


Wargame Design

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Spring 2017

NAPOLEON AT DRESDEN:

“A man such as I am cares little for the lives of a million men.”



Napoleon's Resurgence, 1813

20th Anniversary Issue
1997-2017

Wargame Design, *Spring 2017*

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NAPOLEON'S RESURGENCE, 1813


Publication Date: 10 February 2018

On the cover:

Napoleon I. with Prince Metternich during the meeting in Dresden, 26.06.1813

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Napoleon's Military Maxims

The first I knew of Napoleon was when I accidentally picked up a copy of the Maxims at the age of 10 or 11. Reading the first few Maxims left a profound mark on me, even though I didn't comprehend much of what I was reading. Our brand new pocket edition of the Maxims is now in print, bringing that story full circle.

The Maxims are authentic quotes from Napoleon's letters—a very useful description of his principles and methods, even if they are quoted out of context. OSG reorganized the Maxims, re-arranging them under three main headings. Each page contains one guiding principle of Napoleon. The color illustrations on each page also present a telegraphic history from Toulon to exile. The heavy stock cover has embossed lettering.

These have become, for me, the central core of Napoleonic thought. I find them highly rewarding. I think they can help the player to understand the rules and how to play the game. —Kevin Zucker

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
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NAPOLEON'S LAST GAMBLE

Getting the Most from your Guns

Guy De Frances

Napoleon's quote, "It is with artillery that one makes war," is proved when it comes to *Napoleon's Last Gamble*. Artillery is critical to both sides, even though each may employ it with different goals in mind.



I recently played out the complete *Grand Campaign*, covering June 15 -19. The French made it to the outskirts of Brussels, but were turned back by both a solid wall of British infantry and the appearance of the Prussian army on their right flank. There were several times while playing that I was struck by the significant impact artillery had in the game.¹

Bombardment: A Rules Clarification

The ability to attack enemy units 2 or 3 hexes away by bombardment is a unique attribute of artillery units in the Library games. Bombardment adds depth to the battlefield and may cause an enemy to approach cautiously when artillery is in the neighborhood. For the attacker, bombardment helps build offensive momentum since it can force retreats without having to engage friendly infantry or cavalry. With its ability to bombard over rivers, it is a key weapon in forcing river crossings. Bombarding enemy units adjacent to the primary target of an infantry or cavalry attack will often result in a more effective attack on the primary target. When on the defensive, selective bombardment, perhaps with faster moving horse cavalry can help slow an enemy advance. During my game, Fraser's horse artillery battalion, with its 4 SPs, was particular effective in

disrupting French advances. Acting alone this unit has a 50-50 chance of retreating whatever it can hit.

A "soak-off" is a low odds attack against a defender in order to achieve better odds against other defenders in your ZOC. Bombardment can be used to this end, and the Series rules contain a specific section on this: paragraph 13.5 covers the use of bombardments as soak-offs. This rule was a topic of debate on the Consimworld *Napoleon's Last Gamble* page, and it turns out that many players had misinterpreted it.

At first glance the prior language in 13.5 seemed clear on its face: enemy units that were subject to a bombardment were deemed to have been attacked, absolving abutting friendly units from attacking them in the upcoming combat phase. Where the difference in interpretation arose was with the interplay of the soak-off rule with Series rule 10.31, which requires friendly units in an enemy ZOC to attack. Many players read these together and concluded, as it turns out erroneously, that a bombardment alone satisfied the requirement to attack. Chris Moeller articulated his view of the original design intent:

"Normally a unit has to attack all adjacent units. Bombardment can remove SOME of those adjacent units from the attack. Every unit in a ZOC has to attack SOMEBODY. Bombardment means you don't have to attack EVERYBODY. Does that make sense? Bombardment doesn't trump the requirement that every unit in a ZOC make an attack."

Kevin Z. confirmed that this was the original intent of the rules: *"I am very [w]ary of allowing units in EZOC to NOT attack. For me a unit should only have that option if protected - in a Town, Chateaux, or I.P. Definitely not in open ground. That very fun tactic of making sure to bombard off somewhere else, and then your own stack doesn't have to attack the adjacent enemy? We rewrote 13.5 to shut down the possibility of misinterpretation."*

In Example 1, bombardment by Saint-Cyr will no longer relieve Capitaine of the obligation to attack the Prussian 8th Inf regiment during the upcoming combat phase; he will still have to make a 1:1 attack since a friendly unit in an enemy ZOC must make an attack.

¹ Much of what follows will be applicable to other games in the Library Series.



Example 1

In example 2, Saint –Cyr’s bombardment of the Prussian 8th Inf regiment is a good “soak-off” of that unit, meaning Capitaine now only needs to attack the 30th Inf regiment. Instead of attacking both units at 1:2 odds, Capitaine will now be making a 1:1 against the 30th only.

The soak off by bombardment is still an useful tactic since it can help friendly units avoid attacking all adjacent units, but it will no longer allow units in enemy ZOCs to avoid all combat during the upcoming combat.

The Grand Battery

In NLG a grand battery can be created in one of two ways, and by either side: by playing the Grand Battery card, or invoking the rule contained in the Study Folder at 25.77. There are differences between the two.²

The Grand Battery card is a Tactics card, which means it can be played during either the friendly or enemy Combat Phase. This is a distinction from 25.77, which can only be invoked during the friendly combat phase. If the card is played during the enemy combat phase, the battery can be used to immediately disrupt EZOCs, allowing an otherwise surrounded unit to escape elimination. The card can also be used to cancel a Cavalry Pursuit card. The card comes with a VP penalty (-1) but that is a small price to pay for the chance to prevent unit elimination or a second cavalry attack.



Example 2

You can setup a grand battery under the Study Folder rule at your discretion, but only once per game. *The defensive benefits that come with card play, EZOC and cavalry charge disruption are not available under the Study Folder rule.* The Study Guide rule requires creation during the friendly combat phase only and it only imparts a +1 modifier to the bombardment table. KZ has clarified that each unit in the grand battery gets the modification, so conceivably you could have five separate bombardments getting the benefit of the die roll modifier. One other rule clarification to remember with regards to a grand battery: units in the battery are restricted to 1 hex of movement each turn the battery is in effect.³

“Forecast for June 17, 1815: Hot, with a chance of late day thunderstorms. . .”

Weather played a considerable role in the outcome of the 1815 campaign. If you are playing NLG with the historical weather, you know in advance what weather conditions you will be dealing with, and can plan accordingly. If you want some uncertainty, use the variable weather table and you will see how a change in the weather can disrupt the best of plans. Any weather result other than Fair will have an adverse impact on artillery’s performance, both in combat and with movement. An example from my game brought that home for me. At 5 PM on the 16th the Prussians drew

² Other games in the Library Series have the Grand Battery card or a scenario specific rule for creating grand batteries in the Study Folder.

³ See NLG Update 35, September 1, 2016, amending Study Folder paragraph 25.77

and played the Grand Battery card. At the 6 PM weather check, thunderstorms rolled in, negating the card benefits.

Bad weather hampers artillery movement.

Thunderstorms, and the mud that automatically follows, cuts the movement allowance of your artillery units in half.⁴ There is a way to overcome the movement restriction, but at the price of reducing your full strength artillery units: The 1815 specific rules in the Study Folder, section 25.74, allow you to maintain the full movement allowance by “double teaming” an artillery unit.⁵



Artillery units caught in the mud will force you to either accept a slower passage of the formation, or move the artillery units aside and proceed without them. Which you opt for may depend on a number of factors, including distance from the enemy, time of day, and even which day you are playing; a slowdown caused by weather may be more bearable on June 16th than it is on the 15th, especially if it occurs late in the day. When playing with the variable weather chart you won't know how long the movement restriction will last: mud can last through several weather checks and if there is mud when the night turns start, it is likely to persist into the next morning.

Weather hampers the combat effectiveness of artillery considerably. While heat does not pose much of a problem with combat, with rain or thunderstorms the ability to bombard is lost completely. While the cards and rules are not explicit on this point, I think it is a logical inference that on a turn when bombardment is prohibited (rain, thunderstorms) you should lose the benefit of any Tactics Card that lets you disrupt EZOCs unless the artillery piece is adjacent to the EZOC. While mud doesn't prevent bombardment, it does carry a -2

DRM; you may want a house rule deciding whether mud should prevent disruption of EZOCs.

A Couple of House Rules to Consider

If you want to incorporate some chrome into your play of NLG, incorporate the suggested artillery House Rules that appeared in WDM Vol III, No.6. One difference with those rules comes from treating artillery units as trains; a quick look at the Terrain Effects Chart for trains will show you impact of that change.⁶ Moving or retreating your artillery units across streams carries a risk which is reflected in the table for artillery losses due to terrain. There is also an enhancement to the Bombardment Table, which may result in a reduction of the initiative die roll for the bombarded unit.

Artillery units not stacked with infantry or cavalry, and subject to a shock result, have their initiative value reduced to 1 for purposes of resolving the shock combat. Retreat or elimination is guaranteed. There are situations, however where artillery's characteristics are a benefit in the close combat that a Sk result represents. When defending in ground that otherwise converts an AR* result to Sk, a house rule was offered in NLG Rules Update -34, June 27, 2016, that would allow artillery units to resolve a Shock result at their printed initiative:

*Artillery's Initiative in Shock Combat is always one unless it has the benefit of a crest, sits at the far end of a bridge, or is covered by a town, woods or slope. In other words, if it is defending in an Ar*Shock combat, it should get to use its printed initiative. **If artillery is defending in woods, town, behind a crest, on a hilltop, or across a bridge or trestle, and the result is Shock, use the artillery's printed Initiative Rating to resolve the Shock Combat.** You won't use the artillery unit's shock value unless it is alone in the hex.*

Artillery units in NLG pose challenges for both the French and the Allies. When bombarding, especially when deployed in a Grand Battery, artillery can dominate the battlefield. In bad weather, artillery units are of limited offensive value and their slow speed can be an impediment to sustained forward movement. When playing the grand campaign with the variable weather chart, players will be confronted with some challenging choices when it comes to the use of artillery.

⁴ Under 25.71, thunderstorms last one hour, and are followed by two hours of rain and mud. See NLG Update 35, September 1, 2016.

⁵ The same rule is available in *La Patrie in Danger*.

⁶ Commentary on the movement aspects of this house rule appears in the May 10, 2012 Update for *The Last Success*. You can read it there and in WDM Vol III, No. 2.

DESIGN FILES

Victory Conditions

Kevin Zucker

The current Victory Conditions go back to the Days series game '1806.' I was having problems coming up with an all-encompassing set of conditions for the disparate scenarios in that game and turned it over to the developer. David Collins worked out the first draft of the idea—a list of 4 factors contributing VPs in a nuanced way. We gradually added items as the TLNB series took shape, but in such a way as to maintain overall balance.

