Birds (Derby) Limited Retirement Benefits Plan

Implementation Statement as at 31st December 2021

The Trustee of the Birds (Derby) Limited Retirement Benefits Plan ("the Scheme") has prepared this implementation statement in compliance with the governance standards introduced under The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Disclosure) (Amendment) Regulations 2019. Its purpose is to demonstrate how the Scheme has followed the policy on voting, stewardship and engagement as set out in the Scheme's Statement of Investment Principles ("SoIP"), dated September 2020. This statement covers the period 1st January to 31st December 2021.

A. Voting and Engagement Policy

The policy as set out in the SoIP in respect of voting, stewardship and engagement is in summary as follows:

- i) Voting decisions on stocks are delegated to the investment managers of the pooled funds held by the Scheme: BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited ("BlackRock"), Ruffer LLP ("Ruffer") and Invesco Perpetual Life Limited ("Invesco Perpetual").
- ii) The investment managers have full discretion for undertaking engagement activities in respect of the investments.
- iii) The investment managers will report on voting and engagement activity to the Trustee on a periodic basis together with their adherence to the UK Stewardship Code. The Trustee will consider whether the approach taken was appropriate or whether an alternative approach is necessary.
- iv) The Trustee considers the long-term financial interests of the Scheme to be paramount but, where appropriate and practical, expects the investment managers to consider financially material Environmental, Social and Governance ("ESG") issues in investment decision-making and to practice good stewardship.

The investment managers are expected to undertake good stewardship and positive engagement in relation to the Scheme's investments. The Trustee considers that the long-term financial risks to the Scheme and ESG factors, including climate risk, are potentially material.

The Trustee has implemented this policy as described and in particular:

- Has received reports from the investment managers regarding voting and engagement.
- In light of such reports and otherwise, considered the Trustee's policy in regard to voting and stewardship and concluded that the current policy is appropriate.

B. Voting Record

As the Scheme invests through pooled funds, the Trustee does not have the option of applying its own voting policy. All underlying securities in pooled funds which have voting rights are managed by the investment managers with the investment managers having the legal right to the underlying votes. The following summary is restricted to the Scheme's investments in funds that are invested in equities. The Scheme also invests, with BlackRock, in property and liability matching funds, none of which confer voting rights.

The responses of the investment managers to the Trustee's enquiries about its voting policies during the year ended 31st December 2021 were:

	Aquila Life World Currency Hedged ex UK Equity	UK Equity	Absolute Return	Global Targeted Returns Pension
Fund or Funds	BlackRock	BlackRock	Ruffer	Invesco Perpetual
Voting policies			RESPONSES	
What is your policy on consulting with clients before voting?	BlackRock believes that compensuring they have appropriate serve the interests of shart stakeholders. We believe fundamental rights attached to and their boards should be acted and structured with appropriate ensure that they operate in shot ocreate sustainable value. So the right to vote to elect, remove approve the appointment of the corporate charter Consistent with these shared BlackRock has a responsibilite feedback to companies, in outlients' investments. BlackRock ("BIS") does this through engate teams and/or board member issues including environmental ("ESG") matters and, for those authority, through voting proxeconomic interests of our client the public debate to shape gestandards with the goal of a powith our clients' interests as BlackRock looks to companies accurate, and comprehensive governance and business matters.	e governance structures to eholders and other key that there are certain shareholding. Companies countable to shareholders e checks and balances to nareholders' best interests shareholders should have re, and nominate directors, he auditor, and amend the or by-laws. Incolder rights, we believe the ty to monitor and provide ar role as stewards of our ck Investment Stewardship gement with management are on material business al, social, and governance clients who have given us ties in the best long-term ints. We also participate in global norms and industry blicy framework consistent is long-term shareholders.	Ruffer, as a discretionary investment manager, does not have a formal policy on consulting with clients before voting. However, we can accommodate client voting instructions for specific areas of concerns or companies where feasible.	Invesco has adopted a clear and considered stewardship policy aligned with its responsibility as a shareholder on behalf of all its investors. As their fiduciary, our clients rely on our expertise and commitment to active engagement and dialogue with investee companies to make voting decisions in the best interests of all clients. Invesco is happy to work with our clients to deliver satisfactory outcomes as it relates to stewardship, ESG policies and proxy voting. Invesco's proxy voting process is designed to ensure that proxy votes are cast in accordance with the best interests of all clients. We disclose detailed portfolio specific proxy voting reports detailing all votes including rationales to clients upon request. Invesco's publication of its Policy Statement on Global Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting, disclosure of voting records and ESG investment stewardship reporting enhances our accountability and transparency to our clients. For more information regarding our stewardship, engagement and voting

This allows shareholders to appropriately understand and assess how relevant risks and opportunities are being effectively identified and managed. Where company reporting and disclosure is inadequate or the approach taken is inconsistent with our view of what supports sustainable long-term value creation, we will engage with a company and/or use our vote to encourage a change in practice.

BlackRock views engagement as an important activity; engagement provides us with the opportunity to improve our understanding of the business and ESG risks and opportunities that are material to the companies in which our clients invest. As long-term investors on behalf of clients, we seek to have regular and continuing dialogue with executives and board directors to advance sound governance and sustainable business practices, as well as to understand the effectiveness of the company's management and oversight of material issues. Engagement is an important mechanism for providing feedback on company practices and disclosures, particularly where we believe they could be enhanced. We primarily engage through direct dialogue but may use other tools such as written correspondence to share our perspectives. Engagement also informs our voting decisions.

