

# Wargame Design

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Summer 2017

THE MIND OF NAPOLEON

“I have only one counsel for you—be master.”

”



**NEW FROM OSG**

*Napoleon's Quagmire, 1809*

*Napoleon's Resurgence, 1813*

## Wargame Design, Summer 2017

Editor-Publisher: Kevin Zucker

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### NAPOLEON'S RESURGENCE, 1813

Publication Date: 10 February 2018


### On the cover:

*The Meeting of Napoleon I and Francis II after the Battle of Austerlitz.*

## WARGAME DESIGN

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## Napoleon's Maxims (Part II)

In this issue we are presenting a second selection of *Maxims*, that was added to the 5<sup>th</sup> French edition of *Maxims* in 1874. These additional 37 Maxims did not appear in an English language edition until 1940 (most editions today are still printed without them).

**TAKING STOCK:** Here at the start of the next project, *Napoleon's Resurgence*, it is time to pause and reflect on what we have done in the past year. I used to have a place in Baltimore where I would go and sit and ponder the next game, sitting under a row of 12 mature Oaks. Those trees have a lot of history and a lot of presence in them. Putting together this issue has allowed me to reflect on our successes and failures. In a recent interview with Christopher Moeller, I had the opportunity to reflect, as well, on this whole journey and what it has meant.

For all these years I have always had something that provides a wellspring of creativity, like a real spring of cold clear water you can drink. If you find one of those spots you can become a feature in the landscape providing refreshment for all who come around.

Both music and game design are that wellspring for me. I don't have to choose between them. That was a wrong idea I once had.

—Kevin Zucker

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## Official “Second Part” of the *Maxims of Napoleon*

*In addition to the 78 Maxims of the original edition, another 37 Maxims were added to the 5<sup>th</sup> French edition, printed in 1874, and these remain unknown in most English editions.*

The first principle of a general-in-chief is to calculate what he must do, to see if he has all the means to surmount the obstacles with which the enemy can oppose him and, when he has made his decision, to do everything to overcome them. [LXXIX]

The art of a general of the advance guard or of the rear guard is, without compromising himself, to contain the enemy, to delay him and to force him to take three or four hours to advance a mile. Tactics supplies the only means to attain such great results. It is more necessary for the cavalry than for the infantry, for an advance guard or for a rear guard, than for any other position. [LXXX]

It is exceptional and difficult to find all the qualities of a great general combined in one man. What is most desirable and distinguishes the exceptional man, is the balance of intelligence and ability with character or courage. If courage is predominant, the general will hazard far beyond his conceptions; and on the contrary, he will not dare to accomplish his conceptions if his character or his courage are below his intelligence. [LXXXI]

With a great general there is never a continuity of great actions which can be attributed to chance and good luck; they always are the result of calculation and genius. [LXXXII]

A general-in-chief should never allow any rest either to the conquerors or to the conquered. [LXXXIII]

An irresolute general who acts without principles and without plan, even though he lead an army numerically superior to that of the enemy, almost always finds himself inferior to the latter on the field of battle. Fumblings, the *mezzo termine* (the middle course) lose all in war. [LXXXIV]

A general of engineers who must conceive, propose and direct all the fortifications of an army, needs good judgment and a practical mind above all. [LXXXV]

A cavalry general should be a master of practical science, know the value of seconds, despise life and not trust to chance. [LXXXVI]

A general in the power of the enemy has no more orders to give: whoever obeys him is a criminal. [LXXXVII]

The heavy cavalry should be with the advance guard, with the rear guard and on the wings and in reserve to support the light cavalry. [LXXXVIII]

To wish to hold the cavalry in reserve for the end of the battle, is to have no idea of the power of combined cavalry and infantry charges either for attack or for defense. [LXXXIX]

The power of cavalry is in its impulsion. But it is not only its velocity that insures success: it is order, formation and proper employment of reserves. [XC]

The cavalry should compose a quarter of the army in Flanders or Germany; in the Pyrenees or in the Alps, a twentieth; in Italy or in Spain, a sixth. [XCI]

In a battle like in a siege, skill consists in converging a mass of fire on a single point: once the combat is opened, the commander who is adroit will suddenly and unexpectedly open fire with a surprising mass of artillery on one of these points, and is sure to seize it. [XCII]

The better the infantry is, the more it should be used carefully and supported with good batteries. Good infantry is, without doubt, the sinew of an army; but if it is forced to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, it will become demoralized and will be destroyed. It is possible that a general who is more skillful and a better maneuverer than his adversary, having better infantry, will gain success during a part of the campaign although his artillery park is very inferior; but, on a decisive day in a

general action, he will feel his inferiority in artillery cruelly. [XCIII]

A good army of 35.000 men should in a few days, especially when supported by a fortress or a large river, make its camp unassailable by an army double in force. [XCIV]

War is composed of nothing but accidents, and, although holding to general principles, a general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from these accidents; that is the mark of genius. In war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it. [XCV]

A general who retains fresh troops for the day after a battle is almost always beaten. He should, if helpful, throw in his last man, because on the day after a complete success there are no more obstacles in front of him; prestige alone will insure new triumphs to the conqueror. [XCVI]

The rules of fighting require that a part of an army should avoid fighting alone against an entire army that has already been successful. [XCVII]

When a general has laid siege to a place by surprise and has gained a few days on his adversary, he should profit from this by covering himself with lines of circumvallation; from this moment he will have improved his position and will have acquired a new element of power and a new degree of force in the general framework of affairs. [XCVIII]

In war the commander of a fortress is not a judge of events; he should defend the fortress to the last; he deserves death if he surrenders it a moment before he is forced to. [XCIX]

100 – Agreements to surrender made by surrounded bodies, either during a battle or during an active campaign, are contracts with all the advantageous clauses in favor of the individuals who contract them, and all the onerous clauses against the prince and the other soldiers of the army. To avoid peril oneself, while making the position of the rest more dangerous, is an act of cowardice. [C]

Defensive war does not exclude attacking, just as offensive war does not exclude defending,

although its aim may be to force the frontier and invade the enemy's country. [CI]

The art of war indicates that it is necessary to turn or envelop a wing without separating the army. [CII]

When they are thoroughly understood, field fortifications are always useful and never injurious. [CIII]

An army can march anywhere and at any time of the year, wherever two men can place their feet. [CIV]

Conditions of the ground should not alone decide the organization for combat, which should be determined from consideration of all circumstances. [CV]

Flank marches should be avoided; and when they must be undertaken, they should be as short as possible and made with the greatest speed. [CVI]

Nothing can be designed better to disorganize and destroy an army than pillage. [CVII]

Praise from enemies is suspicious; it cannot flatter an honorable man unless it is given after the cessation of hostilities. [CVIII]

Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they all are under the safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them. [CIX]

Conquered provinces should be maintained in obedience to the conquerors by moral means, such as the responsibility of local governments and the method of organization and administration. Hostages are among the most powerful means; but to be effective, they should be many and chosen from the preponderant elements, and the people must be convinced that immediate death of the hostages will follow violation of their pledges. [CX]

The geographical conditions of a country, life in plains or mountains, education or discipline, have more influence than climate on the character of the troops. [CXI]

All great captains have done great things only by conforming to the rules and natural principles of the art; that is to say, by the wisdom of their combinations, the reasoned

balance of means with consequences, and efforts with obstacles. They have succeeded only by thus conforming, whatever may have been the audacity of their enterprises and the extent of their success. They have never ceased to make war a veritable science. It is only under this title that they are our great models, and it is only in imitating them that one can hope to approach them. [CXII]

The first law of naval tactics should be that as soon as the admiral has given the signal that he is going to attack, each captain should make the necessary movements to attack an enemy ship, take part in the combat and support his neighbors. [CXIII]

War on land, in general, consumes more men than naval warfare; it is more dangerous. The sailor in a fleet fights but once during a campaign; the ground soldier fights every day. The sailor, whatever may be the fatigues and dangers of the sea, suffers much less than the soldier: he is never hungry nor thirsty; he always has a place to sleep, his kitchen, his hospital and his pharmacy. There are fewer sick in the English and French fleets, where discipline maintains cleanliness and experience has discovered all the means of preserving health, than in armies. Besides the perils of battle, the sailor risks those of tempests; but seamanship has so much diminished the latter that it cannot be compared with those on land, such as popular uprisings, partial assassinations and surprises by hostile light troops. [CXIV]

An admiral commanding a fleet and a general commanding an army are men who need different qualities. One is born with the qualities proper to command an army, while the necessary qualities to command a fleet are acquired only by experience. The art of war on land is an art of genius, of inspiration. On the sea everything is definite and a matter of experience. The admiral needs only one science, navigation. The general needs all or a talent equal to all, that of profiting by all experience and all knowledge. An admiral needs to divine nothing; he knows where his enemy is and he knows his strength. A general never knows anything with certainty, never sees his enemy clearly and never knows positively where he is.

When armies meet, the least accident of the terrain, the smallest wood, hides a portion of the army. The most experienced eye cannot state whether he sees the entire enemy army or only three quarters of it. It is by the eyes of the mind, by reasoning over the whole, by a species of inspiration that the general sees, knows and judges. The admiral needs only an experienced glance; nothing of the enemy force is hidden from him. What makes the general's function difficult is the necessity of nourishing so many men and animals; if he permits himself to be guided by administrators, he will never budge and his expeditions will fail. The admiral is never bothered since he carries everything with him. An admiral has neither reconnaissances to make, terrain to examine nor fields of battle to study. Indian Ocean, American Ocean or North Sea – it is always a liquid plain. The most skillful will have no advantage over the least, except for his knowledge of prevailing winds in such and such coastal waters, by foresight of those which should prevail or by atmospheric signs: qualities which are acquired by experience and by experience only.

The general never knows the field of battle on which he may operate. His understanding is that of inspiration; he has no positive information; data to reach a knowledge of localities are so contingent on events that almost nothing is learned by experience. It is a faculty to understand immediately the relations of the terrain according to the nature of different countries; it is, finally, a gift, called a *coup d'oeil militaire* (the ability to take in the military situation at a glance) which great generals have received from nature. However the observations that can be made from topographic maps and the facility which education and habit give in reading maps, can be of some assistance. An admiral depends more on the captains of his ships than a general on his generals. The latter has the opportunity to take direct command of the troops himself, to move to any point and to repair false movements. An admiral can influence personally only the men on the vessel on which he finds himself; smoke prevents signals from being seen and winds change or vary over the space occupied by his line. It is thus of all professions that in which subalterns should use the largest initiative. [CXV]

## DESIGN FILES

## Principles of Design

*Design is the creation of a plan or convention for the construction of an object, system or measurable human interaction. Design has different connotations in different fields. In some cases, the direct construction of an object is also considered to be design. Designing often necessitates considering the aesthetic, economic, and sociopolitical dimensions of both the object and design process. It may involve considerable research, thought, modeling, re-design.*

Redmond Simonsen is my inspiration as well the one who encouraged me to leave the path of music and concentrate on games. (See old OSG discussion about Redmond at the link.) <http://archive.li/jEtUy>

Redmond had a corner office at SPI, overlooking busy 23rd St and Park Ave South. He had a large drafting table with a bright swivel-arm light above it that was always on, where he worked on cover designs. He had a portable desk with a typewriter, generally with a piece of paper in the carriage. He had a couch that he slept on during deadlines and a gaming table with a box of dice next to it. He went through a lot of dice in one game. He made up his own words to Tin Pan Alley songs and sang them loudly. He liked technological gadgets and always had an expensive camera lying around. He was just a little too serious about everything. But he was reliable and I never saw him lose his temper. I probably would have had a meltdown myself if I had ever witnessed it. He was a perfectionist. He had bad ideas about nutrition and he was blasé about the environment. He was a materialist and worshipped Science.