Combat Casualties. As a player, your main way of influencing events is by the use of your combat units. Everything else plays into that ability to attack and defend. The game will actually be won in the combat arena, anyway, so limit VPs to the player in light of the inherent benefit of controlling the board.

Location VPs. You don't want to give them out just because a town has an important location. It should be a place that you want the players to fight over, in the contested zone.

Rule of Thumb. No more than 35-40 points available for VP locations. The median would be 15 VPs for a half map, 30-35 VPs for a full map, total, for locations. At one time I was against the use of location VPs and I never did use them until TLNB. I thought they were a cheap and artless way to get the players to fight historically. Now, I have partly changed my mind, and I find them useful, when used sparingly as part of a larger formula as one of several factors. Only those VP hexes that are in dispute should be scored. You shouldn't get VPs for hexes that you didn't have to fight over. That way VP locations will not dominate the game, casualties and baggage trains will remain important.



VP hexes are situation-specific.

Q-B for example is a cross-roads. It should be worth VPs, but Gemioncourt, Sombreffe, these should not count in a battle of Fleurus. Even though the commander in the field had established a certain operational goal, it doesn't mean that he has to get all the way there in the scope of two days. He has to make good headway.

Baggage trains were included among the original three VP factors in 1806. Troops almost always went into battle hungry, and didn't eat again until the night. The commissariat really only tried to feed them in between battles. Corps baggage trains don't really include foodstuffs primarily. "Supply" in TLNB doesn't represent beans as much as bullets. "Out of Supply" means a morale problem, one that hunger, lack of firewood and low ammo supplies would exacerbate. The Army-level wagons aren't even represented in TLNB; these other wagons were attached to the "Center of Operations." They may be off map near the printed Supply source. The whole reason that the Corps baggage trains are included is to measure victory. This marker represents a place that should be secure. The troops know that things are bad if the enemy are in the baggage. The capture of that location, usually in the rear, is a morale disaster (that you deduct VPs for), much more than the actual value of the provisions.

Interview

The Fourth Phase

KEVIN ZUCKER

with Christopher Basile

Christopher Basile is a musicologist who lives in Australia.

CB: What can you learn from a wargame? You must have given this some thought over the years...

KZ: Well, you can learn something, but it's in the details of history. Sometimes those details can add up to a big-picture change, but you need to be a military theorist to understand it.

Is there a point to the game, you know, other than learning history?

We have dozens of issues full of articles in this magazine "Wargame Design" about that. Look for articles by Christopher Moeller. He has a way of explaining exactly what you were asking. Somehow you get about half-way through the game and you have that "ah-ha" moment, and you suddenly understand something that no historian can really put into words.

Through participation in the dynamics and variables of the historical moment? As it is interpreted/understood of course.

We try to set up the situation, the terrain, the armies, weather and other factors, and give you control of certain variables. However, much of the time, you cannot escape from the historical outcome!

That raises interesting questions, it seems. I think so. But they are very technical in nature.

So it becomes a re-enactment rather than a game. It's like history is a strait-jacket, and can you wiggle free?

Inability to escape historical outcome makes me wonder about fate, or is it just that the designer knowing the outcome cannot but engineer the game accordingly... Don't know. A little bit of everything.

History is an ongoing creation
That is why I don't trust future-history simulations. The only base-line you have is past occurrences. "Always training to win the last war..."+

As one looks back it moves below the horizon out of sight and the view of it is blocked by intervening events... Future history simulations, divining the future, is applied wargaming I imagine....

I picture the Pentagon types wanting a simulation, a kind of game, to play with as a way of trying out options—that still must go on doesn't it? Even in this age of unmanned drones and all that..

They had a wargame prior to Iraq. Our general's comment after the invasion: "It didn't wargame like that."

Really? That's almost too funny to be true. Yes.

In the game version they were welcomed by cheering grateful locals huh? But how can you avoid getting the result you want? How can it be random and real when it's programmed with bias and preferred outcomes...? Perhaps its all more complex than I imagine the simulations—I picture a sort of big-budget version of "Risk."

Rumsfeld said he didn't want any "Fourth Phase" planning. The Fourth Phase is the rebuilding and occupation phase. This is the most costly phase and it requires the most manpower. So he just axed it.

I think USA doesn't do 4th Phase, do they? We do, but without any plan and on the cheap. Remember they put a bozo in charge of the occupation and they sent all the former Saddam loyalists into the wilderness. Good move!

That's what people comment on who visit Viet Nam - how the French were planning to stay, built grand public buildings and so on, while USA just left behind craters, sickness... What has USA built in Iraq except the green zone military base/city? Oil refineries.

USA empire seems chaotic. I figure they already had oil refineries didn't they? But I get your point. See article next page: "Washington's Battle Plan"

Right now the game is to divide the population, that seems to be playing out in a big way right now— what is the goal of that unless one is planning to colonise an entire people? Yes, you are right. They are keeping us divided by playing upon differences and hot button issues that are simply divisive. Divide and conquer! They know the play book by heart.

Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace

U.S. is paying the price for missteps made on Iraq

LA TIMES **July 18, 2003** Mark Fineman, Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, Times Staff Writers
The Bush administration planned well and won the war with minimal allied casualties. Now, according to interviews with dozens of administration officials, military leaders and independent analysts, missteps in the planning for the subsequent peace could threaten the lives of soldiers and drain U.S. resources indefinitely and cloud the victory itself.

Rivalry and Misreadings

The tale of what went wrong is one of agency infighting, ignored warnings and faulty assumptions.

An ambitious, yearlong State Department planning effort predicted many of the postwar troubles and advised how to resolve them. But the man who oversaw that effort was kept out of Iraq by the Pentagon, and most of his plans were shelved. Meanwhile, Douglas J. Feith, the No. 3 official at the Pentagon, also began postwar planning, in September. But he didn't seek out an overseer to run the country until January.

The man he picked, Garner, had run the U.S. operation to protect ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Based on that experience, Garner acknowledged, he badly underestimated the looting and lawlessness that would follow once Saddam Hussein's army was defeated. By the time he got to Baghdad, Garner said, 17 of 21 Iraqi ministries had "evaporated."

"Being a Monday morning quarterback," Garner says now, the underestimation was a mistake. "But if I had known that then, what would I have done about it?"

The postwar planning by the State and Defense departments, along with that of other agencies, was done in what bureaucrats call "vertical stovepipes." Each agency worked independently for months, with little coordination.

Even within the Pentagon there were barriers: The Joint Chiefs of Staff on the second floor worked closely with the State Department planners, while Feith's Special Plans Office on the third floor went its own way, working with a team from the Central Command under Army Gen. Tommy Franks.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's civilian aides decided that they didn't need or want much help, officials in both departments say.

Central Command officials confirmed that their postwar planning group -- dubbed Task Force Four, for the fourth phase of the war plan -- took a back seat to the combat planners. What postwar planning did occur at the Central Command and the Pentagon was on disasters that never occurred: oil fires, masses of refugees, chemical and biological warfare, lethal epidemics, starvation.

The Pentagon planners also made two key assumptions that proved faulty. One was that American and British authorities would inherit a fully functioning modern state, with government ministries, police forces and public utilities in working order -- a "plug and play" occupation. The second was that the resistance would end quickly.

Some top Pentagon officials acknowledged that they have been surprised at how difficult it has been to establish order.

BACKGROUND

Milhaud's Cavalry Division in 1809

In rating the initiative of French Dragoons in the new game *Napoleon's Quagmire*, we gave Latour's brigades 4-Initiatives, while Milhaud's were made 3's. We were able to find out from Robert Burnham's "Charging Against Wellington," some info about the quality of the regiments in Milhaud's division. The regiments were organized into three brigades (number of squadrons in parenthesis), as follows:

Milhaud	3 rd Dragoon Div
Barthélemy	5 Dgn (2), 12 Dgn (2)
Maupetit	16 Dgn (3), 20 Dgn (3), 21 Dgn (3)
Vial	20 Dgn (3), 26 Dgn (4)

Edouard Jean Baptiste Milhaud was 41 years old in 1807 when he took command of the 3rd Dragoon Division in Spain. He had been serving with the 5th Dragoons since January, 1796, when he became Colonel of the Regiment.

General **Maupetit** assumed command of the Light Cavalry Brigade of the IV Corps on 18 September 1808. At that time it consisted of the 5th Dragoons, the 3rd Dutch Hussars and the 1st Vistula Lancers. In June, 1809 his health began to fail and he requested permission to return to France. ¹

5th Dragoon Regiment

The Regiment was created in 1656. It fought at Wertingen and Austerlitz in 1805, Nasielsk in 1806, Eylau and Friedland in 1807.

- Campaign in Spain: Almonacid, Ocaña 1809, Vitoria 1813
- Campaign in France: Craonne, La Fère-Champenoise 1814



In Oct 1808 HQ, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Sqdns entered Spain as a part of Maupetit's Bde. of IV Corps.

In June 1809 HQ, 1st and 2nd Sqdns went to Barthelemy's Bde. The 3rd and 4th Sqdns joined the 8th Prov. Dragoon Rgt, part of Bron's Bde, Caulaincourt's Div. ²

5 Dgn and 12 Dgn were in the same bde from Jun 1809—Jan 1814. Prior to Jun, 1809, they were at different battles:

5th Dragoon Regiment

At Medellin, 5 Dgn was in Maupetit's Bde of IV Corps (until June). The regiment was at Talavera and Ocaña.

12th Dragoon Regiment

12 Dgn was brigaded with 5 Dgn in the battles of Almonacid and Ocaña. These two regiments were assigned to Counter-Guerrilla Ops, 1809-1813. Perreimond departed 10 June; repl. by Dermoncourt.

After the battle of Talavera 27-28 July the British and Spanish armies were pushed away from central Spain, and several French cavalry generals were reassigned.

In early August General Debell was relieved of his command and recalled to France. No general was sent to replace him and his brigade would be led by COL Alexandre d'Ermenonville, CO of the 8th Dgn. On 7 Sept Gen Caulaincourt, CO of the 2nd Bde of the 4th Dgn Div, was promoted to general of division and retired to France.

As with Debelle, no general was sent as a replacement for him and COL Jean Saint-Genies, CO of the 19th Dgn, took command. Also in Sept., Gen Noirot took command of the 1st Bde of the 3rd Dgn Div, replacing Gen Barthélmi, who became governor of Santander.

¹ Burnham, p. 185

² Burnham, p. 247

The French would spend Sept and the first part of Oct in rest & refit. Nap had no regular regiments to send to Spain, only six provisional regiments. He did not believe these six would be enough so he ordered the creation of six more. Twenty-four of the 25 Dgn regts in Spain were tasked to provide their 3rd and 4th Sqdns to fill the provisional regiments.

