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Wargame Design

SPECIAL ISSUE

The Most Influential Graphic Designer in Wargaming



The Series Continues

• Napoleon's Last Gamble • Napoleon's Quagmire • War of Liberation I, 1813

Wargame Design, Summer 2016 II

Editor-Publisher: Kevin Zucker

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Photo: Eric Lee Smith, *Redmond in 1981*.

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WARGAME DESIGN

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EDITORIAL

Brilliance

The Work Itself Shows Everything

Each new game project forces us to re-think things from the ground-up. Despite the common rules, each design has to be formed again from scratch, and it is at the founding stage that we have to remember the ingredients that lead to success. When I find myself looking for inspiration, I frequently cast my mind in the direction of the best training ground for anyone working in this hobby, which was, of course, the old days at SPI. Those memories still serve.

After a stint as a developer, and a while working at the front desk, I spent two full years as Managing Editor—that meant turning raw manuscript into a systematically produced, unified structure—a self-evident, high-utility,¹ attractive, logical and complete package. I learned how to pursue that ideal working side by side with Manny Milkuhn and Redmond Simonsen, SPI's Art Director for 12 years. That goal is illusive, but still inspiring.

The other day, as I was looking for some Redmond-style inspiration, I discovered that the main site is no longer on the web. I had some articles that I had collected when Redmond changed his form of materialization in 2005. I also had some articles left over from last issue that didn't make it in, so I decided to share them here. Enjoy!

¹ Redmond called it "Heuristic."

Redmond A. Simonsen

We never knew his middle name was Aksel

Dave Demko and I have written about my experiences working with Simonsen, and how his design ideas and principles influenced OSG (*WDM* Nr. 1-2, Summer 2013), but this time I'd like to write about Redmond the human being.

Redmond did embody the same principles in life he espoused in his work. He didn't have to work at it, that same logic just motivated him. He found something that worked and didn't re-invent the wheel. He wore the same kind of boot with the square toe all the time. He liked precision cameras, Knirps umbrellas, and other high-tech gadgets.

He had nicknames for everybody, which he used when he wanted to kid them. I was "Zoo-korn..." Many people used the nicknames "RAS" or "Red." These nicknames bugged him, but he rarely showed it. Irad Hardy was the first to coin "Ras." And somehow, he got away with it. Other people, hearing Terry say it, assumed it was o.k.

'Ras' was bad but 'Red' was worse. Some people persevered to use these nicknames despite his great discomfort. My girlfriend at the time called him "Redmink." Even though he adored her, he still objected, but only to me. In a way that's a part of the story; part of Redmond's incredible gamesmanship: "I can use nicknames but you can't..."

Redmond was my boss for two years. We had a lot of dinners together, and we *never* talked about work. We drank a lot of wine. He really thought deeply about life, he had high principles. You had to break through, but then he was very kind and reliable. Typical gruff exterior. He was unlikely to share his inner feelings, but he was always ready to discuss ideas.

Redmond was a good delegator. I took over the chore of marking up copy for the typesetter, and he never criticized how I did it. He showed me a lot of trust. I was there to implement his vision of "Physical Systems Design" (he didn't say "Graphic Design"). I managed the production of

over 100 games in a two-year period, so it was inevitable that I should make some errors. But he rarely complained.

Even at work we didn't talk about what we were doing. I don't remember him ever correcting me, or holding up a chart or something and waving it at me, even when I shifted the Odds

headings to the side on the *Punic Wars* CRT!

There were times at work it would get tense, around deadline for *S&T*: we had reserved presstime on a large Web Press (like *TIME* Magazine used) and we couldn't be late. In that environment, we'd close the doors joining the R&D Hallway so no one would hear the insanity as we tried to get the last-minute corrections done. Actually it was pretty crazy to work there.

Redmond had a vision of a just society. He thought it was achievable. He was always kind to the cleaning ladies who emptied the trash in the evenings, and he said that society should compensate people based on how difficult or dirty a job they had to do. He thought that trash collectors should be paid better than artists, and he insisted that the whole art department discard their xacto blades by covering them first with several wraps of masking tape, to make sure those ladies fingers didn't get cut.


Redmond didn't believe in the soul, he was a realist and rejected anything that could not be proven. Science was his religion, and his faith was that science would solve all of the world's problems; a rational, sane world would be achieved by the laws of evolution. Rationality and numbers would win out. In that sense he was like his partner Dunnigan, who believed that everything in our world was composed of numbers. Life was ruled by numbers and one could thrive if those numbers could be determined. That explains the SPI penchant with Feedback Ratings and the mathematical basis of the SPI product.




In his life and his work alike Simonsen's gods were efficiency and precision. His legacy in the graphic design of wargame maps is still very much alive. His influence on OSG maps and graphics can be easily seen. Redmond advocated clarity and function over beauty.

Despite his practical, engineering outlook, he was a fine poet. One time, when an ambulance went by, he said, "That's the sound of someone else's trouble." He once read aloud to my girlfriend and me some of his poems published in the Cooper Union review. He had a good heart and was willing to share what he had. He cared about people. He was very generous, but also very rigid and stubborn. Overall as the guiding principle of mankind he believed in reason, and if you had the better argument he would acknowledge that with grace.

I was just reading Redmond's article on map graphic design in the book, "Wargame Design." He doesn't talk about how he does it in the article, kind of talks all around it. But the work itself shows you everything. Redmond was a careful designer. He got something that worked and then tweaked; changed one element in the map while leaving all the rest. A gradual evolution came with additional colors: starting with just blue on sandstone stock, then blue and brown, then Red joins Yellow as a novelty...



Cooper Union College in 1964. He served in the Air Force, and worked as a graphic designer creating book covers (including the one for "Is Paris Burning?"), album covers for London Records, and Kool Cigarette advertisements among others. In 1970 he was one of the co-founders of Simulations Publications, Inc. (SPI) and quickly became the most influential graphic designer in the wargaming industry.



KZ 1979. Photo: Simonsen

Redmond A. Simonsen was born 18 June 1942, the second son of Astri Nordlie Simonsen and August Emil Simonsen, and grew up in the Inwood section of Manhattan where he lived until 1984. He attended Stuyvesant High School and graduated with a BFA from

Mentor

by Eric Lee Smith

Redmond is, without a doubt, the most important mentor I have ever had in my life. He affected my short game design career greatly, but he has affected my long product development career profoundly. I hardly know where to begin to describe RAS and what his life has meant to me.

Redmond Simonsen was one of a kind: one of the most intelligent, creative, opinionated, productive, and generous people I have ever known. As the co-founder of Simulations Publications (SPI), he was the creative director and ran the art and editorial departments. But he was so much more than that! He had an engineer's passion for efficiency and logic, combined with an artist's eye for beauty and design. He almost single handedly created the graphic design standards used in the board wargame industry. He created such basic concepts as the numbering system used to number the spaces in board wargames, the rules structure still used by most wargames to this day, and dozens of "graphic systems" for game boards. He was also an accomplished and highly innovative game designer in his own right, especially in the area of science fiction games.

I met Redmond when I was 21 years old. I went to SPI on Friday nights to attend the play-testing sessions open to the public. I was a fan before I got there, one of dozens of young men who would show up at SPI to play games and hang out with the game designers. A startling number of us volunteers got a chance to design games for SPI, due in large measure to Redmond's eye for talent. I "earned" the opportunity to design my first game for SPI within a year of showing up at the door. In reality, Redmond and his partner Jim Dunnigan thought an inexperienced kid from Dallas, Texas, without a game credit to his name, had potential and gave me a shot. It worked too, and not just for me, but for dozens of us.