I was reading "Black Elk Speaks" and he mocked me, saying that I as a European had no business trying to wear garments that weren't made for me, as if I were betraying my own heritage and background. I should be engaged in building up Western Civilization, not tearing it down or opting out. He persuaded me that the

progress of civilization would inevitably bring solutions to all of the problems inherent in our stage of world history; and I should jump on instead of trying to stop that train.

Redmond would have been 75 this year; he was 10 years my senior and I looked to him as a mentor. Even though I have "disabused" myself (one of his favorite words) of most of his ideas, in the gaming realm he seems to have landed on top of a wellspring of creativity that constantly flows. If you can find that wellspring, what it is for you, then creativity is not a chore—it's just there for you in the morning. Redmond was like that.

His plate was full. He had official tasks within the company, and he had to design a constant stream of products, two magazines, an issue game, a quad game, and one full-sized game every two months. That's five covers, five maps, 3-4 counter sheets, etc.

The issue games and the magazine (S&T) were on a tight schedule, every 60 days. At the same time, the issue game is like your flagship—it has to be the best, to entice the player to buy the other games coming out. I think most players held low expectations of the issue games after "Scrimmage" which was universally reviled. I suppose if you polled the readership they'd say

we only had one hit in six issues. I think the best issue games were the ones we called the "fifth quad," that had the benefit of a series rules folder and just needing minimal playtesting.

SPI started devoting more time for development of issue games, and especially more playtesting. My office, when I became Managing Editor, was

the first door at the entrance to the art department, and that was where the R&D staff brought their finished manuscripts. Whether game rules or magazine articles, I would start a ledger record for that project, and just check off the steps until it was in final paste up, in position on 16-up page forms. I think the issue was 64 pages, so there were 8 big illustration boards of 8-page signatures all laid out in imposition order. With my semi-photographic memory, I could remember every page and what was on it, which helped me a lot at last-minute read-throughs. I always

"Man is a small creature and the Earth is great and enduring albeit prone to dramatic changes and catastrophic shifts. It will be here long after we are gone and it won't miss us much. The political fad misnamed "Environmentalism" is just the old 19<sup>th</sup> Century biblical "subdue the Earth" in new, Green clothing. The Earth is not mankind's theme park."

—RAS 4/9/01

stayed late on the night before our printer would come in to pick up the new job.

As Managing Editor I had to see that the galleys got proofed and the corrections set and pasted in. Each step on the ledger, all the way through.

But the first step was for me to read the game rules and make notes in the m.s. as I went. It usually took me three or four days to go through an entire game, along with whatever other projects were underway. A lot of times, I re-typed the entire rules before handing them over to our typesetter. I found that typing it really forces you to get to grips with the material.

In reading the rules, you would find all sorts of inconsistencies, when paragraphs refer back and forth. My solution there was to state the actual rule only in one place, with the secondary rule simply a paragraph reference. (Sometimes it is unavoidable to elaborate on the procedure in more than one place.)

Redmond came up with starting each Major Section with a General Rule and Procedure. A Procedure explains the actions performed by the player in a step-by-step fashion. Writing it this way challenged the designers to re-examine and reorganize their thoughts.

All of this was to try and ensure that the player could play the game with minimal irritation. I often found that I felt I understood what the designer meant, even if he didn't say that. So I would have a lot of conferences with the designers, or even brief Q&A sessions, when I might be discussing four different projects in succession while a line formed out in the hall.

I felt that I had to be a "player's advocate." Even though I understood what my friend Frank Davis had written, most people don't know Frank, and they might need some help.

At first I worked as a game "developer" myself (as there was only one "designer" in that era). But I quit for a while and when I came back, I was working 4 hours a day at the front desk (and studying music the rest of the time).

Redmond came by the desk and asked me if I wanted something to do in between calls and signing for packages. I think one of my first tasks was to help him install the framed box covers for all the games in the hallway leading to the R&D Department. Soon after he dropped a rules manuscript off and asked me to look at it. It was a

Russia game, by Steve the computer guy (his IBM 3 took up a whole room back then).

The first thing noticed was that the organization of the rules was very poor. The rules were written in a stream of consciousness apparently just as the thought occurred. So I reorganized the rules, unscrambling the ideas and separating them into appropriate subjects.

There were as well a lot of typos and grammatical errors to correct. I developed my own format, and to streamline things I had evolved the standardized "Movement Rules," for one example, so whenever possible I would stick in my standardized paragraphs for how to do Improved Positions or whatever, and this, of course, messed with the designers heads. However, there was a strict hierarchy in the development process at SPI. Once the designer turned over the game, the developer was in charge and made all the decisions. "The designer proposes, the developer disposes," as Jay Nelson put it.

Just like that, when the Art Dept. got a hold of your game, the developer was reduced to an advise and consent role. He absolutely dare not try to add anything – no new last minute ideas. Fix things, edit things, sure, but nothing more. If you polled the designers you'd find a mixed response about my influence on the product. However, I had the support of both principals of the company, Redmond in particular, since he was my direct supervisor, and he approved – mostly.

Even though we didn't talk about it, there were some guiding principles that he promulgated and I respected (see sidebar on next page), even if I kind of chafed under the paragraph numbering and for a while, when at OSG, dropped the case numbering system. But the numbering system is back with TLNB and it really does make things easier for the player. Our system worked the best on games that were of moderate complexity. When the monster games started coming through the pipeline, there were a number of spills. As deadlines came and went for "Highway to the Reich," Terry Hardy chopped a square "window" in the sheet-rock wall between his office and Jay Nelson's, so that they could consult and ask questions as they typed. Terry wrote the odd-numbered major sections, while Jay simultaneously wrote the even-numbered ones. As ridiculous as it sounds, the game was just too big for one person. It had four 22" x 34" maps, 2,400 counters, and 32 pages of rules.

What was much worse, the individual sections were being turned in to me piecemeal and I was expected to turn them over for typesetting as



they came in, without having read the whole rules beforehand. I don't know what major cash-flow crunch caused this stubborn insistence on production, when the games had doubled or tripled in size, without any additional development time. That really pissed me off, and I felt that the result would be a disaster, which it was — it required a second edition. That didn't go on very long, and in January of 1977 I resigned.

After I left I didn't see much of Redmond, visiting him occasionally in his office after the company moved (never auspicious for a publishing company). In this case, the warehouse department was moved to New Jersey, in order to economize on expensive city real estate. Carl Jacobsen, who managed the parts department, was blind. He memorized where all the parts for each game were put on the day they arrived from the printer. After the move he had to make a long commute every day to work, memorizing each step along the way. It must have been a rough transition, and there was a lot of slippage out of that New Jersey facility.

I moved on and used the skills I had honed at SPI to run my own company. At first, I set out to make my mark, adding details like autumn foliage at Leipzig, the Study Folder, including more historical detail, and trying to provide more ways to use the game than just playing it.

Because of computer-aided design now we have the ability to add detailing, such as leader portraits on the counters, that wasn't possible in those days, but the principles haven't changed. Redmond is still hovering over everything we do.

### Redmond's Advice to Graphic Designers

Present the game components to simplify the process of play, facilitate the player interface, and make routine chores less onerous.

According to Simonsen, form follows function. The design is a result of a process of refining player actions to their utmost, and the goal is to maximize playability. There are no extraneous design elements—no decoration for its own sake—only what is needed for play or what enhances play.

The player wants to play the game first and foremost; absorbing the history is the result of play. Decoration is unnecessary information that can distract the player from the information he needs. Some of the worst examples: terrain on the map that has no effect; set-ups that don't allow the player to ignore unit designations.

Redmond goes so far as to suggest using a 4-digit code to identify each unit rather than take up space showing its actual historical designation. Designations of course are one area where OSG has gone our own way, instead of pursuing rigid adherence to utility.

In general, the designer should give the proper weight or emphasis to further the play instead of providing too much "historical flavor." Redmond urges the graphic designer to create hierarchies of information, so that the Strength and Movement numbers on a counter are the most visible; rivers, roads, and objective hexes are similarly prominent on the map. You wouldn't want the terrain patterning to obscure the hex numbers, for example. Redmond wants the player to immediately "grok" the components by their graphics, and he wants all the components to bear a visual relationship to each other so that they all fit together in one coherent whole—functionally and stylistically. That is what he means by emphasizing the difference between "Physical Systems Design," and mere "Graphic Design."

As one recent example at OSG, we needed a new marker for Roadblocks. I wanted to use the most universal symbol for this, the crossing gate arm that has been used at border crossings even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Everyone else in the project demurred. For my second idea, the crossing arm had become a chopped-down tree. Still they felt it was lacking. Finally, Charlie came up with the final design. Does the counter tell you immediately what it is and how to use it? It should.



## The Mind of Napoleon

*In addition to the official 115 Maxims, dozens of Napoleonic quotes continue to circulate on many different subjects. Here is a cross-section on the topics of leadership, the army, and politics.*

There is one kind of robber whom the law does not strike at, and who steals what is most precious to men: time.

Great ambition is the passion of a great character. Those endowed with it may perform very good or very bad acts. All depends on the principles which direct them.

The surest way to remain poor is to be an honest man.

Death is nothing, but to live defeated and inglorious is to die daily.

Glory is fleeting, but obscurity is forever.

Throw off your worries when you throw off your clothes at night.

The best cure for the body is a quiet mind.

Water, air, and cleanliness are the chief articles in my pharmacy.

Music is the voice that tells us that the human race is greater than it knows.

To do all that one is able to do, is to be a man; to do all that one would like to do, is to be a god.

When small men attempt great enterprises, they always end by reducing them to the level of their mediocrity.

Imagination rules the world.

The extent of your consciousness is limited only by your ability to love and to embrace with your love the space around you, and all it contains.

Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide.

The torment of precautions often exceeds the dangers to be avoided. It is sometimes better to abandon one's self to destiny.

Take time to deliberate, but when the time for action has arrived, stop thinking and go in.

He who fears being conquered is sure of defeat.

Impossible is a word to be found only in the dictionary of fools.

Ability is nothing without opportunity.

The truest wisdom is a resolute determination.

I have only one counsel for you—be master.

Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.

One must change one's tactics every ten years if one wishes to maintain one's superiority.

You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.

A leader is a dealer in hope.

When soldiers have been baptized in the fire of a battlefield, they have all one rank in my eyes.

An army marches on its stomach.

The battlefield is a scene of constant chaos. The winner will be the one who controls that chaos, both his own and the enemies.

A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon.

Victory belongs to the most persevering.

The battle of Austerlitz is the grandest of all I have fought.

Soldiers generally win battles; generals get credit for them.

You must not fear death, my lads; defy him, and you drive him into the enemy's ranks.

The army is the true nobility of our country.

History is a set of lies agreed upon.

Skepticism is a virtue in history as well as in philosophy.

If they want peace, nations should avoid the pin-pricks that precede cannon shots.

A revolution is an idea which has found its bayonets.

In politics... never retreat, never retract... never admit a mistake.

A Constitution should be short and obscure.

In order to govern, the question is not to follow out a more or less valid theory but to build with whatever materials are at hand. The inevitable must be accepted and turned to advantage.

The best way to keep one's word is not to give it.

If you wish to be a success in the world, promise everything, deliver nothing.

