


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Wargame Design

What is Abstraction: A Look into the Deep Structure of TLNB



Wargame Design Vol. IV Nr. 3
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NEXT GAME:

NAPOLEON RETREATS, 1814

Publication Date: 14 February 2019



John von Neumann

On the cover:
Wassily Kandinsky, *Upward*, 1929

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John von Neumann

Most historians give the credit for developing and popularizing game theory to John von Neumann, who published his first paper on game theory in 1928.

For von Neumann, the inspiration for game theory was poker. Von Neumann realized that poker was not guided by probability theory alone, as an unfortunate player who would use only probability theory would find out. Von Neumann wanted to formalize the idea of "bluffing," to deceive the other players and hide information from them. In his 1928 article, "Theory of Parlor Games," von Neumann first approached the discussion of game theory, and proved the famous Minimax theorem. From the outset, von Neumann knew that game theory would prove invaluable to economists. He teamed up with Oskar Morgenstern, an Austrian economist at Princeton, to develop his theory. Their book, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, revolutionized the field of economics. Although the work itself was intended solely for economists, its applications to psychology, sociology, politics, warfare, recreational games, and many other fields soon became apparent.

Although von Neumann appreciated Game Theory's applications to economics, he was most interested in applying his methods to politics and warfare, perhaps stemming from his favorite childhood game, *Kriegspiel*, a chess-like military (see p. 24)

Shock Combat

Kevin Zucker

Every once in a while an insight comes along that makes these games come alive. It's as if everything becomes clear suddenly. That flash of understanding makes a thing as small and arcane as an Ar result into something profound.*

—Christopher Moeller

What makes Shock different from a straight firefight?

In order to have any effect at all, infantry had to be firing at the same target, battalions at a time, in synch. The muskets were so inaccurate, that to really do any damage you needed a large target and many people firing at it. For old-style warfare it was an absolute necessity for an infantryman to be a cog in a machine. The purpose of regimental bands was to allow troops to step together, in synch, because one man out of place can cause the whole clockworks to jam. Infantry had to know the music and the “dance” for changing from line to square, for example—see Article 11 (next page). Other geometries are possible, especially when the terrain doesn't support nice straight rows and columns. When a unit has to fight in restricted terrain, the normal evolutions of column/line/square cannot be performed. A shock combat is more likely to take place when a unit is in a flexible deployment that takes advantage of terrain. Of the many different geometries available, they may be grouped under three headings:

- 1) One side defending (hilltop, etc.)
- 2) Both sides in motion—surprise meeting
- 3) House to House combat

Except for their (new) jägers, themselves not yet expert, the whole issue of skirmishers was a paradigm shift that required old Prussian nobility to shake some of their hidebound traditions.

If a unit loses its formation, it loses its effectiveness; in TLNB this unit is called "eliminated." The unit has no capability to move and act as one, so at that moment it disappears from

play. The men are still there, still armed, and can be reorganized. But the "unit" has gone to the dead pile, for now.

Shock Combat, like the new skirmisher-style warfare, gives the individual soldier more initiative. You have a unit broken up into independent companies and given special roles, such as the defence of a particular terrain feature.

All of this was new terrain for the Prussian Army in 1806. Their newly-raised Schützen and Jäger alone operated as skirmishers. These were backwoodsmen and border guards who adapted to the terrain; "hunters" with more accurate weapons, broken in small groups spread out over a large area, and taking advantage of their ability to hide themselves in a landscape and harassed troops. The regular Prussian infantry, on the other hand, had difficulty adapting to broken terrain, requiring clear ground and a defined front. "The fatal method of that epoch was to halt ... within the zone of the enemy's effective fire, forming line in order to act by the regulation fire of masses. Harassed by a galling fire from the swarms of skirmishers ... and unable to return it, the Prussian infantry was already shaken and demoralized," even if few casualties were caused. When volley firing finally began it had little effect on the French, hiding in gardens and fields or behind village walls.

For the Prussians of 1806, and the Spanish in 1808/09 (who were influenced by the Prussians) a unit could only continue to move and fight as one when in slope, crest and clear terrain; any other terrain is difficult for them.

What is Shock Combat?

Shock is a short-range, much more lethal firefight, and/or a bayonet fight. It may be sudden and a surprise to both sides. Shock Combat relies less on firepower and more on physical force: axes and bayonets can be used at close quarters where muskets take time to load. These fights

are usually over within 5 to 10 minutes, with one side breaking or surrendering. An exceptionally long Shock Combat can be very bloody.

Your whole stack is not engaged, only your best unit, which is in the lead and the first unit to fight. The lead unit is the one to take any losses as it is carrying the brunt of the fight.¹

The prototypical Shock Combat is probably at a bridge.² At bridges and other narrow passages units are vulnerable. The officers can easily lose crowd control if there is any accident, with groups separated at each end and temporary loss of formation in the crowding.

Closed Terrain

Shock only takes place where units have no LOS—Marshes, Woods, Crests and Towns, and during Storms. Shock occurs *because* there is no LOS between the combatants in the first place.

When a shock combat comes up during play, what we see is one unit defending a town, and one unit standing outside the town, attacking. However, that can be misleading. Enemies are somewhat intermixed, with both sides in partial control of the town, making local attacks and counterattacks upon enemies that cannot be seen.

“Russian infantry defended villages in this way: Jagers in skirmish order occupied the outer buildings and gardens. Inside the village in the streets stood individual companies, if necessary supporting the most threatened parts of the skirmish line. Behind the village stood the reserve; one or several battalions formed in columns. Church and cemetery were defended by grenadiers.”³

“In general, Jäger were trained to fight in cover while the [regular line] regiments considered this beneath them. So while musketeer and even grenadier regiments could skirmish, according to Glinka, they ‘were not trained to take

cover behind local obstacles; they even considered it shameful ... as a result they took very heavy casualties.’ But it is observed that they

Article 11. Signals.

Movement.	Horns.	Drums.
Déploiement [Deploy]	<i>Déploiment</i>	<i>La Breloque</i>
Raliement [Rally]	<i>Ralliement</i>	<i>Aux Drapeaux</i>
Retraite [Retreat]	<i>Retraite</i>	<i>Retraite</i>
Marcher à droite [March to the right]	<i>Marche à droite</i>	<i>La Grenadière</i>
Marche à gauche [March to the left]	<i>Marche à gauche</i>	Three beats [<i>coups</i>] of <i>La Charge</i>
La Charge [charge]	<i>La Charge</i>	<i>La Charge</i>
Marche lente [Slow march]	<i>Pas ordinaire</i>	<i>Pas ordinaire</i>
Marche précipitée [Quick march]	<i>Marche précipitée</i>	<i>La Charge</i> with roll of drums [<i>roulement</i>]
S'arrêter [Halt]	<i>La Messe</i>	<i>La Messe</i>

‘were able to keep enemy skirmishers at bay,’ though with disproportionate casualties.⁴

“There was always suspicion that if dispersed in an open formation away from their officers' canes, the untrustworthy serf would simply desert. Barring that, the serf had no experience in initiative or decision making on his own... The Cavalry Maiden, Nadezhda Durova, was an eyewitness to this in 1812 and noted the frustration of Russian officers during training who had to continually give commands to their Jäger on what function to perform next, as they seemed not to understand how to do so individually.”⁵

¹ Rating the young new recruits in 1814 difficult—you need them low for their Combat Strength (700/SP) but still a “3” for Initiative.