SPI was such an amazing place, it was like a frat house for game geeks, with dozens of games in various stages of completion going on at any time, magazines in constant production, arguments in the halls, playtesters in nooks working on the latest game, new people being trained, game designers pounding out manuscripts on typewriters, the smell of coffee constantly brewing, the Xerox machine coping and breaking

down daily, the odor of rubber cement and Berol markers coming from the art department, the typesetting crew cranking away all day and virtually all night, a constant hubbub of activity. But it was not chaotic; it was systematic. And Redmond was always there, in his office, his "lair," which he seldom left and which was as chaotic as Redmond was systematic.

It is hard to describe the massive productivity of Redmond and Jim's creative unit at SPI. In the days before computers and desktop publishing, Redmond created "systems" and insisted that we game designers and editors learn them and use them, the result being that a group of fifteen people, all young and many under 20, could turn out eighteen magazine issues, including twelve board games in those issues, plus over a dozen other board games, two role playing games, and two newsletters, all in one year. To this day, after working with over 20 development shops, I have still never encountered a firm that could compare to the sheer productivity of SPI. In the course of a little over ten years, RAS and his team published over three hundred games, hundreds more magazines, and remade and reinvented a whole industry. I learned so many things that I continue to use every day, that I simply don't know where I'd be if I had not had my SPI training and experience.

Redmond's intellect was a powerful, nuanced, complex, and overwhelming force. To be on the opposite side of an argument with Redmond was a nearly impossible place to survive. He loved a good argument and thrived on discussing a whole universe of topics: science, photography, art, game design, publishing, type (yes, type), politics, history, science fiction, computers, mathematics, graphic design, New York, music, technology, ballet, cooking, cognac, college, psychology, medicine, and more, an endless list. I discussed all these topics and more with him. Redmond is without a doubt the most autodidactic person I have ever known. He explained to me once that he was born quite premature, weighing less than two pounds, and spent his early months in an incubator with little prospect of living. Yet, he pulled through. He said he attributed his will and intellect to that struggle for life. I believe it.

RAS could be intimidating. He had a temper, and didn't suffer fools gladly. His mind worked so fast that he had a hard time waiting for other people to catch up, get to the point, or just say it. There were legends of RAS throwing phone books

at game designers who broke his patience. However, he also had a deep, deep appreciation for other people and their ideas, regardless of who the person was. I will never forget a scene I witnessed; Justin Leites, a young playtester, was in Redmond's office reporting on the playtest of a science fiction game. Justin was a great tester, but he was giving feedback such as, "It stinks," and RAS was trying to get him to explain, give details. Justin would say, "I dunno, it just stinks," and RAS would try again. Finally RAS was on the verge of losing his temper and said,




"Justin you just don't get it! You are a kid, I am a 35 year old adult. I am treating you as a professional. Do you understand that? Professionals do not treat thirteen year olds as peers. You will

be lucky to be listened to as seriously as I am listening to you today when you are 25." Justin, startled, got the message, and gave RAS the detailed feedback that was needed.

Redmond went to Cooper Union, and I got more of Redmond's attention because I went to art school also. The fact that I was studying photography also interested RAS, because he was a serious photographer. After I graduated, and while working at SPI, my younger brother Clayton moved to New York. He lived with me in my hovel... er, loft... in downtown Brooklyn. I had the dream job of my youth, working for SPI, but I was paid little. It was enough, but there were few luxuries in my life, such as meals out. But once a week, and for over two years, Clayton and I went out every Friday night with Redmond for dinner. At the end of Friday night playtesting, usually around midnight, RAS, Clayton, and I would walk the five blocks from SPI to a restaurant on 21st and Third Avenue, and Redmond would treat us to a great steak dinner. Redmond loved steak, medium rare, with a little salt, a good salad, and a cognac to finish. Dinner and conversation lasted until nearly two in the morning, sometimes three, with our talks ranging over the whole world of topics.

The Simonsen Way

By Redmond Simonsen



Redmond's principles, prejudices, and graphic production standards, in his own words. Sources include chapters in Wargame Design (Hippocrene Books, 1977), various MOVES magazine editorials, interviews and other writings.

When I first began designing wargame systems, not much had been done in the way of systematizing the interface between the rules and the actual play of the game. Before I became professionally involved, one of my hobbies was to take an existing game and build it a graphic system.

I've always considered myself to be more technologically oriented than most artists and I suppose this inclination shows in my work. Games are after all, paper machines. With proper engineering they should reduce the amount of work that the player must perform.

Deciding how much to support the play of the game must be based upon the complexity of the game, benefit of the system, the effort required to execute the system and its commercial feasibility.

Graphics & Physical Systems Design

The more graphic engineering the artist can build into the game equipment and rules, the easier and more enjoyable becomes the play of the game.

Examples of this are: the Production Spiral used in SPI's *War in Europe* game system; Turn-Record Tracks with built in information on special events; Phase Records that are themselves diagrams of a complex sequence of play (such as in SPI's *Fast Carriers*); game maps with the set-up printed directly on them; integrated combat results tables (with terrain effects built in). A good physical system is characterized by its organization of game information to such an extent that the presentation actually accomplishes some of the "work" of using the raw information. It is possible (and often is the case) that a game is well-designed graphically, but no serious attempt at physical system design is evident.

When a designer attempts to aid the player by providing him with a graphic device, of any sort, he must be careful that the neat little system he comes up with doesn't actually add complexity to the game system—watch for:

1. Excessive use of abbreviations
2. Too many markers operating on a single register (sometimes a pencil and paper is better)
3. Systems that are so cramped by lack of space that they become difficult to use
4. Systems that are larger than the playing map or that take longer to set up than the game itself
5. Any system that takes longer to operate than the maneuver portion of the game-turn.

There is no easy formula for developing graphic systems that aid play. Most of the really good ones are stunningly obvious — once you see them in operation. Much of the success one will have depends upon being able to project oneself into the position of the player who will have to deal with the finished game. Whenever possible, the graphic designer should actually play the final version of the game using the test components. Unfortunately, this is sometimes difficult to do since games take a lot of time to learn and play — and the artist doesn't have a lot of time in a commercial environment.

The better the graphic design, the more likely it will not be noticed. Since, in game design, the overriding mission of the graphic designer is to communicate the substance of the game to the user, heavy-handed or flashy images that call attention to themselves (rather than their message) are actually detrimental. If the typeface was eccentric or exotic in design it would be hard to read and would detract from the message rather than convey it.

Signal to Noise Ratio

The challenge to the graphic designer is clear: make the information the player uses clear, organized, accessible, and pleasing to look at for long periods of time.

To use a military metaphor, the player is an unspecialized demolitions man defusing a complex bomb and receiving instructions on how to do so via a radio. The game is the bomb, the game designer is on the other end of the radio and the artwork is the radio.

If the radio is faulty, the unclear signal may break the concentration of the demolitions man (with unpleasant results). Now the qualities of a good radio are fairly obvious: good signal-to-noise ratio; adequate range; reliability; and good design of human factors (ease of handling, etc.).

Metaphorically, these qualities translate fairly well into the qualities of good graphic design in games — what is not so clear, however, is exactly what constitutes a good signal-to-noise ratio in graphics or just what value to place on “reliability” (which translates as consistency of format). And although the gamer is not vaporized when faulty graphics cause him to “detonate” the game he's playing, the fact that it has indeed turned out to be a “bomb” is certainly unpleasant.

Virtually every gamer has had the experience of struggling through what might be an

otherwise good game, hampered by the fact that the organization and design of the components prevents him from easily understanding what he is about — and thereby losing concentration and interest in the game.

Many non-artists have difficulty in separating that which looks good from that which works well. The two are not mutually exclusive — but neither are they necessarily mutually inclusive. I am an advocate of form-following-function.

