

The Yamakawa Kosan Company (A)¹

The Yamakawa Kosan Company, with its head offices located at a small local city in the northern Kyushu, operated five coal mining pits as well as one cement works about six miles from the head office. The capacity of the cement works was 55,000 tons a month. Only 950 out of the total 5,500 employees were working in the cement works, while cement sales amounted to 3.8 billion yen (about 40% of the total sales) compared to 4.4 billion yen (46%) of coal sales.

Company executives were highly satisfied with labor relations in the coal pits, but union relations in the cement works had been considered far from satisfactory ever since 1954, when a merger took place between the Yamakawa Coal Mining Company and the Kosan Cement Company.

Mr. Masakichi Yamakawa, grandfather of the president of the present company, had been one of the earliest pioneers in coal mining in Kyushu, and the Yamakawa family had been regarded as one of the three local "Zaibatsu" in Kyushu.

The Yamakawa Coal Mining Company had been engaged exclusively in coal mining until the year of the merger. The Kosan Cement Company was also started by Mr. Masakichi Yamakawa and his partner in the mid-twenties for limestone mining, and it began manufacturing cement ten years after its inception. In 1954, the capacity of the cement works was 34,000 tons a month, with three rotary kilns.

Mr. Masao Yamakawa, president of the Yamakawa Kosan Company, succeeded his grandfather as president of both companies in 1932, when he was 22 years old. His younger brother later became the "number two" man in the company, with the title of Senior Managing Director. The company was still substantially owned and run by the Yamakawa family and the preservation of family control was considered very important throughout the company.

Labor-Management Relations in the Coal Mines

"We have had very satisfactory union relations, even abnormally good ones, in spite of the fact that our coal seams are of low quality and the wage level of our employees, therefore, is not competitive with the big companies," said Mr. Taro Fujita, director of labor relations of the Yamakawa head office. "The main contributing factor is, I believe, Yamakawa's human approach to labor, which has evolved since the early period of our company's history."

¹This case was prepared by Mr. Hideo Ishida, of the Keio Business School, at Keio University in Tokyo, Japan. Case material of the Keio Business School is prepared as a basis for class discussion. Cases are not designed to illustrate either correct or incorrect handling of administrative problems.

All managers equally stressed that a paternalistic "big family concept" was the underlying ethic of Yamakawa's labor policy, and "the late president" was often referred to. He used to go down into the mines to encourage the miners. Miners who left the Yamakawa Company for the big Mitsui and Nitsubishi mines came back to work for it. They had the feeling that at Yamakawa they could not make money, but that it was a place where they felt comfortable to work.

Assuming the presidency in his early twenties, Mr. Masao Yamakawa carried out progressive labor policies prior to any other companies in the coal mining area. He was always seriously concerned with labor management, which he regarded as the essential core of management of coal mines. The president and all other executives grew up with the company and knew it from top to bottom, so that they were very familiar with the employees as individuals.

The objective of the company's employee relations was to take care of employees' life to the maximum extent. The company's expenses for welfare works amounted to over 20% of the wage equivalent and company housing was available to any employee. The labor management staff, called "off-shop service," was active in handling employees' problems with a motto, "Let us know every detail of each employee's livelihood." Before the war, all coal mining companies employed the "off-shop service" staff primarily to encourage miners to report to work. In the Yamakawa company, the staff even today was considered to have a very important role in improving employee relations and employee morale, along the lines of the paternalistic "big family concept." It counseled employees about their family problems and participated in community organizations and informal work group organizations.

Like most industrial plants in Japan at the time, a local union was organized at every pit of the Yamakawa Company immediately after the war. The locals were federated into the Yamakawa Roren (Federation of the Yamakawa Coal Miners Unions) in January, 1946. The Yamakawa Clerical Workers Union was also started in October, 1945, comprising all clerical workers in the Yamakawa pits and offices. Communists tried to organize Yamakawa, taking it for a target as the local "Zaibatsu." However, moderate Sodomei² leaders assumed leadership in organizing the Company.