The strong man is the one who is able to intercept at will the communication between the senses and the mind.

There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.

All religions have been made by men.

Religion is what keeps the poor from murdering the rich.

A man cannot become an atheist merely by wishing it.

If I had to choose a religion, the sun as the universal giver of life would be my god.

There is no such thing as accident; it is fate misnamed.

He who knows how to flatter also knows how to slander.

A true man hates no one.

The people to fear are not those who disagree with you, but those who disagree with you and are too cowardly to let you know.

One should never forbid what one lacks the power to prevent.

In politics stupidity is not a handicap.

I am sometimes a fox and sometimes a lion. The whole secret of government lies in knowing when to be the one or the other.

Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets.

Public opinion is the thermometer a monarch should constantly consult.

The French complain of everything, and always.

The herd seek out the great, not for their sake but for their influence; and the great welcome them out of vanity or need.

Riches do not consist in the possession of treasures, but in the use made of them.

I can no longer obey; I have tasted command, and I cannot give it up.

Power is my mistress. I have worked too hard at her conquest to allow anyone to take her away from me.

I love power. But it is as an artist that I love it. I love it as a musician loves his violin, to draw out its sounds and chords and harmonies.

There is only one step from the sublime to the ridiculous.

It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I have loved so well.

# The Three Arms in Combat

## 1813-Specific rules for *Napoleon's Resurgence*

Kevin Zucker, Dick Vohlers, Chris Moeller, Aaron Tobul, Chuck Silverstein

Infantry's chief asset is the ability to hold ground. Neither of the other arms can do this. The CRT was designed with infantry vs infantry combat in mind. Here are special rules for cavalry and artillery when defending. If either the attacker or defender has more than one arm in their stack they may ignore the following.

THE THREE ARMS COMBAT MODIFIERS			
When the given unit type is the only type in that combat			
Defender	Infantry	Attacker	
		Cavalry	Artillery
Infantry	•	+2 cols. on CRT Unless (1), (2)	(13.4)
Cavalry	convert all De, Dr4, Dr3 to Dr2	must use charge table	(13.4)
Artillery	Arty [nit of [1] (13.42)	convert Dr3 and Dr4 to De	•
Unless either applies:		(1) defender has any terrain benefit (2) defender is in square (square marker)	

Above is a proposed table of modifiers to bring out the advantages of the different arms in combat. In 1813 the French had a 1:4 deficit in cavalry, so this would be a special rule for the 1813 game.

The artillery already has special rules for attacking in adjacent combat so I defaulted to that (13.4).

Cavalry-vs.-cavalry must charge. Infantry alone cannot kill cavalry, only push it back. Artillery isn't mobile enough to execute a Dr3 or a Dr4. When these results are rolled, the guns are considered captured (and the unit eliminated).

**New:** Infantry can voluntarily adopt **square** formation (no extra cost) at the start of its movement. A unit in square that is bombarded gets a +2 on the Bombardment Table.

Adding in more combat modifiers brings the focus down more to the combat level and adds more grit into the system. If you feel you do want to add them in, you might consider making them just optional rules.

At Lützen the Coalition had a 3:1 superiority in cavalry. If they could move the fighting a little further north, into the plain around Lützen itself, then matters could take a dramatic turn in their favor. I want the game to show the **POTENTIAL** French vulnerability.

In no prior TLNB game has there been such an imbalance in cavalry, so exactly what would

happen if one side's cavalry dominates the battlefield, is a special situation that hasn't come up before.

In 1813, Wittgenstein's strategy was to fight in open terrain where his cavalry advantage could be exploited. All the cavalry generals understood this. They would chase the poor-quality French cavalry from the field and then make havoc among the untested French infantry.

This mod would be an 1813-specific special rule and not for the series.

If a force including cavalry attacks infantry (without cav or guns) gets a shift of two columns (3:1 becomes 5:1) on the CRT. **EXCEPTIONS:** There is no shift if (1) the defender has any terrain benefit or (2) is in square (marked square), or (3) is stacked with cavalry or artillery

Chris Moeller

I've always been excited about seeing how 1813 could explore the real imbalance in cavalry that I read about in books. The first thing that springs to mind is swarming **vedettes**. I'm dying to see what the impact of a large imbalance of light cavalry will mean to both the advantaged player and the disadvantaged player. Theoretically, the advantaged player should be able to gain perfect **knowledge** of the enemies dispositions while concealing his own. He should also be able to cut **supply** to the disadvantaged force fairly easily. If the French are fighting without supply, they will have severe battlefield disadvantages simply from that.

As for battlefield cavalry, the allies will have **combined arms** regularly where the French won't. They will have opportunities to make charges against weaker divisions that are unstacked at relatively good odds. Their light

cavalry will be able to **tie up French forces** without fear of being pinned by French light cavalry. All of those are significant battlefield **advantages** that the dominant coalition force



should have simply by virtue of having more cavalry—when attacking in clear terrain.

The advantage of open ground is that cavalry can be used at full effect. They will operate at **full strength**, they will be able to charge, etc.

So I'm not convinced that a special rule is needed... we've never seen a truly dominant cavalry force in play before. For all the reasons I've laid out, I think they have the potential to be a powerful advantage with the rules and combat table as written. Testing will tell of course.

All good points. I just want to make sure that French infantry find themselves vulnerable to cavalry when in the open terrain.

This is a situation that hasn't been seen before—where one side has such cavalry dominance that it impacts the maneuvers of the opposing infantry. Either they all have to be in square all the time or they have to take a chance of getting disorganized by the enemy cavalry. In such conditions of superiority, the coalition cavalry don't have to worry about being interfered-with by French cavalry. That means they can optimize their formation for attacking infantry instead of protecting themselves against cavalry. The optimal formation would be a long thin line, but if enemy cavalry are around they would need a more dense and compact formation. (That being my best guess.) Perhaps others know more about this...

This can be put on a card instead of in the book. I think the special vulnerability of the French infantry cannot be shown just in the course of play at "game-tactics." Coalition cavalry has something extra this time - the ability to ignore enemy cavalry and adopt a loose **formation** for harassing the infantry, either forcing them into **square** or else cutting up their **formation**. This turns into a shock combat I suppose.

Napoleon's maxims say what the function of battlefield cavalry is supposed to be (p. 71). "Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially infantry engaged in front."(L)

Every division of infantry was supposed to have a regiment of cavalry attached, when on the march, and for a corps 1-3 brigades of cavalry. Why was that? Infantry without cavalry is like an aircraft carrier without CAP.

The object of that little bit of cavalry is to force the enemy cavalry to approach in a formation which is more dense. (This is my supposition. I need to check de Brack.)

The Russians wanted to catch the French in the open terrain north of Kaja. This is significant because the Prussian player could move quicker than Wittgenstein against the four villages, while they were occupied by just one division. His failure to attack early was because he didn't know what was in there and wanted to bring up his Artillery.

Chris Moeller

Fascinating. So it's not just a "cavalry are more effective " issue, it actually changed how the Coalition cavalry and French infantry behaved... which was quite different from normal.

Bowden:

"When the campaign opened, the Russians and Prussians fielded approximately 25,000 regular cavalry, 11,000 landwehr cavalry, plus another 14,000 Cossacks... Napoleon had less than 12,000 cavalry - a deficit of about 4 to 1."


"In each skirmish, the French would form square and, **supported by their artillery**, easily drive the Allied horsemen from the field."

Near Weissenfels on the 29th, "the French possessed only infantry and foot artillery. The Russians were all mounted troops." Souham formed "battalion squares and, with the divisional 6-pounder artillery working at top speed, withstood charge after charge. **Lacking their own** infantry support, the Russian cavalry had little hope for a favorable outcome.... Assailed by squares of French infantry advancing (**very slow**) in **checkerboard** formation, supported by artillery, the Russian horse withdrew."

—Napoleon's *Grande Armée of 1813*

Leggiere:

In case of an immediate attack, "the majority of Souham's division that waited in the quadrilateral would have been attacked on three sides. Doubtless the French would have been forced to retreat to the plain of Lützen, where the superior Allied cavalry would have

**decimated** Napoleon's young troops...."   
page 236.

Wittgenstein "posted the entire Cuirassier Corps of the Russian Reserve followed by the Russian Guard Light Cavalry and the Guard Artillery horse guns on the left wing, to prevent Bertrand from enveloping Wittgenstein's left. pages 247-48

"The constant threat of a flank attack by the Russian cavalry considerably slowed Bertrand's march." page 250.

"Ney had counted on the 39th division reaching the battlefield no later than 3:00 but the threat posed by Cossacks swarming his flanks and rear froze Marchand, who did not continue his march until around 5:00." page 251

—*Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany Vol. 1*

From F. L. Petre:

"The great superiority of the allies in both cavalry and artillery naturally made them desire a battle in open country, where these arms would tell most and where the French would lose the advantage of their superiority in village or wood fighting." page 65

—*Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany*

On 2/10/15 we changed the charge table to account for situations where one side has only infantry and the other side only cavalry. That was because of Krasnoi in 1812. We added the "Pr" results. This Pr is interpreted as follows:

On a *Pr*, *Pr1* or *Pr2* result the charging units are returned to their starting hex (reducing the number of steps indicated) and the target unit(s) have their Movement costs doubled in the following Movement Phase for all terrain other than road, trail and clear. Place the 'square marker' on the target unit(s) to denote increased movement costs.

### CHARGE CRT

Rev. 10/3/2014

Die Probability Ratio (Odds) Attacker: Defender

Roll	1:1	1:2	1:3	1:4
1	OR	OR	OR	OR
2	OR	OR	OR	Pr1
3	OR	Pr	Pr1	Pr2
4	Pr	Pr1	Pr2	Ae
5	Pr1	Pr2	Ae	Ae
6	Ae	Ae	Ae	Ae


KEY: OR = *Overrun*; Ae = *Attacker Elim*

Odds over 1:1, treat as 1:1. Worse than 1:4 not allowed.

On a *Pr*, *Pr1* or *Pr2* result the charging units are returned to their starting hex (reducing the number of steps indicated) and the target unit(s) have their Movement costs doubled in the following Movement Phase for all terrain other than road, trail and clear. Place the 'square marker' on the target unit(s) to denote increased movement costs. Units in square may move their full MA.

Chuck

The effect of clouds of enemy cavalry upon 'bare' infantry was to slow down their advance, as French infantry would advance either in square or in a formation that could easily deploy into one, something like the Austrian **battalion-**

**masse.**  So maybe an effect on movement would fill the bill. Infantry could advance their full movement but then receive an unfavorable DRM to charge—perhaps based on the unit's initiative?—or move at reduced rate and not suffer any 'vulnerable' DRMs.

Chuck, we need an example

One need only look back to the Egyptian campaign to see French infantry beating off clouds of mamelukes! So I agree the main impact at our operational level would be on French infantry movement, and perhaps for 1813 giving light cavalry a longer LOS than infantry units.

Why? 4 hexes instead of 3? Chromish.

Chandler: On Napoleon accepting an armistice after the battle of Bautzen: "This armistice will interrupt the course of my victories. Two considerations have made up my mind: **my shortage of cavalry**, which prevents me from

striking great blows and the hostile attitude of Austria."

On further reflection it would seem the effects of the disparity of cavalry in the 1813 campaign was not on the immediate battlefield outcomes but at the operational level—pursuit of the losers and potentially reconnaissance.