It is sometimes difficult to separate poor (or good) graphic design factors from poor (or good) game design factors. There is a great deal of feedback between the two. Of course, no matter how good the graphics and physical system, they cannot turn a weak game design into a strong one (although they can sometimes cosmetically hide an inadequate game design, at least for a while). But the reverse is possible: bad graphics and poor physical systems can ruin a good game.

Game Maps

The best possible combination is a well-designed physical system which has an overlay of just the right amount of mood enhancing decoration. Usually, the more complex the game system, the less decorated it should be. When counters carry several different values and symbols; when the terrain is highly varied, when the mechanics of play are very involved, it is then that decorative effects should be kept to the bare minimum.

There are some elements of decoration that I am dogmatically opposed to. First on my list of such elements is the placement on maps of extensive terrain that has no effect on play whatsoever. Second on the list are orders of battle that go strictly by historical designation without giving the player the option to ignore the designation and set up the game and the reinforcements purely by unit type and value.

The graphic designer (who should of course be basically familiar with the game) can often draw out of the developer/designer important pieces of information that can be successfully integrated into the map design. There is no magic formula for creating a map that is not only pleasant to look at but which, more importantly, serves and supports the game system.

Game Map Symbolology

In game map design, symbols are most often used to characterize a “point” feature — something that resides in a single hex or location. Such things as cities, resource centers, industrial

sites, forts, railheads, airfields, and ports are examples of terrain features that can successfully be represented by the use of symbols.

Symbols are usually pictographic, i.e., they actually look like stylized versions of the feature they represent — or they are simple drawings of objects associated with the feature being represented — for example, a resource center might be represented with a pick and shovel symbol. Non-pictographic symbols are used when the feature being represented has no obvious object with which it is well associated or when the number of other symbols on the map calls for the use of abstract symbols to avoid confusion. Stars, for example, might be used to denote capital cities or arrows to indicate invasion hexes.

By changing the color and/or size of the symbols, more variations can be achieved if truly necessary. Symbols can be combined with each other to form ideographs that convey more complex messages than any one symbol could. For example, a map shows three types of installations (ports, fortifications, and airfields) each of which must be characterized as being “major” or “minor” and also be identifiable as to which player possesses them originally. One could use twelve different symbols, but a better solution is to use a symbol in a circle to indicate a “major” installation and a different color to show ownership. This way by using only one more symbol (in conjunction with three basic installation symbols) and one color change one creates a simple system that is easy for the player to remember and easy for the eye to spot on the map.

When using symbols, the designer must remain conscious of the fact that too many symbols, or symbols that lack recognition value, may actually confuse the player rather than convey the information.

Moreover, symbols suffer from their trait of being obscured by the counters occupying the hexes containing the site being symbolized. This, incidentally, is an important consideration regardless of terrain treatment — how much will the counters affect the visibility of the playing surface?

One solution (which I often use) is to fill the hex with the feature so that even when it’s occupied, the terrain is still visible around the edges of the playing pieces. This gives the map a somewhat more abstract appearance — but I feel that the sacrifice of naturalism is worth the additional utility gained by this technique.

1. The number of different symbols should be kept to a functional minimum. Don’t make arbitrary distinctions between items that, in the game, are treated identically. For example, if all fuel resource sites are operatively the same, don’t show petroleum sites as little oil wells and coal sites as little picks and shovels. Instead, use a common symbol that evokes the “fuel” concept rather than the irrelevant fuel type.

2. To be effective, symbols must be simple and well designed. A complex, cluttered symbol does not contribute to player information retrieval. Most symbols are best treated in silhouette form.

3. The symbol should be evocative of the basic concept of the thing for which it stands. The test of a good symbol is how well it is understood without recourse to a key or legend. Whenever the artist is doubtful of the recognition value of his symbology he should show them to an associate without telling him what they mean, and ask that person to quickly interpret the symbology.

4. The symbol should reproduce well in the map environment. Even if the symbol is effective in isolation, unless it works in the context of the map, it can be a bad symbol. Also, when several symbols are used, they must all work well together. They should have a consistency of style and approach to make them into a total system.

The “perfect” game map surface would combine the characteristics of both mounted and unmounted maps: it would be rigid; one continuous piece without splits; fold to compact size yet opens perfectly flat; have a homogenous cross-section; and be truly durable. As yet there are no such perfect surfaces that can be made cheaply enough to be commercially viable. There is some promise though in the new plastic laminates that are coming into the stream as replacements for paper in certain applications. Until some designer (I hope it is I) comes up a better solution, the gamer will have to cope with the less than perfect surface for this all-important component.

The designer should never lose sight of the fact that most gamers are deeply influenced by the game map: a good map goes a long way towards creating a positive impression of the game.

Since the map is the most constantly used component, it should be the most effective in doing its job of providing the basic environment for the game.

Counters

As a general rule, the more tactical the game, the more information will be displayed on counter; the more strategic, the less information. If, however, a game becomes very tactical an information threshold is passed which demands that data be removed from the counter (as in the example of the air games where much is done on a player's "control panel" that is separate from the game's counters). One might say that the extremes in scale result in very simple counters and the middle-grounds produce most variation and problems.

Rules & The Case System

Let's face it: rules are not exactly light reading — the number of concepts and procedures to be explained in detail can hardly be dealt with in a few easy paragraphs of colloquial English. The closest analog to a set of rules would be a set of computer program instructions.

The rules are means to an end — and they must be highly organized and efficient means to serve the complexity of wargame play.

Rules writing is inescapably technical writing — not literature. Its object is unequivocal communication — not entertainment. The entertaining part is supposed to be the play of the game.

One must be honest about the limitations of the rules generation process — to create flawless rules on the first go-round is virtually impossible unless the game is so simple as to be irrelevant. Beyond simple typos and plain oversight, there will always be the possibility of alternate interpretation of given statements — because the player is not a computer: he's a thinking human

who brings his own background and mindset to the reading of the rules.

My favorite fantasy (regarding rules) is to have a master file of hex-grid wargame rules that would cover every possible situation that could occur in a game. These master cases would be precisely and lucidly written and organized into a data retrieval / word processing system so that entire blocks of rules could be called up electronically by keying in a string of code numbers.

The developer would then add whatever minimal necessary names and dates and the whole body of rules would be automatically typeset. Every case would have a master reference number and a computer program would make sure that every case number that needed cross-indexing would get it.

It would be a boon to editors and gamers alike to have such a system working for them. The clarity and preciseness of the rules would take a quantum leap forward and the flexibility of development in game systems would increase mightily. Game testing could proceed with more finished sets of rules. Annoying minor typos could be forever banished. Laborious typesetting tasks and long production times could be reduced. Ah, the millennium would arrive for rules compulsives such as I.

To use a military metaphor, the player is an unspecialized demolitions man defusing a complex bomb and receiving instructions on how to do so via a radio. The game is the bomb, the game designer is on the other end of the radio and the artwork is the radio.



The A-A forces at Hal

Tim Carne

I did not get an updated version of my article to Kevin in time for publication in the last issue so I have provided it here. This is my musing over how the forces at Hal could have been used during the campaign — ideas that have not been tested or played through. I hope they spark some comment.

I fully understand the TLBN rules philosophy to not have special situation rules but rather use a card mechanism. The cut-off of the ALT reinforcement cards (9PM June 16) blocks out any mechanism to bring these forces into play on the 18th.

Historically Wellington kept a large detachment at Halle to ensure his position could not be turned by a French advance by the road from Mons to Brussels and to secure his line of retreat. It is understandable why Wellington took this course of action but hindsight allows players the opportunity to use this force in the main battle on June 18.