Mr. Fujita, Director of Labor Relations, had been materially responsible for that function ever since the unionization stage. He described the situation as follows:

²Sodomei is a national labor federation with organization experience dating back prior to World War II.

"The company has never interfered with unionization. We thought we had to face up to post-war situations which were quite new to us with an attitude that we recognize all our people, the union members, as well as our employees. We have never failed to keep our word with the union, and they have full confidence in us. I am sure both parties have established a firm mutual trust."

All the leaders of Yamakawa Roren had been in responsible positions in the union, some for as long as ten years. Mr. Kitani, president of Yamakawa Roren expressed the union's philosophy, saying that they thought of the Yamakawa Company as a "rice field" they were willing to cooperate to increase the crops and they felt they had the right to demand their share in due course.

With the declining demand for coal, the company had been closing inefficient pits and "rationalizing" the remaining pits. In cutting down its work force, the company was unusually successful in getting "voluntary retirements" and transfers from one pit to another.

"In case of closure or shutdown, we regard permanent layoffs as inevitable and accept it," stated Mr. Kitani. "We always keep so close in touch with the company that we are able to predict what is going to happen two or three years ahead of a "rationalization program".

Yamakawa Roren was affiliated with Zentanko (All Japan Coal Miners Union), a moderate national union with a membership of 46,000, which was in rivalry with the left-wing Tanro (Coal Miners Union of Japan), which had a membership of 137,000. Zentanko, in turn, was confederated in Zenro-Sodomei, a moderate national confederation with 1,108,000 membership which was in rivalry with the left wing, Sohyo, with a membership of 3,989,000.

Wages and semi-annual bonuses were collectively bargained for between the Kyushu Regional Zentanko organization and the Kyushu Coal Mining Association. There had been very few disputes between the Yamakawa Roren and the company, and when the regional wage negotiations did lead to strikes, the Yamakawa parties were likely to be the first to reach agreement. For instance, in 1952 after the armistice of the Korean War, when the coal mining industry suffered the most prolonged strikes on record, even moderate Zentanko unions went on strike for over 60 days, but the Yamakawa parties reached an agreement after only a 12-day strike. And while most unions went on strike against lay-offs during the 1953-54 coal depression, Yamakawa successfully avoided a strike. The chronological record of labor disputes since 1954 is shown in Exhibit I.

"Both parties are willing to accommodate one step before going on strike," commented Mr. Kitani, the union president. "As the ratio of labor cost to the total coal cost is very high (about 50%), the problem of dealing with people is the crucial point in the management of coal mines," stated a labor relations executive. "The survival of this company -- despite its low quality coal and bad natural conditions -- has been first of all due to good labor relations, I believe. Throughout this company the feeling has been that we could not survive unless we work with perfect unity. Quite the contrary, in the cement industry -- a sunny spot so far and with low labor cost ratios (less than 10%) -- it seems to me that management is too easily inclined to try to solve problems with money. Our president criticizes cement management, saying that in the cement industry there is no true labor management at all, and he maintains that Yamakawa should not follow them. Since union relations have been very bad in our cement works, he has always been anxious to improve it."

Labor Relations in the Cement Works

There was no liaison office, nor were there official communications between Yamakawa Roren and the Kosan Cement Workers Union, the union at the Yamakawa's cement works. Kosan leaders regarded Roren as a "company union." Roren leaders commented that the Kosan Union was still at the primitive stage they had been before they established mutual confidence with the Yamakawa management.

The Kosan Cement Workers Union was organized in October 1945. Until 1952, it was a "mixed union," namely, a union comprising both manual and clerical workers. In that year the latter organized themselves into an independent union because of conflicts between white collar and blue collar workers within the union, in which the company supported the white collar workers.

Before the merger of the Yamakawa Coal Mining Company with the Kosan Cement Company in 1954, there had been no strike except a seven-day strike over the issue of semi-annual bonus, which took place in the year following the split in the union. After the merger, however, the company was put into a very vulnerable position with regard to strikes, starting with a five-day strike over the bonus issue at the end of the merger. (See Exhibit 2).