This is probably an effect that needs to be modeled on the level of Kevin's earlier work *Struggle of Nations*, in pursuit tables and the like. In skimming my resources I could not find an instance where the French made **mistakes based on faulty recon.**

Chuck, there were many instances. Most notably after Lützen, Napoleon didn't know the direction of the coalition retreat until about the 6<sup>th</sup>, 4 days later.

from James R. Arnold's "Napoleon 1813 – Decision at Bautzen"

Chapter II – A New Army,  
Part 2 "The Cavalry Problem" (pg. 41ff)

"...whereas a conscript (infantry man, ed. by AEG) could receive a musket, master rudimentary drill while marching towards Germany, and, if unable to maneuver on the battlefield, at least hold his place and mechanically close on the center as enemy fire harrowed the ranks, it took month of training to produce an acceptable cavalry trooper. In the end, effective cavalry required a match between rider and horse. In 1813 there was an appalling shortage of both." (pg 41)

"...and then there was the dire shortage of horses. The large horses needed to support the weight of metal-clad heavy cavalry troopers had suffered far more than the smaller horses serving in the lighter cavalry. The purported 1,830 Russia survivors who were carried on the mid-January muster roll had only 336 horses among them..." (pg. 44/45)

"...a German veteran observed that 'The French dragoons, for some time degenerated, regained moral force in Spain; and in 1813-14 acquired respect.' ... When active campaigning resumed in 1813, the dragoon division that marched into Saxony consisted of the remnants of four regiments, each with only one squadron,

commanded by Brigadier General Marie Reiset. .. (pg.45)

"...on April 15<sup>th</sup>, the day Napoleon departed Paris to assume field command, Brigadier General Claude Guyon's light cavalry brigade carried seven regiments on its roster. The shared a total of 624 horses, an appropriate number for a solitary regiment." (pg. 46)

"...in sum, the French cavalry that served in the spring of 1813 consisted of detachments built from an ill-fitting amalgam of Russia survivors, Spanish veterans, troopers found in the regimental depots, and conscripts. Numerous regiments were actually provisional units, formed from a mix of squadrons taken from different regiments. They were particularly weakly officered and lack esprit de corps. On April 16, 1813 Eugène reported to the emperor that he did not trust his cavalry to support his infantry because the troopers were too **demoralized and fatigued**. Indeed, during the spring campaign most line cavalry regiments were hesitant to engage the allied horse. Their young, green horses were poor substitutes for strong, mature, and trained cavalry mounts. Untrained for war, unused to carrying the load with which they were burdened, they sickened and became weak. French troops had never been renowned for their horse care habits, but now after so many losses of experienced men in Russia and the time pressure to recreate a cavalry arm, it was worse. A Saxon officer observed, 'A new detachment of cavalry might be recognized at a hundred paces distant, by the smell preceding from the sores of the horses'. The allies would note that the shock arm of the French cavalry, the cuirassiers, barely worked up to trot when delivering charges in 1813." (pg. 46)

"...overall in the spring campaign the allies fielded 37,000 cavalry against 15,000 French, most of whom were **not yet ready** for field service. In spite of all his efforts, Napoleon's drive and genius was powerless to change his calculus. He anticipated what this discrepancy would mean on the battlefield when, in early March, he told his marshals to make sure the conscripts received **extensive practice in forming battalions squares** rapidly. He also predicted the difficulty in **reconnaissance**, writing to Ney to **restrain his cavalry's scouts** because what could '15 or 20 men' accomplish against Cossack 'troops of 4 to 500 men'?'..." (pg. 47)

Aaron

I had a couple of possible thoughts. One would be

a card for the allies that reduces French movement allowance by one for X turns.



Alternately, it could reduce French initiative by one. This could help replicate incidents like the delay of the 39<sup>th</sup> Division quoted above. Another option would be to reduce French **movement allowances by one across the board**, with a possible exception if the units spend the entire move in terrain that prohibits cavalry charges. If that seems too harsh, you could lessen the impact by only implementing the penalty if there is an enemy cavalry unit in LOS.

Aaron, you are definitely thinking in the right direction, but an “across the board” effect would be too extreme and would take away the point of the exercise. The units that are vulnerable are those without a terrain benefit.

This mention of Cossacks reminds me to make Cossacks capable of turning into Guerrillas (see Quagmire 25.82+) by the play of a card. If you play the card you must convert all Cossacks to guerrillas.

Chuck

I would suggest an MP cost as well to go into square, and would that affect stacking, meaning would all infantry in the hex have to be in square?

I thought of adding a cost, but if we make sure that changing formation is the first thing a unit does, then it is already costing two MPs in effect.

“All infantry in the hex are affected by the square marker.” Good. That means that some units would end up in square that hadn’t even moved—another reason why not having a cost to square is better. We already have the stacking cost—infantry units only have so many.

Aaron

My younger self loves all of the chrome with squares and modified CRTs based on the arms involved. My current self prefers keeping things as close to the existing rules as possible. At the

Chapter III – The Allied Armies,  
Part 1 “The Tsar’s Army” (pg. 60ff)

“...in contrast to the situation in France, Russia possessed an enormous supply of horses. During the fall of 1812, internal security forces requisitioned horses in lieu of men in selected provinces. This experiment netted some 10,000 saddled horses, enough to mount more than fifty, full-strength squadrons. On a national level, such resources allowed the tsar to order that no horse be purchased abroad because they were much cheaper in Russia in spite of wartime inflation...” (pg. 64/65)

“...however, the Russian army could not convert unskilled, raw recruits into effective troopers faster than anyone else. Typical recruits, particularly those assigned to dragoon and light cavalry regiments, had no previous experience with the horses. Their first encounters with the spirited animals collected from steppe herds seldom went smoothly. The length of time needed to train a trooper presented a bottleneck that limited the number of replacements received by field regiments. Consequently, outside of the Guard and cuirassier regiments, most Russian cavalry was severely understrength in the spring of 1813. In addition the cavalry arm was in the midst of adopting a new organizational structure featuring six field squadrons. Many regiments were too weak and therefore remain organized with three or four squadrons...” (pg.65).

“...except for the regiment serving in the Guard, the **Cossacks** remained an entity unto themselves. Seldom did anyone have a precise notion of **how many were present** on any one day. Still, they provided a formidable, if erratic, weapon. Although their most valuable service came away from the battlefield where they interdicted French communications, they also delivered occasional sharp blows during pitched battles. A veteran Prussian officer observed the Cossacks in action in late April 1813 and ‘here witnessed the peculiar skill and fighting methods of the Cossacks. They went in front in scattered order, remained in constant motion, now right, now left, seemingly aimlessly ... When an enemy squad was close enough they rushed from all sides as on a given signal... overwhelmed him. What was not stabbed or chase away, was caught. Among the ‘caught’ in this combat was one of Macdonald’s staff officers from whom they extracted useful intelligence” ... (pg.65)

end of a busy day I often don't have much brainpower left and if there are too many special rules to puzzle through it becomes more work than pleasure. I realize I don't speak for all of your customers, of course.

With that in mind though, I find myself being drawn back to my initial idea of imposing a penalty on French infantry. If you impose a -1 to initiative on all French infantry and officers (or all French period?) who have coalition cavalry in LOS and are not in protective terrain it will slow them down (by causing them to pass command rolls less often) and have an impact on combat (via shock). You could also say that Ar results in attacks by coalition forces containing any cavalry on French infantry in clear terrain convert to shock to increase the impact. It doesn't have the same granularity as some of the other proposals, but I think it achieves similar results with fewer special rules and charts.

I definitely like the idea of Cossacks being able to convert to guerillas!

I definitely agree with the premise that new rules (1813-specific) should be kept to a minimum and not impact on the Series rules at all. I have made a commitment not to include detail for its own sake, but only when the "design intent" requires it. Nonetheless every battle is going to require its own Special Rules and year-specific rules. And that is not a bad thing. The game needs to continue to evolve—not by expanding its scope, but only through what is necessary and sufficient to render each new battle at the existing level of focus.

Normally we think of unit formation as a tactical consideration. But here in 1813 cavalry usage had an impact on Grand Tactical planning, and has to be covered in some way in order to show the factors unique to these two battles—French cavalry being so overwhelmed as to prevent their infantry from getting out of square.

I like your idea of reducing initiative of all French infantry if within LOS of enemy cavalry and in clear terrain. Now that begs the question—why not just reduce all infantry initiatives directly on the counter and cut that last little bit too?

The calculus we need to work with is whether the "coolness factor" of a new rule is

worth its learning curve. For example, with NLG we added the Roadblocks; with Quagmire, the Guerrillas. We added these because we had to, in order to present the grand tactical situation adequately. (Actually, we could have left out the Guerrillas from Quagmire, but we will need those rules for later Spanish Quads.)

*In the process of researching this we came up on a number of quotes on the subject from James Burbeck, a selection of which are included below. He argues that artillery probably should not be able to bombard if they are engaged in front directly in adjacent combat.*

Artillery batteries (usually called companies at this time) had a natural tendency to fire to their immediate front. Certain commanders were renowned for their ability to concentrate artillery fire. But the overwhelming tendency in the heat of combat was for the gunners to fire straight to their front.

Battlefield smoke increased the difficulty of identifying friend or foe. Artillerists could not tell the difference between friendly and enemy troops as close as 800 yards if they were engaged. This brought down the maximum range from 1,500 yards for larger guns. Once they did begin firing, artillerists would likely continue firing though their own smoke that blocked the view to their front.


Another feature of the battlefield was damage to the artillery batteries themselves. A battery with a third of its horses killed could be totally immobilized. These dead horses had to be freed from the harnesses before the living horses could be re-grouped into effective teams. A battery could completely lose its mobility as well as receiving damage to the cannon and crew.

*James Burbeck*

<http://www.wtj.com/articles/napart/>



DESIGN FILE



### Ocaña Scenario Design

*With just a few sources, we had difficulty determining the road by which Sebastiani's IV Corps arrived in the approach to Ocaña.*

*Finally we found, in W.F.P. Napier, important details that clarified the big picture.*

Derek Lang (in sans-serif), and Kevin Zucker in Typewriter.

If I understand now, the entire French cavalry force must have crossed at the Queens' bridge, with Paris splitting off from there. The bridge of Aranjuez had been broken, and I am not sure if the bridge of boats was in place. The river is pretty narrow there, maybe 30 yards.

I think Milhaud entered Aranjuez, with Paris and the rest of IV Corps following close behind. Soult then issued orders for the cavalry to move out in search of the Spanish, while the infantry concentrated in Aranjuez (or maybe rested after their march). I'm still trying to find out the full story behind the bridge of boats. So far I know the original bridge in Aranjuez was called the Puente del Rey (King's Bridge). It seems to have been demolished by the Spanish Army at (or just before) the battle of Aranjuez in August, to prevent it falling into the hands of the French.

Actually, the French destroyed it. See Note "A" below.



*The queen's bridge area of the Ocaña map*

The bridge of boats seems to have been constructed in September as a replacement for the King's Bridge. I think it may have been more substantial than a normal pontoon bridge, since it was probably intended to remain in use for a considerable time until the King's Bridge could be rebuilt. My Spanish sources say that the bridge of boats was still there on 18/19 November and was used by the French. Areizaga's order to General Zayas, telling him to march to Aranjuez, specifically mentions the bridge of boats as well.

Here is my sketch for the Approach to Ocaña, situation on November 18. I have followed the map called "Despliegue de Fuerzas" that shows the French all coming by hex 0117. I have attached a new set up v2.05 with the French arriving along the road leading from that hex. Oman also mentions the French arriving over the bridge into Aranjuez.