There was a discussion on ConSimWorld (June 4) regarding the appearance of Division Colville in the Thursday Night Gamers video. There is a cut-off at 9PM on June 16 for ALT reinforcement which has the effect of excluding the force at Halle if not already entered.

If we are assuming the role of Wellington as player then we ought to be able to override history and call in some or all of this detachment. The same can be said of D'Erlon on the 16th which is addressed either by card or special rule (32.37).

When you consider the ALT reinforcements we have elements of the Young Guard and V Corp available which were not even in theatre but I admit the interest of including these for strategic variation of the campaign. The case for considering the Halle forces is stronger as these forces were clearly in theatre and able to be used.

As always there needs to be a balance of risk and reward for making operational decisions. As it stands should Wellington draw the ALT reinforcement cards then he can take all the benefit of using these forces for the cost of 3VP. This is limited to Colville in the campaign game (32.2 #2) and Stedman and Colville in the Waterloo scenario (30.2 #1 and #2).

My alternative thinking on this is to allow the Allied player to issue a March Order to either or both of Stedman and Colville to march from Halle to Waterloo on June 18. These units would arrive at hex N 0113 three turns after the order is issued.

I want to insert a risk that would make this decision uncomfortable for the Wellington player. This risk would be the actual march of French troops on to the Mons-Brussels road. For the French the reward is keeping the Halle forces away from the main battle and possibly even outflanking the Waterloo position and forcing an Allied retreat; the risk is to have to fight Wellington with fewer French troops.

The challenge is to keep this simple. What I am proposing is to allow the French player to exit units to the West at Nivelles or even not enter the map at all. At some stage on June 18 an off-map conflict is determined and strategic VP are applied.

In more detail, the French player may :

- designate any ALT reinforcements as taking the western route so these units do not even enter the map;
- remove one corps and/or one cavalry corps from the start of the scenario and allocate these to the western route
- exit one corps and/or one cavalry corps at Nivelles N0131 (up to the end of the June 17)

Subject to a maximum of two infantry and one cavalry corps taking the western route.

On June 18 on each turn requiring a weather check the allied player throws a dice for the off-map activity. Initially there has been no contact so the dice throw is for discovery or recon. If the dice results in a 6 then the allied player is informed of the French strength committed to the western route. If the result is 5 or less then no discovery has happened and this recon segment is repeated next weather turn adding one to the dice roll.

The first weather turn after discovery the French player determines the combat as one single large combat on the western route by determining the odds and using the standard combat table. Only consider Dr results. Once the allied force has received a total of 4 Dr (that is 4 single Dr or 2xDr or any combination adding up to 4 Dr) then the force at Hal counts as

defeated and the French are awarded an immediate 20 VP.

For the allied player the important result is to get a discovery early and to know that the French have no forces on this Western route allowing Wellington to call over the force from Halle.

Ideally I would like to introduce dummy formations for either side that would make it more difficult for the allied player to work out what the French player is up to. It would be interesting to march a dummy corps off the map at Nivelles on June 17 to play on Wellington's mind about calling in the detachment. The dummy corps would also cover the absence of one of the regular corps diverted to the Western route at the start of the campaign.

One final consideration about the forces at Halle is what to do with these if the extended campaign continues into the 19th June where Wellington has retreated from Mt St Jean. The Extended game has a scenario for Ixelles which does bring in the Halle forces (36.34). There should perhaps be a mechanism for making these forces available to the Allied player. I suggest that if Mt St Jean and Braine l'Alleud fall to French control then the Hal forces appear at NX 0126 and 0129 at the 7AM turn on the following day.

If the French have sought to turn Wellington's right flank with forces up to the western map edge there could be a mechanism to trigger the arrival of some of the Halle forces at N0113 should the French come within 5 hexes on N0113.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Perhaps there is a simpler way to introduce the forces at Hal, using existing rules. An amendment to the rules effectively nullifies any Card No. 29 drawn after June 16, 9PM:

ALT Reinforcement Cards No. 29:

For both sides, ignore instruction and any VPs after June 16th, 9 PM.

(add) EXCEPTION (*Campaign-Grand Campaign only*): For the Coalition Player, continue to play ALT for effect until after June 17th, 9 PM, or at any time once Groups #1 and #2 have arrived.

Spanish OrBat (continued from page 24)

11) Latour Maubourg's Div:

- a. Perreimond: I have had this wrong in my OOB. In June he was sent to back to France. Who to promote? (note: Perreimond would likely still be correct for Medellin, but not for Talavera. So, you could argue, Perreimond may not "die" a wargaming death at Medellin!)
- i. Dermoncourt: Acc. to the French wiki, he was "in command of a brigade". Also, senior to Ismert, the other colonel in the brigade.
- b. d'Oullenbourg: concur (I believe this is the correct spelling, though it differs wildly.) Note that he returned to France sometime in 1809, so this is somewhat shaky.
- c. Digeon: somewhat concur; have found no better information

12) Milhaud's Div:

- a. Boye: somewhat concur; have found no better information
- b. Maupetit: somewhat concur; have found no better information
- c. Corbineau: Corbineau succeeded to brigade command when Sebastien Vial was killed at Ocaña. Vial should be the commander of this brigade.

13) King's Reserve:

- a. Guye: somewhat concur; I find Guye was "Colonel of 1st regiment of the line espagnol". Does this make him candidate for this brigade or Corbalan's?
- b. Corbalan: I can't find anything on Corbalan. Perhaps this is Bigarre, who appears to be in command of the "Spanish Royal Guard"?
- c. Jamin: concur
- d. Godinot: concur
- e. Saligny: Saligny was killed in February of 1809 in Madrid. Candidates to replace him:
 - i. Rey: Steven Smith's OOB lists Rey as commander
 - ii. Schwiter: Senior colonel of the two regiments (Baussian was the other)
 - iii. Belliard: Thiers says "he left Belliard in Madrid with Dessolles 2nd Brigade...."

14) Other notes

- a. I saw nothing that indicated that the KGL brigades deserved a "4" in this stage of their history. Their performance at Talavera was more like a "3".
- b. King Joseph's Guard seems overrated. Did these troops ever have a battlefield performance that suggests a "3" or "4"?

Napoleon's Maxims

The Maxims recommend the study of the campaigns of Turenne, Alexander, Frederick, and that is how to find out the rules of war. These things hadn't changed.

Napoleon's inheritance was guided by principles of warfare that had already been worked out by others. What he added to that was the "operational art." The term "operational art" wasn't coined until the 1920's. I think the Emperor would prefer the term "cheating." But he disavowed any system of operations, and his methods and maneuvers had been guided rather instinctually than intellectually.

Other writers, coming along in the late 19th-century, looked for "Napoleon's System of Operations," and we have a pretty good idea of it by now, except for one thing: Napoleon by no means always followed his own principles.

TERRAIN

The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and large rivers occupy the third place. [1]

Buzzing across on a motorway is not the way to experience what an army had to go through following river roads along gorges. Dragging cannon over such roads was sometimes impossible.

Crossing a large river was most often done by a stone bridge. If the bridge was damaged they usually could not remove the pillars, so that a new roadway could be improvised with large planks. Rivers were less frequently crossed by pontoon bridges, that were not always able to support the weight of heavy artillery, sometimes by boat or a rope ferry.

A river should be crossed at a re-entrant bend, if possible, which gives supports to both flanks of the crossing army. While an army is divided, with part of its strength on either bank, it is particularly vulnerable.


The operation begins with a few companies crossing in boats and securing the area of the bridgehead. There are assault boats and pontoon boats, but often any kind of shallow draft boat can be pressed into service. Houses and barns are town down for the bridge planks

It is vital to get vedettes across the river as soon as the span is complete, to reconnoiter the vicinity and locate the enemy. A diversionary crossing may be

necessary to deflect the attention of the enemy commander far away from the actual site.