That is why we see some rgts with just 2 sqdns. The 5th and 12th Dgn regiments lost their 3rd Sqdns in May. Anyway no replacement troopers were forthcoming by the end of 1809.

The French command structure saw several more changes in late Oct and early Nov 1809. On 17 Oct General Paris took command of the LC Bde of the V Corps.

On 7 Nov Gen Digeon, CO of the 2nd Bde of the 3rd Dragoon (Cav) Div was reassigned as CO of the cavalry of Loison's Reserve Division. He was repl by COL Vial, the CO of the 16th Dragoons. Gen Oullenbourg, the CO of the 2nd Bde of the 1st Dragoon Div, was allowed to return to France due to poor health. He would be repl by Col Bouvier des Eclaz, CO of the 14th Dgn.

AtB: On 18 Nov the largest cavalry battle of the Pen War was fought near Ocaña, during which Gen Paris was killed. He was replaced by COL Subervie, the CO of the 10th Chas.

The next day the Spanish Army under Gen. Areizaga was crushed at Ocaña and forced to retreat. During the battle COL Vial, the new CO of the 3rd Drag Div's 2nd Bde, was killed, 12 days after taking command of the brigade. After Ocaña fighting was over for the year, with the French in nominal control of much of Spain. By the year's end there seemed some prospects of finally subduing Spanish resistance. This progress led Napoleon to believe that he would not be needed in Spain.

MILHAUD'S DIVISION 1 APR 1807

3e Division de dragons ~ Milhaud, g.d.

Brigade Maupetit, g.b.

5e Régiment de dragons (Lacour) (3) 381

8e Régiment de dragons (Girardin) (3) 312

Brigade Debelle, g.b.

9e Régiment de dragons (Queunot) (3) 266

12e Régiment de dragons (Giraud) (3) 350

Brigade Barthélemy, g.b.

16e Régiment de dragons (Vial) (3) 373

21re Régiment de dragons (Dumas) (3) 314

12 escadrons 1996

Napoleon's Resurgence

Spring 1813 Renaissance of the Grande Armée

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Napoleon advanced into Saxony with a fresh army of 130,000 men, conscripted and trained from scratch in just four months. The green cannon fodder lost 25,000 of their number at the Battle of Lützen on May 2nd, and 15,000 more fell out along the march from weakness, malnutrition, and disease. With additional reinforcements the army surged again to 160,000, intercepting the Coalition armies at Bautzen. French youth left on that Saxon field 12,000 men, and even more march attrition. The Russians and Prussians were losing just as many, and had not as many to lose. But Napoleon's mere 6,500 cavalry were wholly inadequate to impel his pursuits with the needed punch to damage the enemy. In hopes of building up his strength in cavalry and the other arms, Napoleon accepted a six-week truce. Late Summer negotiations, when they finally came, were not seriously engaged.

BATTLES SIMULATED

Lützen Struggle for the four villages, 2 May

With the death of Marshal Kutusov on 28 April, there was no further obstacle to the Tsar's fervent dream of dictating peace from the Tuilleries. The Allies marched boldly across the Elbe, not knowing Napoleon's plans, his strength, or his location. They took up a position astride the road to Leipzig, the Emperor's presumed objective. After a string of actions at Halle, Merseberg and Weissenfels, the two armies met on the field of battle at Lützen on the 2nd of May.

Bautzen The Guard's Moment of Truth, 20-21 May

The Russo-Prussian army was nearly 100,000-strong, but Napoleon outnumbered them, and Marshal Ney was approaching with 85,000 reinforcements. Napoleon had planned to pin down his enemies and then trap them with Ney's troops. But the Bravest of the Brave ended up coming in on the flank, not far enough to oblige Wittgenstein to redeploy, and so no deadly "hinge" was formed in the enemy line. The Russians were defeated, but Napoleon's army was at the end of its tether, and the pursuit cost him more men than the enemy. The Bautzen map is one and one half map sections: 33x34"

Luckau Gateway to Berlin, 6 June

Bülow's Prussian Corps of 30,000 men marched south from Berlin, threatening French Communications with Dresden. Oudinot's XII Corps and Beaumont's cavalry were at Hoyerswerda on the 28th of May when some of Bülow's force stumbled upon them. By the time Oudinot caught up with them again on June 6th Bülow had concentrated most of his Corps at Luckau, driving the French back with a loss of 2,000.

June 17th ...and All That Jazz

The Ways of Wargames and Waterloo's Wet Weekend

By Paul Comben

The events of 1815's "in-between" day reveal why certain factors commonly make their way into wargame design, and why others get left by the roadside. June 17th saw very little fighting, but a great number of decisions that would determine how the 18th would pan out. And through the course of that progressively cold and very wet Saturday history records an intriguing mix of fairly common wargame elements, as well as other important military matters which but rarely, if ever, find their way into designs. So, although I will be referencing a few operational games featuring the Hundred Days, I will also be looking further afield to see how these elements are treated.

June 17th – The Early Hours: Two Armies Sleep, Another Slips Away

You can go through an awful lot of military history, passing from era to era, before you will find much of anything in terms of full-on combat occurring at night. Armies would march at night, seek to deploy for an expected fight upon the morrow, pursue or retreat through the darkness; but for a period extending over millennia, battle itself proved somewhat of a rarity. Alexander, upon the plain of Gaugamela, was advised by some of his generals to essay a night attack upon the teeming host of Darius, and according to some sources, the Persian king kept his army awake the whole night to provide for such a contingency. But Alexander, whose disdain for doing anything when he could not be seen doing it probably sat alongside his dislike for the general uncertainty of a night action, declined to take up the option. Such caution was certainly well founded, because until we come to the most recent of times, compounding the fog of war with several hours of effort in a pitchy gloom was no way to conduct the practice of arms. In 1066AD, the dusk pursuit

of the remaining Saxon army from the field of Hastings led contingents of Norman knights straight into the Malfosse – a massive and still extant ditch, at least forty feet deep, bordering the eastern side of the likelier Crowhurst battlefield site. ¹In all probability, several score of their number perished in the fall. And close to seven hundred years later, the Jacobite army of the Bonnie Prince set out on a night march on the eve of Culloden which resulted in nothing save the straggling of the clans over a broad expanse of trackless moor. And for Americans, there is the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson to recall, shot by his own side whilst trying to work out where the other side was late in that spring day at Chancellorsville.

Little wonder that armies usually kept well away from serious night combat – picquets could exchange a few blows or a few shots, or a rumour or alarm might sound somewhere, but armies would keep near everything else until sunrise, including, in many but not all cases, a full pursuit of retreating forces. The obvious pursuit exception would seem to be the aftermath of Waterloo itself, but that was really more noise (drummer boys mounted on horses) and threat than substantial forces pressing forward. And for a very long time, there just was not facility for anything else, unless we start bringing into consideration the smaller actions of irregulars or partisans, who did their work without the need of formal military structures and organization, and with the preference of the covert and clandestine within a night environment. ²

Thus, as was the accustomed practice, with the last daylight fading on June 16th 1815, nearly all full-on military action came to a close. In the immediate aftermath of Ligny, the still viable contingents of the three committed Prussian corps began their long retreat to Wavre, whilst Bülow's corps, which had missed the battle, marched to

join them there. Meanwhile, a third body of Prussians, readily described as a broken mob, headed east in the general direction of home. Among the French forces that had been present at Ligny, even getting at least a few squadrons of cavalry looking for the retreating foe was delayed until 4am; essentially, the army hunkered down on the field and awaited orders that were a very long time coming.

It was much the same story for the French at Quatre Bras – a prolonged period of near complete inactivity, although they were facing an army still massing its strength and with no present inclination to retreat. What united the battlefields and the forces still present on or near them was that not one of those commands had a clear picture as to what was happening, and contingents on both sides were in a fog as to what to do next.

When it comes to modeling all of this in game situations, the variance in approach is considerable. Night, in many a game outside of what *may* be seen in a twentieth century design working at a relevant scale, often signals a shutting down of almost every function save movement – and many games may well limit that also. As I recall, the original version of *Terrible Swift Sword*, and perhaps later versions as well, had “Thoroughfare Only” turns during the night, where, if you were not on a pike, you were not going to move, period – much the same (road only) is also part of night turns in *Waterloo: Fate of France*.

OSG’s 1815 gran tactical designs (*Napoleon’s Last Battles* and *Napoleon’s Last Gamble*) also largely follow the night shutdown model, be it for combat or reorganization of eliminated forces with some chance of coming back. An interesting contrast, however, comes in the *Napoleonic Brigade Series*. Here, night does not work on the basis of a range of rigid task proscriptions, but by surrounding many still possible activities with a variety of limitations, adverse modifiers, and a general feeling of risk. You can even fight during the hours of darkness, but keeping control of your forces, and “finding” enemy forces in the middle of night and “nowhere” is far from easy, and is only to be undertaken if you have a very good reason so to do.

All of this naturally leads curiosity to wonder when night combat did become part of the way of things. In John Gorkowski’s second *Red Poppies* game, covering a variety of engagements in the Ypres salient 1914-17, night can be a time of not inconsiderable bustle and combat. The game presents the nighttime hours as what they were: periods to improve defences, bolster a position, and maybe, just maybe, take a run at the enemy – albeit with the risk of units getting lost amidst a landscape shorn of feature and bathed in gloom. Night, perhaps more than anything else, was very much a time for the trench raid, with several parties equipped with grenades and the more medieval frontline weaponry, looking to keep the enemy on his toes and bring back a prisoner or two.

And that technology was now assisting in the military endeavours of the darkness was offered in the recollections of the British novelist and Western Front veteran, Henry Williamson. In recordings made for the Imperial War Museum and the BBC, he spoke of the nightly ritual of the “wind-up.” This was a German practice, involving a sequenced firing off of flares (Williamson considered German flares far better than the British ones), and a rippling “hurrah” moving along the German line, usually intimating rather than actually presaging an attack.

It is hard to look further back than the beginning of the last century for occasions of serious and ongoing night combat “in the field,” but since those days, right up to the time of Alamein, Stalingrad, the Falklands and later, it has been part of the nature of warfare and the process of killing.³ Modern weaponry and modern tactics are largely responsible for this: with no need to mass men to mass firepower and effect control, with night sights and all manner of other assets facilitating actions no Napoleonic army could ever realistically consider, night could well be considered as just as bloody as the day. But that is not the same as saying that absolutely nothing happened on the bygone fields of Ligny and Quatre Bras after darkness fell. At Quatre Bras, there were some engagements between forward posts, especially near the Materne pond. And at Ligny, there was the flight of the aforementioned Prussian mob, the rescuing of the stricken Blücher, and growing concerns among the

Prussian command as to the whereabouts of their entire ammunition supply train.

