2.25.

Reviewed by Father Vianney F. Vormwald, O.F.M., B. Ed. (State Teacher's College, Cortland, N.Y.), M.A. (Notre Dame University), Chaplain of Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y.

Father Freburger has done the liturgical movement a real favor in presenting "34 liturgies of the Word for Holy Week, major feasts and selected Sundays arranged in dialogue form for three readers." In the introduction, the arranger states, "The gospels are dramatic. In liturgical celebrations, the drama is dependent on the interpretive skill and reading ability of the individual lector or celebrant." Unfortunately, however, he seems to contradict that statement with the next sentence: "But there is the possibility of giving the dramatic element fuller expression by treating the text . . . as a script."

The presentation of dramatic reading of the Scriptures should have had an introduction dealing with the purpose, the problems, and the possibilities of introducing the Word of the Lord as drama.

It is too bad, too, that Father Freburger's editors did not give him better assistance. (They even have a grammatical error in the acknowledgment of the scriptural readings.) Any editor would have tried to have some integration of the three readers, but "narrator," "speaker," "Jesus", "Lord," "Speaker 1", "Speaker 2," "Mary," "All," "Reader 3," "Woman," "Speaker," "God," "Man," and "People" confuse the presentation for three readers.

Although a few of the arrangements appear to be forced, this book in the hands of a creative liturgist will give him an insight into the dramatic possibilities of some pericopes of the Word, beyond the Passion narratives.

New Pentecost or New Passion? The Direction of Religious Life Today. By Thomas E. Clarke, S.J. Paramus, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1973. Pp. 181. Paper, \$3.95.

Reviewed by Father Julian A. Davies, O.F.M., Ph.D. (Philosophy, Fordham University), Associate Editor of this Review and Head of the Philosophy Department at Siena College.

Perhaps a more accurate subtitle for this valuable work would be Twelve Perceptive Essays on issues in religious life since Vatican II. The reaction of religious to personalism and the secularization thrust occupies a good deal of the well thought-out and carefully nuanced pieces.

The gut issues of permanent commitment, community, poverty, celibacy, and freedom are illuminated with some original and insightful suggestions, and with some others that ought long since to have been restored to their traditional

place of honor in the outlook of religious: e.g., that celibate communities are better conceived as unities of brothers and sisters, on a family model, than as associations of friends: that poverty is something shared in and with community, not a strictly personal, private commitment; that religious consecration implies fidelity, and that it does involve an element of real mystery, not merely a career decision; that celibacy breaks down a "tribalism" that tends to choke human development: and that freedom needs dependence to be real.

Father Clarke's general methodology is to set up a problem as a clash of extremes and then to make a wary move down the middle, or to left or right of center as the case may be. His first essay on the classical "essentialism" which canonized the past vs. the new dynamism with its total surrender of fixity or continuity, e.g., ends up slightly to the left of center; and his creative opposition of the religious as loyal core of civil servants and the "avant garde" of good things to come does likewise, but ever so slightly so. I found myself more frequently questioning the author's extended theorizing efforts than his more practical observa-

Father Clarke is certainly aware of religious life as it is being and has been lived in the recent past. His essays, while not indicating any bold new directions for religious life to take, are not mere analyses. Any religious or group of religious could find much that is helpful in this extremely well written work.

## Multi-Media Review

Hi God! An Ecumenical Religious Education Program Based on the Human Growth and Development of Children and All Who Are Open to Love. By Carey Landry and Carol Jean Kinghorn. Cincinnati: North American Liturgy Resources, 1973. Boxed set containing 2 stereo LP discs, Teacher-Parent Book, Music (melody & guitar accompaniment) Book, and Poster Set, \$16.95 complete.

Reviewed by Stephen Garnet, a Franciscan Student at Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y., and Seventh-Grade CCD teacher at Saint Clare's Parish, Albany, New York.

Hi Godl is an ambitious attempt to provide a program with adequate resources to enable Christians working with young children to present them with an experience as outlined in "To Teach as Jesus" Did," a pastoral message on Catholic education from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Washington: USCC Publications Office, 1973): "Community is at the heart of Christian Education not simply as a concept to be taught but a reality to be lived." Through education men must be moved to build community in all areas of life; they can do this best if they have learned the meaning of community by experiencing it.

The material of the program is grouped around four basic thematic questions: (1) Who am I? (2) Why am I here? (3) Who is God? and (4) What is my relationship with God? The answers to these questions require a whole lifetime of living; and that is why the use of this fine program presupposes a willingness on the part of the teachers to become involved in seeking ever deeper and fuller answer of their own to the four basic questions. To put it another way, teachers who mean to use this program conscientiously must have a willingness to grow and become ever more fully the persons they were meant to be.

The records and the songbook which are included provide an excellent opportunity to participate in one form of communal activity. The twenty-eight songs are an invaluable aid in bringing home the points of the four thematic questions—as are the posters in illustrating the point of each of the four sections of the program.

Don't undertake a *Hi Godl* program unless you are willing to give it the time and effort needed, especially concerning the part the songs should play in the development of the program. If you do decide to use *Hi Godl* I wish you the peace and the growth that the program is seeking to provide.

### **COVER AND ILLUSTRATION CREDITS**

The cover and illustrations for our April - May issue were dr by Sister Mary Regina, P.C.P.A., of the Monastery of Sancta C. Canton, Ohio.