The first objective after assembling all the army on the farther bank, is to either encounter the main enemy army or, if time allows, to seize the nearest permanent bridge so that communications can be re-established on a reliable basis.

Once reliable communications are re-established, the river-crossing phase of operations is complete.



CASE STUDY: Aspern Essling

With Vienna now under his control, Napoleon wanted to cross the Danube as quickly as possible in order to forestall the Austrian Army's arrival on the opposite bank, and to defeat that Army wherever it might be found. But that was just the problem as the Tabor bridge at Vienna had been demolished beyond repair and Hiller's VI Corps already controlled the left bank from its base on the Bisamberg, just upstream from Vienna. The first attempted crossing at Schwarze Lackenau resulted in a French disaster and the loss of 700 men. A new crossing place was needed, and the only practical site near Vienna was at Kaiser Ebersdorf. However, the lack of a bridging train, or even boats, anchors, and cordage meant that construction could not begin until the night of May 18th. By then, Charles and the main body of the Austrian Army had arrived in the vicinity of the Marchfeld.

The resulting battle is known as Aspern Essling. This crossing became a disaster when the bridges were swept away, first by rising flood and then by fireships.

March Rates in TLNB

Kevin Zucker

I have been thinking a lot lately about the basic parameters of the game as a possible insight into the pace of operations on June 15th. Should infantry really be able to cover 8 hexes of road, turn after turn? Or is that rate unrealistic?

The average walking pace for a fit person who is not carrying any weight is about 3 mph. At 4200 yards our game allows infantry to march 2.39 mph on roads in road march.

$$525 \text{ yds} \times 8 = 4200 \text{ yds} / \text{hr} = 2.39 \text{ mph}$$

If you ask an infantry soldier, two and a half miles per hour is a realistic speed for a grunt carrying his own kit. It also allows for halts and unexpected stops. The *halte des pipes* was 5 minutes on the hour.

The fastest route march for troops on the march was 90 paces per minute. When Marshal Lannes's corps crossed into Poland they increased to a route march between 85 and 90 paces a minute.

$$90 \times 55 \text{ min} = 4950 \text{ paces} / \text{hour}$$

I take a pace as 5/6 of a yd.—4125 yards / hour

$$525 \text{ yards} / \text{hex} = 7.87 \text{ hexes} / \text{hour}$$

The game's 8-hex Movement Allowance allows troops to travel 91.5 paces per minute if they move all 8 hexes on the road. Eighty-five paces versus 91.5 doesn't sound like a great difference, but it might not have been maintained for Lannes's whole 30 kilometer march to Stargard in unknown hostile territory, with all the incumbent delays, alarms, and confusion.

Lannes's thirty kilometers is a long march for one day; 22 was the normal day's march (Napoleon's dividers were set to 7 to 8 leagues.)

The men needed a whole day off every third or fourth day, or indeed as many halts as possible. In most battle games you aren't moving at top speed very long.

The 8-hex march rate was considered burst-speed, not a long-term moving average. On the 15th of June 1815, if we don't have any Prussian roadblocks, then we see the French fantassins burning up the macadam. A normal days march of 22 km could be made by our cardboard foot-sloggers marching flat out in TLNB in under 6 hours.

$$22 \text{ km} / 13.75 \text{ miles} / 46 \text{ hexes} / 5.76 \text{ turns}$$

That is the intersection of the theoretical maximum and the practical average. Now none of this matters in a one-day battle game. You can see that the problem becomes noticeable only when you have these columns going across whole



map sections. A 22 km march will take you from Charleroi well into the Forêt de Soignes. In TLNB, uncomplaining cardboard ends up moving their theoretical maximum.

The first step to regulate this would be to take away the March Orders available to the French on the 15th. That way forces would either have to be under command or move by initiative.

The effect of the windings of the roads deduct 20% when counting paces. There have to be some allowances from the theoretical rate for other kinds of obstructions. The Prussians built several roadblocks that it took the French an hour or so to clear. Wagons could be blocking the streets of a town, etc.

The green sketchings on the photo below show the same positions as in the above situation map. The game pieces are superimposed in their 11 AM, 15 June positions. Since we had Regiments and not battalions to deploy, we had to choose

March; Search and Attack; Reconnaissance in Force; Hasty Attack ... just to mention some of the Forms of Maneuver listed in FM 100-5. Similarly, Defensive patterns such as Delaying Action have rarely if ever been seen in a wargame.



one, usually the most forward, of the battalions instead of distributing them "en vedette" as Pirch did.

The III/28 was trapped at Couillet, on the south bank near Châtelet, and surrendered.

Delaying Actions of the Prussians

How many games do you know that involve a delaying action like June 15th? Gamers have generally been presented with only one kind of battle situation: a relatively balanced set-piece with the units all lined up and ready to crash into each other. Heretofore game designers have avoided any other kind of situation except for the major clash. There have been precious few games covering a Movement to Contact; Approach

This distortion of history can leave players without any tools when they are faced with a delaying action. So we want to develop some guidelines and I thought that Zieten's orders (below) would be a good place to start.

Delaying actions are not generally a part of the basic wargamer's toolkit, which tends to be focused on aggressiveness, moving quickly to engage the enemy. When confronted with a very unbalanced situation, Joe gamer tends to overreact and run at top speed in the opposite direction. In taking flight so quickly, he overlooks opportunities to show single acts of courage in important choke points, forcing the enemy to deploy to shoe-horn him out. He then should seize the opportunity to retire upon a prepared position where another unit or two awaits their comrade further back. A phased withdrawal such

as the plan devised by the I Corps of Zieten, should be used on such occasions. The outposts were to fall back on their battalions, battalions upon their regiments, and regiments upon their brigade concentration points.

Orders given by Lt Gen von Zieten, commanding the 1st Prussian Corps d'armee, on the 2nd May, 1815, to be acted upon by his brigadiers in case of the enemy's attack.

Should the enemy advance by Binche or Maubeuge, and compel the advanced posts to retire, the brigades of the corps will assemble in the following manner:

- The 1st brigade in rear of Fontaine l'Evêque (west of Courcelle)—*off map*
- The 2nd brigade in rear of Charleroi
- The 3rd brigade in rear of Fleurus
- The 4th brigade in rear of Onoz
- The Reserve Cavalry in rear of Gembloux, where it will receive further orders.
- The Reserve-artillery in rear of Egheze.

The 2nd brigade will leave a battalion at each of the points, Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne, upon which the advanced posts can fallback, and the 1st brigade will leave 2 companies at Fontaine l'Evêque for a like purpose.

The remainder of these orders can be read here...

<http://www.mocavo.com/History-of-the-War-in-France-and-Belgium-in-1815-Containing-Minute-Details-of-the-Battles-of-Quatre-Bras-Ligny-Wavre-and-Waterloo/492261/625>

The 1 and 2 brigades deployed rearguards of perhaps battalion size or even less, often with hussar squadrons to support the infantry. This is at a level below the representation in TLNB and there are more roads and crossings than the Prussians can cover especially once they lose a few units.

As shown on the sketch above, there were nine units of battalion size or smaller in the Prussian deployment. What Derek and I decided to do was to advantage the Prussian player by giving him the credit for managing the calling-in of the battalions already at the start of play (11 AM). I

think they had achieved this to a degree by that hour, but several battalions were still out until about 2 PM. That is, our set-up has the Prussians more concentrated than the sketches show.

The alternative was to create "roadblocks" of company size with their own rules. As you can see from Zieten's orders, the roadblocks are not intended to operate independently but rather as an extended ZOC cast over a wide area. As soon as the enemy appears, they are to rejoin their regiments, and the Prussians, as shown at left, had drawn up in advance where the units were to concentrate. In the game as published we have taken all this burden off the player and just set things up with the regiments intact. This makes the Prussian player's task of delaying somewhat harder than it would have been with the additional roadblock markers on the board.