One other aspect common to both sites was the effort by the armies still present on the field to recover at least some of their wounded and bring in the stragglers. In his own book of the campaign, Tim Clayton cites examples of British medical staff getting out onto the field of Quatre Bras to offer help to the wounded, and while such actions might well be considered as peripheral to the scope of a wargame, Ben Hull's *Fields of Fire* does work the administration of casualty clearing into how the performance of your forces is assessed.

The Prussian "mob" certainly cannot readily be thought of as peripheral given both the confusion it caused among the French as to the line of the Prussian retreat, and the notable reduction it made in the strength of the Army of The Rhine. This mob was on the road to Namur soon after the Prussian lines broke and the army began to withdraw, but there is no game that I know of where this crowd of fugitives is portrayed as a physical, on-map presence, or where there is any possibility that such a flight will misdirect the pursuit effort of the opposing army.

Looking at some 1815 designs, we could say that any such fugitive contingent is there, at least sometimes, but not represented at the exact point one might readily expect to see it. If we return to the two OSG designs mentioned earlier, or even to *The Last Days of the Grande Armée*, the rally/reorganization process can bring back previously full strength eliminated units at reduced strengths, and at the same time, among those units who do not return at all, as well as those returning with reduced contingents, one may perceive the "footprint" of those who have fled. But that does not create any sense of a sizeable mob being mistaken for a main body, and misleading a victorious force into what they are meant to pursue.

Here, I sense we are in the throes of the things designers willingly choose or feel compelled to leave out in order for their creations to work without hideous encumbrance. One possible solution, for games at the appropriate scale, might be to have a night events table, with some form of filtering of results dependent on what has

happened during the previous daylight hours (adverse results creating mobs, confusion, additional fog of war); I readily concede that such processes are likely to be fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, odd and untoward things happen at night in warzones, and at the very least, this sort of material could add some real piquancy to the right sort of design.

Less difficult to represent, but still often absent except in the most abstracted sense, are the massive trains accompanying armies. If you think of the armies of 1815, it is one thing to see columns of redcoats, Prussian landwehr, or the massed ranks of *La Garde Impériale*, and quite another to picture the meat on the hoof, the bakers' ovens, the ambulances (such as they were in most cases), the wagons carrying musket or artillery ammunition, and a whole host of other impedimenta. And yet, this was (and in various ways, still is) all very much part of any fighting force, and furthermore, things happened to such trains during the 1815 campaign that cannot be catered for by simply saying: "Your LOC runs in this or that direction and ends at this or that point."

First, during the action at Quatre Bras, the panicked rout of a body of cuirassiers was enough to cause significant disruption to French trains at Frasnes (belonging to II Corps) and at Charleroi. Secondly, in the aftermath of Ligny, the French cavalry that did finally get forward came within a hair's breadth of capturing the entire ammunition train of the three Prussian corps present at the battle. This latter event would have been disastrous for the Prussians, as it would have wrecked any serious combat potential for those corps whose ammunition was in desperate need of replenishment. And clearly, in terms of representing such a possibility, what we are talking about is more than simply having a unit or two landing on a map edge with a supply symbol on it – this must be seen as on-map stuff, and important stuff, but inevitably, within the broad family of 1815 games, treatments vary. To give an example, *Napoleon's Last Gamble* does have baggage/supply markers, but the emphasis is on fitting them to a particular purpose within that specific game model, and is not about seeking to cover every historical contingency.⁴

One particular historical aspect that can be missing, even when the relevant counters are on the map, is that the trains, baggage and the like of former eras often had civilian drivers – men “not under military discipline” in the parlance of the day. In the *Musket and Pike Series* this is reflected in those scenarios where deployed artillery is immobile because the civilians have cleared off well to the rear. In 1815, it was certainly the case that both the Anglo-Allied and French army had civilian drivers, who were jittery to say the least, and ready to clear off at the drop of a hat or the distant report of weaponry being fired.

Such instances, as well as other “baggage and clutter” occurrences, I will address later in this article, but now let us move the clock forward to daybreak on the key day...

June 17th – Morning: Getting Stopped Armies Started

“Waterloo Eclipsed!” ran an actual American Civil War headline worked into the rules artwork of the old Yaquinto design, *Pickett’s Charge*. Whatever one thinks of the veracity of that, certainly Waterloo had been paralleled by certain events in the Pennsylvania of early July 1863. But then, any battle, any operation in fact, in the pre-telegraph, pre-radio era, could have contained much the same sort of frustrations. On July 2nd and 3rd, RE Lee had intended to launch a number of coordinated attacks at various points along a line just a few miles long. But these had floundered in a mass of prolonged delays in some areas and premature assaults in others. Longstreet was slow and reluctant to commit; Hill and Ewell failed to jump off at the right time, and very little ended up happening when it was meant to. But this was always likely to happen in those chapters of valour when, as often as not, the character of one man determined the character of a maneuver or assault; or when one man looked at something other than what some other man thought he should be seeing; or when watches ran slow or fast; and when dispatch riders added the wrong thing or nothing to what they were meant to be delivering.

On the second and last days of Gettysburg, the armies were at least awake and in some posture

for action; but on the morning of June 17th 1815, not a great deal of anything was moving to a purpose on the battlefields of the previous day. Without restraint, players will balk at this, possessing the omniscience to see an enemy “hanging out to dry” or vulnerable friendly forces that really need to get somewhere else very quickly. But the plain historical truth is that Ney’s wing of *L’Armée du Nord* was hunting around for breakfast that morning, whilst Ney himself was convinced he had far more army in front of him than was actually there. Napoleon’s Ligny contingents were also looking for a meal, whilst the intermittently dozing emperor was looking at the newspapers, and in a mind to regard Ney as having far less of an army in front of him than his marshal had actually seen. As for Wellington, he was certainly not seeing a bunch of depleted Prussian units disappearing off to the north – in fact, apart from Ney’s forces, including at least a part of “Dithering Drouet’s” I Corps, he really could not see anything.

Over the years, numerous designs have sought to cater for the inertia of commanders and armies by various means – although it would also have to be said that sometimes games have not really catered for this at all. This is not meant as a criticism of every such game; the utterly brilliant and beautiful *Napoleon*, for example, is far too busy offering its glory to the world for anyone to get het up about what it does not contain. But where kicking things into gear is an issue, designers have found all sorts of ways of representing the reality of the situation – delayed German reinforcements for Overlord games; immobile and wayward US forces in the early stages of many a Bulge game; leaders with variable ratings; leaders who cannot stack with other leaders; the continuations and trumping of *GBoH* and *M&P*; various types of order system; and in the era especially under review here, the bearskins staying in place at Borodino and the various models of “late start” and “wake up” used in the Zucker 1815 models.

The thing is, whilst these things are often catered for in some respects, they are often never more than peripheral adornments to the involved processes of movement and combat. As I have said in other articles, and perhaps most notably in my *Take Me to Your Leaders* piece for *The Boardgaming Way*, whilst we see all kinds of attention devoted to how much armour a shell can

get through at this or that range, or have involved processes for a charge of cavalry on whatever field, we often see little more for a key leader than a movement factor and a combat bonus. And yet, when we review so many of those key campaigns and battles of history, how can we fail to put command characteristics on at least an equal level with the profiling of particular weapon and troop types?

To put it bluntly, what is the story of June 1815 from the French perspective without due consideration of the erratic mechanism, sometimes grinding into movement, sometimes faltering to a stop, often stuck in gear, slow to start and occasionally overheating, that was Napoleon's war machine? Near everything that happened, or failed to happen, with regard to the fortunes of *L'Armée du Nord* sprung from what Grouchy, Napoleon, or Ney either opted to do, not do, or overlooked. Wargames, from a certain perspective, can hit some difficulties in this regard, for if they take the "You are In Command!" meme to the extreme, you run the risk of a simulation that is utterly bereft of fundamental realities which made the situation what it was in the first place. On the other hand, no one wants to be so tethered by presets and scripting that the scope of the playing experience is reduced to acting out a series of scheduled events. Somewhere in-between there will be found sufficient veracity to give your gameplay context.

So the still largely immobile armies of that morning in 1815 were hungry and looking for food, and while they did that, their commanders waited in what can only be called passive anticipation for some indication as to what to do next based on some idea of what had last happened elsewhere. Certainly not passive were sizeable numbers of Napoleon's guard, who had been off looting since the arrival of the sun gave them a better idea what was out there worthy of their interest. Just how good, or how bad, Napoleon's last army was, has been the subject of serious debate over the years. There are plenty of accounts of the campaign which will state something like "his best army since 18##," but more modern studies tend towards the depiction of a force of brittle and untempered enthusiasm at one extreme, and downright lawlessness at the other. Amongst other things, *La Garde* played

merry hell with the French gendarme units, pillaging with a sense of arrogant impunity that bordered on the praetorian at times, and on such occasions as they were apprehended in the act, simply breaking out of incarceration with the help of their confederates.

Clearly, incidents of looting can have an effect on getting any particularly miscreant formation on the move. Returning to the BBC/Imperial War Museum recordings, one British tank commander at Cambrai in 1917 spoke of a pause in the advance initially prompted by the need to cool the engines and let the infantry catch up, only to have that period prolonged by then returning to his tank (and he could hardly have been the only commander to experience this), and finding he had no crew because "they'd all gone off looting." A few months later, the elite German Stosstruppen readily succumbed to the temptations provided by the overrun British supply depots; and of course, these are merely a few examples of behavior that has been pretty much endemic to the passage of arms in all eras.

The first time I encountered a game with some mechanisms for a "looting and pillage" effect was in the old Battleline title, *Fury in The West*. Via a very straightforward mechanism, the Confederate army would progressively melt away into useless stragglers the more it was pushed forward. To be honest, this reflected more than the simple looting of the overrun Union camps; it was also a factoring-in of the very difficult terrain, the rawness of at least some of the troops, the muddle of the Confederate corps lines mixing together, and the sheer ferocity of the close quarters fighting. But certainly, discovering the bounty of the US camps was too much of a temptation for many, and the game did a rather good job in this regard.⁵

Depending on the army and the era in question, looting and any other associated activity can be seen as some form of permissible army activity – or as a breakdown of discipline. As often as not, however, it is a mixture of both, and towards the end of this article I will briefly look at where the line becomes very faint between letting soldiers get on with surviving in the field and actually undermining the efficiency of the army they are serving in.

Before getting to the time when just about all the campaign forces in Belgium were again in motion, it is well to look at the processes by which we may gain any sort of clear idea of a contingent's strength at a given time. In some ways, it may sound that I am stating the totally obvious here: men are killed, wounded, become captives, are late arriving, or depending on fate (as often as not in our world, the roll of a die or turn of a card), they do not appear at all. But I rather suspect that in the world of 1815 that was far from the end of the story, for many men went out of the ranks with nothing wrong with them at all, and not all of those could be defined in our models as routed or fled.