² The bridge rules (7.63) handle the special problem of capturing a bridge with a straight Initiative roll and automatic 1R for both instead of using the Shock procedure.

³ TMP <http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=170375>

⁴ Zhmodikov, I, 44

⁵ Bill Gray, writing on TMP

“Austrian Chief of Staff Graf Radetzky in 1813 stated that, ‘skirmishing should only be done in a very restricted fashion because neither we nor the Russians have mastered this type of fighting.’”⁶

Shock is any combat other than the flat and level line/column/square fight, where battalions are not lined up in rows and columns. The occurrence of Shock Combat is very random; worse troops may get the upper hand, if they are alert, intelligent and responsive. Sometimes, as in an ambush, Shock Combat can be planned, but such plans often go wrong.

Some troops excelled at this kind of helter-skelter warfare; others could not function well. Any troops might be involved in a Shock Combat, depending upon circumstances. Prussian and Russian jäger excelled at Shock, as did the French infantry generally, and Austrian Grenzer, marksmen raised from backwoods provinces. Inexperienced troops without élan and the Prussian line infantry pre-1807 would not be placed in a town.

Aaron: I thought that troops like Grenzers and jägers were better at skirmishing, but never considered that they would be effective in “shock” combat. I pictured that more as grenadiers going in with the bayonet and sappeurs chopping down gates. An explanation of exactly what shock represents in the game helps my understanding of what is occurring.

That leads me to my second revelation. I thought that the Ar should be replaced by the Dr* since the defender should almost always be at an advantage in situations where shock applies. But when fighting in a town, both sides may take advantage of the cover afforded by buildings and the sharp sudden nature of combat at close quarters. I had stuck in my mind again a picture of the stout defenders of Hougomont holding the walls against all comers. Of course, there are times when “good” terrain will hinder the defender. To some extent it is covered by the fact that your artillery and/or cavalry are less effective in certain terrain. When infantry is holding a defile or stuck in terrain like woods where they*

can’t deploy into line, then even if they outnumber the attacker they may not be able to bring their superior numbers to bear.

Reconsidering the "Ar*" Result

The Ar* makes low-initiative troops easy to kick out of a town, for example. But we concur that a low initiative rating indicates that a unit is not very good at "cohering" and performing unsupervised tasks invisible to their officers. All writers agree that it was just in this ability that the French troops generally excelled.

A unit’s Initiative Rating is a combination of leadership—plentiful officers, good CO—and troop quality: training and doctrine, morale, well-supplied, confident and intelligent troops. Initiative means more than “élan;” but you can see how troops with a lot of élan and little training could still fight well in a town or in woods, even if they were not very good in regular combat; whereas low élan/poorly trained troops might congregate in the wine cellars and get completely drunk.

Bringing Back the Ar*

(See Table below). We are in the midst of testing a new Combat Results Table, which suppresses the Ar* and adds a Dr* result in each column instead. We all agreed on the reason for making this change, but we want to make sure it doesn’t change the balance of attacker vs. defender. We have roughly estimated that the defender will be helped in 5.5% of combats when the Ar* results are suppressed and Dr* added. At 1:1 odds, the Attacker had the edge, now the defender has it.

In order to re-balance the 1:1, the Table below has added back an Ar* result at 1:1. This Ar* gives the Attacker “a second bite at the apple” and a good chance of prevailing if he has the better lead unit—that is, troops who already know how to do House to House combat and instinctively know how to seize the initiative even when they cannot see the enemy or each other.⁷

⁶ Bill Gray, writing on TMP

⁷ 17th Light firefight in the fog with von Zweiffel’s Saxon troops at Jena (SS Nr 5, p. 40).

COMBAT RESULTS TABLE (CRT)

Die Roll	Probability Ratio (Odds) Attacker:Defender												Die Roll
	1:5 ⁺	1:4	1:3	1:2	1:1.5	1:1	1.5:1	2:1	3:1	4:1	5:1	6 ⁺ :1	
1	Ar	Ar	Dr ^{c)}	Dr	Dr	Dr2	Dr2	Dr2	Dr3	De	De	De	1
2	Ar2	Ar	Ar	Dr* ^{b)}	Dr* ^{b)}	Dr	Dr	Dr2	Dr2	Dr4	De	De	2
3	Ae	Ar2	Ar	Sk	Ar	Dr* ^{b)}	Dr	Dr	Dr2	Dr3	Dr3	De	3
4	Ae	Ar3	Ar2	Ar	Sk	Sk	Dr* ^{b)}	Dr* ^{b)}	Dr	Dr2	Dr2	Dr2	4
5	Ae	Ae	Ar3	Ar2	Ar	Ar* ^{d)}	Sk	Sk	Dr ^{c)}	Dr	Ex	Ex	5
6	Ae	Ae	Ae	Ar3	Ar2	Ar2	Ar	Ar ^{e)}	Sk	Ex	Ex	Ex	6

Attacks at greater than 6:1 are treated as 6:1; Attacks at worse than 1:5 are treated as 1:5. "Ar*" may be Shock (Sk). If you obtain a Shock Result, proceed to compare the Initiative Ratings of the best units on either side on the Shock Combat Table and apply the Combat Result.

NOTES:

- a) The CRT above is the same as the Test Table with changes noted.
- b) In the Test Table Ar* results have been removed, and Dr* added in each column.
- c) From the Test Table remove the * at 1:3 and 3:1
- d) At 1:1, add Ar*

WHEN STAFF OFFICERS GOT TRAFFIC DUTY

When the Leader and his staff officers become the traffic cops, unit integrity means you don't have traffic jams. Uxbridge or Picton and Cooke ARE the divisional integrity.

For all divisions which do not have an on-map leader, that is what the so-called "Divisional Integrity rule" is for.

Stacking is a way of showing divisional control. There isn't really any stacking going on.

What is going on is that stacked troops are within arms-reach of that divisional general.

(Rather than give out dozens of Divisional general officers with a command range of 1 or 2),

Stacking is a way of showing that those units are within reach to be pulled in as needed, on

the standing reserve principle. That is, the reserves are standing "Behind" (not on top of)

the front line units and can feed in regiments as others become exhausted. Their mere presence

also gives confidence to the firing line. Ultimately, the entire stack may get pulled in.

The deployment area for a large stack could extend into adjacent hexes.

The normal stack limit of two brigades is because well-trained troops could maneuver at brigade level, which means the men know how to march with each other in their faces. Drilling for some time the brigade generals figured out how to coordinate their movements, first among their own regiments and then when in the presence of others.

When an officer is present, all that changes...

Control Freaks in Wargaming



Photo: Fritz Feddeck

Every once in a while you meet someone, could be a gamer, someone at work, who is a little too invested in winning. It's the same competitive spirit that causes a driver to put lives in danger on the road for the gain of a measly car length.