**NOTE ON BAGGAGE TRAINS
WHY DO WE HAVE THEM?**

The purpose of the baggage trains is to provide a convenient way to describe the most vulnerable point in the army; so that when enemy forces arrive at that point, it is a morale crisis for the troops. That is not because they care about their wagons per se, but that this vulnerable point indicated by the baggage train is usually placed in the back of the army, on the way that the men have just marched. So it is an abstraction, not literally a flock of wagons but more like a "railhead."




Expedient Obstacles

A Roadblock should probably (realistically) be done only by infantry, not cavalry or artillery, and would probably require a battalion of, say, 500 men to accomplish the work. US Army FM 5-102 says an abatis can be constructed rapidly using demolition to fell trees.

Counter mobility

Expedient obstacles are basically created by using what nature has placed in the area. Imagination and ingenuity are the key factors in successfully constructing and employing expedient obstacles. The possibilities for expedient obstacle creation are almost endless. A few of the more obvious are:

- Abatis.
- Log obstacles (including hurdles, cribs, and posts).
- Rubble.
- Broken vehicles and battle-damaged equipment.
- Flooding.
- Fires.



ABATIS

An abatis is an effective obstacle against vehicles in a heavily-wooded area with few roads or trails. An abatis can be constructed

rapidly using demolition to fell trees. The trees should be felled at a 45-degree angle to the road or trail. The tree should remain attached to the stump to make the obstacle more effective and difficult to clear.

Troops have to cut down a lot of trees in order for it to take half a turn's move (for infantry) to remove it—somewhere between 15-30 minutes. Let's say they have 100 men and horses working on clearing the road. How many trees can they clear in 30 minutes. Somewhere between 2-10 trees a minute depending on the size of the tree; i.e., between 30 and 300 trees had to be chopped down. If the axe is sharp, a 12 inch diameter tree can be felled in about 5 minutes. 1 man = 6 trees.

But they have to haul and sometimes stake the poles, hook them up to horses, drag and position them to effectively block the road. And, chopping with an Axe is NOT the traditional way to fell a tree. A cross-cut saw is much more efficient.

Defended Abatis. The purpose of an Abatis in siegcraft is to increase the amount of time that the attackers have to spend in the field of fire. If the Abatis is defended by a small outpost then the effect is much greater. It's not just clearing the obstacle; first they have to assault through the obstruction to remove the enemy fire, and only then can the road-clearing begin.



34.42 Construction (*change*):

Each army can construct up to 3 Roadblocks each Night PM turn, on any road or trail hexside in a defile (34.41), not in EZOCs, within 3 hexes of a friendly *infantry* unit. Each roadblock must trace to a different infantry unit. Construction is automatic—simply place the Hidden Force/Road-block Marker on the map.

Neverovsky's Retreat from Krasnyi

Scenario for Napoleon Against Russia

General Dmitry Neverovsky's division (10 infantry battalions, 4 cavalry squadrons, 3 Cossack regiments, 14 guns, for a total of 9,500 men) was posted west of Smolensk, on the south bank of the Dnieper. His cavalry outposts were at Liady, several miles to the west of Krasnyi, where most of his division was stationed.

Krasnoi lies about 36 hexes off-map to the south and west of the Smolensk map. Neverovsky had been retreating for about five hours by the time he arrived on map. By that point, the French cavalry were exhausted and managed to let the Russians break contact, to set up again at Korytina.

Forces involved in this scenario:

FRENCH: MURAT,
enters on 5 PM with
I Cav Corps 5700 (1 LC, 1 HC, 5 HC)
II Cav Corps 3360 (2 HC, 4 HC)
III Cav Corps 5930 (3 LC, 6 HC)

Note: None of the French HArt is available. All French units enter anywhere on the west mapedge.

NEY enters on 6 PM with 24 Légère, LC of I and II Corps

Württ HArt, Cav. enter on 7 PM

10 ID enters on 9 PM

ALT: #1 2 LC, 3 HC, #2 HArt of the three Cav Corps; #3 accelerate 7 or 9 PM reinf

RUSSIANS: NEVEROVSKY

27ID 5000 (3 Bdes inf, Kharkov D, Pol Uhlands,

Cos, arty Apuchkin)

The Russians set up freely but not closer to Smolensk than the town of Korytina.

ALT: #1 one div of VII Corps (arrives at any gate of Smolensk)

Duration: 14 August 5 PM - Night PM

Victory: The game ends when all Russian units have arrived within 5 hexes of Smolensk, or have been eliminated. Do not score any VPs for locations. Otherwise the game ends at Night.

Cossack patrols told Neverovsky of a large enemy force approaching. The general withdrew his forces from Krasnyi, leaving in the town the 49th Battalion of Jaegers with 2 guns. At dawn on 14 August Murat with three cavalry corps (15 thousand swords) came to the little town and drove out of Lyady troops of Rukkola (the general was wounded). Then Murat's cavalry came to Krasnyi, followed by the infantry of Ney.



Neverovsky formed a square in order of battle in the ravine (about 6 thousand fighters). On the left, he placed 10 guns, covering the Kharkov Dragoon regiment. At the same time, the 50th battalion of Jaegers (Nazimova) with 2 guns had been focused on the road to Smolensk, taking a position behind a stream.

The French stormed the 49th battalion left in Krasnyi. A few light companies under the supervision of Ney entered the town and drove out the jaegers, capturing two guns. Then part of the French cavalry went around the left flank of Neverovsky's position. His dragoons went to the counter charge, but were overturned by superior forces and suffered huge losses. They were required to pull back along the Smolensk road. The French captured 5 guns, while others were able to go straight for the dragoons.

As a result, Neverovsky was left with only infantry. Before him was the main body of the column of Ney, huge masses of French cavalry appearing in the rear. He decided to retreat to Smolensk. He marshalled his forces in dense columns and began to move. The general reminded the men how they should act, "Guys, remember what you were taught, no horse can overcome you: the one firing is not in a hurry, shoot straight and slow." As the French cavalry was on the attack, the division stopped and Neverovsky heard shots. All the area around the

out into the open before a settlement where they had to cross a fence.

By evening, the division came to a position where friendly guns were protected by jaegers. Artillery fire and darkness halted the enemy attack, and the weary division was able to stay at Korytyna. The Russians had lost about 1,500 people, including 800 prisoners. The French lost 500 men killed and wounded. Contemporaries noted this fight as a beautiful example of a well-trained infantry action against enemy cavalry. Count



tower was covered with corpses and wounded. The French division wrapped around the rear and 2-sides, but it could not smash through. "All right, guys!" — shouted Neverovsky. The soldiers replied, "Glad to be here! Hurrah! "

The defense was promoted by a broad mail road, lined on both sides with ditches and trees. The French could not organize a huge attack in front. In addition, the French cavalry was not strong in artillery to upset the ranks of Neverovsky's Division (the French horse artillery had been delayed at the defile before Krasnyi). Murat's cavalry was able to cut off and destroy only a small part of the division when the men came

Segur wrote: "Neverovsky retreated like a lion." A fight that delayed the French arrival at Smolensk, allowing Barclay to reach the city first, became one of the most memorable actions of the Russian war of 1812.