BlackRock's approach to corporate governance and stewardship is explained in our Global Principles. These high-level Principles are the framework for our more detailed, market-specific voting guidelines, all of which are published on the BlackRock website. The Principles describe our philosophy on stewardship (including how we monitor and engage with companies), our policy on voting, our integrated approach to stewardship matters and how we deal with conflicts of interest. These apply across relevant asset classes and products as permitted by investment strategies. BlackRock reviews our Global Principles annually and updates them as necessary to

activities please refer to our 2020 Environmental, Social and Governance Investment Stewardship Report publicly available our website: https://www.invesco.com/corporate/abo ut-us/esg.

	reflect in market standards, evolving governance practice	
	and insights gained from engagement over the prior year.	
	Our Global Principles available on our website at	
	https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-	
	sheet/blk-responsible-investment-engprinciples- global.pdf	
	giobai.pui	
Please provide an overview	The team and its voting and engagement work	Invesco has adopted and implemented a
of your process for deciding	continuously evolves in response to changing	Policy Statement on Global Corporate
how to vote	governance related developments and expectations.	Governance and Proxy Voting ("Policy")
	Our voting guidelines are market-specific to ensure we	which it believes describes policies and
	take into account a company's unique circumstances by	
	market, where relevant. We inform our vote decisions	procedures reasonably designed to ensure
	through research and engage as necessary. Our	that proxies are voted in the best interests
	engagement priorities are global in nature and are	of its clients. This Policy is intended to help
	informed by BlackRock's observations of governance	Invesco's clients understand our
	related and market developments, as well as through	commitment to responsible investing and
	dialogue with multiple stakeholders, including clients.	proxy voting, as well as the good
	We may also update our regional engagement priorities	governance principles that inform our
	based on issues that we believe could impact the long-	
	term sustainable financial performance of companies in	approach to engagement and voting at
	those markets. We welcome discussions with our clients	shareholder meetings.
	on engagement and voting topics and priorities to get	
	their perspective and better understand which issues	Invesco views proxy voting as an integral
	are important to them. As outlined in our Global Principles, BlackRock determines which companies to	part of its investment management
	engage directly based on our assessment of the	responsibilities. The proxy voting process
	materiality of the issue for sustainable long-term	at Invesco focuses on protecting clients'
	financial returns and the likelihood of our engagement	rights and promoting governance
	being productive. Our voting guidelines are intended to	
	help clients and companies understand our thinking on	structures and practices that reinforce the
	key governance matters. They are the benchmark	accountability of corporate management
	against which we assess a company's approach to	and boards of directors to shareholders.
	corporate governance and the items on the agenda to	The voting decision lies with our portfolio
	be voted on at the shareholder meeting. We apply our	managers and analysts with input and
	guidelines pragmatically, taking into account a	support from our Global ESG team and
	company's unique circumstances where relevant. We	Proxy Operations functions. The final
	inform our vote decisions through research and engage	Transportations randomics frie final

	as necessary. If a client wants to implement their own voting policy, they will need to be in a segregated account. BlackRock's Investment Stewardship team would not implement the policy ourselves, but the client would engage a third-party voting execution platform to cast the votes.		voting decisions may incorporate the unique circumstances affecting companies, regional best practices and any dialogue we have had with company management. Our proprietary proxy voting platform ("PROXYintel") facilitates implementation of voting decisions and rationales across global investment teams. Our good governance principles, governance structure and processes are designed to ensure that proxy votes are cast in accordance with clients' best interests. The Policy is publicly available on our website: https://www.invesco.com/corporate/abo ut-us/esg.
How, if at all, have you made use of proxy voting services?	BlackRock's proxy voting process is led by the BlackRock Investment Stewardship team (BIS), which consists of three regional teams – Americas ("AMRS"), Asia-Pacific ("APAC"), and Europe, Middle East and Africa ("EMEA") - located in seven offices around the world. The analysts with each team will generally determine how to vote at the meetings of the companies they cover. Voting decisions are made by members of the BlackRock Investment Stewardship team with input from investment colleagues as required, in each case, in accordance with BlackRock's Global Principles and custom market-specific voting guidelines. While we subscribe to research from the proxy advisory firms Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, it is just one among many inputs into our vote analysis process, and we do not blindly follow their recommendations on how to vote. We primarily use proxy research firms to synthesise corporate governance	Ruffer's proxy voting advisor is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). We have developed our own internal voting guidelines, however we take into account issues raised by ISS, to assist in the assessment of resolutions and the identification of contentious issues. Although we are cognisant of proxy advisers' voting recommendations, we do not delegate or outsource our stewardship activities when deciding how to vote on our clients' shares.	Invesco may supplement its internal research with information from third-parties, such as proxy advisory firms. Globally Invesco leverages research from Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. ("ISS") and Glass Lewis ("GL") and we use the Investment Association IVIS in the UK for research for UK securities. Invesco generally retains full and independent discretion with respect to proxy voting decisions. Globally, we receive research reports including vote recommendations from ISS and Glass Lewis for company shareholder meetings across our holdings. To assist with the operational aspects of the proxy voting process including vote

information and analysis into a concise, easily reviewable format so that our investment stewardship analysts can readily identify and prioritise those companies where our own additional research and engagement would be beneficial. Other sources of information we use include the company's own reporting (such as the proxy statement and the website), our engagement and voting history with the company, and the views of our active investors, public information and ESG research.

In summary, proxy research firms help us deploy our resources to greatest effect in meeting client expectations

- BlackRock sees its investment stewardship program, including proxy voting, as part of its fiduciary duty to and enhance the value of clients' assets, using our voice as a shareholder on their behalf to ensure that companies are well led and well managed
- We use proxy research firms in our voting process, primarily to synthesise information and analysis into a concise, easily reviewable format so that our analysts can readily identify and prioritise those companies where our own additional research and engagement would be beneficial
- We do not follow any single proxy research firm's voting recommendations and in most markets, we subscribe to two research providers and use several other inputs, including a company's own disclosures, in our voting and engagement analysis
- We also work with proxy research firms, which apply our proxy voting guidelines to filter out routine or non-contentious proposals and refer to us any meetings where additional research and possibly engagement might be required to inform our voting decision
 The proxy voting operating environment is complex and
- The proxy voting operating environment is complex and we work with proxy research firms to execute vote instructions, manage client accounts in relation to voting and facilitate client reporting on voting

Each research analyst, supported by our responsible investment team, reviews the relevant issues on a case-bycase basis and exercises their judgement, based on their in-depth knowledge of the company. If there are any controversial resolutions, a discussion is convened with senior investment staff and, if agreement cannot reached, there is an option to escalate the decision to the Head of Research or the Chief Investment Officer.