This is a guy we'll call "Spike," the ultra-competitor. He needs to win at whatever cost, and always has to be better than YOU. He is a smart guy, but he is incessantly working the angles. Winning inflates his ego. If he doesn't win, he blames the designer. His motto is, "whoever dies with the most toys wins."

For this guy, wargaming is about ONE thing: "who is best." It's not about the forces of history, tactics, strategy, or military theory.

He doesn't like the large role played by "*Her Sacred Majesty, Chance*," in wargames. That goes entirely against his views. He wants a guaranteed kill with machine-like precision. "Perfect plans" are his holy grail. He is willing to devote considerable time and thought to mastering the system. He will spend three hours optimizing a single turn to obtain the most 3:1 attacks.

Do you know the type? I guess I can say, a lot of them do end up as designers.

Jay Nelson and I were at Origins 79, and we were roundly assured that our games were not about history, by a teen-age whipper snapper with red hair. Leipzig had just come out and he wasn't impressed by our maps or our leader displays. We both just looked at him, dumbfounded. There was another gamer walking about the campus pathways that year, a comely lass, who assumed she knew what ZOCs are really all about.

Games as a sublimation of the sex drive?

The most basic human drives are for survival: hunger and sex. There is a predatory personality, that is a throwback to hunter-gatherer times very dominant in our times. For example, Nestle's CEO, Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, stealing millions of gallons of drought-stricken California's water supply, and selling it for pure profit, while denying any human being's innate right to water. These individuals like to work their way into positions of power, because they are more dedicated, scarier, and willing to do whatever it takes to get there. It is a personality in which morality never took strong enough root. I suppose the world is full of such folks, so I guess the wargaming fraternity has its share.

A charming individual, intelligent, he knows something about winning, but nothing about losing. He might even be willing to cheat—or very loosely interpret the Forced March rules!

Being a control freak is a very hard life.

One control freak I met in wargaming was a person who inspired me a lot, whom I admired and loved. That is, of course, my old boss Redmond Simonsen. He liked having the best camera, best gadgets, and being the best at what he did. He worked incredibly hard, often sleeping on the "captain's bed" in a corner of his office instead of going home. You'd be coming to work early and Redmond would be walking down the bright yellow hallway in his maroon bathrobe with toothbrush in hand.

I have often told the story of sitting across the map of *Quatre-Bras* from Redmond in his office at SPI.

It was a tense game. I was playing the Anglo-Allies. There is no room for a single error if you play Wellington. Simonsen could not roll right. He got up and went into the shipping dept., and came back with a box of 2,000 dice. He sat down and continued rolling 6 after 6, tossing each die in succession out the office door, finally shouting in fury, "Oh, come on!" That kind of demand against the hand of fate almost guarantees its own frustration, a sort of instant Karmic-payback loop courtesy of the Goddess Nemesis. I was smiling because I knew that those small SPI dice roll more than their share of 6's. But I said nothing. Luckily that flashing anger passed by very quickly. He'd be perfectly relaxed and genuine again in a few minutes. The game was instantly forgotten.

Discussion

with Christopher Moeller, Andreas Gebhardt,
Chuck Silverstein, Eugene Rodek, Kevin Zucker

The desire for control is at the heart of all of our suffering. When we can control things it gives us the illusion that we can keep ourselves secure and comfortable. There are an infinite number of ways we try to exert control over our environment.

Chris

I learned to separate who I "really" might be from whatever "Kevin Zucker the designer" means to different people. That is about them, not about me. I learned to allow people to project upon me whatever their unconscious had in store, like a walking movie screen. When I led my first tours in Europe, in my early 40's, the European fans of NLB remarked that I had shattered their image of a grizzled old wise man. If you try to fulfill people's expectations, that is at best a gray and dull mediocre existence. If you follow your own guiding star, some people will love you, some will hate you (and the rest won't care)!

Are You Good at Taking Criticism

The Germans I think have the right idea. When something is wrong, they say so. This gives time for the right people to respond and take necessary action. I was just imagining the scene at Blücher's headquarters on the Kreckwitz heights. He was determined to stand his ground; having been stung by a remark made by Wittgenstein. Do you suppose Gneisenau was standing there biting his lip, or did he forthrightly say what duty required? Our world is in flames, alarm bells are going off everywhere, and we are standing there, dumbstruck...

Kevin

To throw in my last penny to the ideas being spread out and discussed thereafter:

The Germans are blamed for being very unpolite or even rude in speaking out what (some would say) „have to be said“...

Perhaps it all depends on the subject, the right time and the necessity to avoid emergency accidents (by all means) for being direct and clear in focusing the topic of communication ...
Andy

A perfect example is Germany's leadership on renewable energy, reduction of fossil fuels and greenhouse gasses, leadership against GMOs. (However, Bayer/Monsanto's glyphosphate is a huge and jarring exception.)

Right now we are witnessing colossal structural failures in every sector of the economy because of the tyrannical force of 5-year plans, leaving CEOs without levers to save the planet, even if personally they are not in denial about the consequences of their products. We cannot blame the uneducated masses, we have to blame the elites, the 0.1% who control everything. They have a choice whether to make money through building up or through destruction. They have chosen to destroy.

In the military, in govt., in business, a well-functioning system requires a feedback loop from the ground-level workers to the top boss. Gneisenau's forthrightness in 1813 is an example of this. (He was, of course, hated by everyone.)

Three things can go wrong:

1. The staff can be comprised of sycophants and hangers-on like at 1813's Russian HQ, telling the Tsar how smart he was, regardless of their own opinion - if any.
2. The senior staff may be too afraid of telling a tyrant like Hitler the truth about their real assessment of the war.
3. Faithful servants of a semi-tyrant like Napoleon do not fear to tell the truth, their warnings are dismissed out of hand. He believes what he chooses to believe.

All three kinds of broken feedback loops are in evidence in our society today.

Just to wrap things up, Spike, who has to win at all costs, likes a game he can rig. He fiddles with the rules and regs so that he always wins ... just

like Koch ... or Napoleon. Napoleon cheated, obviously and outrageously, at cards (he played “Whist”).¹ He also cheated at war. He broke all the rules.

Kevin

This discussion makes me think of the personality profiles Wizards of the Coast created for magic players, based on what they want out of their game experience: “Timmy, Johnny, Spike and Vorthos.”

Timmy loves to build decks with giant monsters, or cards that do massive amounts of damage. He's attracted to ultra-powerful cards.

Johnny is a tinkerer. He likes to build decks with cards that nobody else would think of using. He likes to solve puzzles. He wants his decks to be creative and unique.

Spike wants to win. He's interested in what will help him win consistently. He'll dig into the math, statistics, etc... to that end. He wants to “break” the game to give himself a competitive advantage.

Vorthos, is the gamer who's interested primarily in the art, lore, roleplaying element of the game. Less interested in winning, more interested in flavor and immersiveness.

Using those four profiles, Wizards tries to make sure that there's something in Magic for all four profiles. I like the non-judgmental way they approach their players: none of the profiles is bad, they just respond to different things.

Let's look at how these profiles might apply to the Library games:

Timmy loves the big Imperial Guard units. He loves Napoleon's 3 command rating. He loves Davout's III Corps in 1806. There's plenty in the library for him to enjoy.