I have already cited some obvious examples of "clearing off," but as has been cited in some more recent studies, huge numbers of men could at least temporarily absent themselves in order to assist a wounded comrade. This was not frowned upon in many armies of the time, and there were even stipulations as to how many healthy men could help in the care of a fellow with this or that kind of wound. In many instances, it was considered perfectly permissible for two healthy soldiers to help a wounded comrade; but in cases where an officer was hit, irrespective of whether he was popular or not, carrying him from the line to a dressing station or field hospital could well become a serious group effort. As Tim Clayton says in his detailed account of the campaign, battalions and regiments could shrink by sizeable proportions as the good Samaritans went off with their charges, and there was surely no telling just how many would get back to the ranks again.

I am not especially convinced that all games relevant to this discussion have factored this in – we may have steps lost to death and incapacity and honest-to-goodness rout, but drifting back to the rear with a plaintive expression of concern on the face.... hmmm. ⁶ What is also interesting in this regard is that while plenty of games working at a pertinent level do have mechanisms for recovering portions of prior losses, it might be questionable as to whether the broad world of wargaming has ever got those losses quite right in the first place. Factoring everything in, Wellington might well have been facing the last crises of Waterloo with barely thirty thousand effectives⁷; whilst at Gettysburg, Meade's council of war at the end of the second day's fighting

(Allen C. Guelzo's *Gettysburg: The Last Invasion* is particularly noteworthy here) offered up a remaining strength for the Army of The Potomac of a little over fifty thousand men out of the ninety thousand it probably started with.

No doubt, on a smaller scale, all the 1815 forces, either in motion or stubbornly or ignorantly inactive, were still in the process of gaining and losing men that morning of June 17th. I think there is a general assumption in wargaming that stationary and unengaged forces are more likely to gain strength than lose it, and that is why many recovery systems are set the way they are. By way of contrast, doing just about anything, from being on the march to being simply out foraging or "on the thief" inevitably degrades strength, though the ratio of gain to loss must vary for a variety of factors beyond simply the passage between two points and this action or that.

June 17th Noon to Early Afternoon: Columns on their Feet, Cavalry on the Hoof

When Napoleon next saw Marshal Ney, the emperor was not a happy man. Having sent a series of written commands to the "Bravest of the Brave" to get his decorated self into gear and actually do something, the emperor then waited "with impatience" for the first sounds of a cannonade beginning on a battlefield only seven miles or so from where he was standing. The only very recently passive and ruminative *tondu*, having finally realized just how vulnerable Wellington's army was, had become all *activité* and *vitesse*, and not unreasonably expected Ney to do what Davout, stuck back in Paris, would have done as a matter of course – fix Wellington's forces frontally whilst Napoleon brought complete destruction down on their flank. But Ney still thought he had a lot of army in front of him rather than a partial accumulation of force, and furthermore, the marshal was doing his best to presage Jackson's uncharacteristic passivity at Gaines Mill by being just plain "out of it."

As I said earlier, this kind of matter is impossible to recreate in a wargame unless one starts to impose restrictions on what players wish to do

based on what players can actually see. I believe that finer modeling of command and commander realities is an essential aspect of design, but not one that is always given due place. Part of the problem may be that tension between putting the player in command and having the historical commanders behave in a realistic manner, but it might also reflect that difference between assessing the effectiveness of a piece of armour plate or an impersonal group of soldiers defined only by their weaponry and training, and defining by numbers or letters the passions, genius or utter mediocrity of senior individuals.

The one excuse Ney had, apart from the nervous burnout many modern authors consider him the victim of, was that the II Corps units under his command were low on ammunition after the fight at Quatre Bras the previous day. Replenishing musket and artillery stocks was an essential part of army efficiency, but, as we will see again later, there were times in this “in-between” day when things went awry. The disarray of at least part of the II Corps train would not have helped this process, but then, the sorting-out of formations after hours of intense combat, and getting wagons to a position where resupply could be effected, was a challenge that all armies in this campaign would have needed to sort out.⁸

But after the mitigating factors are put into the equation, the fact is that Wellington’s partial force got the news of the Prussian retreat and acted on that news well before Napoleon, Ney and Grouchy had got a single aggressive move in place. Two interesting aspects of the campaign, actual and alternate, can now be brought under study: how do games handle what is the very complicated process of withdrawing from a field of battle in good, or at least reasonable order, and how to model the larger scale aspects of retreat and pursuit in a way that reflects some property of the essential fog of war.

To take the second point first, following the results of June 16th Napoleon had a range of options beyond what he actually (and finally) did. Some of these involved action against the retreating Prussians conducted with much more sense of direction and purpose, and others involved keeping near all the army together and marching on Wellington with the entirety of *L’Armée du Nord*. Of course, what Napoleon

opted to do was detach two entire infantry corps and the better part of two cavalry corps to pursue the Prussians whilst the rest of his Ligny contingents marched to join Ney at Quatre Bras. On reflection, as even Napoleon himself admitted on St. Helena, this was the inferior option, for not only did it keep his forces as divided as were those of the enemy, it also consigned a very substantial portion of his overall force to the pusillanimous meanderings of Marshal Grouchy. Far better would have been to locate and track the Prussian main body with a relatively small force of cavalry whilst the entirety of the army went after Wellington. Had anything like Waterloo then taken place, Napoleon would have had adequate means immediately to hand both to fend off Blücher and finish off Wellington.

But that is not the way it played out; and on many a wargame map, whatever other provision is made for realism, it will not play out that way either. Why? Because without adequate provision for fog of war or command/order limitations, generals will move their forces apace, and so the moment the Coalition player sees the French army drawing together, he will seek to do the same with the Coalition forces – the Prussians, unless they are shattered beyond recall, will look for the first crossing over the Dyle, and Wellington’s army will look for the first place they can all join up. In other words, feats of immaculate perception will suddenly take place, allowing the historically fumbling, moving by whisper, rumour and oath contingents, to effect something close to a perfect liaison.

One other aspect of the presentation of a Napoleonic army on the move, and this linking to the pursuit and retreat process, and the “feeling out” of the enemy, is consideration of the frontages involved. From my earliest days in the hobby, I well recall games of Avalon Hill’s *Waterloo*, both my own and magazine replays, where the armies played out a prolonged battle over a seriously extended front that bore little or no relation to any engagement from the Napoleonic period. And yet, in some ways, these early games were not entirely wrong: true, the main contingents in the actual campaign were kept to relatively narrow fronts and passages of march, but beyond these, vedettes and some more substantial forces looked for open flanks and “felt” not just for the enemy, but for the remoter

formations of their own and allied armies/forces. What this meant in practice was that beyond the army's centre of gravity, extending out over a far greater distance, were screens of light cavalry, relays of the same to convey communications and intelligence, and larger forces seeking for a point of advantage. With regard to this last point, Napoleon was to claim in later years (this is cited by Clayton), that he had a substantial cavalry force sweep beyond Wellington's main body in the general direction of Hal. But as Clayton also pointed out, Napoleon's habit of reimagining the events of awry campaigns hardly deserted him after Waterloo, and sifting through events to ascertain what had genuinely missed the historical record as opposed to what was merely inventive hindsight, provides an undoubted challenge in itself.

To a certain extent, this hide and seek, this following and finding of forces on the "quiet day," can be expressed as the relation between different types of speed – i. e. how fast is the pursuing force moving in relation to the withdrawing force; how fast is intelligence reaching those forces involved; and who then is quicker to turn intelligence into action? Other considerations will also be present, though the state of contending forces can be factored into the question of speed; and to such as this can be added matters such as the distance between forces, the weather, and/or the proximity of nightfall.

So, the essence of pursuit is to move swiftly and with purpose; but if the enemy is in a vulnerable position already, that is where you naturally want to keep them, and not let them slip away in the first place; and of course, nothing holds an enemy in position, sticks them down and keeps them there, better than an attack with weight behind it.

Appreciating this from long experience, once Napoleon belatedly understood his opportunity on the 17th, he rode towards Quatre Bras with a great deal of fast acting and weighty glue in the shape of ten thousand cavalry. At the same time, he must also have been hoping that Ney was doing something, anything, to apply some aggressive fixative of his own. Not that much earlier, the emperor would have caught Wellington's still part-assembled force and have been in the perfect position to wreck it; but by the time Napoleon did arrive from Ligny, having read the papers and

done the crossword, he was merely witness the consequence of his own delays and the ineptitude of his marshal. Wellington's most vulnerable forces were already several miles to the north, and in addition to the distance, between those troops and Napoleon's cavalry, was just about all of Uxbridge's cavalry command.

In the simulation world, certain games and game series do touch upon some aspects of a withdrawal, but it might be hard (though I stand to be corrected) to define one particular rules set in one particular model which is specifically about the process of withdrawal and pursuit for more than a unit or two at a time.⁹ Detailed tactical models will offer players a chance to test certain aspects of the procedure as the big picture develops, but one does have to bear in mind that such battle situations are usually brought to a close by the very fact that one side or another feels, by often arbitrary assessment, that it has to quit the field. One exception can be found in the detailed tactical profiling of *Musket and Pike*, in whose later titles have appeared one or two scenarios where players are challenged to utilize the game system to play out the demands of a withdrawal and a pursuit.

At campaign level, one system that can be overlooked owing to its deceptive simplicity is *Napoleonic 20*. With an absolute economy of units, but with game events and unit profiling tailored to create an historical model, learning where to put things (including those few cavalry units) in order to stop things or start things is key to play. All the cavalry rules for this system, including the optional extras, are incredibly simple but outstandingly effective- and that includes trying to gum up a retreat or disjoint the pursuit of a closing enemy.

So, while Grouchy continued to look for his large Prussian needle in completely the wrong haystack, Napoleon did what he could to move the straggling main body in the right direction. In many campaign accounts, not a great deal of attention is given to the sort of road(s) and terrain the Prussians and Grouchy's forces were moving over, although many wargame maps make it clear that much of the shift northwards was on inferior "roads" and often difficult terrain. To the west, Wellington and Napoleon were moving their armies, for the most part, on clearer terrain, but

there was a substantial bottleneck at Genappe, made the more difficult by the Genappe stream, and the Charleroi – Brussels chaussée was hardly a multi-lane trunk route.