As discussed above, we do use ISS as an input into our decisions. In the 12 months to 31 December 2021, of the votes in relation to holdings in the Ruffer Absolute Return Fund we voted against the recommendation of ISS 7.4% of the time.

disclosure to meet regulatory requirements, Invesco retains the services of ISS and leverages our proprietary proxy voting platform ("PROXYintel") to further streamline the process. Invesco also engages ISS's governance research and voting services to implement our internally developed custom voting guidelines specific with voting recommendations on environmental. social and governance (ESG) issues applied globally. Our custom voting guidelines are reviewed annually and seek to support Invesco's Good Governance Principles on best practice standards in corporate governance and long-term investment stewardship. For more information on Invesco's use of third-party proxy advisory firms, please see our Policy Statement on Global Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting publicly available on our website: https://www.invesco.com/corporate/abo ut-us/esg.

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What process did you follow for determining the "most significant votes"?	BlackRock Investment Stewa around themes that we belie governance practices and delifinancial performance. Our year clients to understand their prio well as our active participati debates, help inform these the identified in turn shape our of specific Voting Guidelines and which form the benchmark agas ustainable long-term financial companies. We periodically publish "voidetailed explanations of governance, strategic and sust consider, based on our Engagement Priorities, mas ustainable long-term financial bulletins are intended to explanations are intended to explanations are intended to explanations are likely to be high interest to our clients and potentially represent a material undertake on behalf of clients. public shortly after the sharehand others can be aware of out it is most relevant to them. bulletins to contain explanation votes for the purposes requirements.	eve will encourage sound iver sustainable long-term ar-round engagement with rities and expectations, as on in market-wide policy mes. The themes we have Global Principles, market-ind Engagement Priorities, ainst which we look at the all performance of investee the bulletins" setting out key votes relating to stainability issues that we Global Principles and terial to a company's cial performance. These explain our vote decision, impinning it and relevant colicable, where the issues in-profile and therefore of other stakeholders, and all risk to the investment we we we make this information molder meeting, so clients are vote determination when we consider these vote ons of the most significant	We have defined 'significant votes' as those that we think will be of particular interest to our clients. In most cases, these are when they form part of continuing engagement with the company and/or we have held a discussion between members of the research, portfolio management and responsible investment teams to make a voting decision following differences between the recommendations of the company, ISS and our internal voting guidelines.	As part of the firm's Shareholder Rights Directive II implementation, the criteria defined by Invesco for a vote to be considered 'significant' is based on the following: (i) materiality of the position, (ii) the content of the resolution and (iii) inclusion on Invesco's ESG watchlist.
Did any of your "most significant" votes breach the client's voting policy (where relevant")?	n/a	n/a	No	[Y/N]-N
If "Y" to the above, please explain where this happened	n/a	n/a	n/a	

and the rationale for the action taken.			
Are you currently affected by	As an investment manager, BlackRock has a duty of	No	
any of the following five	care to its clients. BlackRock's duty extends to all of its		
conflicts, or any other	employees and is critical to our reputation and business		
conflicts, across any of your	relationships, and to meeting the requirements of our		
holdings?	various regulators worldwide. Employees are held		
1) The asset management	responsible by BlackRock to seek to avoid any activity		
firm overall has an apparent	that might create potential or actual conflicts with the		
client-relationship conflict	interests of clients.		
e.g. the manager provides	BlackRock maintains a compliance program for		
significant products or	identifying, escalating, avoiding and/or managing		
services to a company in	potential or actual conflicts of interest. The program is		
which they also have an	carried out through our employees' adherence to		
equity or bond holding;	relevant policies and procedures, a governance and		
2) Senior staff at the asset	oversight structure and employee training.		
management firm hold roles			
(e.g. as a member of the	Among the various policies and procedures that		
Board) at a company in	address conflicts of interest is BlackRock's Global		
which the asset	Conflicts of Interest Policy. This policy governs the		
management firm has equity	responsibility of BlackRock and its employees to place		
or bond holdings;	our clients' interests first and to identify and manage		
3) The asset management	any conflicts of interest that may arise in the course of		
firm's stewardship staff have	our business. In order to mitigate potential and actual		
a personal relationship with	conflicts of interest, each BlackRock employee must,		
relevant individuals (e.g. on	among other things:		
the Board or the company	Identify potential or actual conflicts of interest both in		
secretariat) at a company in	relation to existing arrangements and when considering		
which the firm has an equity	changes to, or making new, business arrangements;		
or bond holding;	Report any conflicts of interest promptly to his/her		
4) There is a situation where	supervisor and Legal & Compliance;		
the interests of different	Avoid (where possible) or otherwise take appropriate		
clients diverge. An example	steps to mitigate a conflict to protect our clients'		
of this could be a takeover,	interests; and		
where one set of clients is	Where appropriate, disclose conflicts of interest to		
exposed to the target and	clients prior to proceeding with a proposed arrangement		
another set is exposed to the	Disak Dank Land 9 Compiliar as assistant manual for		
acquirer;	BlackRock Legal & Compliance conducts mandatory		
	annual compliance training, which includes a discussion		