Johnny loves vedettes. He loves weird battles that are outside the norm... Pultusk/Golymin. The Spanish battles.

Spike is the person that Kevin's referring to: the guy who likes to win. That doesn't mean he'll cheat, but if there's someone who DOES cheat, he'll be a Spike (hidden forces might be too great a temptation for his competitive

nature). He wants the rules to be consistent and not change, so that he can figure out how to win consistently. He's less interested in the roleplaying and historical elements. The pieces could be blue and red for all he cares.

Vorthos loves the history. He will argue if he doesn't think the unit and commander ratings are accurate, or if the game doesn't reflect history as he sees it. He wants the story of the games to be strong, and the components to be beautiful.

I attended a workshop by an art marketing guy who said (I paraphrase): “You need to figure out not only what customers you're actively courting, but also those you are actively repelling. If you are trying to appeal to everyone, your work will be weak. It won't be about anything real.” The Library games aren't designed for Spike, because Kevin, you aren't one. You don't care about what they care about, and because you're a one-man shop, what you care about is what players are going to get. That's a lovely thing for players who are like you, but you're not going to get Spikes as customers.

Chris

Wow Chris, this one brings it right on the spot! I even recognized myself in parts in one of your characters. We should have met this May ...

Andy

Hi Chris,

I have a similar model of the OSG audience, only it has 8 segments:

The Napoleonic History Buff (Vorthos)

The uniform fanatic

History and Strategy buffs

The competitor (Spike)

The collector

People who like maps and graphics

Game design aficionados

The Kevin Zucker fan

When I design a game, I am very careful not to offer any low-hanging fruit for Spike to nibble on.

husband and his daughter (the wife of Jérôme), the King stopped Napoleon, who was taking up a trick that did not belong to him, saying, “Sire, on ne joue pas ici en conquérant.” (*Diaries of a Lady of Quality*, 2d Ed. p. 128)

¹ Napoleon used to play Whist at Württemberg, but not for money, and he played ill and inattentively. One evening, when the Queen Dowager was playing against him with her

I am going to frustrate his urge to power (for his own moral salvation of course).

Kevin

Of all the above, I would check off 6 of these
8. Missing from this list IMHO is:

The History Buff/competitor (Vorthos with a splash of Spike).

I want to win when I play and will use (not abuse) the rules to do so. I believe one can do that and still be immersed in the history and enjoyably of the game and fellow gamers.

Gene

I still haven't made peace with dark brown Russian and grey Prussian counters
Chuck

I disregarded the uniform colors. You cannot beat Clash of Arms at that game. Each counter is so gorgeous, just to admire. The French Player has green, red, blue and even yellow cavalry. You have at Jena, both infantries wearing blue. That just doesn't cut it.

Anyway, I chose, for the Russians, a symbolic color—Mud, the earth, standing for the vast expanses of the steppes. Besides, everyone's uniforms were this color most of the time.

For the French, sky blue, for the aspiration up and away from earth.

For the Prussians, feldgrau, iron, swords, a knight in armor.

For the Austrians, leather. Horsehide

For the Rheinbund, black forest colors.

So I chose a color that symbolized something about that army, and also chose the colors that you would see on the battlefield. Earth, sky and metal. Smoke and Fire.

For the Poles, crimson.

The Portugese, the color of mulled wine.

For the Spanish and Saxons, we used their actual uniform color, white.

We also chose colors that look well together on the map, and at the same time, do not blend in to the terrain colors. If you always have to use the uniform colors, then you don't have those choices. Watching the Pittsburgh Players

yesterday, I was reflecting on how nice those counters look on the map. The counter design must be a part of what makes the games "heuristic," handleable. You never spend time fiddling for the unit you want. With the Corps stripe at the top, really makes you take in at a glance your corps sectors.

It might even be that without those advantages, we might not have gotten this far. In my HO the counters are well designed and a plus for playability.

Here are a couple of random screenshots from yesterday's video. In the first one, note how clearly the corps stand out. In the second one, note how easily the front line shows out. This may seem like braggin' but I am looking as a designer, whether the design choices have worked. I am biased, but I cannot find anything to complain of for a design that uses every crust of space.

Some have tried to criticise the use of NATO symbols. Remember, Redmond insisted on using silhouettes for some Nappy games. Not a bright idea but that is the way Spike thinks.



Hierarchy of info:

1. Nationality
2. Corps
3. Strength
4. Movement
5. Other



At long range, all you see is the clear demarcation between the two sides. If there is one thing open to criticism, it is the Division i.d. This one item is a little more important than it gets credit for. It's kind of hidden in there. I'm just taking 5 points off of our *perfect score* for that.

Letters

From: Mark Edwards
Re: Dave Collins

In your wonderful remembrance of Dave Collins, you got at least one detail wrong: I never played *NLB*. I played the Civil War stuff, and didn't really understand Napoleonic Tactics until much later. Just read *Killer Angels* and the reference to Line and Square hit me...

Dave appreciated the work he did with you on Napoleonic history and research. He also found it frustrating some times.

Dave's oldest sister Donna took over Dave's death arrangements here in NY. I met many *Blue Jacket* people there; they turned out in force. Dave had an impact with those actors, and with the Indians in Ohio. This weekend, at the powwow in Dayton they will dance a dance in honor of Dave on June 23rd.

All the *Blue Jacket* people, immediately confirmed my experiences with Dave. Great cook but he *will* destroy your kitchen

Back in 1997, Dave decided he was going to Cambodia, and I said "Don't do that." And he said "I am." So then one morning, we rode the downtown No.2 train from 72nd to 42nd. And I begged him not to do it. There wasn't anyone over 35 left in Cambodia at that time.

Everyone around us started following the conversation. Later on, he lost his wallet and his return ticket. And I paid ~\$999.00 to get him a one way ticket back home. Since then he had the nickname '.9 G.'

Professional Couch surfer

I always told Dave he could stay for 2 weeks. When it became 2 months it was a problem: *NYT* piles around the house. Kitchen a mess. Every pot used. Bathroom worse. But we played many games, hung until late, and had a good time. Dave, for lack of a better word, was a schnorrer ... and he was a layabout, a raconteur and a *bon vivant!*

The Editor replies:

I forgot to include perhaps the most iconic "typically Dave" story. When I started out with OSG in 1978 I imagined that the company could become a "life raft" for SPI employees, for SPI would surely go under. Unfortunately, OSG went under first!



Sure enough, in the summer of '79, the entire R&D staff of SPI walked out in a group led by *Battle over Britain* designer John Butterfield. They only had to walk west on 23rd Street, then 8 blocks up Broadway.

There must have been a strategy session as they stopped briefly in Madison Square park to talk it over, because at the meeting Butterfield did almost all the talking. He was clearly the leader and one of the best designers among them. I was happy to welcome them on board, but they wanted a controlling interest in the company, in exchange for bringing all the productive capacity of such an illustrious pool of talent.

I was sitting at my 1940's heavy wooden desk with the drawers on both sides and a typewriter in the middle — desktop strewn with every kind of paper. The R&D staffers were sitting in chairs drawn up on the other side of the desk. We had an open plan loft space so everybody was sort of included in everything. That was just the way we did things at OSG.