I don't think Sebastiani's IV Corps arrived down that road from the north. I think they were marching back to Aranjuez from the east, shadowing the movements of the Spanish army on the opposite side of the Tagus. Ontalba & Ruiz say:

In the afternoon of that same day, 18th, Sebastiani, who was familiar with the area around Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus by the Queen's bridge, and having received notice that Spanish cavalry were approaching the area, sent word to General Milhaud to stand in the vanguard with his Dragoons. General Paris was ordered to advance with his Chasseurs and Polish Lancers along the line of the river AND UPSTREAM of this, protected by the hills that lie on that side of Aranjuez.

I think Soult was trying to concentrate his forces at Aranjuez. Sebastiani arriving from the east, Mortier arriving from the west (Toledo) and Dessolles arriving from the north (Madrid). My impression of what happened is that Sebastiani's IV Corps crossed the Tagus at the Queen's bridge (in which direction it doesn't say) and as Milhaud and Paris entered Aranjuez they became aware of the presence of the Spanish cavalry nearby. Sebastiani ordered his cavalry to intercept the Spanish while his infantry (which would still have been strung out on the road from the Queen's bridge) continued marching to Aranjuez. That sequence of events fits the available evidence. I have not read or seen anything to indicate that Sebastiani arrived from the north along the road from Madrid.

I have set up the French forces for Ocaña and they seem to be enroute from San Juan. I always assumed they came by the Royal road from Madrid. That's the French entry and SS I had in mind.

Only Dessolles' Reserve came from Madrid, where they had remained with Joseph to protect the city. The rest of the French Army was out looking for Areizaga. I had assumed (wrongly as it turns out) that Soult had the I, IV and V Corps with him, and after he left Victor at Villamanrique he had marched back to Aranjuez with Sebastiani and Mortier. However, reading a bit more of Vela Santiago's book tonight, I discovered that Mortier's V Corps was actually marching from Toledo (this is confirmed by Ontalba & Ruiz, my other Spanish source for Ocaña). This also explains why V Corps only had two of its infantry divisions at Ocaña, apparently the third one was left behind in Toledo.

I have updated the Setup and TRC to reflect the fact that V Corps is arriving from Toledo (new versions attached).

It is said that Paris took the northern road that went toward the Ontigola Mirador.

I have searched for this place and all I can find are individual vacation houses for rent that are claiming to be at the Ontigola Mirador, but there isn't any overlook at any of these houses. Just a suburban development. Anyway, the addresses listed are near to the town of Ontigola, not way up north.

There were two instances when the Spanish cavalry ruined the battle completely for their side. At Ocaña they were ordered to charge but instead they turned around and left the field, leaving the flanks of the infantry unguarded. So yes, there is an immediate effect on the Spanish infantry for having no cavalry.

A good general would not risk the battle on a cavalry charge of such magnitude, stripping all his flankers. It is a maxim of the first importance that infantry without any cavalry protection are sitting ducks. That is what happened at Ocaña and Medellin, I believe.

So, we cannot just have a rule that says: "If the Spaniards charge they lose the game." Even though that is what happened. I doubt whether the Spanish player would risk his cavalry in that way.

The Spanish cavalry has an average init that is one point lower than the French. That is not that great a deficit when you remember that the die is ALREADY rolled to give a modifier up or down on the Shock Table.

So you don't want additional wristage. Just add your modifier into the existing matrix. The Spanish cavalry wouldn't even stand for a shock combat. They fled in terror. That deserves some notice in the game.

In the afternoon of that same day, 18th, Sebastiani, who was familiar with the area around Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus by the Queen's bridge, and having received notice that Spanish cavalry were approaching the area, sent word to General Milhaud to stand in the vanguard with his Dragoons. General Paris was ordered to advance with his Chasseurs and Polish Lancers along the line of the river and upstream of this, protected by the hills that lie on that side of Aranjuez. Sebastiani crossed from the north to the south side of the Tagus, and Paris branched out from the bridge (upstream) to the east.

I have not read or seen anything to indicate that Sebastiani arrived from the north along the road from Madrid.

Oman states clearly: On the morning of the 18<sup>th</sup> Milhaud's and Paris's cavalry, riding at the head of the French army, crossed the Tagus at Aranjuez. The map Despliegue de Fuerzas shows it as well. The only corps that arrived by a different road was Victor.

I don't know for sure that Sebastiani arrived from the east instead of the north, but that is how I interpret the evidence.

The Despliegue de Fuerzas map is actually from Vela Santiago's book. I don't think it is conclusive one way or the other. The arrows extending down from Madrid are showing the approach of Soult with Dessolles Reserve. There is a cavalry division shown in position at Aranjuez which is labeled "Sebastiani" but I think is actually Milhaud's division of dragoons. The map does not, in my opinion, indicate clearly the position or movements of Sebastiani's IV Corps.

The quote from Oman is not conclusive either. He says only that the French crossed the Tagus at Aranjuez, but he does NOT tell us which bridge they used. Did they cross via the bridge of boats at the site of the King's bridge on the Royal Road, or did they cross at the Queen's bridge, as the Spanish sources claim?

The bridge they used is important because it would indicate the direction they were arriving from - the bridge of boats would mean they were coming down the Royal Road from the north, the Queen's bridge would mean they were approaching from the east.

Perhaps not, if the bridge of boats was broken. If the bridge of boats was broken, as the quote at (A) indicates below, then perhaps the French forces had no other option but to divert over to the Queens bridge to cross the Tagus and move aggressively toward the enemy.

The alternative explanation would involve a crossing from the left to the right bank as though they wished to put that river between themselves and the Spanish. But that is not in accord with Sebastiani's character. I think we should be able to get definitive info. I will start checking in Thiers.

On the despliegue map, there is no arrow showing Sebastiani marching through San Jose, when all the other corps are shown. The way I see it the map clearly shows Sebastiani north of the Tagus, directly next to a march arrow moving North to South into Aranjuez.

Mortier's corps was concentrated at Toledo, while the II Corps was in motion from Oropesa to Talavera, and Paris's light cavalry was watching the roads to the east of Madrid.[1]

On the 12<sup>th</sup>, Lacy's division crossed the Tagus, and two pontoon bridges were built near Villamanrique. But the 13<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> were days of storm, the river rose, and the artillery and train stuck fast on the vile cross-roads from Ocaña. Less than half the army had crossed by the 15<sup>th</sup> when the advanced cavalry skirmished with Paris about Arganda.

### **The Tajuna River**

NOTE (A): It seemed nevertheless that Areizaga was committed to an advance upon Madrid by the high-road from Albacete, wherefore Soult destroyed the bridges of Aranjuez and Puente la Reyna and ordered Victor to march from Aranjuez on Arganda with the I Corps, nearly 20,000 men, purposing to join him with the King's reserves and to offer battle on the Tajuna; while Mortier and Sebastiani's Poles and Germans should fall upon the enemy's flank. That is, the enemy's left flank, as they marched toward Madrid.

Soult expected to fight a battle on the Tajuna, with Sebastiani moving north-east to join him.

We know that, on the 15<sup>th</sup> Ariezaga's advanced cavalry skirmished with Paris about Arganda. Arganda del Rey is north- 14 miles from Madrid. The town of Titulcia is where the Tajuna branches off from the Jarama, flowing toward Perales.

If Sebastiani's men retraced their footsteps exactly, after Ariezaga withdrew from Victor, they should arrive on our map at Titulcia. From there, the shortest distance back to Aranjuez would be by the road called "Senda Galliana" or Rooster's path.

NOTE (A): Soult destroyed the bridges of Aranjuez and Puente la Reyna and ordered Victor to join him to offer battle on the Tajuna; but Ariezaga retreated just as Victor's cavalry appeared to his front. He pulled back to La Zarza on the 17<sup>th</sup> with the intention of marching back to Ocaña.

Soult then reversed the marching orders of all his columns save Victor's and bade them return hastily to Aranjuez, where the bridge was repaired in haste. Victor, however, had got so far to the east that he was directed to cross the Tagus at Villamanrique and follow hard in Ariezaga's rear. On the morning of the 18<sup>th</sup> Milhaud's and Paris's cavalry, riding at the head of the French army, crossed the Tagus at Aranjuez, and pressing forward met Freire's horsemen, between Ontigola and Ocaña, while Ariezaga's column was strung out between La Zarza and Noblejas. The collision of Milhaud and Freire brought about the largest cavalry fight during the whole Peninsular War.

### Approach to Battle: Prelude at Ontigola

With Victor in pursuit Marshal Soult just had to wait for Ariezaga to fall into his hands. The IV Corps of Sebastiani was in Aranjuez accompanied by the German division of Leval, the Polish division of Werle, the light cavalry brigade of Paris and Milhaud's division of dragoons; altogether 9,500 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, with 20 pieces of artillery.

The French held the principal crossings—the bridge of boats on the Royal Road, the Queen's bridge a few miles upstream, and even the ford at Oreja further upriver, on the road linking San Juan with Oreja.

On the 12<sup>th</sup>, Lacy's division crossed the Tagus, and two pontoon bridges were built near Villamanrique. But the 13<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> were days of storm, the river rose.

Soult then reversed the marching orders of all his columns save Victor's and bade them return hastily to Aranjuez

Vela Santiago also mentions the thunderstorm.

This is the most interesting bit of all. As unreliable as I consider Oman to be, this quote actually supports my argument that IV Corps was marching back to Aranjuez from the east.

Having said that, Oman is so vague that it's hard to know what forces he is actually talking about, but I think it can only be Sebastiani because he says that Victor did not march back, and we know that Mortier was in Toledo and Dessolles was in Madrid.

According to page 127 from Thiers:

-1st paragraph. IV Corps concentrated between Aranjuez and Ocaña.

-2nd paragraph. On the 15th, IV Corps crossed from the left bank to the right by the Queen's bridge.

-3rd paragraph. On the 18th, Sebastiani recrossed by the Queens bridge with his cavalry.

Thiers doesn't state where the IV was on the 16th-17th.

I don't understand why you have the French IV Corps on the Royal Road, when we know that they crossed at the Queen's bridge. I thought you found a source (either Theirs or Oman) who even claimed that the bridge of boats in Aranjuez was "destroyed" or, at least, out of commission on 18th, so why put them there?

Every source we have looked at (Spanish, English, French) without exception says that Sebastiani crossed by the Queen's bridge. IMHO the evidence does not support them being there at all. They would have entered our map in the corner but they did not march directly to Aranjuez, probably because Sebastiani already knew that the bridge of boats was not usable. Instead they marched to the Queen's bridge (as every source tells us) to cross the Tagus and march back towards Aranjuez.

If you can find a source (any source) that says Sebastiani crossed by the bridge of boats on the Royal Road then I will happily admit that I was wrong, but otherwise, Sebastiani should be on the secondary road at the Queen's bridge.

Are we agreed the French would cross the Tajo bridges from the north to the south and not the other way? Or, do you think that when sources say "Sebastiani crossed the bridge," there is a reason the whole of IV corps could be going from the south to the north? I think Sebastiani, who is known to be aggressive—wants to move and engage the enemy toward Ontigola.

Regarding the pontoon bridge, this can be laid in an afternoon. I suspect that when the French took up the pontoon bridges they floated the boats somewhat downstream, perhaps to the Queens bridge or thereabouts. So after 12 hours they had a functioning pontoon again.

We also have to ask ourselves an important question: is the location of the IV Corps arrival important to the strategic choices the French player has? I think the answer to that is yes, for the Oca AtB I think it is. What do you think?