f the Global Conflicts of Interest Policy. ead more about how we manage conflicts of interest in ur Global Corporate Governance and Engagement rinciples found here ttps://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact- heet/blk-responsible-investment-engprinciples- lobal.pdf, and in our stand alone statement found here ttps://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publicati		
ur Global Corporate Governance and Engagement rinciples found here ttps://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-neet/blk-responsible-investment-engprinciples-lobal.pdf, and in our stand alone statement found here ttps://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publicati		
n/blk-statement-conflicts-of-interest.pdf		
or more information about securities lending, please see our commentary, Securities Lending Viewed strough the Sustainability Lens here ttps://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/securities-lending-viewed-through-the-sustainabilityens.pdf		
In behalf of our clients we intend to vote at all hareholder meetings of companies in which our clients re invested. In certain markets, there might be egulatory constraints or operational issues which can ffect BlackRock's ability to vote certain proxies, as well is the desirability of doing so. We do not support inpediments to the exercise of voting rights and will ingage regulators and companies about the need to emedy the constraint. Where we experience inpediments in relation to a specific shareholder ineeting, we will review the resolutions to assess whether the business under consideration warrants obting despite the complications caused by the inpediment. For example, we currently do not vote at hareholder meetings that require share blocking: the estriction that is imposed when a vote is cast expresents a liquidity constraint on the portfolio in anagers and increases the risk of failed trades, which can be costly to clients. BlackRock may in its discretion eletermine that the value of voting outweighs the costs	demonstrated its commitment to responsible investing by actively encouraging ESG (environmental, so governance) practices across every a of our business. We aspire to incorp ESG considerations into all of our investment capabilities in the context financial materiality and in the best interest of our clients. We do this the engaging with companies and proxy voting on our clients' behalf. We are constant partnership and dialogue wour clients to ensure we achieve our clients stewardship needs. We are committed to being transparent with clients and companies about our	ocial, area orate ext of rough e in vith
or interest of the second of t	more information about securities lending, please our commentary, Securities Lending Viewed ugh the Sustainability Lens here s://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publicativecurities-lending-viewed-through-the-sustainability-pdf Dehalf of our clients we intend to vote at all reholder meetings of companies in which our clients invested. In certain markets, there might be platory constraints or operational issues which can not blackRock's ability to vote certain proxies, as well ne desirability of doing so. We do not support rediments to the exercise of voting rights and will age regulators and companies about the need to rediments in relation to a specific shareholder reting, we will review the resolutions to assess ther the business under consideration warrants and despite the complications caused by the reholder meetings that require share blocking: the riction that is imposed when a vote is cast reholder meetings that require share blocking: the riction that is imposed when a vote is cast resents a liquidity constraint on the portfolio regers and increases the risk of failed trades, which be costly to clients. BlackRock may in its discretion	more information about securities lending, please our commentary, Securities Lending Viewed ugh the Sustainability Lens here s://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publicati ecurities-lending-viewed-through-the-sustainability-pdf Dehalf of our clients we intend to vote at all reholder meetings of companies in which our clients invested. In certain markets, there might be allatory constraints or operational issues which can ct BlackRock's ability to vote certain proxies, as well ne desirability of doing so. We do not support adiments to the exercise of voting rights and will age regulators and companies about the need to edd the constraint. Where we experience ediments in relation to a specific shareholder titing, we will review the resolutions to assess ther the business under consideration warrants and despite the complications caused by the ediment. For example, we currently do not vote at reholder meetings that require share blocking: the riction that is imposed when a vote is cast esents a liquidity constraint on the portfolio tagers and increases the risk of failed trades, which be costly to clients. BlackRock may in its discretion termine that the value of voting outweighs the costs

and block the shares in that instance.

With regards to US assets, we have approximately a 100% success rate in voting our funds' assets, with the exception of certain portfolios that utilize a long/short strategy whereby the funds leverage may prevent us from voting.

With regards to non-U.S. assets generally, we have approximately a 90% success rate in voting our funds' assets. Of the remaining: 8% were uninstructed due to share blocking, and 2% of the votes go unexecuted result from either the fund's leverage or market-based impediments such as ballots received post cut-off date or post meeting date, meeting specific power of attorney requirements, special documentation, etc.

activities.To view our 2020 ESG Investment Stewardship Report and proxy voting disclosures, please visit our corporate website:

invesco.com/corporate/about-us/esg. Invesco publicly discloses our proxy voting records and voting decisions in compliance with the UK Stewardship Code and the European Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II) on our webpage here:

https://vds.issgovernance.com/vds/#/Mz k3MA==/.

Voting statistics (applicable to the Scheme's Reporting Period)	BlackRock World Equity	BlackRock UK Equity	Ruffer	Invesco Perpetual
How many meetings were you eligible to vote at?	2111	174	95	348
How many resolutions were you eligible to vote on?	24629	2458	1250	5343
What % of resolutions did you vote on for which you were eligible?	99%	100%	100%	98.3%
Of the resolutions on which you voted, what % did you vote with management?	91%	94%	91.8%	92.1%
Of the resolutions on which you voted, what % did you vote against management?	8%	5%	6.5% ¹	7.9%
Of the resolutions on which you voted, what % did you abstain from voting?	0%	1%	1.7% ²	0.3%
In what % of meetings, for which you did vote, did you vote at least once against management?	36%	29%	41.1%	44.4%
What % of resolutions, on which you did vote, did you vote contrary to the recommendation of your proxy adviser? (if applicable)	0%	0%	7.4%	4.8%

- 1. This figure represents total votes against management less the Withhold and Abstain votes.
- 2. This figure is Abstain and Withheld votes. These vote options depend on jurisdiction.

Highlights of some of the significant votes during the period are shown in the table below. Whilst many votes may have significant impact on the financial or non-financial performance of a company, the ones below have been drawn out as they are part of wider engagement that the investment managers have been conducting with the particular company and hence reflect the achievement of an engagement milestone.

C. Most Significant Votes

Most significant votes				
In relation to the Fund named above, which 10 votes (at a minimum) during the reporting period do you consider to be most significant for the Scheme?	BlackRock World Equity	BlackRock UK Equity	Ruffer	Invesco Perpetual
VOTE 1				
Company name	Tyson Foods Inc	BP PIc	WH Smith	SBM Offshore NV
Date of vote	11/02/2021	12/05/2021	20/01/2021	24-Mar-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)			0.27%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Amend Omnibus Stock Plan Approve Recapitalization Plan for all Stock to Have One-vote per Share	Accept Financial Statements and Statutory Reports Approve Remuneration Report	Governance – remuneration	Authorize Board to Exclude Preemptive Rights from Share Issuances
How you voted	For	For	Against	For (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?			We sent a letter to the Board and met with a Board member prior to the vote	NA
Rationale for the voting decision	[SD-S0316-001] We believe that one vote per share is in the best interest of long term shareholders		We voted against management on the approval of the remuneration report at WH Smith as we felt the timing of an executive pay increase in the current circumstances was inappropriate. This did not express a negative view of the	A vote FOR this proposal is warranted because it is in line with commonly used safeguards regarding volume and duration.