I listened to all that the group proposed, including all the guarantees that would prevent a repeat of their SPI experience. Fearing that I might actually give away the store, Dave comes up and quietly slithered inside the desk where my feet are. From which he loudly announces: "Don't do it, Kev."

The meeting ended abruptly and promised follow-up talks never materialized.

I suppose Butterfield and the crew were able to go back to Jim Dunnigan and plausibly say, "Jim, we're going to take your entire R&D Dept. to OSG unless we get X, Y, and Z." If he didn't say, "I don't give a rat's ass," I'm glad I was able to help!

What is Abstraction?

Kevin Zucker and Dave Demko

You cannot really “simulate” something as messy as Napoleonic Warfare. There is too much chaos for us to produce anything like a blow by blow, exact replay. However, the very chaos provides us with a solution. It’s as though the lights went out at the first shot, and when they come back on, the wounded are lying around, men are running here and there, the firing dies out and one side or the other has prevailed. What exactly happened, we cannot simulate; but we can distribute the results to follow historical trend lines.

Warfare is a Human activity, not merely automatons driven by a Megalomaniac. That means you can set events in motion, but who really has control once you let the genie loose?

There is a basic philosophical disagreement within the wargaming fraternity when it comes to the laws of cause and effect vs chance.

Chaos Theory vs Newtonian Determinism

These two viewpoints can be characterized as the Morale vs. Hardware approaches: The butterfly effect vs the mechanistic clockwork.

Game designs fall into these two main camps: No. 1. Concretizing; literal representations of hardware with lots of gears whirring; or,

No. 2. Abstraction, a higher-level ordering of information. What distinguishes this level is clarity of vision. But this vision is lost when you get into the high weeds and start poring over the data.

“Concreteness is the enemy of clarity and focus.”
—Chris Moeller

An abstraction is a representation that omits the unessential. How much is omitted determines the “level of abstraction.” All thought deals in abstractions because full representations of reality are physically impossible for the brain to handle. The right abstraction is also much faster. The better one’s abstractions, the more efficient one’s work becomes. ¹

Rather than a catalog of specific effects, an abstraction gives you a range of possible outcomes. Abstraction allows us to compress a large amount of data into a small space.



Technically, everything in a game is abstraction. A wargame designer has no choice but to include abstractions. Abstractions are what make a game playable at all. Some designs are heavier on the concretizing and some are not concretized at all. A game by Reiner Knizia is 100% abstraction.

The original abstraction that enabled wargaming to exist in the first place was the first AH CRT based on 3:1 odds as a threshold of change. (The hexgrid that came along at the same time was another defining abstraction.)


COMBAT RESULTS TABLE												
ODDS	1-6	1-5	1-4	1-3	1-2	1-1	2-1	3-1	4-1	5-1	6-1	ODDS
1	A elim	A elim	A back 2	A back 2	D back 2	D elim	D elim	D elim	D elim	D elim	D elim	1
2	A elim	A elim	A elim	A back 2	Exchange	Exchange	Exchange	Exchange	Exchange	D back 2	D back 2	2
3	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	D back 2	D back 2	D back 2	D elim	D elim	D elim	3
4	A elim	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	A back 2	D back 2	D back 2	D back 2	D back 2	D elim	4
5	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	Exchange	Exchange	D back 2	D back 2	D elim	5
6	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	A elim	D elim	D elim	D elim	D elim	6

Odds greater than 6 to 1 or 1 to 6 mean automatic elimination.

In the first AH wargames, the Combat Table was the *only* table you needed to consult. Quickly Jim Dunnigan came along with *Jutland*, complete with check-boxes for each increment of damage to hull, midships armor, and battery firepower. Naval warfare has been the realm of concretizing ever since. Lou Zocchi’s *Battle of*

¹ <http://www.thwink.org/sustain/glossary/Abstraction.htm>

Britain game gave out a certain number of Hawker Hurricanes each week, according to official production records.



Jack Greene, designer of ship-to-ship games such as *Destroyer Captain*, found the focus on hardware alone could not produce historical results, and brought the element of chance back in via a Random Events Table with 99 mishaps that could occur, bringing the process full-circle. All that armor amidships

cannot stop a random hit in the smokestack. Her Sacred Majesty Chance cannot be done away with entirely, it seems.

Dunnigan's first work in the hobby was a series of "Kampf" pamphlets. He did Bastogne and Guadalcanal, among a few others. I had the Guadalcanal one. This was 24-half-size pages with a cardstock cover, all courtesy of Xerox. (Dunnigan worked as a watchman at the Xerox plant.) The AH *Guadalcanal* had just come out. Here I was, comparing the strength in machine guns of the Japanese 38th Infantry against the First Marines.



Dunnigan's basic design philosophy said that every unit is a 4-4 unless you know something about it. The basic building block in any wargame. He doesn't mess around trying to determine the rate of fire of the Charleville Musket.

In the *Air*

Force/Dauntless series, the designers used the weight of shell to assign firepower factors to the various aircraft. This made the B-17 truly a flying fortress. It was indestructible. The problem is, they aggregated from the bottom-up,² instead of looking at overall loss statistics to see how many Fortresses the US was losing vs how many

Messerschmitts, and build a table that would aggregate to historic loss levels over time.

That is just what we did with the NAB CRT, plugging actual data from 1814 directly into the table. We don't need to know what might be happening tactically. Our outcome set assures that the game will fall within an historically valid range of combat outcomes (or at least that's the theory).

That is an abstraction, but a valid one.

In TLNB, among the prime abstractions are the ZOC Surround and Stacking. The ZOC Surround is an abstraction of a unit's vulnerability to being attacked on the right or left flank. The way the rules are written, if you have fulfilled the conditions for a ZOC Surround you have—in fact—achieved a flank attack. Unlike the concrete version of the rule, we never mention the words "front" or "flank," but the result is the same. All the effort that would be expended on Facing is saved for the enjoyment of the game.

Stacking is an abstraction of a local officer's span of command, which isn't really vertical; but stacking the units gives the same effect as a more complex mechanism that left the units where they actually stood.

The four combat tables are abstractions. Combat strengths are concretized, but Initiative ratings are abstractions (how well did the officer or unit do in this campaign). The core of the game is in the interaction of the CRT with the terrain, and the Terrain Effects on Combat is the main tool a skillful player uses to create his path to victory.

One great abstraction in TLNB is the way units pop in and out of existence. We never see concrete losses. They are assumed to be *equal* over many turns. Simply because a unit has to expose itself as a target to engage, gradual casualties will be very nearly equal and more or less constant among all the units in play. But manpower losses are not the main determinant of victory. Other factors besides casualties can affect cohesion, and a unit isn't usable if it is disorganized; even though the men are there, the unit isn't. Until Reorganized. In all the great battles losses only became greatly unbalanced after one side made the decision for a general retreat; or worse, when their delay of that decision resulted in whole unit and stack elimination.

² They forgot *rate* of fire.

Which aspects of TLNB are "concrete," discrete things, and which are abstractions?