In the spring of 1957, the union went on strike over a wage increase which lasted 34 days. This was the second longest strike in the cement industry during the postwar period. Labor managers felt that the union was irresponsible in that it too easily resorted to strikes, refusal to work overtime, and other practices that encouraged workers to harass management. Following the practice of the left-wing coal miners' union, it was said to be actively engaged in shop activities against supervisors.

Mr. Fujita, Director of Labor Relations of the Yamakawa head office stated:

"We suffered very badly from frequent strikes for several years after the merger. We can't deny the fact that an underlying cause for the strikes was the employees' emotional feeling of distrust about the new management. In the ten years since the merger, however, the frequency of strikes has been decreasing, particularly in recent years because more employees recognize our labor policy to be fair. I regret that our progress was slow. But even now there is still an adamant left-wing faction in the union, whose belief is that a union's raison d'etre consists in encroachment on management prerogatives. I think we need to reconsider our basic labor policy in order to improve our union relations at the cement works."

Although Mr. Masao Yamakawa was president of both companies when they merged into the Yamakawa Kosan Company, the cement workers had been virtually controlled by Mr. Shojiro Yamakawa, Managing Director of the Kosan Cement Company, under whom good employee relations had been maintained in the only plant of the company.

Remembering "the good old days," an employee stated:

"In previous days, management was so good in handling people that all of us admired managing director Shojiro. Relations between the company and the employees was very close. On the first of April every year we used to get together for the ceremony welcoming new employees on the top of the hill where there is a small shrine called the "God of the Mountain." At a meeting he once surprised us by offering a wage increase more than the union's demand."

1 After the boom years following the outbreak of the Korean War, the coal industry and the cement industry formed a marked economic contrast. While coal was suffering a severe depression in 1953 and 1954, cement was enjoying a record-breaking boom, called "the boom in three white goods", which began in 1954¹ and was sustained four years. The merger of the Yamakawa and Kosan Companies took place in 1954 under such industrial circumstances.

The Kosan Union strongly opposed the merger movement, but in time it compromised by signing an "Agreement on Merger" with the Kosan Cement Company, with the following provisions:

1. The Company will not lay off nor transfer the cement workers to the coal mines due to the merger.
2. The Company will maintain the same policy as before concerning wages and term-end bonus.

3. The Company and the Union will make efforts to settle the labor agreement, now in process of negotiation, as soon as possible.
4. Negotiations between the new company and the Kosan Cement Union shall continue to be held on the site of the Kosan Cement Works.
5. Financial reports shall be disclosed to the Union.
6. The length of service of all employees shall be discontinued, a lump sum retirement pay will be paid, and all workers shall be considered as being new employees hereafter.

The contract between the new Yamakawa Kosan Company and the Kosan Cement Union had not as yet been signed. The major issue unresolved was the so-called "peace provisions". The company's position was that following the previous contract provision, "unless the parties reach agreement, the company or the union is to appeal to the Labor Committee (a government agency at three levels -- national, regional and local) for conciliation. If this is unsuccessful, the issue may be subject to arbitration by the Labor Committee upon agreement of both parties." Labor managers explained that the reason for the prolonged delay of the agreement was that contract negotiations were usually cancelled when close to agreement due to frequent changes of the union leadership. In contrast, the union wanted the right to give only 24 hours' advance notice before going out on strike. As the young union vice-president described it, "The union has only to inform the company ten minutes before walking out. The union is far better off ~~with~~ a contract."

without

Among the provisions of the "Agreement on Merger", the new company rejected only the "disclosure of financial reports." As far as manual workers were concerned, there were no transfers between the coal mines and cement works, according to the agreement. The parties flatly disagreed on interpretation of the wages and bonus provision. The union maintained that by "the same policy as before", it meant that wages and bonus should be comparable to industry standards. The company blamed the union for its "self-styled interpretation" and its disregard of the difference in the financial ability to pay among firms in the industry, which, it felt, deserved primary consideration.