Prince Bagration, soon to fall in this campaign, wrote to the Emperor: "We cannot sufficiently praise the courage and firmness with which the division, absolutely brand new, fought against overwhelmingly superior forces of the enemy. You might even say that such an example of courage has no match. "

The Ultimate Gamble: *the Grand Campaign*

Guy De Frances

Upon conclusion of my solo play and study of NLG's Grand Campaign, some numbers:

The "score", at the end of the campaign, was 111-104 in favor of the allies. One thing I didn't realize until I ran the final tally was that for the French to garner a win they need to have a ratio of at least 1.5 : 1. If the allies notch one VP more than the French, they get the victory; anything in between is a draw. I don't think this would have influenced anything I did, but in a game with a live opponent it is something to keep in mind. The daily VP tally played out as follows (French : Allies); it see-sawed each day.

June 15 8:30 Strategic Allied

June 16 46:-2 Strategic French

June 17 7:19 Strategic Allied

June 18 40:30 Marginal French

June 19 3:34 Strategic Allied

TOTAL 104:111 Allied Victory


As far as losses go, the French lost 45 SP's and the Allies 112. Slightly more than half of the allied losses were incurred on June 16, mostly around Ligny. Units that ended up PEU don't tell the whole story on losses. Many units ended the game on their reduced side. At game end 22 of 38 French brigades were reduced (57%) and 18 of 31 Prussians were reduced (58%). 80% of the surviving French cavalry units were reduced, and 45% of all British units were reduced.

When I started the game I wanted to see if the French could seize Bruxelles by the 19th. I strengthened the French left with Vandamme's III Corp and moved Lobau's VI Corp to the right, thinking that by strengthening the left wing the French would have a better opportunity to defeat the A-A

forces blocking their direct route north. This would also let me explore fighting delaying actions, since I assumed the right wing, once the battles around Ligny were over, would be act as a holding force against the Prussians. NLG gives you several opportunities to explore rear guard and delaying actions if you are interested.

As it turned out, throughout the course of the game outnumbered forces were able to successfully delay superior numbers for lengthy periods of time. Elements of Prussian I Corps delayed the French advance between Gilly and Fleurus for many hours on the 15th. IV Corps (Gerard) and VI Corp (Lobau) kept much larger Prussians forces at bay for all of the 18th, although they took many losses doing so. Likewise, Prussian III Corps held off French efforts to interfere with the movement of Prussian troops north to Bruxelles for most of the 19th.

Command is at the core of the LNB system, and my study bore that out. Early on the French



drew both the Davout and Soult cards, which allowed far greater control over the Armee du Nord than occurred historically. (There is a House Rule making these cards mutually exclusive. I took Davout out on the 18th and put Ney back in light of that House Rule.) The A-A forces start with plenty of commanders and leaders, but in my study both Hill and Pr. William ended up being lost on the 18th. 4 or 5 other A-A leaders also fell during between the 16th and 18th. Wellington has enough command points to handle the A-A on his own, but losing Hill and Pr. William meant having to be very careful with Wellington's placement, and by extension unit placement, on the 18th and 19th. It made it nearly impossible to take advantage of the Wellington card, which the Allies drew mid-game. For the Prussians it goes without saying you have to protect Blucher; without him you are stuck making initiative rolls.

In future games I would like to further explore the nuances of conducting battles within the NLB system. Artillery is important to any attacker's success; Napoleon's maxim "it is with artillery that one makes war", is true in the NLB games. When the French were able to bombard they were usually able to generate offensive momentum. If the weather turned, and bombardment became impossible, offensive movement sputtered. The same problem arose when Wellington hid units behind crests, and out of LOS of the French artillery. Proper artillery placement, along with card play, is the only way to avoid a trip to the UAR box when forced to retreat through enemy ZOC's. The grand battery card, which I had originally thought of as an offensive tool, is arguable more valuable as a defensive card. One situation I learned to avoid, if possible, is dispersing a corps formation. Early on I moved elements of the Guard to assist with the attack on Ligny and was not able to gather the Guard together for the remainder of the game. The Prussian IV Corps also got

divided at one point. Sometimes you may have to split a formation, but it creates command problems, especially for the Prussians with their low initiative units.

Returning to my original question, can Bruxelles be taken by the French? I think it would take a crushing victory over the Prussians on the 16th to achieve that. One revelation in NLG was seeing just how many Prussian units were engaged in 1815. What the Prussians lack in quality, as expressed in moral and command, they make up for in sheer quantity. On a replay, I think I would throw as many forces against the Prussians on the 16th as possible, and pursue them as necessary on the 17th. Napoleon knew he had to defeat the allies in detail, and if you can't smash the Prussians on the 16th an ultimate French victory is going to be elusive.

If you haven't had a chance to get NLG on your table try to do so. It is a comprehensive exploration of the Waterloo campaign, brings to light the issues and decisions that the commanders on each side had to make, and is just plain fun to play.



DEVELOPMENT NOTES:

Napoleon's Spanish OrBat

Derek Lang, Kevin Zucker, David Jones

Most gamers will have access to Oman's massive multi-volume history of the Peninsular War. A great work of history, it has one blindspot when it comes to the information presented about the Spanish Armies. I wrote to Derek with a series of questions, mainly pointing out where Oman's information differed from Derek's OrBat. My queries are in italic.

Spanish Baggage Trains: my suggestion is to double the quantity (2 per army).

We actually already have 2 trains for use at Ocaña, and we only really need one each for Medellin and Almonacid (smaller battles), but we could certainly add another one for Talavera. We currently have 3 baggage trains on the xls, but we could increase that to 4 as follows:

Army of Extremadura Train-a: used at Medellin and Talavera

Army of Extremadura Train-b: only used at Talavera

Army of La Mancha Train: used at Almonacid and Ocaña

Army of the Centre Train: only used at Ocaña
So we would have one train at the smaller battles (Medellin and Almonacid) where the Spanish Army only has 5 formations, and two trains at the larger battles (Talavera and Ocaña) where they have 8 or 9 formations. I think that would work well.

Oman has Rgt Osuna with Montes instead of Bassecourt

Spanish sources don't agree on this, but I think the evidence points more towards Rgt Osuna being with Bassecourt. They are listed among the regiments that accompanied Alburquerque from Andalucia, and it doesn't appear that any of those units were transferred to other formations until after the battle of Medellin, at which point Rgt Osuna transferred to Portago's 3rd Division (where I have them in Montoya's brigade at Talavera).

Oman has Rgt. Mérida with 2 Div.

I have Rgt Merida listed as part of Ibeagh's

brigade of 2nd Division (scroll along to the right and you will see it there).

Oman has Rgt. Cordoba not with Montoya

Sañudo says that they were there. This is an example of Lipscombe's orbat differing from Sañudo's, despite Lipscombe claiming to have used Sañudo as a source.

Oman has 9 bns with Alburquerque

Sañudo says 5 bns, and Lopez Fernandez (my other source for Medellin) says 7 bns, I went with Lopez Fernandez in this instance because I believe he is correct to place Rgt Osuna in Alburquerque's Division (see above). Oman lists the Tiradores de Castilla (a Light Infantry Rgt) as having 3 bns, but Spanish Light Infantry Regiments only consisted of a single battalion. If Lipscombe had correctly listed the Tiradores de Castilla with 1 bn instead of 3 (as the Spanish sources do) then he would have the correct total (7 bns).

Oman has Rgt. Cuenca with Ortiz

Spanish sources differ on this. The two sources I used for Ocaña were Vela Santiago and Juarez & Ruiz. Both have good orbats, but they do have some minor differences. There are a few regiments listed in Juarez & Ruiz which Vela Santiago says were not present. Vela Santiago's book is more recent and his orbat is more detailed, so I have generally followed his version.

Oman has Chinchilla with Ortiz at Ocaña

Spanish sources agree that the Chinchilla Provincial Militia was in Carbajal's brigade of Lacy's 1st Division.