Concrete:

1 Turn = 1 hr.
 1 SP = 400—800 men
 1 hex = 480 m
 1 unit = brigade
 1 leader = 1 officer + staff
 all Terrain Effects
 Supply Lines
 Damaging a Span
 Reconnaissance

Abstractions:

Initiative
 Reorganization
 Stacking Limits
 Whole Unit Elimination
 Combat Results in general
 Bombardment, Charge and Shock Combat
 Repairing a Span (bridge or trestle)
 Vedette vs LC (only) Reconnaissance

Generally, anything in the game that requires a die roll is abstract. The die roll comes instead of concrete facts.

Weather is abstract.

Weather Effects are concrete.

Leader capture is abstract.

LOS is concrete.

Command Range is concrete. "Real" command range was not so discrete as portrayed in the game.

If something happens "inside the closed watchcase" it is an abstraction; anything that happens on the map is concrete: a player rolls the die and gets a Dr2, that is abstract. There is no special reason why. A unit implements a Dr2, that is concrete.

Unit elimination, OTOH is abstract, because we do not show it on the map. To really show it on the map would require break-down markers like in *La Bataille*. *La Bat* is concretizing...



The abstractions are those parts of the simulation that the player can't directly manipulate. For example, how does cavalry scout? They use terrain and dispersion and techniques for estimating distances and numbers of troops.

Reconnaissance (8.3)				
Applies when a unit moves into an EZOC				
Non-Phasing Player has:	Phasing Player has:			*Die Roll for Vedette vs LC
	LC	Vedette	No LC/Vedette	
LC	●	Roll die*	●	1 R
Vedette	VR	●	●	2,3,4 VR
No LC/Vedette	R	R	●	5,6 VX
VR Vedette is eliminated and placed in Recovered Section of the UAR				
VX Vedette is placed in PEU box R Reveal ● No effect				

All of that happens "inside" the Reconnaissance Table, which may involve a die roll. We use die rolls to account for what isn't shown and to substitute probability for absolute player control. So we're often rolling when we're letting the abstraction operate.

Abstractions are used when: a) the designer doesn't represent things explicitly and, b) the player hasn't got control absolutely. Therefore, the abstraction and the dice tend to go together. The exception is that sometimes Reconnaissance is a direct lookup, concretely. Another exception is demoralization. We don't have players rolling for Demoralization with a DRM based on the number of lost strength points; the demoralization threshold is fixed, with no randomization involved. The only randomness in demoralization is indirect, through combat results die rolls. Nevertheless, demoralization is definitely an abstraction of how much physical and mental effort the troops can exert and how much pressure they can tolerate.

Initiative is an abstraction of a wide variety of unfortunate events—missed orders, wrong turns, and 97 other mishaps. Instead of all that abstraction, what would the game be like if all officers were always in command (concrete)? Then you might as well just trash the command rule and go back to playing *AH Bulge*. What you'd have then is an army of automatons. You'd also have a much faster army.

However, there is one time when you might want to suspend the Command Rules—during a General Retreat. You want the whole army moving toward the same point, or as the card says, "toward any friendly Supply Source or reinforcement arrival hex."

What should the status of officers be during a General Retreat? Do you treat all officers and/or units as in command? We decided it is better if they are not in command but simply on automatic pilot.

Instantaneous General Retreat

An army on the move makes a lot of noise. The sound of drums could carry for several miles. Since it was through the sounds of the drum that the officer in charge communicated with the troops, there evolved a series of beats, each of which regulated the pace at which the men should advance—or retreat. *La Retraite* was the signal to cease combat or withdraw in battle.

Commanders often used "three cannon shots" to indicate the moment of the attack. They could have done something similar with the GR, although I never read of it. They had elevated torch stands used as signal fires.

Traditionally, battle ceasefires were also marked by the firing of three volleys, indicating the dead and wounded were being cared for. HQ,

already anticipating a retreat, might have messengers sent out with a tentative order to stand-by and watch for events on the main front, or for some other pre-arranged signal issued beforehand. At the Battle of Bautzen,

"Wittgenstein issued the necessary (retreat) orders according to his original disposition (laid out before the battle). Three main columns formed. The northern consisted of Barclay's troops; the center of Prussian troops and Yermolov's detachment; and the southern column of all remaining Russian troops. Barclay received instructions to maintain his position south of Rackel and Briesnitz until all troops of the middle column cleared Wurschen. He would then follow and unite with this column at Weissenberg while the southern column marched to Löbau...Although it was not an easy task, the allies executed this retreat in a noteworthy manner."³

"East of Purschwitz, Blücher awaited orders that never came. Instead, he received word that Allied Headquarters had decided to retreat."⁴

A little research might reveal other ways that the General Retreat was communicated by a pre-arranged signal of some kind. When your units

are all moving according to the GR card instruction that is an abstraction. In the game's mechanics, we don't show the internal mechanisms of the retreat; it just happens. A General Retreat is happening within the "closed watchcase" even though it's large, spanning the map, instead of small like the evolutions within a brigade that happen invisibly inside the hex.

Perhaps the greatest of all the game's abstractions is the Sequence of Play. Despite the fact that, in reality, any action could happen at any time, the Sequence of Play arranges actions of like kind in separate phases, an abstraction required to make the game playable at all. This artificial phasing is not entirely without historical parallel. There is much truth to the alternating initiative of the battlefield as one side gears up and then launches an attack, after which comes the counter-attack. The movement of troops on the map sometimes mirrors the ebb and flow of the battlefield so well that in the course of play one might find oneself recreating the mistakes of history, without meaning to.

Ludwig Adolph zu Wittgenstein



³ Leggiere, p. 356

⁴ Leggiere, p. 357

Demoralization = 40% of SPs engaged.

There is an ironclad rule, throughout all the series, setting Demo Levels at 40% (really small corps get a bump up of a point or two).⁵

Demoralization is related to a historic occurrence—40% loss was the highest level ever sustained by a winning side. That is a positive benchmark, a very specific ratio. When you lose 40%, that means all the officers and the oldest soldiers—the cadre, in other words. When they are gone, the conscripts don't know what to do, they have no one to follow.

Basing *demoralization* on *losses* alone⁶ is very much the concrete approach. In this case, the word “Demoralization” has a very specific meaning, not the dictionary definition. Demoralization actually means your best cadre are out of the fight, a concrete fact.

Demoralization is just the name we used. Our Casualty Level Tracks are a concrete measure of manpower losses. Then we point to the Loss Track and say, “that is the Morale Track.” But that is just naming. The track is still a loss track.

Indeed, there might be a close correlation between the amorphous, unmeasurable “morale” and the concrete “men left on the battlefield.” The losses on both sides are always calculated and estimated by each historian. This is something they all do, simply because they are having a hard time defining who “won,” so that is a piece of data that we can obtain for every battle.

Since there is no change in the demoralization level (40%) that is a known data point in the play of the game. That is, yes, it is still an abstraction, but within the abstraction is a large measure of concreteness. Concrete losses scored by corps, concrete 40% Level, concrete effects on advances and no die roll anywhere.

...