Outcome of the vote	1 st Motion – Pass 2 nd Motion – Fail	Pass	performance of the CEO and management team during this challenging period, but rather we felt that going ahead with a pre-planned base remuneration increase was not appropriate for a company that is at present loss-making, has suspended its dividend, raised equity, may benefit from government support measures and has made a large number of staff redundant. We were also of the view that the disclosure around the personal performance criteria is not clear. The vote in favour of approving of the remuneration report passed with 67.4%	Pass
			shareholder support. However, the Board has subsequently confirmed they are revising the remuneration report and will not include the executive pay increase due to the feedback from shareholders.	

Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?	against remuneration	Therefore we didn't take further action beyond our continuous engagement
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?	We believe this vote will be of particular interest to our clients. The vote against management was in the context of engagement with the company and the result of extensive internal discussions	proposal

VOTE 2			
Company name	Amerisource Bergen Corporation	Countryside Properties	Woodside Petroleum Ltd.
Date of vote	11/03/2021	05/02/2021	06-Apr-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		1.34%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Advisory note to ratify named executive's compensation. Elect director DM Duncan	Governance – board composition and remuneration	Approve the Amendments to the Company's Constitution Proposed by Market Forces
How you voted	Against For	Abstain	Against (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We wrote to the company explaining our decision prior to the AGM.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision	1- [LN-M0550-002] Remuneration committee	We met with David Howell (Chair of the Board) and Amanda Burton (Chair of	

discretion has been used poorly.2- [SF-M0000-001] to against due to lack of disclosure. It is a company's capital proposals. The company believes its current determine its long-term financial performance. We shared our view that the company would benefit from a non-executive director with a proven track record in capital allocation. Given the changing strategy of the changing strategy of the changing strategy of the comprany to ensure management is incentivised to deliver on the revised strategy and, importantly, to align their interests with shareholders. We shared our thoughts around this, including a total shareholder return measure, a meaningful shareholder gregulizement and ensuring post-cessation and vesting requirements are in line with the guidance from the linvestment Association. We attach significant importance to the company's strategy, board composition and executive remuneration as we deem	Г	T		1 1 11 11 11
vote against due to lack of disclosure. company's capital allocation strategy. Decisions in this area are critical and will utilinately determine its long-term financial performance. We shared our view that the company would benefit from a non-executive director with a proven track record in capital allocation. Given the changing strategy of the business, significant changes need to be made to the remuneration policy to ensure management is incentivised to deliver on the revised strategy and, importantly, to align their interests with shareholders. We shared our thoughts around this, including a total shareholder return measure, a meaningful shareholder requirement and ensuring post-creations and vesting requirement are in line with the guidance from the line formation and stakeholders. company's capital allocation with stared and will utilinately determine its long-termine to make a company when the company would benefit from a non-executive in feedback to the company on its strategies, affairs and changing strategy on its strategy and its independent on the revised strategy and its external reporting of that strategy and operations to respond our thoughts around this, including a total shareholder return measure, a meaningful shareholder requirement and ensuring post-creation and vesting requirement Association. We attach significant importance to the company's strategy, board composition and executive		discretion has been used		
Vote against due to lack of disclosure. allocation strategy. Decisions in this area are critical and will ultimately determine its long-term financial performance. We shared our view that the company would benefit from a non-executive director with a proven track record in capital allocation. Given the changing strategy of the business, significant changes need to be made to the remuneration policy to ensure management is incentivised to deliver on the revised strategy and, importantly, to align their interests with shareholders. We shared our thoughts around this, including a total shareholder return measure, a maningful shareholder return measure, a meaningful shareholding requirement and ensuring post-cessation and vesting requirements are in line with the guidance from the Investment Association. We attach significant importance to the company's strategy, board composition and executive		poorly 2 [SE M0000 001]	,	1 .
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		addressing t		
			the long-term	
		success of		
		and all stakel	nolders.	
Outcome of the vote	Pass	Re-election	proposals Fail	
	Pass	passed with a	range of 78-	
		93% shareho	lder approval	
		for votes		
Implications of the outcome e.g. were		Whilst we		ne of the vote
there any lessons learned and what		engagements	s with the meets our ve	oting intention.
likely future steps will you take in		non-executive	e directors so Therefore, v	we didn't take
response to the outcome?		far, we have	not received further action	on beyond our
		acknowledge	ment our continuous	engagement
		concerns	will be and dialog	jue with the
		addressed. C	consequently, company, a	s appropriate.
		we decided t	o abstain on	
		our votes in r	elation to the	
		re-election	of all non-	
		executive di	rectors. We	
		wrote to the	ne company	
		explaining of		
		prior to the A		
		continue to e		
		of the	upcoming	
		remuneration		
		consultation,	and we look	
		forward to co		
		discussions.		
On which criteria have you assessed			staining or >1% IVZ C	wnership and
this vote to be "most significant"?			re-election of Includes	Key ESG
			or material proposal	Ť
		holdings are	1 1	
			rise after	
		discussion	between	
		members of	the research,	
		portfolio man	•	
		responsible	investment	
		teams		
		Louino		