Oman has Rgt España-2 with Ortiz instead of -1

Spanish sources agree that the correct disposition should be 1st España (1) in Lacy's 1st Division, and 2nd España (2) in Zerain's 5th Division, which is what I have. However, I did omit to distinguish between the 1st and 2nd regiments (now corrected).

Oman has 4 guns instead of 6 guns in 1, 2, 3 and 5 Divs.

Sources disagree. I don't think there is a definitive version of the disposition of batteries or total number of guns for the Spanish artillery at Ocaña. Vela Santiago says there were 48 guns, Juarez & Ruiz say 60. In the end I compromised and gave them 54. The sources agree there were 30 guns at Almonacid.

4th Division is missing Guardias, Bujalance, Reales Españoles

The Spanish sources agree that the Royal Guard (*Reales Guardias Españolas*) were in the 3rd Division, not the 4th. The Bujalance Provincial Militia is there and I have listed them.

5th Division is missing Cordoba, Carmona

Spanish sources are in complete agreement that Rgt Cordoba 1st Bn was in 1st Division, 2nd Bn was in 3rd Division, 3rd Bn was in 4th Division (exactly as I have it). The Carmona Light Infantry Regiment was definitely in the 1st Division, not the 5th.

6th Div missing Ecija, Alpujarras at Ocaña

Spanish sources disagree. Juarez & Ruiz list those regiments in their orbat, but Vela Santiago says they were not there. In these cases I have followed Vela Santiago, for the reasons I already mentioned.

Oman has Alonso with Badajoz instead of Salamanca Prov Mil

Spanish sources disagree. Juarez & Ruiz list the Badajoz Provincial Militia, but the entry is marked "?" as with several regiments they are not sure about. Vela Santiago lists the Salamanca Provincial Militia (not Badajoz) so again, I have followed his version.

Gelo (cavalry officer) add for Ocaña

The organization of the Spanish cavalry at Ocaña is exactly as I have it on the xls. Juarez & Ruiz and Vela Santiago are in complete agreement that there are four divisions commanded by Bernuy, Rivas, March and Osorio, all under the overall command of Freire. I think you might have meant to say Almonacid rather than Ocaña, in which case see the next reply.

Add two units for Almonacid: March and Osorio (under Zolina)

March and Osorio commanded two of the cavalry divisions at Ocaña, neither of them was present at Almonacid. In his entry for Almonacid (page 141 of the *Peninsular War Atlas*) Lipscombe shows the Spanish cavalry divided into three distinct groups. I'm going to call those Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3. Group 1 is Zolina's brigade of two regiments. Group 2 consists of four regiments with Girón, and group 3 consists of a so-called division under "Gelo".

Every one of those units is present in our orbat. Group 1 is Chacón's brigade of Vigodet's 2nd Division. Group 2 is Ibarra's brigade of Girón's 3rd Division, and Group 3 is Tabernier's brigade of Lacy's 1st Division and Negrillo's brigade of Zerain's 5th Division. Every one of the units is there, nothing is missing.

There is no evidence in the Spanish sources (that I have seen) to support the organization proposed by Lipscombe. It may well be that the units were deployed on the field in the positions that Lipscombe shows on his map, but the actual command structure was not (as far as I can tell).

Add arty unit (Park) 16 guns at Ocaña

Juarez & Ruiz actually says that the reserve guns were distributed among the batteries of the infantry divisions to strengthen them. That is another reason why I have all of the batteries with 6 guns at Ocaña. Vela Santiago also mentions this, but he says that 2 guns remained in reserve along with the "*carros de municiones, todo el equipaje y la caja del ejercito*" which I translate as "ammunition wagons, all the baggage and train of the army." So I think the "Park" really only consisted of ammunition wagons, caissons, baggage etc.

Strength totals:

Medellin, Derek has 25,500, Oman has 32,000 Ocaña, Derek has 44,500, Oman has 57,922.

For Ocaña, my total is actually 51,000 (44,500 is just the infantry). The Spanish sources disagree a bit. Juarez & Ruiz say 57,900 based on Sañudo (same source used by Lipscombe). Vela Santiago says 51,000 based on a wider range of sources and his own archive research (which is why I trust him more).

UNIT COMMANDERS IN 1809, David L Jones

Dave weighs-in with his own research on unit commanders.

My goal is the best OOB ever on this period. I do not think anyone has come close. If I “concur,” I have documentation that the commander is correct. By “somewhat concur,” nothing I know disputes the commander.

1) Ruffin's Div:

- a. Barrois: concur
- b. La Bruyere: Although he was my previous commander, it looks like he wasn't there... because he was dead! Killed in Madrid in December 1808. Candidates to replace him:
 - i. Chaudron-Rosseau: was a GdB who was distinguished at Talavera, and later at Barrosa commanded a small brigade including the 96e Ligne (acc. to Lipscombe). Thiers mentions “General C-R” as leading a charge including the 16e Legere which is Laplane's Div.
 - ii. Meunier, CM: Col in command of 9e Legere at Talavera, later at Barrosa may have commanded a small brigade including the 54e Ligne (acc. to Lipscombe)

2) Lapisse's Div:

- a. Laplane: concur (I believe this is correct spelling; I have been using “Laplannes” all these years)
- b. Solignac: somewhat concur; have found no better information

3) Villatte's Div:

- a. Cassagne: concur
- b. Puthod: I have long suspected I had had this wrong for years. Apparently he was recalled to Paris in March of 1809 for service with Army of Germany. Candidates to replace him:
 - i. Peschaux: Col in command of 95e Ligne at Talavera, later at Barrosa commanded a small brigade including the 27e Ligne (acc. to Lipscombe)
 - ii. Meunier St. Clair: Col in command of 63e Ligne at Talavera, later at Barrosa may have commanded a small brigade including the 54e Ligne (acc. to Lipscombe)

4) I Corps Cavalry:

- a. Beaumont: concur
- b. Subervie: concur

5) Sebastiani's Div:

- a. Toussaint: I see what you are doing here, “promoting” Rey to Div command and

promoting Toussaint to brigade command. I have no problem with that

b. Liger-Belair: concur**6) Valence/Werle's Div:**

- a. 4th Regt: concur
- b. Potocki: Not sure what to do here. Potocki seems to have been disabled at Almonacid. Was he just regiment commander or brigade commander? Smith says FPF Vonderveldt was brigade commander. I discount this because he was taken prisoner in April.
- c. Sulkowski: Smith says Blondeau was commander. French wiki says he was GdB at Ocana, so I am inclined to go that way.

7) Leval's Div:

- a. Porbeck/Kruse: concur
- b. Schafer: concur
- c. Chasse: concur

8) Merlin's Div:

- a. Strolz: concur
- b. Paris: concur
- c. Ormancy: concur

9) Girard's Div:

- a. Chauvel: concur (Note: Steven Smith's OOB agrees)
- b. Remond: I believe what you've done here is identify the senior colonel present and designate him as brigade commander. I prefer Vielande, who was confirmed to be in command of a brigade during the battle and can't be tied to any other brigade.

10) Gazan's Div:

- a. Lagarde: I believe what you've done here is identify the senior colonel present and designate him as brigade commander. I prefer Pepin, who was confirmed to be in command of a brigade during the battle and later commanded this brigade at Albuera
- b. Quiot: I believe what you've done here is identify the senior colonel present and designate him as brigade commander. I prefer Brayer, who was confirmed to be in command of a brigade in Gazan's Div during the battle and later commanded this brigade at Albuera

11) Beauregard's Div: Check spelling, it may be “Beurgard” aka “Woirgard”

- a. Briche: concur
- b. Vial: Sebastien Vial commanded a brigade at Ocana, but it was a dragoon brigade. This brigade doesn't fit any OOB I have seen including Steven Smith's. What to do?

(continued on page 11)