The Employees at the Cement Works

The Japanese cement industry consisted of 21 companies -- 12 specialized and 9 diversified. A new specialized company was financed and established by a big coal mining company affiliated with a "Zaibatsu" and a diversified company was operating cement, coal mining and chemical business. The three biggest specialized companies held about 50% of the

total market and the top six companies' share amounted to 70%. On the other hand, 13 companies operated only one plant. Yamakawa, one of the latter, produces about 600,000 tons a year, some 2.5% of the total production.

The cement works was operated with three shifts as is usual in process industries and the dominant type of work was "watching the meters." Among the 840 workers at the plant, 290 were working on the "direct lines", 170 in the "indirect" departments (electricity, machine shop and maintenance), 180 in the quarry close to the works. There were also 90 each in raw material and shipping departments and in office, labor management and research and development departments.

As the location of a cement works is usually limited by access to the principal raw materials (limestone and coal, the latter being replaced by oil), cement works were generally in isolated locations. Yamakawa was quite exceptional in that 85% of the employees were living in company houses adjoining the works. This was explained by the fact that the works was started as a quarry, that it was located in a coal area and that after the war many of the repatriates from areas formerly ~~under~~ under Japanese domination found employment there. They were said to have amounted to 30% of the employees.

The average age of the employees was 39.6; 30% of whom had gone beyond the compulsory education level. Less than 10% were female. After the merger, the company stopped the regular annual recruitment plan in order to limit the size of the work force. Consequently, around 80% of the present employees had once served the old Kosan Cement Company.

The company had a simple job classification system which classified workers as 1st, 2nd and 3rd, on the basis of seniority. It was not linked with the wage system as such. The status of foremen was not specially compensated. But the wage system, as well as the promotion system, were almost totally based on seniority, which was the ruling principle in Japanese organizations.

In the cement industry the "status system," in which shokuin (white collar workers with some status connotation) was differentiated from the manual workers, was abolished after the war. However, the coal companies still kept it. The Yamakawa Company maintained the system in both the coal mines and the cement works. The promotion system of the company from the status of manual workers to Shokuin status did not seem to be very attractive to the workers, mainly because "promotion" was accompanied by at least a temporary wage decrease. The manual workers with a high school education and with two years or more of experience in assisting clerical workers, were permitted to take the test for promotion, but half of the qualified people avoided it. A typical employee with a diploma, having served several years as a manual worker in the cement works, and promoted to the shokuin status, received about 4,000 yen monthly wage decrease.

The company was worried about the wage balance between the shokuin and the manual workers. Among the 1,100 shokuin in this company, about 100 were working at the cement works, and 20% of them were transfers from the old Yamakawa Company. The two white collar unions of the coal mines and the cement works were independent of each other until 1957. They were then unified to gain affiliation with the Council of the Shokuin Unions of the Coal Mining Industry. There was very little differential in the average wages between the Shokuin Union and the Kosan Union.

The latter surely expected to be better paid in the near future, considering the large differentials in the amount of "base ups" (the annual average wage increase negotiated) between the two unions - 3,250 yen for the Kosan Union and 2,500 yen for the Shokuin Union in 1961, and 2,000 yen and 1,050 yen, respectively in 1960. In the spring of 1961 after wage negotiations, the company paid an additional lump sum of 5,000 yen for the shokuin at the cement works as an exceptional measure to fill the gap, but it caused complaints on the part of the shokuins out of the cement works, particularly among those transferred from the works.

While the wage level of the shokuins was substantially below the standard of the cement industry, it was near the average level of the coal mining industry. As far as the semi-annual bonus was concerned, the Yamakawa Company was among the best in coal mining industry.

Management Policies and Practices

Immediately after the merger, almost all management at the cement works was replaced by the managers from the head office (people of the old Yamakawa Company). They were called "the occupation forces" by the cement employees. The chief labor managers of the head office were sent consecutively after the merger to take over the function of labor management at the cement works, but their management turned out to be very unsatisfactory to the executives of the head office. The union considered the local labor management only as "the window of the head office" and stood guard against the labor policy of the old Yamakawa Coal Mining Company.