VOTE 3			
Company name	Danske Bank A/S	Walt Disney	Barclays Plc
Date of vote	16/03/2021	09/03/2021	26-Apr-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.57%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Accept Financial Statements and Statutory Reports Approve Allocation of Income and Dividends of DKK 2 Per Share Approve Creation of DKK 1.5 Billion Pool of Capital without Preemptive Rights Approve Creation of DKK 1.72 Billion Pool of Capital with Preemptive Rights	Governance – lobbying and succession planning	Approve Market Forces Requisitioned Resolution
How you voted	Against, For, For, For, For	Voted for shareholder resolutions and re- election of Board member	Against (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We communicated our concerns to the company prior to the AGM.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision		On the topic of lobbying and the company's memberships of trade associations, we voted for a shareholder resolution in 2018, 2019 and 2020 requesting additional disclosure. While the	A vote AGAINST this resolution is considered warranted In November 2020, the Company followed up on its commitment to come back to shareholders with further development of its climate strategy,

company has responded to	including targets.
these resolutions by	Despite some apparent
increasing its disclosure,	current gaps in the
this only includes trade	Company's approach to
associations based in the	climate change,
US. As the framework has	Barclays' continued
been established, and the	commitment to evolving
analysis already conducted	its climate strategy over
for these associations, we	time is recognised as a
do not think it is onerous	sufficient and
for the company to expand	appropriate response to the matters raised in the
this to cover all trade	resolution at this time.
associations of which it is a	resolution at this time.
member. We stated clearly	
to the company that we	
were disappointed that it	
has not expanded its	
analysis and that we would	
support the shareholder	
resolution at the 2021	
AGM.	
Another significant	
concern for us is	
succession planning at the	
board level. As we did in	
2020, we debated whether	
to support the re-election	
of Susan Arnold given her	
long tenure on the board.	
This is of particular	
importance to us when	
there is not an	
independent Chair of the	
Board. We decided to	
support her re-election to	
provide continuity in a year	

		where we expect changes to the board. We communicated our concerns to the company prior to the AGM.	
Outcome of the vote	Fail, Pass, Pass, Pass, Pass	Re-election proposal passed with 97.2% shareholder approval for vote. Shareholder resolution failed with only 32.7% shareholder approval for the vote.	Fail
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		We will continue to vote on shareholder resolutions that improve transparency and enhanced disclosure.	The outcome of the vote meets our voting intention. therefore we didn't take further action
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		We believe this vote will be of particular interest to our clients. The shareholder resolutions aimed to increase the transparency of the company's climate lobbying activities	>1% IVZ ownership and includes key ESG proposal

VOTE 4			
Company name	TransDigm Group Inc.	Royal Dutch Shell	QBE Insurance Group Limited
Date of vote	16/03/21	18/05/2021	26-Apr-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		1.33%	>1% IVZ Ownership

Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation	Vote on managemen resolution relating to the company's climate transition plan	Reduction Targets
How you voted	Against	For	Against (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		No we did not as we did not vote agains management.	NA NA
Rationale for the voting decision	1- [SF-M0500-010] Pay is not aligned with performance and peers.	We supported Royal Dutch Shell's first Energy Transition Strategy plan The decision was made in the context of the progress Shell has made as a result of engagement and the commitment of the company leadership to continue to meaningfully engage on the remaining areas of Climate Action 100+. The management resolution gained support of 88.7% of its shareholder base. We are committing to continued engagement with the company to work on details of the company's transition plans to ensure absolute emission equivalent targets sit alongsides short- and medium-termintensity targets, and the need for furthe alignment on capital	disclosure of targets to reduce the company's exposure to oil and gas assets is warranted. The company currently provides disclosure and actions taken to limit exposure to greenhouse gas emissions and disclosed targets in relation to coal, and oil and gas, and has committed to achieving net zero emissions by 2050 in its investment portfolio.

		transition stratthe progress in did not see a vote in favous shareholder filed by the NG This. As a member of Action 100+ init engaged with collaboratively individually over years and we are forward to continuengagements, on the coprogress on its plan.	or to vote company's egy and made, we need to reference of the proposal of the
Outcome of the vote	Fail	The resolution with 88.7% favour.	votes in
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		and improves of and continue to credible transition strate initiatives.	rogresses meets our voting intention. Therefore, we didn't take further action beyond our continuous engagement and dialogue with the company, as appropriate.
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		We believe this be of particula to our clien management re aimed to increase.	r interest Includes Key ESG ts. The proposal esolutions

	company's climate transition planning and	
	outcomes.	

VOTE 5			
Company name	Vinci SA	Aena	Deutsche Telekom AG
Date of vote	08/04/2021	27/04/2021	19-Mar-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.81%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Approve Allocation of Income and Dividends of EUR 2.04 per Share Approve Company's Environmental Transition Plan Approve Compensation Report of Corporate Officers Approve Compensation of Xavier Huillard, Chairman and CEO Approve Consolidated Financial Statements and Statutory Reports	Advisory Vote on Company's Climate Action Plan	Authorize Use of Financial Derivatives when Repurchasing Shares
How you voted	For	For	For (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		No we did not as we did not vote against management.	
Rationale for the voting decision		We supported the company's 2021-2023 climate action plan, as we believe that climate change-related risks may be significant for the long-term performance of Aena and should be taken into consideration.	A vote FOR this proposal is warranted.

	1	-	
		This followed our support	
		for the shareholder	
		resolution brought	
		forward in 2020	
		requesting the company	
		to submit climate	
		transition plans to	
		advisory vote at its 2021	
		AGM and provide	
		updates to its plan on an	
		annual basis from 2022.	
Outcome of the vote	Pass	The resolution passed	Pass
		with 95.7% votes in	
		favour.	
Implications of the outcome e.g. were		Management have	The outcome of the vote
there any lessons learned and what		committed to giving	meets our voting
likely future steps will you take in		shareholders an annual	intention. Therefore, we
response to the outcome?		vote on its climate	didn't take further action
response to the outcome:		transition plan, a	beyond our continuous
		significant step and Aena	engagement and
		is the first company in its	dialogue with the
		sector to do so. We will	3
			,,
		· ·	appropriate.
		credible energy	
		transition plans and	
		initiatives.	40/ 10/7-0
On which criteria have you assessed			>1% IVZ Ownership and
this vote to be "most significant"?		be of particular interest	Includes Key ESG
		to our clients. The	proposal
		management resolutions	
		aimed to increase the	
		transparency of the	
		company's climate	
		transition planning and	
		outcomes.	