Perhaps it is no surprise, therefore, that the one piece of notable face-to-face mischief on the in-between day occurred here, as French and British mounted forces clashed in the streets of the small town as well as in its surrounds. It is no exaggeration that the French pursuit had got a bit bothersome at this point – something not helped by one of the Eton “playing field” type (Sir John Vandeleur) getting it all in a muddle when it came to keeping his brigade of cavalry working effectively as part of the screening rearguard. All told, it seems that the British may have got slightly the worse of this encounter, although from the wargame perspective, cavalry hacking away at each other in the middle of some tight streets is not the sort of thing that is readily catered for. Many games prohibit cavalry doing anything against built-up hexes, and I for one do not mind admitting having the occasional wince when I have seen other designs where cavalry ends up doing all sorts of questionable things in totally cluttered hexes/areas. Prohibiting cavalry from engaging infantry in such locations makes perfect sense, but surely having a sense of mounted elites going at it pell-mell under the town clock is worth accommodating?

Whether any substantial amount of Napoleon’s pursuit force could have compromised Uxbridge’s screen and even disrupted the deployment at Mont Saint Jean will always be nothing more than a matter of conjecture. Without doubt, when his blood was up, and when the situation offered him opportunities, the campaign-worn Napoleon could still display that old formidable vigour; however, physically something was not quite right with the emperor, and the drive was only there for short periods. But even if there had been absolutely nothing wrong with him that day, the master of the battlefield was not master of the sky; and it was from the sky that the greatest impediment to his pursuit suddenly appeared as the afternoon moved on.

June 17th Afternoon to Evening: Downpour

After the hot and humid atmosphere of the previous day, and of the earlier part of the next, the campaign area grew unseasonably cold and torrentially wet; and once it started raining, it would not stop until the morning of the following day. At Eylau, a little over eight years earlier, Napoleon’s army had fought in the driving snow and the freezing cold of East Prussia, and a great deal had gone badly wrong – one corps blundered half-blind straight into the muzzles of massed Russian cannon, and the reinforcing French corps, intended as Chandler said, to create and “fight a veritable Cannae,” were off the pace, late, and ended up helping to stave off a looming disaster. Just over a year earlier, it had been cold at Austerlitz, but the key element early on was the fog; the fog had helped conceal any intimation of Napoleon’s true intent, but nothing on the French side had really been put in motion until The Sun of Austerlitz began to shine over the battlefield. And now, on the road to Waterloo, it was cold – not anywhere near as cold as at Eylau, but cold enough to make troops far from the prospect of a decent bivouac feel utterly miserable. But it was the rain more than anything else that affected matters now – totally relentless, disorientating, and soon transforming anything other than a paved road into a deep cloying mire.

Napoleon’s Last Gamble keeps its weather effects relevant and to the point. If you play with the historical weather, which covers everything from bright sunshine to torrential rain, you will see wheeled transport slow the wetter it gets, cavalry impeded by conditions under hoof, and the whole process of movement and combat significantly impeded. Thus, if, for whatever reason, Wellington or Blucher has got away from the French, those French units are going to have very little chance of catching up.

The rain did for any hope Napoleon had to catch Wellington’s army before the end of the day, and whilst that was clearly to Wellington’s benefit, the duke had a few other certainties in play that the rain could not erase – that he was retreating to a site he knew, and intelligence was growing that Blücher would make every effort to join him there.

Accounts vary somewhat regarding how Wellington had become acquainted with the ground a short distance south of the hamlet of Mont Saint Jean, but in the course of this brief campaign, the large detailed map of the area was the one he specifically asked for, and it was subsequently employed to plot out the deployment of forces as they arrived. Wellington had, in fact, surveyed a number of potential battlefield sites prior to the campaign beginning in earnest, including his preferred ground close to the town of Hal. What the Hal site actually consisted of in 1815 is something historians have generally tended to disregard in favour of the ground where battle actually occurred.¹⁰

As for the actual battlefield site, we may wish to ponder what is meant by either a “prepared” or fully surveyed site? One of the best examples of a prepared battlefield from the Napoleonic Wars is Borodino, where the Russians deliberately picked an area with a range of defensible hills and ridges, with their right protected by a steeply banked river and their left at least partially protected by expanses of woodland. To augment this, the Russians constructed earthworks along much of the prospective battlefield’s length, as well as entirely razing one village a little to the west of their main line. Of course, a prepared site need not be a matter of erecting any form of fortification; according to some accounts, Darius “prepared” the battlefield of Gaugamela by creating obstruction-free lanes for his scythed chariots, and in the more modern era, anything along the lines of registering artillery or clearing obstructions to lines of sight prior to combat can also be readily regarded as “preparing” the field.

But at Waterloo Wellington did not prepare the field in any such manner. Napoleon initially suspected he might have done, by constructing earthworks along his line; and to determine whether he had or not, the emperor ordered what appears to have been a vigorous forward reconnaissance. In actual fact, the only thing really thrown up by the duke’s forces that was not there to begin with was the abatis put across the Brussels chaussée next to La Haie Sainte. Nevertheless, it is tempting to wonder if surveyed fields, as opposed to prepared ones, should still confer some form of benefit in wargame terms – maybe just an extra point on the commander’s rating if battle occurs on a surveyed field.¹¹

And still it rained; but while near all Wellington’s regiments made ready to bed down on the mud they would be defending the following day, the French were hopelessly strung out from the southern edge of the battlefield to the road and fields south of Genappe.¹² It was hardly a time for fighting, but not every figure in either army believed that to be the case, and before the field of Waterloo took its drenched self into the fitful slumbers of a brief June night, there were still things to unfold that would have serious consequences for the fighting upon the morrow...

June 17th – Evening into Night: Loopholes, Loud Noises and Looting (Again)

The armies that would contest the field of Waterloo on the 18th June did not exactly go quietly into that foul night just a few hours earlier. As the darkness of evening grew, the French had enough cannon forward to knock on the door of the Allied position and see just who was in. The French artillery opened up, the Allied batteries responded, and while very little hurt was done within the range of the ordnance involved, around Mont Saint Jean and the beginnings of the Soignes forest, the intimation of approaching destruction soon developed into an utter chaos of abandoned vehicles, fleeing or overturned vehicles, and the widespread and hectic perturbations of the fainthearted.

All of this gains relevance to events of the following day when it is understood that many of these wagons, often served by those who could be trusted anywhere closer to the enemy, were full of artillery ammunition. Allied batteries that had fought at Quatre Bras were yet to replenish, and with the trains descending into chaos, many of these would either get no further supply or would have to beg ammunition from those sources still functioning. It was a major reason why many of Wellington’s batteries fell silent well before the battle was over.

To be honest, I struggle to think of any game with a relevant context where an artillery scare has any palpable game effect. It boils down to this: the

artillery units are never given anything like that range of influence; there are no such results on the CRTs; and the wagons are rarely on the board to be got at anyway. And that is not the end of it: modern histories of Waterloo (especially those of Barbero and Clayton) have produced considerable evidence that the Grand Battery whose fire preceded the initial attack of D'Erlon's I Corps, initially opened up at ranges most games simply do not provide them with. This artillery certainly caused casualties, but its main purpose was to dismay, degrade function and intimidate – just as it had done during that wet evening, with effects way beyond even its extended killing range. And I do not see a game where you can do anything of the like.¹³

In the end, the dark and the damp persuaded Napoleon that any further action against “the English” would be futile. By contrast, he undoubtedly would have liked rather more action from Marshal Grouchy. By the latter stages of June 17th he was at least going in the right direction, but he was too far behind Blücher to make a difference unless he started to cut across towards Napoleon – something he singularly failed to do that day or the next. At the very least, he needed to extend the outer reach of his force by getting cavalry patrols and relays into the gap between his wing and the French main body, but he did not do that either. And while it may seem a simple matter of scenario set-up, if you look at the Wavre map and scenario for *Napoleon's Last Battles*, a serious portion of Grouchy's force is clearly arriving from off the eastern edge of the map – too far behind to catch the Prussians unless the dandy Frenchman understood and implemented some basic military geometry. Blücher's three Ligny corps were essentially marching round the shorter sides of a right triangle to get from the scene of their defeat to the location of their hoped-for victory. Grouchy, if he had got a move on, could have gone along the hypotenuse and intercepted them; but whatever shapes the new marshal may have had in mind, a triangle most certainly was not his selection.¹⁴

Back at Waterloo, all sorts of things were going on as darkness fell. Napoleon was in the last field palace of his military career, and that in the shape of the substantial farmhouse dwelling of Le Caillou; Wellington was in his own headquarters building in the middle of Waterloo itself; the

French army was, at least for the time being, rather more planted than pushing forward; and amongst all those soldierly contingents just trying to warm up and get something sustaining in their stomachs, were the steadfast men of the King's German Legion at La Haie Sainte, who, prior to defending that location upon the morrow were busy knocking its gate down for firewood.

Without doubt, the soldiers of the KGL were some of the finest in Wellington's army, but there is a marked difference between how they singularly failed to prepare the farmhouse for a prolonged action and how the British guards went about their business at Hougomont. By the time the French made their first attacks against the chateau, its walls were copiously supplied with loopholes, extemporized firing steps were in place, and, wonder of wonders, the main gate was not lying in charred and smoldering pieces on the ground. Just why matters were so different between these two key bastions is difficult to pin down with certainty. Baring, the officer directly responsible for the defence of the farmhouse, would lead its defence with immense courage the following day, but whether through fatigue, oversight, hunger or tiredness, he does not appear to have told his men to do much of anything militarily useful and to the point the night before. But it was raining, and it was miserable, and on a night such as that, couriers were not the only thing that could lose their way.

And all round the battlefield, the looting had started again – but this time it is important to make a distinction, however vague, between what “*les Braves*” had been up to in and around Ligny, and what was going on now. Within the surreal environment of a battle's prelude, the “trade” that was now taking place was tacitly approved of by commanders in both armies – many French wagons were still too far back to be of any use to troops further forward, and many of Wellington's men would have had precious little to eat since before marching to Quatre Bras or heading directly to Waterloo. In short, they all needed to eat and find what comforts they could. That is not to say that everything that went on was done with the sort of propriety R E Lee would have approved of, because it most definitely was not. The guards may have worked hard at Hougomont, but they were also interested in what might be found in the cellar or could be

persuaded to fall out of a locked draw. Some British soldiers even ventured as far as the chateau of Mon Plaisir, whilst all kinds of last minute “shopping” seems to have taken place around the commercial establishments of Merbe Braine and Braine l’Alleud.¹⁵

But from the purely military point of view, the most significant aspects of the story pertain to what the two commanders, Napoleon and Wellington, knew about the disposition of the forces they might yet bring to the field. By the time he retired for a brief night’s sleep, Wellington knew where Blücher was, and that he had every intention of striking out in support of his British ally. Napoleon, on the other hand, was in the utterly ridiculous position of seeking to recall at least part of a wing he had only detached a few hours earlier. And here we are on difficult ground, because surrounding these events we have Napoleon’s “wise after the event” recollections, the record of Soult’s actual messages to Grouchy, of Grouchy’s messages to Napoleon, the later testimony of god knows how many other people in and around the French campaign, and a range of allegations that Napoleon was deliberately betrayed by traitors in his midst.