Unification between management from the head office and the original cement management was not very effective. Mr. Sekiguchi, the first labor manager after the merger, who had been the chief labor manager of the head office, recalled the situations at the time of the merger as follows: "A coal mining company survived only through thrifty management, you know. When we came over to the cement works, the methods of the cement management struck us as quite strange. We simply could not be patient with their sloppy management -- spending money very freely and spoiling the employees.

To the old cement managers and employees, on the other hand, management from the head office seemed to be conservative. They appeared to keep to the conventional management policy peculiar to coal mines, notwithstanding the official policy of responding to the unique conditions of the cement works.

Mr. Yoshida, the present labor manager of the cement works, who had been in this position before the merger as deputy manager to the two consecutive labor managers sent by the head office, stated: "Of course, we follow the line set by the head office, but at the same time, we can't neglect the way the cement industry goes. While in the coal mines many employees have long service in this company, some of them even with two or three generations of service, at the cement works many repatriates were employed shortly after the war. Many of these became union leaders. Since their standard of living abroad and their educational level were generally higher than the others, they were very likely to become discontented with the conditions here. As promotion opportunities were rather limited in this single cement works, the union naturally tends to concentrate on money issues. I don't think discipline is particularly lax in the workshop."

Labor management executives of the head office described the causes of the bad union relations at the cement works as follows: "Basically, the lax management of the old Kosan Company has worsened in the days of "the boom in three white goods." The union has come to believe that it can win whatever it demands. The union is unconscionably spoiled by management. No one has had the experience of the severe depressions often met coal industry. Besides, they were biased at the time of the merger. They felt that they must suffer from the merger with a sick coal company and its traditional labor management! To eliminate such a bias, we have been accepting their excessive demands, however painful it may be to us. Nevertheless, the employees over there don't seem to have accepted our goodwill and still seem to have the concept of the independent Kosan Cement Company, neglecting the reality that it is now completely under the direct control of Yamakawa. ~~We feel deeply sorry to find they still seem to have the concept of the independent Kosan Cement, neglecting the reality that it is now completely under direct control of Yamakawa. We are deeply sorry to find bad faith in them still, some ten years after the merger.~~"

Union Policies and Practices

The leaders of the Kosan Cement Union were changed almost every year in contrast to the very stable leadership of the Yamakawa Roren. Since the merger, the union had five president. In the union elections, Mr. Yoshizawa, the present union president frequently competed against Mr. Hirose, a left-wing leader. The latter was president in 1953, the year previous to the merger, and in 1956 and 1958, while the former was president in the year of the merger, 1954, 1955, 1957 and 1961. Mr. Hirose was a typical "repatriate leader." Mr. Yoshizawa was regarded by management as "the most reliable and moderate" among the leaders of the union. Both of them were members of the municipal assembly.

Cliques within the union were formed on a department basis, such as quarry, cement, and electrical, rather than along ideological lines. The union had its educational programs which were, in general, of left-wing ideological orientation, but they were not activities supported by the members. The political aspirations of the rank and file were not considered very high. However, it was said that "once the union set up an issue against the company, say for wage demands, they stuck closely together."

Union president, Yoshizawa criticized management as follows: "Cement workers are radically different from coal miners in terms of the skill required, as well as the educational background of the workers. In a cement works high school graduates are working in the shop, reading the meters. I never forget that at the time of the merger, management officially pronounced that policies and systems of labor management should be uniform, regardless of the kind of industry they belong to. They were really wrong in trying to treat cement workers in the same way as coal miners, and in trying to change the established customs here to those of coal mines. Personally, I feel the bosses, who came to this works from the head office, were good men, but we could not get along with them on an organization level. Relations with the company seems to have been improved a little bit over the years, it's true. The reason is that management has come little by little to realize the differences between cement workers and their union from those of coal miners."