VOTE 6			
Company name	Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd	Ambev	Legal & General Group Plc
Date of vote	12/04/2021	29/04/2021	10-May-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		1.07%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Approve the Amalgamation Agreement	Governance – remuneration	Authorise Issue of Equity without Pre-emptive Rights in Connection with the Issue of Contingent Convertible Securities
How you voted	Against	Against	For (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We met with and informed the company of our voting intentions prior to the AGM	NA
Rationale for the voting decision	[LN-M0307-001] This operation is not in the interest of shareholders.	The company asked to increase its annual remuneration cap by 11.2%. The company only used 64% of its cap in 2020 and 75% of its cap in 2019. Given the current cap hasn't been met and the company is proposing an 11.2% increase in that cap despite weak share price and margin performance over a number of years, we did not believe approving the increase would be warranted. We have engaged with the company on this item	A vote FOR these resolutions is warranted, although this is not without concern for shareholders:- If the Company were to issue such securities and a trigger event were to occur, causing them to convert into ordinary shares, this would result in significant dilution to non-participating shareholders.The main reasons for support are:- Such authorities are common proposals at UK banks and are intended to apply in

		and they point to the need to adjust compensation for inflation and market benchmarks. Voting for this item would seem to be perpetuating the inflationary spiral of executive compensation and we believe we need to send a message that poor performance cannot be rewarded with higher pay.	only; and- The conversion into ordinary shares would require the CET1 ratio to fall to a level which would denote significant capital weakness well beyond the Company s current position and minimum regulatory requirements.
Outcome of the vote	Pass	The resolution passed with 86.5% votes in favour.	Pass
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		We will continue to vote against remuneration policies that we deem to be inappropriate in the context of the circumstances of the company	The outcome of the vote meets our voting intention. Therefore, we didn't take further action beyond our continuous engagement and dialogue with the company, as appropriate.
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		We believe this vote will be of particular interest to our clients. The vote against management was in the context of engagement with the company and the result of extensive internal discussions	>1% IVZ Ownership and

VOTE 7			
Company name	Dow Inc	NEC	Suofeiya Home Collection Co., Ltd.
Date of vote	15/04/2021	22/06/2021	07-May-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.34%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation Amend Omnibus Stock Plan Approve Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan	Governance – vote on election of independent director	, ,,
How you voted	For	Against	For (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We met with the company's IR in advance of the AGM and communicated our concerns.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision		We voted against the election of a director due to his affiliation to a company linked by cross-shareholdings with NEC. We therefore deem him not to be independent.	
Outcome of the vote	Pass	The proposal passed with 64.7% votes in favour.	Pass

Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?	engage with the meets o company on governance intention. To issues and feedback our didn't take f	with the as
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		wnership and Key ESG

VOTE 8			
Company name	Woodside Petroleum Limited	American Express	Melrose Industries Plc
Date of vote	15/04/2021	04/05/2021	02-Jul-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.58%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Approve Capital Protection Approve Grant of Performance Rights to Peter Coleman Approve Remuneration Report Approve the Amendments to the Company's Constitution Proposed by Market Forces	Governance – vote on election of independent director	
How you voted	For, Against, For, For, Against	Vote against non-exec directors with tenure over nine years.	•
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		No we did not.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision	[SF-S0000-020] The request is either not clearly defined, too prescriptive, not in the purview of shareholders, or unduly constraining on the company [SF-S0000-009] Shareholder proposals	We voted against the re- election of several non- executive directors as, due to their tenure on the board, we no longer considered them to be independent and we believe board refreshment is essential to a well-functioning group.	resolutions is warranted as no significant concerns have been identified.

	best facilitated through regulatory changes.		
Outcome of the vote	Withdrawn, Withdrawn, Pass, Pass, Fail	Re-election proposals passed with a range of 95-99% shareholder approval for votes.	Pass
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		We will continue to vote against the re-election of non-executive directors where we have concerns about their independence.	meets our voting intention. Therefore, we didn't take further action
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		Votes against the election of directors for material holdings are significant. These arise after discussion between members of the research, portfolio management and responsible investment teams	>1% IVZ Ownership and Includes Key ESG proposal

VOTE 9				
Company name	Moody's Corporation	Ame	rican Express	Berkeley Group Holdings Plc
Date of vote	20/04/2021	04/0	5/2021	24-Aug-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.58	%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation Approve 2020 Decarbonization Plan	inclu share	eholder resolution esting annual D&I	Relating to the B Share Scheme and Share Consolidation
How you voted	For	For		For (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		No w	ve did not.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision		that comp publi asse Equi Effor Expr meal incre diver inclu diver room Dive socia wher the capit	ssing Diversity, ty, and Inclusion ts. Whilst American ess is taking ningful steps to ease its workforce sity and promote sion, reporting of its esity statistics has a for improvement resity feeds into al considerations in investing, under guise of human	resolution is warranted as no significant concerns have been

		consequently, improvement in disclosure would benefit shareholders in assessing the company's long-term value and reputational and legal risks.	
Outcome of the vote	Pass	The resolution passed with 59.7% votes in favour.	Pass
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		on shareholder resolutions that improve transparency over Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Efforts.	intention. Therefore, we didn't take further action beyond our continuous engagement and dialogue with the company, as appropriate.
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		We believe this vote will be of particular interest to our clients. The shareholder resolutions aimed to increase the transparency of the company's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Efforts.	>1% IVZ Ownership and Includes Key ESG proposal

VOTE 10			
Company name	Canadian Pacific Railway	Centene	Origin Energy Limited
Date of vote	21/04/21	27/04/2021	12-Oct-2021
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		1.24%	>1% IVZ Ownership
Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Approach Approve Share Split	Governance – vote on election of independent director	
How you voted	For	Against	Against (In Line With Management)
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		No we did not.	NA
Rationale for the voting decision		We voted against the re- election of non-executive directors - Frederick Eppinger and David Steward - whom, due to their tenure on the board, we no longer considered to be independent. We believe board refreshment is essential to a well-functioning group.	as the request to amend the company's constitution is potentially broad with no regulatory framework to oversee shareholder proposals.
Outcome of the vote	Pass	Re-election proposals passed with a 93.2% and 98.8% shareholder approval for votes respectively.	

Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?	We will continue to vote against the re-election of directors where we have concerns about their independence. We will continue to vote against the re-election of meets our intention. Ther didn't take furt beyond our or engagement dialogue word company, appropriate.	voting refore, we her action
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?	Votes against the election of directors for material holdings are significant. These arise after discussion between members of the research, portfolio management and responsible investment teams	

VOTE 11			
Company Name	Pfizer Inc.	Fuji Electric	
Date of vote	22/04/2021	25/06/2021	
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.32%	
Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation Elect Director Albert Bourla	Governance – vote on election of independent director	
How you voted	For	Against	
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		Following engagements before and after the 2020 AGM at which Ruffer voted against three	

	directors, we reiterated
	our stance ahead of the
	2021 AGM and our
	intention to vote against
	the re-election of one
	director.
Rationale for the voting decision	Fuji Electric has made
Table 1 and 1 and 3 account	significant governance
	improvements over the
	last year by setting up
	formal remuneration and
	nomination committees
	chaired by an
	independent outsider as
	well as announcing a
	formal policy to reduce
	cross-shareholdings. We
	fully support these
	changes, but explained
	we only consider two out
	of nine directors to be
	independent outsiders,
	and if including the
	statutory auditors, three
	out of 14 as truly
	independent outsiders.
	This does not align with
	the current Corporate
	Governance Code rules
	and will not meet the
	one-third minimum for
	Prime Market listed
	companies under the
	proposed Code revisions
	taking effect later this
	year ahead of the Tokyo
	Stock Exchange
	changes in April 2022.
	The company continues

		to be receptive to our feedback and is making efforts to improve its governance, but we will continue to engage on these issues.	
Outcome of the vote	Pass	The resolution passed with 89.3% votes in favour.	
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		We will continue to vote against the re-election of directors where we have concerns about their independence.	
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		Votes against the election of directors for material holdings are significant. These arise after discussion between members of the research, portfolio management and responsible investment teams	

VOTE 12			
Company name	Johnson & Johnson	Token Corp	
Date of vote	22/04/2021	29/07/2021	
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.06%	
Summary of the resolution	Adopt Policy on Bonus Banking	Governance – board structure & independence/effectiven	

	Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers' Compensation	ess. Vote on election of CEO/Chairman
How you voted	Against For	Against
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We emailed management ahead of the AGM outlining our intentions to vote against Mr Souda and our justifications for doing so.
Rationale for the voting decision	[SF-S0500-102] Executive compensation matters should be left to the board's compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through the election of directors.	"We deliberated about the merits of voting for the re-election of the CEO/Chairman who is also the Chair of the Board. Whilst we acknowledge the importance of the CEO/Chairman to the business, there are aspects of the business where it is operating more like a private company than a public one. We hold the CEO/Chairman accountable fr this. In addition, if the statutory auditors are included, there are only 2 out of 7 Board members who are independent outsiders and one of those has a tenure of 29 years and we would therefore also consider them as non-independent.

Outcome of the vote Implications of the outcome e.g. were	Fail, Pass	We therefore voted against the CEO/Chairman in order to send a strong signal that the company should be managed for the interests of all shareholders, including minorities. We intend to engage with the company on the lack of board independence, lack of nomination and remuneration committees and capital allocation."	
there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		with 71.5% votes in favour.	
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		We will continue to vote against the re-election of directors where we have concerns about their regressive influence over board composition and independence.	

VOTE 13			
Company name	Canadian Nat Railway	II-VI Incorporated	
Date of vote	27/04/2021	18/11/2021	
Approximate size of fund's/mandate's holding as at the date of the vote (as % of portfolio)		0.12%	

Summary of the resolution	Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Approach	Governance – boar structure independence/effective ess. Vote on election of CEO/Chairman.	ξ 1
How you voted	For	For	
Where you voted against management, did you communicate your intent to the company ahead of the vote?		We engaged with the company ahead of the AGM	
Rationale for the voting decision		We voted for the appointment of Vinces Mattera to the role of Chair and CEO on the basis that a vote against this appointment wou detract from our existing investment case and also raise the risk profit of the company, given the complexity of the company's operation and Dr Mattera knowledge of these, the acquisition of Coheres (the largest deal in the company's history) and the fact that succession for his replacement at CEO is underway. The Lead Independent Director conveyed the Dr Mattera knows the company better the anyone else and he has been with the company in various roles since 2004.	offeest dest dest dest dest dest dest dest

Outcome of the vote	Pass	The resolution passed with 96.0% votes in favour.	
Implications of the outcome e.g. were there any lessons learned and what likely future steps will you take in response to the outcome?		The company has followed this same transition plan for the prior two CEO/Chair roles and felt it worked well as it meant the Chair understood the business very well, which is important given the complexity of its operations.	
On which criteria have you assessed this vote to be "most significant"?		This is a rare case where we have voted in favour of a Chairman/CEO joint role, where normally we might suggest these two roles to be separate.	

Other key votes by BlackRock (in respect of the World Equity Fund) included Charter Communications Inc. AT&T Inc, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., General Electric Company, Rio Tinto Limited, Union Pacific Corporation, Chevron Corporation, Exxon Mobile Corporation, Delta Airlines Inc, the Kroger Co, AGL Energy Limited, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Origin Energy Limited and Whitehaven Coal Limited.

D. Conclusion

The Trustee has followed the Scheme's voting and engagement policies during the year by continuing to delegate to the investment managers the exercise of rights and engagement activities in relation to the Scheme's investments.