The entire game is an abstraction, there are just different amounts of concreteness in different rules. Demoralization *is* an abstraction, but the thing called “Demoralization” in this game—the TLNB term of art—is an abstraction based on a consistent benchmark. It is not touchy-feely. It is somewhat arbitrary, but it is arbitrary in an even-handed way. It's an abstraction: the lights

go out and come back up, showing the results of excessive losses.

But Demoralization is not a surprise; we knew that corps was going to demoralize minutes



before it did so. Cause and effect is operating.

A lot of times, game terminology corresponds to concepts that the gamer can grasp intuitively, but the “concretizing” we have done around that concept may not be entirely common-sense.

An example would be the Supply Rules. The common-sense meaning of “supply” is wagons loaded with food and ammo, able to be distributed. And we even have the wagons in the game, to further underscore that sense. But what Supply actually means is again game-specific.

It doesn't address whether the men's bellies are filled. The point of supply is *only* a morale effect. In this sense it has no effect on combat strength, it “only” causes the troops to lose the ability to advance after combat. Which renders that formation quite unable to take ground or eliminate a single unit. What it means in the deep structure of TLNB is actually a psychological imperative—the LOC / route home must be open and clear. If you have lost your baggage, that route is probably in peril. The baggage train comes to stand at the road junction that leads home, so it is not about the foodstuffs on those wagons but rather, and more important, having a clear line of retreat for the men if they should need to get out of there. Whether men are in supply or not is abstract; if they were fed once today, then they aren't starving. However, if they can see enemy troops in the rear that is a very specific and age-old panic-inducing concrete situation.

⁵ We made it 35% in the 1794 battle

⁶ We could have included such factors as supply, officer loss, and who has the most on-map VPs.

Light Cavalry on Attack and Defense

The more I play the Library games, the more I'm struck by the tremendous advantage that light cavalry gives to players. Because my opponents' forces are hidden, I can't know how often cavalry vedettes are being used to simulate stacks of combat units, creating an illusion of strength in a weak portions of the line, or of depth in reserve. I do know when enemy cavalry isn't probing at my lines, or preventing me from probing his. One of my opponents said in frustration at the end of a recent session: "what am I supposed to do? There are British units everywhere." Little did he know. Which is the point. When vedettes are used successfully against you, you usually don't know it. You can go game after game, falling for the same tricks. For example, if your opponent uses several cavalry brigades to create the appearance of divisional stack behind his lines, all you know is that the battle seems unfair. The order of battle is clearly against you. The best you can do is huddle up and protect yourself. That's the beauty of hidden forces. They can create the element of uncertainty that wargames are so in need of if they want to be considered simulations.

The problem with hidden forces is that, because often you don't know when you're being fooled, it's difficult to learn and grow as a player. I thought I'd share some of my experiences from our current campaign to reveal some of what's going on "behind the curtain," and start a conversation about the role that light cavalry plays on the battlefield.

Situation 1: Preparing for Withdrawal

Here, Wellington (me) is attempting to break contact with the French just North of Genappe. I want to move my forces back to Waterloo as quickly as possible, but I don't want my opponent to interfere with me in the 5 hours before nightfall. There are some roadblocks about 8 hexes up the road that I can use to slow things down, but by themselves, they're not enough to prevent a rapid pursuit. For this I need my light cavalry. Luckily, at this point in the campaign, I've have a wealth of light horsemen, and I know from experience that, locally, I have more than he does.



Figure 1.1

Here we see the armies facing one another. The French have sent their cavalry elsewhere (I know this from probing and skirmishing with them earlier today), so the only way they can gain intelligence prior to combat is by repulsing. I know my French opponent. He won't repulse unless he knows for certain what he's facing, so I'm

safe from that for a turn or two, even if he comes at me aggressively. Look at the photo: all of my front-line units are behind crests. The Napoleon's Last Gamble map is liberally sprinkled with crests, a cavalry-man's dream. My units can see past them as the French approach, but I can't be seen until they move adjacent. Looking from the French perspective, the British line looks pretty solid. As solid as it's looked all during our day and a half of fighting in this area. Let's take a closer look at what's behind those crests.



Figure 1.2

Three brigades of light cavalry, most of it broken down into vedettes. One hex is doubled up to make it look like maybe it's a more robust rearguard. One of the brigades has remained formed, in case the French act uncharacteristically and just start repulsing into my line. Behind this screen, the army is forming up to march North. This illustrates why a pursuer wants light cavalry of his own. French light cavalry would completely defeat this deployment. They could recon the vedette line during the movement phase, expose it for what it is, and repulse right through it with stacks of infantry. Without cavalry, the French are reduced to moving their line up for a blind assault, or moving into a position where they can reveal my line without attacking it. In either case, they will lose one or more turns. If I'm unmolested, if the French player decides to move in a different direction altogether, this gambit will never be seen by him. He will be unable to learn the lesson of this moment, and so it will keep happening again and again. If you wonder why historically great generals like R.E. Lee repeatedly beat their opponents using the same strategies, think of this example. If you wonder why historically BAD generals kept falling for the same tricks, think of this example. If you don't realize what's happening to you, it's very difficult to learn from your mistakes. General Grant had a revelation early in his career:

“Grant soon had a chance to test his men, and himself. He was ordered to advance on a Confederate regiment in Missouri, commanded by Col. Thomas Harris. As he approached the enemy, Grant later recalled, “my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt as though it was in my throat.” But as the Confederate camp came within view, he saw that the Rebels, hearing of the Yankee advance, had left. “It occurred to me that Harris had been as afraid of me as I had been of him.”

When Lee fought Grant, late in the war, Lee's old tricks no longer worked.

Situation 2: Light Cavalry on the Attack

Wellington is presented with a brief opportunity to strike back at the French near Genappe when they turn West to interfere with my Prussian ally's attempts to retreat. I want to present enough of a threat to the French that they will hesitate and let my ally escape, but I have to be careful. We have a rough parity in numbers, and I can't afford to get pinned in an ongoing fight which he will be able to reinforce.



Figure 2.1

This is the situation as the French begin to send some of their forces West (the left side of the photo) to interfere with the Prussians. For the whole game, this army has been pressing the British relentlessly with a superiority in cavalry and total numbers. That situation changed, as the British were reinforced numerically, and more importantly for this discussion, received Uxbridge's excellent light cavalry. The French VI Corps is marching to rejoin Reille's II Corps (road column, top of the photo). When they arrive, French overall strength will be roughly equal to mine, so I have to be careful. Luckily, I have reason to believe they are sending their cavalry West against the Prussians. I've learned this through a probe by the three vedettes pictured above. Excellman's IIIC stack outside of Bruvère de Glabaix is all battle cavalry (no light cavalry), so Uxbridge's British vedette survives the encounter.



Figure 2.2

The French deploy in a holding position around Genappe, while sending Excellmans' Cavalry West. VI Corps comes out of column south of Genappe. My forces reverse direction and advance threateningly in an attempt to get the French player's attention. I have two divisions facing the French right (his strongest wing), which I'm "bolstering" with two stacks of vedettes in the center. My strength is all shifting East, towards the French left (his weakest wing). Look at the deployments in Figure 2.2 for a moment. Which army is exposed? Which general knows where his opponent's line is weak and where it is strong? Why is that?