A rank and file worker with a high school education described his feeling about union and management:

"I don't like the union as such. Actives in this union are only 10% or 20% of the members. There are a lot more people who feel a union can go as far as the company prospers, but they are silent within the union. I think the union leaders are doing a good job for us, but I dislike their manner, pretending to be big shots. However, I feel frustrated much more with the company. The company always tries to suppress our moderate demands, while giving rather generous bonus to the coal union, even more than the big Mitsui or Mitsubishi coal companies'. Seeing this situation, we naturally feel like fighting against the company. We used to walk out on the semi-annual bonus issues, taking it for something like a regular event!

I feel the employees' morale in this plant has badly deteriorated. Suppose we honestly work hard, we are not given any reward. There is no promise of promotion or of wage increase. Incidentally, I think the company's policy of the status differentiation between the shokuin and the manual workers is simply out of date. I hope we will be treated equally, even if it's in name only. Supervisors seem to me to be helpless. They have no prestige at all in the shop. Even the Kacho (head of department) wouldn't and can't scold his men. I wish management people were more sure of themselves and frankly willing to listen to our inner wishes and grievances."

Union-Management Relations

The wages and the two semi-annual bonuses were determined through collective bargaining held in the spring for the annual wage increase, and in early summer and toward the year-end for the term-end bonuses. Negotiators were composed of the director of labor relations and other labor managers and the local managers, and union president, vice-president, secretary and other executive board members. The negotiations took place at the cement works according to the "Agreement on Merger." The negotiators did not seem confident of the authority of their counterparts. Company representatives criticized union negotiators in that they never made a decision before the issues were sent back to the union delegates' meeting, even at a point very close to agreement. Union representatives blamed company negotiators in that it was the only company whose president or second man did not attend negotiations. They felt that in spite of the lip service that they were given carte blanche, their positions usually lacked flexibility so that they were not actually delegated full power over the issues under discussion.

On the issues besides wages and bonuses, the parties held joint consultation sessions when necessary, attended by the plant manager and other local managers and union officials. But its function was rather limited because the union did not regard local management as having any substantive power.

Union leaders boasted that their shop activities were the most active of any cement unions. They had shop committees in each department and the stewards were said to be delegated power to appeal directly to the Kacho (head of department) on such day-to-day issues as work assignment and working conditions. The company refused to recognize them to be official union organs and took them for employees' grievance channels. However, the executives of the head office felt that management rights were infringed on and discipline was undermined through the shop activities at the cement works.

Kosan Cement Workers Union was affiliated with the National Federation of Cement Workers Union (NFCWU), which was independent of both national confederations -- Sohyo and Zenro-Sodomei. NFCWU and the Cement Industry Association had central joint conferences two to four times a year, where information was exchanged on such problems as economic trends, industrial safety and the like. Negotiations over working conditions were held on an enterprise basis as is common in Japanese industry. NFCWU, however, had been trying to tighten its control over the affiliated unions. As a matter of fact, the amount of the annual wage increase and the bonuses negotiated were marked with increasing similarity. (See Exhibit 3).

Mr. Abe, president of NFCWU, stated:

"In the cement industry competition among companies is very severe and the Association doesn't seem well organized. Companies dislike central bargaining with us. They like to stick to the business family concept. Among our union members, the company-first concept remains strong, too. But we are struggling for establishment of standard working conditions in the industry by means of the standardization of labor contracts and by the establishment of industrial minimum wages. We want to classify inter-company wage rates by skill and labor intensity, in view of industry-wide collective bargaining."

In the spring of 1962, NFCWU, for the first time, raised uniform demands against companies for wages to be increased an average 5,000 yen and a minimum wage of 10,000 yen to be set for workers 18 years old. They scheduled strikes for April 24, April 28 and May 9-10.

NFCWU was affiliated with 15 enterprise unions, with one of the big three enterprise unions remaining outside, but it did not have a rival industrial union. Within the Cement Industry Association, a few people were wondering if centralized collective bargaining would be desirable, in view of the de facto standardization of wage increases and bonuses, as well as the time and energy lost in the process of independent but closely related negotiations. However, the bigger companies seem to be more reluctant to accept centralized collective bargaining.