An operational level map of the theater would help us calculate time and distance studies. I still think it is a good idea, just to ask Charlie to throw a hexgrid on to a 1:200,000 series map of the area.

Joseph ordered his army to retrace their steps, except for Victor who was to follow the Spanish army.

If the IV Corps retraced its steps to Aranjuez, it would have marched back through Titulcia.

The town of Titulcia on the Rio Tajuña in the corner of the game map. From Titulcia, the most direct route to Aranjuez would be the Senda Galliana. That is my theory.

*History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France ...*, Volume 2 of W.F.P. Napier gives us the specifics we need on page 247.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges near Aranjuez in two hours.

**13.00 18th** A division of cavalry, two divisions of the IV Corps and the **Advanced Guard of the V Corps**, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by **the light cavalry of the V Corps**; the whole making a reinforcement of about 2,000 men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person.

According to Napier, p.246, the IV Corps infantry was at Bayona and the corps cavalry at Chinchon on the 16th.

Bayona is now called Titulcia.

**Titulcia** es un municipio español ... Su nombre tradicional, desde los tiempos de la repoblación cristiana, en el siglo XII, hasta comienzos del siglo XIX, fue "**Bayona** de Tajuña."

Now we know for sure that the IV Corps was at Titulcia when it was recalled. The cavalry was further along the mapedge, toward San Juan.

### SPANISH INITIATIVE RATINGS

I have been looking over the initiative ratings of the Spanish as a whole. Several things are popping out at me now that I can see all the counters in one glance.

The Spanish are a few 3's with the rest 2's and 1's. The French are all 3's —no great shakes—but no 2's at all. That means that Zayas and Solano are going to be able to prevail in a Shock combat, and none of the other Spaniards will. Is that really true? Did not one Spanish regiment prevail in any combat in 1809? I seem to recall reading that they were good if they had an obstacle to increase their defensive strength. We have to discuss a few promotions.

The British army has 5 initiative- 4's, which is cool. But these will be involved in only one battle. Cardinal Rule: You have to give both players the tools to win the game, or else people won't play your game.

In this campaign, the Spanish were still caught up in a braggadocio kind of false flag-waving. There was only one Spanish general in 1809 who knew not to fight if you could possibly help it. So our generals don't know the real victory condition: don't fight. And the corollary to that: get away with the mostest. Hold onto a bridge for most of the day, and delay the French. Throw sand in their gears, harass their men with guerrillas and roadblocks and vedettes. I can tell you, you cannot have a game where one side wins by absconditis. The players will stone you, just as the troops would.

My understanding is that the troops were no great shakes, but they distrusted their generals, and with good reason. When an army doesn't trust its generals, it tends to lose.

So I am ready to make the argument that the initiative of the units be increased, and the generals decreased!

There is a special problem with 1 initiatives, whether a unit or an officer. They only move once in every six turns. A "2" will move every 3 turns, and a "3" every-other turn. In 6 turns, the game has already passed you by. The 1 rating should be reserved for the worst of the worst. In fact, there are only two units with a 1 initiative in this entire series (in 4LB).

The French have several 7-SP brigades, the Spanish a single 5. Raw strength matters too. If the French have the second division in play they have a stack of 15 SPs. The strongest stack of three the Spanish have (without an officer) is a 10. That is a significant tactical disadvantage in the long term.

Yes, the Spanish only have a few (actually three) units with [3] initiative. Obviously this does give the French an advantage. However I don't accept your argument that the [2] initiative Spanish units can't prevail against the [3] initiative French in Shock Combat - if the Spanish player rolls 5 or 6 and the French player rolls 1 or 2, then the Spanish player wins. Not great odds admittedly, but I think it is realistic that the French should win more shocks than the Spanish.

Remember as well that it is only the lead unit's initiative that counts in Shock. So even though the Spanish do have quite a few units with [1] initiative, they have enough [2] initiative units that they should often have a [2] as the lead unit in Shock. I honestly don't see the problem here.

So I am ready to make the argument that the initiative of the units be increased, and the generals decreased!

This comment REALLY worries me. The Spanish are already at a disadvantage (in terms of command) compared to the French. The best Spanish Officers have [3] initiative, the rest have [2]. while the French all have [3] and [4]. Are you seriously saying that you want to give the French an even bigger advantage here? It won't matter what initiative ratings you give to the Spanish units if they are out of command all the time.

There is a special problem with 1 initiatives, whether a unit or an officer. They only move once in every six turns. A "2" will move every 3

turns, and a "3" every-other turn. In 6 turns, the game has already passed you by. The 1 rating should be reserved for the worst of the worst. In fact, there are only two units with a 1 initiative in this entire series (in 4LB).

Actually, the Swedish units in NaL have [1] initiative as well. However, I do take your point that we should maybe be a bit more sparing in how we use the [1] initiative. I will look again at how I have rated the Spanish units and see if I can raise a few of those [1] units to [2].

The French have several 7-SP brigades, the Spanish a single 5. Raw strength matters too. If the French have the second division in play they have a stack of 15 SPs. The strongest stack of three the Spanish have (without an officer) is a 10. That is a significant tactical disadvantage in the long term.

Sorry Kevin, but I think you are not seeing the whole picture here. Yes, the French do have larger units than the Spanish, but importantly they also have FEWER units than the Spanish. I did a quick count of the total SP's for the battle of Medellin (just as an example), and the French army has 45 SPs compared to the Spanish 46 SPs. Obviously, as you have said, the larger French units will allow them to concentrate more SPs in a single hex, but I would argue that is the sort of tactical advantage that the French ought to have.

The larger number of (smaller) Spanish units may be able to surround the smaller number of (larger) French units, so the French may not have much of an advantage anyway.

Following up on my earlier email, I think if I change some of the unit ratings it will raise a lot of the [1] initiative brigades up to [2] and maybe one or two of the [2] initiative brigades up to [3].

The ratings used for the Spanish units:

#### Infantry

500	[3]	Guards
550	[3]	Grenadiers
600	[2]	Foreign regiments
650	[2]	Light regiments, Marines
700	[1]	Line regiments, Provincial Militia

**Cavalry**

650 [2] Line regiments, Dragoons  
 700 [1] Light regiments

I propose to re-rate the units as follows:

**Infantry**

500 [3] Guards  
 550 [3] Grenadiers, Foreign regiments  
 600 [2] Marines  
 650 [2] Light regiments, Line regiments  
 700 [1] Provincial Militia

**Cavalry**

600 [2] Line regiments, Dragoons  
 650 [2] Line regiments

This should raise most of the [1] initiative units up to [2], and a couple of the [2] units up to [3].

I like your proposal to increase most of the 1's. Please go ahead. Let's see how that looks. That should reduce the French advantage in shock combat. A slight tilt to the playing field tends to aggregate into very unbalanced outcomes.

I have always made sure that the disadvantaged side has a one-third chance of winning. Otherwise people will not play the game.

I'd rather not build the Spanish army's deficiencies into the combat units. That is too deterministic. I think the place to represent the Spanish army's problems is in the area of victory conditions and possibly morale break points.

I will go ahead and re-evaluate the Spanish units. Most of the [1] initiatives will change to [2], and we might get one or two more with [3] initiative. A few units will probably gain 1 SP as a result too, which might not be a bad thing either.

That should reduce the French advantage in shock combat. A slight tilt to the playing field tends to aggregate into unbalanced outcomes. I have always made sure that the disadvantaged side has a one-third chance of winning. Otherwise people will not play the game.

I agree. I was thinking about it a bit more this morning, and it occurred to me that the poor command ratings of the Spanish leaders will mean that their units will often be out of command. Thus the individual units will frequently have to roll to move. So having poor leadership and a lot of units with [1] initiative was probably going to be to big a disadvantage for the Spanish player.

Re: vedettes in Orbat v1.9

The Spanish have 4-4-2-6 vedettes in the 4 battles, and the French have 4-6-4-4.

Neither side has very many and the limited numbers are fairly even. Let me know if I missed something.

I've finished my re-evaluation of the Spanish units. We now have only four units with [1] initiative - two in the Army of Extremadura and two in the Army of La Mancha.

If we feel the Spanish are doing too well, we can lower their demo level to 35%.

The appropriate area to deal with Spanish inferiority is really in the Morale area and not in the initiative or unit quality area.

Agree.

Or generalship. I would have no trouble demoting 2-3 officers to (2).

I think that would be very hard on the Spanish. When I rated the officers I started from a baseline average of [2] and only awarded a rating of [3] if I found some evidence to justify a particular officer being above average. I would not want to demote any of them to [2] ... with one exception. Freire (the cavalry commander at Ocana) was by all accounts a capable officer and is praised by several Spanish historians. However, the performance of the Spanish cavalry at Ocana was very poor, so you could make a case for Freire being a [2] instead of a [3]. All of the other [3] ratings are IMHO justified (bear in mind these guys are only commanding Divisions of a few units each, not Corps).

The Spanish have 4-4-2-6 vedettes in the 4 battles, and the French have 4-6-4-4.

You have the Spanish numbers correct, but remember that the British have 4 vedettes as well, so the Allied total at Talavera is actually 8. The French actually have 6 vedettes at Ocana (same as

the Spanish). So the totals for each battle are: 4-8-2-6 (Allied) and 4-6-4-6 (French)

The Spanish Cavalry consistently broke in shock combat. If there was an occasion on which they did not break on first contact, I'd like to know about it. They are currently rated initiative 1's and 2's. I would be o.k. with leaving them that way instead of improving them.

De Lastres commanded some of the finest cavalry from the left over professional army. The queen's dragoons...

Royal Cara (1), Rgt Rey (3), Dgn Reina (2), Lanc Andaluca (2), Caz Cordoba (2), Caz Llerena (2).

You cannot go wrong by giving them a (3). Everyone who knows about Talavera will say o.k. Don't you think?

Brief biography of de Lastres's career:

[http://www.eborense.es/biografia\\_general\\_jose\\_mariadelastres.html](http://www.eborense.es/biografia_general_jose_mariadelastres.html)



The list of regiments you quoted is for Medellin. At Talavera his brigade consisted of Rgt Rey (3), Dgn Reina (3), Dgn Almansa (4). I suppose the Rgt Rey (King's Rgt) and Dgn Reina (Queens Dgn) were arguably the best in the Spanish army, so maybe we could justify making de Lastres a [3] at Talavera.

OK then. Maybe raise de Lastres to a [3].

I agree the Spanish cavalry was not very good. The only victorious engagement that I've read about was the charge of de Lastres' brigade at Talavera. This incident is much celebrated in the Spanish sources, but not mentioned at all in the English ones (no surprise there).

I would raise all of the Spanish cavalry initiatives to [2] vs the French [3] and some [4]'s the Spanish will still lose many more shocks than they win.

To be honest, I wouldn't advocate raising any of the Spanish cavalry - not even de Lastres - to [3].

De Lastres charge at Talavera caught Leval's Division in the flank and overran a battery. It was a well-timed and well-executed attack, but the outcome would probably have been different if any French cavalry had been present to support their infantry.

I don't want to denigrate de Lastres accomplishment (for which he was decorated and promoted) but to be honest (in game-terms) all he really did was win a shock combat. He rolled a 5 or a 6 with his [2] initiative, and the French rolled a 1 or a 2. It's something that can happen, but doesn't happen very often.

It was a success that the Spanish are rightly proud of, but I don't really think it means that de Lastres brigade was anything special—I reckon an equal number of French cavalry would beat them in a straight fight (so I don't think they should be given the same initiative as the French).