Figure 2.3

Shifting his formations to the right, Wellington pounces on the VI Corps, eliminating a divisional stack (the top of the picture). Facing Reille's powerful right flank (conveniently behind crests) are one stack of Brunswicker vedettes and another of British vedettes. This is the sort of sequence of maneuvers that makes the Library games so compelling to me. This entire exchange, from the initial demonstration to the overloaded British right wing, wouldn't have been possible without vedettes and hidden forces. Imagine for a moment if our units had been operating without the hidden movement rules. First of all, the opening demonstration would have been laughable. The French player would have simply strengthened his line against the British concentration, and moved on to smash the Prussians. The British would not have been able to intimidate the French, much less strike them a blow. In Figure 2.3 there is literally nothing standing between the French player's powerful right and the British line of retreat north. This is the sort of "moral" influencing that light cavalry can perform in the game. This sequence of demonstrations and attacks caused the French to recoil. Not only did they not join the pursuit of the Prussians, but they lost another turn or two in their pursuit of the British.

NAPOLEON'S RESURGENCE HOUSE RULE:

Adding Coalition Roadblocks at Bautzen

Kevin Zucker

During the development of *Napoleon's Resurgence* we encountered the question of Coalition roadblocks. A roadblock represents a physical obstruction (such as an abattis) plus a battalion more or less. We knew they had some roadblocks at Bautzen, especially along the Spree. But we decided they weren't critical, and so they were omitted.

Now the Coalition player may wish to avail himself of the omitted roadblocks. (The markers and rules are included in *Napoleon's Quagmire*.) This House Rule applies to the May 20th Set-up.

Going back to search out the Coalition roadblocks, there are three mentioned in Leggiere, "*Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany*" (Vol. 1)

1. Plieskowitz (2816)

2. Doberschütz (2519)

I think Dobschütz is meant and not the village of Doberschütz (S-1211).

3. Niedergurig bridge (2320).

Then I checked Nafziger's "*Lützen & Bautzen*" and found three more.

4. Roadblock near the Powder Mill (1506). Macdonald found an unguarded stone bridge "which his corps rapidly crossed" while part of his troops crossed at a ford "near the powder mill."

"As they crossed, they were struck by the Volhynie Infantry Regiment in a bayonet attack led by Colonel Kurnossov and momentarily slowed." (p. 218).



"Oudinot encountered only a few skirmishers as he crossed the Spree. These were quickly pushed back, as Pacthod's 13th Division crossed two fords and the small bridges near the village of Singwitz (1813). His forces had completed their passage of the Spree by 1:00 PM."

5. They encountered another roadblock...

"Pacthod's right moved onto a high plateau crowned with pines (S-1914) and defended by a single Russian battalion in a strengthened position."

6. The Russians put a roadblock at Hochkirch (S-5200).

"The Russians had cut down many of the trees around Hochkirch, to give their artillery a clear field of fire as well as to build an abattis to increase the obstacles that the French would have to overcome." Nafziger (p. 221)

The total of SIX roadblocks can be placed historically or freely, anywhere east of the River Spree, according to the Study Folder of *Napoleon's Quagmire* (25.73). Since part of the function of the Roadblock is wrapped in its hidden nature, it is more interesting to use the "free" set up.

THE ROAD TO HALLE


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
- **Expanded Waterloo Scenario:** June 18th. Allows Napoleon the option of flanking the Mont St Jean position at the risk of freeing up the 17,000-man Hal force.
- **The Fields of Hal Scenario:** June 17th - 18th. Hypothetical battle in the Hal environs (below). Can Blucher affect the outcome? Wellington believed that this area was the most likely location for the culminating battle, rather than Mont St Jean.
- **Extended Campaign Scenario:** June 15th - 19th. Provides Napoleon and Wellington more operational options, with more areas to defend, more room for maneuver (and for error).

In addition, several **Turn Record Charts** and **Anglo-Allied Setup Cards** will be provided to account for the added map and associated arrival times on the WX map. No additional counters will be needed.



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simulation. He used his methods to model the Cold War interaction between the U.S. and the USSR, viewing them as two players in a zero-sum game. From the very beginning of World War II, von Neumann was confident of the Allies' victory. He sketched out a mathematical model of the conflict from which he deduced that the Allies would win, applying some of the methods of game theory to his predictions. In 1943, von Neumann was invited to work on the Manhattan Project. Von Neumann did crucial calculations on the implosion design of the atomic bomb, allowing for a more efficient, and more deadly, weapon. Von Neumann's mathematical models were also used to plan out the path the bombers carrying the bombs would take to minimize their chances of being shot down. The mathematician helped select the location in Japan to bomb. Among the potential targets he examined was Kyoto, Yokohama, and Kokura.

"Of all of von Neumann's postwar work, his development of the digital computer looms the largest today." (Poundstone 76) After examining the Army's ENIAC during the war, von Neumann came up with ideas for a better computer, using his mathematical abilities to improve the computer's logic design. Once the war had ended, the U.S. Navy and other sources provided funds for von Neumann's machine, which he claimed would be able to accurately predict weather patterns. Capable of 2,000 operations a second, the computer did not predict weather very well, but became quite useful doing a set of calculations necessary for the design of the hydrogen bomb. Von Neumann is also credited with coming up with the idea of basing computer calculations on binary numbers, having programs stored in computer's memory in coded form as opposed to punchcards, and several other crucial developments. Von Neumann's wife, Klara, became one of the first computer programmers. Von

Neumann later helped design the SAGE computer system designed to detect a Soviet nuclear attack

In 1948, von Neumann became a consultant for the RAND Corporation. RAND (Research And Development) was founded by defense contractors and the Air Force as a "think tank" to "think about the unthinkable." Their main focus was exploring the possibilities of nuclear war and the strategies for such a possibility.

Von Neumann was, at the time, a strong supporter of "preventive war." Confident even during World War II that the Russian spy network had obtained many of the details of the atom bomb design, von Neumann knew that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union became a nuclear power. He predicted that were Russia allowed to build a nuclear arsenal, a war against the U.S. would be inevitable. He therefore recommended that the U.S. launch a nuclear strike at Moscow, destroying its enemy and becoming a dominant world power, so as to avoid a more destructive nuclear war later on. "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when," he would say. An oft-quoted remark of his is, "If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?" Just a few years after "preventive war" was first advocated, it became an impossibility. By 1953, the Soviets had 300-400 warheads, meaning that any nuclear strike would be effectively retaliated. In 1954, von Neumann was appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission. A year later, he was diagnosed with bone cancer. William Poundstone's *Prisoner's Dilemma* suggests that the disease resulted from the radiation von Neumann received as a witness to the atomic tests on Bikini atoll. "A number of physicists associated with the bomb succumbed to cancer at relatively early ages."¹

When *Tactics II* appeared, designer Charles Roberts was summoned to Rand's offices in Santa Monica, California, to explain where he got his Combat Results Table. Apparently it was similar to one they were using. He explained that he worked it out himself based on the idea of 3:1 being needed to insure a win. While Roberts was there, he noticed the use of the hexgrid (von Neumann's idea) on Rand's game maps.

1