Some labor managers of the Yamakawa Kosan Company thought that industry-wide collective bargaining would be better for the company, in that smaller unions, like the Kosan Union, seemed to take the initiative in promoting centralized bargaining. In case the leadership and control of NFCWU were strengthened, the "high hat" Kosan Union would be checked in its course by the moderate big unions, and independent local negotiations would become less emotionally entangled.

Exhibit 1

Yamakawa Kosan Company (A)

Record of Labor Disputes
Federation of Yamakawa Coal Miners Unions
(since 1954)

Year	Period	Issue	Type of Disputes
1957	7/22	term-end bonus	refusal to work overtime
1958	4/29-4/30	wage increase	48-hour strike
1959	3/31	wage increase	24-hour strike (notice was 48-hour strike, but agreement on 3/31, back to work starting with 1st shift on 4/1).
1961	4/25	wage increase	walkout of 1st shift on 4/25 (notice was for an indefinite strike period, but back to work, starting with 2nd shift on 4/25).

Source: Company Records

Exhibit 2

Yamakawa Kosan Company (A)

Record of Labor Disputes
Kosan Cement Workers Union
(since 1954)

Year	Period	Issue	Type of Disputes
1954	12/11-12/15	term-end bonus	120-hour strike
1956	1/27 2/1-2/25	discharge of an injured worker	24-hour strike refusal of any type of overtime work (including off-day work and off-hour calling)
1957	4/4- 4/9 4/19-4/20 4/22-4/24 4/25-5/22	wage increase	refusal of off-day and overtime work for an indefinite period, starting with 1st shift. 1-hour walkout after lunch of 1st and 2nd shift 24-hour strike, starting with 2nd shift 48-hour strike 72-hour strike overall strike for an indefinite period -(28 days)
1958	2/15-2/21	term-end bonus	refusal to work overtime for an indefinite period
1959	7/10-7/18 7/13-7/18 7/15	term-end bonus	refusal of off-hour work for an indefinite period refusal to work overtime for an indefinite period 24-hour strike
1960	12/8 12/9	term-end bonus	24-hour strike for office workers refusal to work overtime for an indefinite period
1961	4/14-4/15 4/26-5/5 4/28-5/5 4/28	wage increase	every shift 30 minutes walkout, starting with 2nd shift on 4/14 and ending with 1st shift on 4/15. refusal to work overtime for an indefinite period refusal of off-day work for an indefinite period 24-hour strike.

Source: Company Records

Exhibit 3

Yamakawa Kosan Company (A).

Wages and Term-End Bonuses in the Cement Companies

Name of Company	Average Annual Wage Increase Negotiated		Average Term-End Bonus Negotiated		Cement Workers (Excluding Clerical, Technical and Quarry Workers)		
	1960	1961	1960 1st Term	1960 2nd Term	Number of Workers	Average Age	Average Monthly Wage, as of March 1962
Honda	1,930	3,600	58,000	57,500	2,691	37.8	36,028
Ogawa	2,133	3,504	64,000	64,000	2,501	31.6	32,802
Osaka	1,930	3,573	55,500	55,500	989	36.9	35,557
Yamaguchi	1,650	3,300	53,500	56,000	658	34.6	29,750
Nikko	2,000	3,500	56,500	57,400	380	36.7	37,996
Tochigi	2,100	3,500	60,280	56,580	860	34.0	29,017
Ishikawa	2,311	3,159	57,700	57,700	276	34.8	34,321
Taisei	2,500	3,500	54,789	55,652	218	39.1	36,732
Koyo	2,100	2,950	58,900	59,600	1,315	38.5	32,653
Soda	2,248	2,903	56,300	57,500	1,186	-	33,076
Nissan	2,000	4,500	54,000	54,003	446	40.8	33,871
Tateno	2,440	3,600	54,855	54,855	330	36.7	33,667
Yamakawa	2,000	3,250	53,700	54,200	453	37.1	33,544
Yamakawa Clerical	1,000	2,484	85,000	89,900	1,127	38.3	35,089
Yamakawa Coal Mines	18 yen a shift	60 yen a shift	28,046	30,822	3,523	36.7	25,264

Source: Company Records

(Money Unit: Yen)

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