# Library of Napoleonic Battles

Designed by Kevin Zucker and OSG

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## 1794: French Revolutionary Wars

Fleurus, 26 June—Jourdan 82,000 vs. Coburg 70,500

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## 1796: War of the 1st Coalition, Part I

Montenotte, 11-12 April—Bonaparte 14,000 vs. Argenteau 9,000

Dego, 14-15 April—Bonaparte 12,000 vs. Argenteau 5,700

San Michele 19 April—Sérurier 15,000 vs. Colli 11,000

Mondovi, 22 April—Sérurier 15,000 vs. Colli 11,000

**G**eneral Bonaparte's first campaign broke two years of stalemate in the coastal mountains, and succeeded in detaching the Piedmontese from the Austrian alliance.

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## 1796-97: War of the 1st Coalition, Part II

Castiglione, 5 August—Bonaparte 35,000 vs. Wurmser 15,500

Arcole, 15-17 November—Bonaparte 20,000 vs. Alvintzy 18,500

Rivoli, 14-15 January—Bonaparte 22,000 vs. Alvintzy 28,000

Mantova, 16 January—Bonaparte 28,000 vs. Wurmser 14,000

**B**onaparte parried four massive Austrian offensives in six months, marching quickly to gain local superiority.

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## 1799-1800: War of the 2nd Coalition, Part I

Zurich I, 4-7 June 1799—Massena 30,000 vs. Charles 40,000

Novi, 15 August 1799—Joubert 35,000 vs. Suvorov 35,000

Zurich II, 25-26 Sept. 1799—Massena 33,500 vs. Korsakov 19,605

Hohenlinden, 3 Dec. 1800—Moreau 76,407 vs. Johann 58,221

**A**fter first Zurich a stalemate ensued. Joubert's force landed at Genoa and was defeated at Novi. At second Zurich Massena defeated Korsakov and drove Russia from the Second Coalition.

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## 1800: War of the 2nd Coalition, Part II

Chivasso, 26 May—Lannes 12,000 vs. Haddick 5,000

Turbigo, 31 May—Murat 12,000 vs. Vukassovich 5,346

Montebello, 9 June—Lannes 13,000 vs. Ott 18,000

Marengo, 14 June—Bonaparte 28,127 vs. Melas 29,096

**B**onaparte led his army over the Alps in mid-May. Melas's communications were cut with Ott's defeat at Montebello. Melas launched a surprise attack at Marengo, catching Bonaparte off-guard. At 2:30 he arrived with the Reserve, and Desaix joined in at 5:30, clinching victory.

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## 1805: War of the 3rd Coalition

Ulm, 19 October—Napoleon 80,000 vs. Mack 23,273

Dürrenstein, 11 Nov.—Mortier 12,000 vs. Kutuzov 24,000

Schöngrabern, 16 Nov.—Murat 35,000 vs. Nostitz 7,000

Austerlitz, 2 December—Napoleon 65,000 vs. Kutuzov 86,025

**A**ustria opened hostilities, seizing Venezia and Bavaria. Before Russian help could arrive, Napoleon marched his army from the Channel coast and surrounded Ulm. The swiftness of the collapse and the fall of Vienna stunned the world.

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## 1806-07: War of the Fourth Coalition

### The Coming Storm [201]

Jena, 13-14 October—Napoleon 124,800 vs. Hohenlohe 51,800

Auerstädt, 13-14 October—Davout 28,867 vs. Brunswick 53,380

Pultusk, 25-26 December—Lannes 25,600 vs. Bennigsen 40,000

Golymin, 25-26 December—Murat, 38,000 vs. Galitzin 17,000

Eylau, 7-8 February—Napoleon 81,080 vs. Bennigsen 68,669

Friedland, 13-14 June—Napoleon 67,297 vs. Bennigsen 61,219

**I**n 1806 and 1807 the French encountered the poorly-led Prussians in Saxony and then came chaotic winter battles against the Russians.

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## 1808-09: Peninsular War, Part I

### Napoleon in Spain

Vimeiro, 21 August—Junot 16,662 vs. Wellesley 18,669

Espinosa de los Monteros, 10 Nov.—Victor 21,000 vs. Blake 24,000

Tudela, 23 November—Lannes 31,000 vs. Castaños 19,000

La Coruna, 16 January—Soult 20,000 vs. Moore 14,900

**T**he disaster at Bailen and Joseph's withdrawal from Madrid forced the Emperor to appear there in person. The British had a strong base in Portugal. Popular insurrections broke out and the French were nearly driven from the peninsula by the time Napoleon arrived in November. By January Madrid had been reconquered, but rumblings from the Danube interrupted the mopping up operations and forced Napoleon to depart on January 17.

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## 1809: War Against Austria

### The Last Success [202]

Abensberg, 19-20 April—Napoleon 55,000 vs. Louis 34,000

Eckmühl, 21-22 April—Napoleon 60,000 vs. Charles 77,000

Aspern-Essling, 21-22 May—Napoleon 66,000 vs. Charles 95,800

Wagram, 5-6 July—Napoleon 160,000 vs. Charles 140,000

**N**apoleon and his Army of Germany met their first setback in the shadow of Vienna against a modernized Austrian Army.

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## 1809: Peninsular War, Part II

### Napoleon's Quagmire [207]

Medellin, 28 March—Victor 18,000 vs. Cuesta 26,000

Talavera, 27-28 July—Joseph 46,735 vs. Wellesley 54,569

Almonacid, 11 Aug.—Joseph 18,200 vs. Venegas 23,000

Ocaña, 18-19 Nov.—Joseph 29,000 vs. Aréizaga 54,939

**W**ellesley advanced against Victor, who withdrew onto reinforcements from Joseph and Sebastiani. Together they advanced on Talavera, suffering a tactical defeat. Venegas and then Aréizaga advanced on Madrid only to be defeated in turn.

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## 1810-11: Peninsular War, Part III

### The Struggle for Portugal

Bussaco, 27 Sept 1810—Massena 55,000 vs. Wellington 50,000

Fuentes de Oñoro, 3-5 May 1811—Massena 48,452 vs. Wellington 36,946

La Albuera, 16 May 1811—Soult 24,260 vs. Beresford & Blake 35,284

**W**ellington was forced to withdraw behind the lines of Torres Vedras to protect the approaches to Lisbon. Massena's army was brought up short and eventually withdrew into Spain. In April 1811, Wellington besieged Almeida. When Soult gathered a new army and marched to relieve the siege of Badajoz, the opposing armies met at the village of Albuera.

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## 1811-13: Peninsular War, Part IV

### The Spanish Ulcer

Sagunto, 25 October 1811—Suchet 20,000 vs. Blake 28,000

Salamanca, 22 July 1812—Marmont 49,652 vs. Wellington 51,939

Vitoria, 21 June 1813—Joseph 57,300 vs. Wellington 88,276

**W**ellington's renewed offensive led to the defeat of Marmont at Salamanca. Madrid and Andalusia fell in quick succession.

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## 1812: From Smolensk to Moscow

### Napoleon Against Russia [205]

Smolensk, 16-17 August—Napoleon 140,000 vs. Barclay 30,000

Valutino, 18-19 August—Ney 30,000 vs. Barclay 40,000

Shevardino, 5-6 September—Napoleon 35,000 vs. Bagration 25,000

Borodino, 7-8 September—Napoleon 134,300 vs. Kutuzov 130,300

Maloyaroslavets, 23-24 Oct.—Napoleon 24,000 vs. Kutuzov 97,012

The Russian Army finally gave Napoleon the decisive battles he so greatly desired. His first maneuver started out well—with the French poised to slip into Smolensk behind the Russians. However, the opportunity to bring an end to the campaign remained unfulfilled. After that, Moscow became the default destination.

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#### 1813: War of Liberation, Part I

##### **Napoleon's Resurgence [208]**

Lützen, 2 May—Napoleon 144,000 vs. Wittgenstein 93,000  
Bautzen, 20-21 May—Napoleon 167,410 vs. Wittgenstein 97,000  
Luckau, 5 June—Oudinot 20,000 vs. Bülow 15,000

Napoleon arrived with a fresh army at the end of April and drove the Coalition out of Saxony by the end of May. He left Oudinot to defend his communications against an advance from Berlin. The Armistice had been declared days before Oudinot's loss at Luckau.

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#### 1813: War of Liberation, Part II

Löwenberg, 21 August—Napoleon 23,000 vs. Blücher 37,700  
Dresden, 26-27 Aug—Napoleon 155,000 vs. Schwarzenberg 200,000  
Wartenburg, 3 October—Bertrand 14,000 vs. Yorck 16,000

At the conclusion of the armistice the Emperor advanced into Silesia and caught up with Blücher at Löwenberg, but Blücher retreated to safety. Napoleon returned to Dresden to repulse the onslaught of the main enemy force in the plain of Dresden. After several lost battles, Napoleon abandoned the right bank of the Elbe, and Yorck's crossing could not be stopped

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#### 1813: War of Liberation, Part III

##### **Four Lost Battles Reprint**

Grossbeeren, 23 August—Oudinot 22,000 vs. Bülow 35,000  
Katzbach, 26 August—Macdonald 84,000 vs. Blücher 63,000  
Kulm, 29-30 August—Vandamme 37,000 vs. Barclay 70,000  
Dennowitz, 6 September—Ney 58,000 vs. Bülow 100,000

Napoleon was outnumbered and strategically surrounded by three large armies: Bernadotte's Army of the North, Blücher's Army of Silesia, and Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia. The Trachtenberg Plan required any one of these armies to retreat when faced by Napoleon in person, coordinated with an advance by the other two Armies. This plan was the undoing of Napoleon.

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#### 1813: War of Liberation, Part IV

##### **Napoleon at Leipzig [203]**

Leipzig, 14-19 October—Napoleon 196,550 vs. Schwarzenberg 279,030

Hanau, 30-31 October—Napoleon 50,000 vs. Wrede 42,392

Napoleon at Leipzig is a comprehensive game with a proven track record of excellent re-playability, among the most popular Napoleonic wargames of all time, with 20,000 copies in print across the first four editions. Now it has a bigger playing area and more manpower for both sides. Completely revised order of battle; all new unit set-ups; revised and expanded maps.

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#### 1814: Campaign in France, Part I

##### **La Patrie en Danger [204]**

Brienne, 29 January—Napoleon 36,000 vs. Blücher 28,000  
La Rothière, 1 February—Napoleon 45,000 vs. Blücher 120,000  
Champaubert, 10 February—Napoleon 15,000 vs. Olsufief 3,700  
Montmirail, 11 February—Napoleon 25,000 vs. Yorck 32,000  
Vauchamps, 14 February—Napoleon 11,000 vs. Blücher 8,000

Napoleon arrived at the front and surprised Blücher's Prussians and Russians during a snowstorm. Just two days later the Prussians triumphed at La Rothière and wrote-off the enemy as a spent force, advancing hell-for-leather across the Marne and onto the highway to Paris. Ten days later Napoleon seized his opportunity

when Marshal Vorwärts got his dispersed columns defeated in detail, in rapid succession in three short sharp combats.

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#### 1814: Campaign in France, Part II

Craonne, 7 March—Napoleon 39,000 vs. Winzingerode 23,000  
Laon, 9-10 March—Napoleon 39,000 vs. Blücher 70,000  
Reims, 12-13 March—Napoleon 18,000 vs. St. Priest 13,400

Blücher withdrew from the Ourcq when he heard of Napoleon's advance. At Soissons he linked up with reinforcements that brought his total force to 100,000. On 7 March, Napoleon attacked westwards along the Chemin des Dames. The Prussians were forced to withdraw towards Laon.