What we can be sure of is that Grouchy plain did not move in any direction that would have been seriously useful to the emperor. There is some debate as to what orders were sent from imperial headquarters, and whether they actually arrived, but none deflected him northwestwards; and on the 18th, the sound of the cannon booming away from the same direction failed to bounce his strawberries out of the basket. Was it cock-up or conspiracy? Certainly, Napoleon’s army was twitchy after the early desertion of General Bourmont; but then, Blücher had come close to being roughed up by the rioting and disaffected troops of the Saxon V corps prior to the campaign’s start; Wellington was forced to witness sizeable portions of his own foreign contingents melt away into the countryside; and during Waterloo itself, there was a long procession of troops entering the streets of Brussels declaring that “all was lost. “The truth was, all three armies contained troops and individuals who would have far preferred fighting another war or no war at all, and in the matter of weighing cock-up against conspiracy, I would

tend to favour the former unless an irrefutable case can be made to the contrary.¹⁶

Conclusion: The Lull before the Storm

Hopefully, we can agree that Waterloo’s in-between day was full of telling events and consequences, much of which has a place in the deliberations of a game designer. In all, I think a fair case can be made that June 17th was the day Napoleon’s plans saw the wheels starting to come off. The battles of June 16th had gone well enough to keep that plan viable, but then, on the 17th, the French army had remained divided, the apparently defeated Prussians had been lost track of, the rapid concentration of force against the one functioning coalition army on the Saturday had not be brought about, communication between the two wings of the French army had not been reliably secured, and none of the key French commanders could be described as functioning at their best – whatever that was for Grouchy, and whatever it had been for Ney.

And thus, beyond matters of command, confusion, fugitives, the sound of the guns and anything else relevant to that day’s proceedings, what we are talking of a lull, and from the hobby perspective, how one creates such a lull within a wargame design? This is something which I know particularly interested a group of US wargamers (YouTube’s Thursday Night Gamers channel) as they have played through a full campaign scenario (with the extra days and extra maps) of Zucker’s *Last Gamble*.

To create a realistic separation between the armies as the game moved to the morning of the 17th (Part 12 of the series) the group had experimented with a couple of house rules – one was a more widespread employment of roadblocks, and the other was a rule about the movement of baggage trains away from the supply source. Both of the rules clearly have an historical context, and to my mind, the baggage train concept is readily appreciated, even if different players might like to produce or finesse their own versions: basically, if formations are in the midst of replenishment, moving the wagons around is hardly conducive to

getting the job done – a bit like driving away from a fuel pump while the hose is still in the car.

In truth, there are many different game means to create a lull, and I could spend a great deal of time going through those, wherever they might differ from the various factors listed in this article already. Sometimes, of course, history lends a helping hand – because, as on June 17th 1815, it rained buckets, or because, on a day in October 1813, the Battle of Nations was paused by a temporary armistice. But beyond actual events, it is about carrot and stick – give a player a reason to pause, and occasionally a reward for doing so, and you will get a desired effect.

And yet, whatever else you take from this article, maybe we should not be overly judgmental about what any given 1815 design, or anything else for that matter, does or does not have in its locker, unless we first understand that designers almost invariably suit their work to a particular size of game canvas, and with particular notions in mind. Of course, Avalon Hill's *Waterloo* is basic simply because it is very old. But then, *Napoleon* is also old, lacks a lot of detail, but is damnably clever where it wants to be. GDW's *1815* has all the rain you could hope for, alongside

blown cavalry and disrupted units...but I much prefer *Napoleon*. Clash of Arms' *L'Armée du Nord* also has all kinds of good things, but it is too large a canvas for me, so I play *Hundred Days 20*. All of these games have their own relationship between scope, detail and system, and inevitably, the more popular a subject is, the more difference in rendering you are likely to see – as in all fields of creative enterprise.

Christopher Moeller



¹ Just to provide a very brief overview of the case for the Crowhurst site:

- a) Senlac Hill has no Malfosse feature – and never has.
- b) There is archeological and documentary evidence that the site of the commemorative abbey was moved in its early laying-out from Crowhurst to Battle - simply for reasons of having a better "aspect."
- c) A defence at Crowhurst, given the different coastal geography of 1066, would have effectively bottled-in William's army at the base of a peninsula surrounded on three sides by wetlands and the sea. This would also help explain why Harold did not stay longer in London after his march south from Stamford Bridge - i. e. he wanted that position.
- d) As an experienced military commander, Harold would never have chosen a location such as Senlac Hill, given its wide open flanks and mild gradient. It must also be remembered that just about all his army had never faced mounted knights before. The oldest accounts of the battle, which speak of the Saxons standing behind rudimentary earthworks and palisades thus gain in credibility. Harold needed more than a "wall" of levies to fend off such assaults.

The book, **Secrets of The Norman Invasion** (by Nick Austin), goes into far more detail on these and many other points. A dedicated YouTube channel, SOTNI, is also available.

² One set battle exception to the usual "calm" of a Napoleonic battlefield at night occurred at Aspern-Essling. Here, fighting for and within the village of Aspern continued well after dark, with the close proximity of opposing forces and the negation of the usual means of command and control created a combat environment bereft of the usual lulls and withdrawals.

³ Siege warfare from just about any era, with its close, compressed lines, has often been the setting for night

operations. The final assault at Badajoz is one such example, and combat around the works in the Crimea a little over forty years later is another. In the very early Twentieth Century, as trench warfare approached its bloody zenith, there were numerous examples of night engagements during the Russo-Japanese War.

⁴ The relevant counters in *Napoleon's Last Gamble* have a clear and specific game purpose – to define a point in the army's overall on-the-map presence where any proximity of enemy units denotes that the army's position has been compromised.

This is not the only way you can represent the function of such trains, but it is a valid one. The variable importance of units of this type might also be witnessed via different but related events pertaining to Gettysburg: Lee's admittedly apocryphal description of Stuart's captured wagons as "a hindrance to me"; and then the necessity of getting a massive column of wagons carrying the wounded, the army's remaining supply, and some loot from northern towns safely on its way before Meade could react.

⁵ Another relevant example of a looting provisions within game mechanisms would be the *Musket and Pike* pursuit rules for cavalry – not so much in the cavalry dashing off in the first place, but the uncertainty as to whether any or all of them will ever come back. Their absence can well be imagined as a mix of pursuing a defeated foe and looting the enemy's baggage – which is often (but not always), off the map.

From the same era, but up a scale or two are the looting mechanisms integral to GMT's *Thirty Years War* and *Won by The Sword*, though whether either game offers the view of a looting army as a volatile force, difficult to control, is maybe a little doubtful. Looting appears linked to an army's general upkeep rather than an injurious means of military dissipation.

⁶ Perhaps the most effective way of showing potentially temporary losses is the straggler method applied to *Fury in The West* and The Gamers' *NBS* and *CWB* systems. These keep "blood" losses separate to those more circumstantial diminutions of force that may be recovered when the contingent in question has a chance to "gather its scattered." "

⁷ How do we get to this figure? More recent casualty assessments (Killed/Wounded/Missing) for Wellington's army at Waterloo give a figure of just over seventeen thousand – most of which would have been suffered by the time of Napoleon's final attack. To these we can add the ten thousand or so who are commonly reckoned to have routed, several thousand more who were shaken loose or otherwise unable to contribute to their units (the lost, those embarked, most likely at a slow pace, on helping comrades – or anyone else – to a dressing station, and cavalymen without horses). We can also add a clear majority of Wellington's artillerymen who, through diverse causes including having no ammunition, a wrecked battery, or just, as Wellington himself complained, having disappeared completely during the French cavalry charges, were no longer of any use to the army. Finally, we can look to those parts of the regimental strength that was never present in any fighting capacity – officer's servants, wagon drivers, baggage guards etc.

This can be backed by considering the large "hole" in Wellington's centre come the early evening – Alten's division, originally about seven thousand strong, was to all intents and purposes bludgeoned to nothing; Picton's division, which was already markedly understrength after Quatre Bras, could have only been shredded remnants; and Lambert's brigade, which some credible accounts place close to the farm of Mont Saint Jean, had had the strength blasted out of it by close range French artillery fire. That probably totals in excess of ten thousand permanent and temporary losses before we even begin to look anywhere else, and Müffling, both a military man and there on the line, also estimated Wellington's remaining strength as only thirty thousand.

But what of the French at the same period? Here matters are difficult because of the utter ruin the army descended into, making the assessment of actual losses at a given point especially challenging. Nevertheless, there are certain clues: after the repulse of D'Erlon's I Corps much of the French effort, with the exception of Hougomont and the cavalry charges, was fought by the artillery and skirmishers – something highlighted by Clayton, and strongly intimated as the reality of things in the original designer's notes to *Wellington's Victory*. Furthermore, Mark Adkin in *The Waterloo Companion* points out that D'Erlon's divisions were disjointed rather than wrecked by their failed attack – they lost about five thousand men all told, out of the seventeen thousand who had advanced.

Following this repulse, Napoleon resolved to break Wellington with a prolonged period of artillery fire, followed by a concentrated assault by heavy cavalry. But Ney sent the cavalry forward too soon, prompting Napoleon to say: "There is Ney, hazarding the battle which was almost won." Amongst other things, the cavalry got in the way of much of their own artillery, and it is possible to argue that once the cavalry was around the squares, battle often petered out into a relatively bloodless test of nerves – the allied infantry held fire and the French cavalry feinted here and there to provoke a response. Most allied infantry saw the presence of the enemy cavalry around them as some sort of relief from the far more destructive artillery fire.

But was the French cavalry wrecked? Perhaps not, in terms of sheer numbers of cavalymen or horses killed, but their mounts were exhausted and a living but unhorsed cavalymen was of precious little use. The French certainly had the same "casualty drift" as in Wellington's army as fit soldiers helped wounded men to the rear, (there are accounts that the French

field ambulances had experienced the same civilian flight as the Allied baggage), and late in the day the area between La Belle Alliance and Le Caillou was full of walking wounded, unhorsed cavalymen, and various other ineffectives.

Putting this all together, Napoleon's main issue as the evening phase commenced may have been lack of forces due to an extended front rather than total casualties. Above all else, this extended front robbed him of the reserve he needed to punch through Wellington's line.

⁸ At 8am on June 17th Soult sent a message to Ney which included the following:

"...Today it is necessary to finish this operation and to fill the munitions, to rally the isolated soldiers, and to return the detachments. Give orders accordingly and ensure that all wounded are bandaged accordingly and directed to the rear. Some have complained that the ambulances have not performed as they should."