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#### 1814: Campaign in France, Part III

Mormant, 17 February—Napoleon 19,000 vs. Pahlen 4,300  
Montereau, 18 February—Napoleon 30,000 vs. Württemberg 15,000  
Arcis-sur-Aube, 20-21 March—Napoleon 30,000 vs. Schwarzenberg 100,000

La Fère Champenoise, 25 March—Marmont and Mortier 21,000 vs. Württemberg 28,000

As the Coalition armies approached Paris, Napoleon and his Marshals were unable to stem the flood of history.

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#### 1815: Campaign of the Hundred Days

##### **Napoleon's Last Gamble [206]**

Quatre-Bras, 16 June—Ney 26,695 vs. Wellington 36,000  
Ligny, 16 June—Napoleon 80,000 vs. Blücher 86,569  
Wavre, 18 June—Grouchy 33,000 vs. Thielemann 17,000  
Waterloo, 18 June—Napoleon 71,947 vs. Wellington & Blücher 191,461

La Souffel, 28 June—Rapp 21,100 vs. Württemberg 30,000

Napoleon began by moving on the central position between the Prussian and British Armies. On June 15th the Grande Armée was unleashed across the Sambre River. As the 16th dawned, troops of both sides still converged on the battlefields. After withdrawing from the Rhine, General Rapp turned to oppose an Austrian crossing of the river line. The Württembergers moved to intercept. Rapp pulled back toward Strasbourg and fought the last pitched battle of the Napoleonic Wars.

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## 84 BATTLES OF THE LIBRARY OF NAPOLEONIC BATTLES

Name	Mo	Day	Year	Forces	Location	Type of Battle	Maps	Turns	Volume
1 Fleurus	6	26	1794	Austria/Britain	Belgium	Deliberate Attack	2	15-24	
55 Montenotte	4	12	1796	Austria/Piedmont	Italy	Mountain pass			
56 <del>Cosseria</del>	4	14	1796	<del>Austria/Piedmont</del>	<del>Italy</del>	<del>Strong point defense</del>			Deleted
57 Dego	4	15	1796	Austria/Piedmont	Italy	Clash			
58 San Michele	4	19	1796	Austria/Piedmont	Italy	Clash			
59 Mondovi	4	22	1796	Austria/Piedmont	Piedmont	Clash			
51 Lodi	5	10	1796	Austria	Italy	River crossing			
52 Castiglione	8	5	1796	Austria	Italy	Hasty Attack/Deliberate Attack			
53 Arcola	11	17	1796	Austria	Italy	River crossing			
54 Rivoli	1	15	1797	Austria	Italy	Mountain pass			
60 Zurich I	6	4	1799	Austria	Switzerland	Rearguard action			
61 Novi	8	15	1799	Austria/Russia	Piedmont	Frontal Attack			
62 Zurich II	9	26	1799	Russia	Switzerland	River crossing			
63 Hohenlinden	12	3	1800	Austria	Bavaria	Envelopment			
64 Chivasso	5	26	1800	Austria	Italy	River Crossing Frontal Attack			
65 Turbigo	5	31	1800	Austria	Italy	River Crossing			
66 Montebello	6	9	1800	Austria	Italy	Meeting Engagement			
67 Marengo	6	14	1800	Austria	Italy	Deliberate attack/Counter-attack			
43 Ulm	10	19	1805	Austria	Bavaria	Feint/Demonstration/Turning Movement			
44 Dürrenstein	11	11	1805	Russia	Austria	River crossing			
45 Schöngrabern	11	16	1805	Russia	Austria	Rearguard			
46 Austerlitz	12	2	1805	Austria/Russia	Bohemia	Meeting engagement en passant/flank attack			
2 Jena	10	14	1806	Prussia/Saxony	Thuringia	Deceptive attack	1	15-24	The Coming Storm
3 Auerstedt	10	14	1806	Prussia	Thuringia	Holding Attack/meeting engagement	1	15-24	The Coming Storm
4 Golymin	12	26	1806	Russia	Poland	Meeting Engagement/deliberate defense	1	9-20	The Coming Storm
5 Pultusk	12	26	1806	Russia	Poland	Move to contact	1	9-20	The Coming Storm
6 Eylau	2	8	1807	Russia	E. Prussia	Rearguard/move to contact	1	14-26	The Coming Storm
7 Friedland	6	14	1807	Russia	E. Prussia	Meeting engagement en passant/flank attack	1	15-30	The Coming Storm
47 Vimeiro	8	21	1808	Britain	Portugal	Battle			
48 Espinosa de los Monteros	11	10	1808	Spanish	Spain	Clash			
49 Tudela	11	23	1808	Spanish	Spain	River crossing			
50 La Coruna	1	16	1809	Spanish	Spain	Rearguard			
32 Medellin	3	28	1809	Spanish	Spain	Envelopment/Counterattack	0.5	8	Napoleon's Quagmire
8 Abensberg	4	21	1809	Austria	Bavaria	Move to contact / all out assault	1	11-34	The Last Success
9 Eckmühl	4	22	1809	Austria	Bavaria	Rearguard/move to contact	1	11-27	The Last Success
10 Aspern-Essling	5	22	1809	Austria	Austria	River crossing	1	17-31	The Last Success
11 Wagram	7	6	1809	Austria	Austria	Frontal Attack	1	21-36	The Last Success
33 Talavera	7	27	1809	Britain/Spanish	Spain	Deliberate Attack/Frontal Attack	0.5	15-30	Napoleon's Quagmire
34 Almonacid	8	11	1809	Spanish	Spain	Hasty Attack	1	14	Napoleon's Quagmire
35 Ocaña	11	19	1809	Spanish	Spain	Envelopment	1	6	Napoleon's Quagmire
68 Bussaco (Serra do Buçaco)	9	27	1810	Britain	Portugal	Frontal Attack			
69 Fuentes de Oñoro	5	3	1811	Britain	Spain	Turning movement			

Name	Mo	Day	Year	Forces	Location	Type of Battle	Maps	Turns	Volume
70 La Albuera	5	16	1811	Britain/Spainish	Spain	Turning Movement			
82 Sagunto	10	25	1811	Spain	Spain	Turning Movement			
83 Salamanca	7	22	1812	Britain	Spain	Turning Movement/Hasty attack			
22 Smolensk	8	15	1812	Russia	Lithuania	Assault on a fortified city	2	8-34	Napoleon Against Russia
23 Valutino	8	18	1812	Russia	Russia	Rearguard	1	16	Napoleon Against Russia
24 Shevardino	9	5	1812	Russia	Russia	Rearguard action/Approach March	1	5-44	Napoleon Against Russia
25 Borodino	9	7	1812	Russia	Russia	Deliberate Attack/Frontal Attack	1	14	Napoleon Against Russia
26 Maloyaroslavets	10	24	1812	Russia	Russia	Meeting engagement/flank attack	0.5	16-30	Napoleon Against Russia
40 Lützen	5	2	1813	Russia/Prussia	Saxony	Meeting Engagement/deliberate defense			
41 Bautzen	5	21	1813	Russia/Prussia	Saxony	Deliberate Attack/Frontal Attack			
42 Luckau	6	6	1813	Prussia	Saxony	Clash			
84 Vitoria	6	21	1813	Britain	Spain	Turning Movement			
71 Löwenburg	8	19	1813	Prussia	Silesia	Area defense			
74 Grossbeeren	8	23	1813	Prussia/Russia	Prussia	Turning Movement	0.5	12	Four Lost Battles
72 Dresden	8	25	1813	Austria/Russia	Saxony	Assault on a fortified city/Counterattack			
75 Katzbach	8	26	1813	Prussia/Russia	Silesia	Meeting engagement	0.5	11	Four Lost Battles
76 Kulm	8	30	1813	Austria/Prussia/Russia	Bohemia	Pursuit/Rearguard action	0.5	20	Four Lost Battles
77 Dennewitz	9	6	1813	Prussia/Russia	Prussia	Turning Movement	0.5	12	Four Lost Battles
73 Wartenburg	10	3	1813	Prussia	Saxony	River crossing			
12 Liebertwolkwitz	10	14	1813	Austria/Russia/Prussia	Saxony	Reconnaissance in Force	1	9	Napoleon at Leipzig
13 Wachau	10	16	1813	Austria/Russia/Prussia	Saxony	Pitched Battle	1	11	Napoleon at Leipzig
14 Moeckern	10	16	1813	Russia/Prussia	Saxony	Desperate defense	1	11	Napoleon at Leipzig
15 Leipzig	10	18	1813	All above/Sweden	Saxony	Concentric attack	2	18-22	Napoleon at Leipzig
16 Hanau	10	29	1813	Bavaria/Austria	Hesse	Move to Contact/All out assault/roadblock	0.5	8-18	Napoleon at Leipzig
17 Brienne	1	29	1814	Russia/Prussia	France	Meeting engagement/Move to Contact	0.5	6-12	La Patrie en Danger
18 La Rothière	2	1	1814	all above/Württ/Bav	France	Desperate defense/Deliberate Attack/Envelopment	0.5	7-25	La Patrie en Danger
19 Champaubert	2	10	1814	Russia	France	Move to Contact/Pursuit Battle	1	13	La Patrie en Danger
20 Montmirail	2	11	1814	Russia/Prussia	France	Meeting engagement/flank attack	2	10-24	La Patrie en Danger
21 Vauchamps	2	14	1814	Russia/Prussia	France	Rearguard/cavalry envelopment/Pursuit Battle	1	8	La Patrie en Danger
36 Craonne	3	7	1814	Russia/Prussia	France	Meeting engagement			
37 Laon	3	10	1814	Russia/Prussia	France	Reconnaissance in Force			
38 Reims	3	13	1814	Russia	France	Frontal Attack			
39 Fismes	<del>3</del>	<del>13</del>	<del>1814</del>	<del>Prussia</del>	<del>France</del>	<del>River crossing</del>			Deleted
78 Mormant	3	17	1814	Russia/Austria	France	Approach March/Rearguard action			
79 Montereau	3	18	1814	Austria/Württ	France	Frontal Attack			
80 Arcis-sur-Aube	3	21	1814	Austria	France	Approach March/Counterattack			
81 La Fere Champenois	3	25	1814	Württ	France	Rearguard action			
85 Crossing the Sambre	6	15	1815	Prussia	Belgium	River Crossing	1.5	16	
27 Ligny	6	16	1815	Prussia	Belgium	Deliberate Attack/Frontal Attack	0.5	8	Napoleon's Last Gamble
28 Quatre-Bras	6	16	1815	Britain/Allies	Belgium	Desperte Defense/Hasty Attack	0.5	8	Napoleon's Last Gamble
29 Wavre	6	18	1815	Prussia	Belgium	Rearguard/flank guard	0.5	9-18	Napoleon's Last Gamble
30 Waterloo	6	18	1815	Prussa/Britain/Allies	Belgium	Frontal Attack	0.5	10	Napoleon's Last Gamble
86 Ixelles	6	19	1815	Prussa/Britain/Allies	Belgium	Frontal Attack	1	14	
31 La Souffel	6	29	1815	Austria/Wurttt	France	Rearguard action/Approach Battle	0.5	7-10	Napoleon's Last Gamble

see FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993. Forms of Maneuver