The full message along with many others, can be found in *Waterloo Betrayed* by Stephen Beckett: the basic premise of the book is to present the argument that Napoleon was being deliberately betrayed by certain senior figures during the 1815 campaign, and most notably Marshal Soult. The book is well worth reading just for the number of campaign documents it presents in their full form, though it is only right also to give the author merit for having had the drive to present a very different view of events.

However, it will be up to individual readers to weigh the strength of his arguments – after all, Napoleon did blame himself, and in truth had no one to blame but himself, for the appointments he made in 1815; and to this we can add his utterly unproductive wandering around on the Ligny battlefield during the morning of the 17th, the continued division of the army on that day, and the licence given to the purpling Ney to chew through every formation he was given charge of.

⁹ *Napoleon's Last Gamble* does have its "General Retreat" card, but that, of course, within the functions of the game, does not set out or commend a tactical model for getting the job done.

¹⁰ A terrain map of the area around Hal may offer up a few clues, given the position of the town in relation to the river (Sambre) that runs through it roughly north to south, and what appears as a substantial ridgeline, running parallel with the river close to its east bank. As pure conjecture, if Wellington had formed his army on or behind this ridge, while he would not have been blocking the road to Brussels along what he had thought would be Napoleon's main line of advance, he would have been threatening the lines of communication of any force trying to sweep past him to the west and north. Furthermore, any force attacking him there would have had to get through the town and then have a river at its back in order to effect an assault. But this is only my conjecture, and may well be totally wrong – one objection being that holding this ground would have allowed Napoleon, even if temporarily, to get between Wellington and the Channel coast.

A little to the southwest of Hal there is another noticeable ridge, which may have been a candidate position, and would have kept a clearer link to the west. The one issue with this position is that it runs somewhat northeast to southwest, and would have potentially have left Wellington's right open to turning, although his left would have been at least partly warded by the same river. Nevertheless, this line does seem to appear (if I have identified it correctly!) on the map for Kevin Zucker's *The Emperor Returns*, though the other line does not.

¹¹ I suggested this to a wargame designer and friend a while back. The idea was that in a Waterloo campaign game, or any other suitable subject, a player could secretly choose one or

more areas of the map as a surveyed field (basically noting a hex or hex range as “the field.” If combat occurred within x hexes of such a given point, and with a minimum of x amount of combat strength then within that distance of the marker, the field would be activated. This might sound a little awkward, but it could work, and one example of a game where it might be workable (not noting hex locations but one or more of its battle location maps) is Rob Beyma’s somewhat underestimated *Waterloo: Fate of France*.

¹² If you ever want to see some seriously wet and strung-out units in an 1815 game, try GDW’s vintage title!

¹³ Napoleon had expressly wanted the batteries whose fire was to precede the attack of I Corps to open in one simultaneous eruption of noise in order to create a psychological effect on the enemy. As far as the initial position of these batteries was concerned, note that Ruty told Desales to look for a more forward position (this turned out to be the ridge close to La Haie Sainte) *once* the French infantry divisions were actually approaching Wellington’s line.

In terms of game ranges for Napoleonic artillery, both the recent OSG designs and the *Napoleonic Brigade Series* give their artillery a range that would accommodate the initial position of the Grand Battery at Waterloo, but the psychology of noise and thunder, and the mere presence of deployed pieces, is not something designs specifically address.

¹⁴ Grouchy thus had an opportunity to take advantage of his very own central position – but alas for his emperor, having not planned for the contingency, he then failed to see it, or to use it.

¹⁵ Whatever Wellington’s men were tacitly permitted to get away with on the eve of the greatest battle in history, it was a different matter entirely once that battle was over and the battlefield was left behind. Wellington would not countenance any plundering of French civilians; in all probability, any man caught so doing would have been severely punished.

¹⁶ Again we are back with the claims in Stephen Beckett’s book. By portraying Soult as the main villain, we would have to accept that a man whom Napoleon had trusted with very senior commands and responsibilities, and whom he had known for years, had sat next to him during the campaign with the specific purpose of deliberately acting like some clerical von Stauffenberg, writing one hapless order after another, and by direct consequence, was agreeable to pulling the roof down on his own head as well as the emperor’s.

And are we meant to believe that Soult was still “on the job” late in the day on the 18th? Certain references by Clayton tend to refute any such notion: Soult, that evening, was ordering the arming of the unhorsed cavalry to help defend the French flank south of Plancenoit; and it was Soult who helped get Napoleon away from the field as the French army lapsed into a scattered rabble. Beckett adds that Soult thus saved himself at the same time; but then, even Marshal “Come and See a Marshal of France Die!” Ney got off this final field of ruin. On the other hand, had Soult actually been seen at about 7pm disappearing south behind a piece of uprooted privet, evaluations might come to different conclusions!

Leader Losses

These three charts are designed to provide a narrative to what happened to the leader that caused his removal. There are 3 charts. One for combat where an infantry or cavalry unit is involved. One for artillery and one for a leader capture result. Results of 'wounded' are not recoverable in the time-span of the battle or campaign being fought in the game. They are effectively removed in game terms.



Roll 2 x d6 and read lowest number first.


Combat v Infantry and/or Cavalry

11	Sword Strike to Skull	1-3 = KIA	4-6 = Survives Wounded
12	Missing – Never Found		
13	Left Arm Hit	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
14	Chest	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
15	Right Leg	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
16	Found Unconscious & Incoherent. Needs Weeks of Rest		
22	Left Eye	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
23	Right Leg	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
24	Stomach	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
25	Chest	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
26	Captured: Meekly Surrendered When Confronted by Enemy Troops		
33	Neck	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
34	Stomach	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
35	Left Leg	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
36	Right Leg	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
44	Chest	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
45	Captured: Stood Ground and Went Down Fighting		
46	Right Arm	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
55	Right Eye	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
56	Stomach	1-2 = KIA	3-6 = Survives Wounded
66	Bullet Pierces Skull	1-3 = KIA	4-6 = Survives Wounded



Combat v Lone Artillery or Bombardment

11	Right Leg	Survives Wounded & Amputated
12	Chest	Killed
13	Right Leg	Killed
14	Left Arm	Survives Wounded
15	Left Leg	Survives Wounded
16	Stomach	Killed
22	Right Arm	Survives Wounded
23	Left Leg	Survives Wounded & Amputated
24	Left Arm	Killed
25	Decapitated	Killed
26	Left Shoulder	Survives Wounded
33	Right Arm	Killed
34	Stomach	Survives Wounded
35	Right Arm	Survives Wounded & Amputated
36	Right Leg	Survives Wounded
44	Stomach	Killed
45	Left Arm	Survives Wounded & Amputated
46	Decapitated	Killed
55	Chest	Killed
56	Left Leg	Killed
66	Right Shoulder	Survives Wounded



Leader Alone In a Hex

- 1** Surrenders Meekly to Captors
- 2** Dies Bravely Fighting Enemy
- 3** Found Unconscious By Enemy Troops
- 4** Dies Bravely Fighting Enemy
- 5** Captured Whilst Fighting Enemy
- 6** Roll on Inf/Cav Leader Loss Table

The British Way of War

Recreating British Command and Tactics in the Library of Napoleonic Battles

Andrew Hobley

One of the many joys of the LNB system is the subtle way in which national characteristics are shown. An Austrian army generally has large units with low initiative, generally abysmal officers and one Commander with a limited command ability. The Prussians, from 1813 on, have reasonable officers and improving unit abilities as they gain battle experience. Russians have many small divisions, variable officers and one or two Commanders. The French as a rule have better officers, larger Corps (so one command goes a long way) good unit initiative and often Napoleon himself. No need for special 'national' rules, apart from non-cooperation rules for particular campaigns, but the net result feels right.

What of the British who (apart from a rocket artillery unit at Leipzig) have yet to make an appearance? What makes them different from the other nations (not better, just different) and how can LNB replicate this?

Organisation and Command in the Peninsula

Unlike the continental armies the British in the Peninsula were not organised in Corps, but in initially in brigades or, from the Battle of Talavera onwards, into divisions made up of several brigades. Cavalry had its own division and the artillery was either attached to a division or used in an ad hoc fashion. There were (apart from Vitoria in 1813) no intermediate commanders and Wellington commanded the divisions directly himself. So for organisation we have eight to eleven commands, each with an officer, and one CinC.

The 'division and officer' organisation will then be similar to the Russian army. But how can we replicate Wellington's very active command style? Unlike many of his opponents he did not establish a command post from which squadrons of aide-de-camps came and went. His command post was where he was at any one time. He was a superb horseman and was always to be

found at the point of crisis or decision, having usually galloped there leaving his staff trailing in his wake. The most well know example is Salamanca when from the armies centre he observed the French lead division was too far advanced, galloped three miles to order in a few words ("Edward, move on with the 3rd division, take those heights in your front, and drive everything before you") the British right to attack and then galloped back to give orders to the British centre. In LNB terms he was in two parts of the battlefield giving command during the same turn. He would often ignore the chain of command, issuing orders to individual units regardless of their own commander's presence.

Giving Wellington a command strength of 3 or more may seem excessive (and will upset the Francophiles at that is as good as Napoleon) and will not replicate the 'force multiplier' effect of his speed of movement across the battlefield. I am not sure that the quality of some of his officers would justify them having high initiative levels, to make up for them being outside Wellington's command range.

It may be argued that as most of the time the British stood on the defensive then the current mechanisms, and a command strength for Wellington of 2, will not disadvantage the British. At Vitoria, when the British are attacking, there were four column commanders, so four Officer-Commanders may do the trick there. But that leaves Salamanca - do we need any particular mechanism for that battle? Is there a justification for giving Wellington a greater command *range* to reflect the way he moved around?

Of course there will be a Wellington Card "Up Guards and at them!" with some sort of combat bonus. (although he did not actually say that so some other phrase will be needed!)

British Tactical doctrine

NB For ‘British’ read “British, KGL, and Portuguese allies when properly trained. Does NOT include Dutch, Belgium, Nassau and Brunswick in 1815 or allied Spanish troops at any time.

Infantry

The British army operated a quite different tactical doctrine to its continental neighbours, a

“... relatively unique style of fighting, which was quite different from that practiced by continental armies.” (Napoleonic Infantry Combat by Derek Lang in Wargame Design, Fall 2014)

The emphasis was on a two deep line, holding its fire until the enemy were close. A thick skirmish line would delay and disturb the advancing enemy. When in range the main line fired one (occasionally more) disciplined volley, before charging home with the bayonet. Silence was kept until just before the charge, when three cheers would ring out. Coupled with Wellington’s propensity to have the men lying down behind a hill crest the impact was, as the French report, deadly. It was not just a defensive formation, at Salamanca the British attacked in line and (mostly) drive the French back.

So how to represent this in LNB? Less in more, so rather than any special rules my initial thought was to allow British infantry have an initiative one 1 higher than would normal. This means in any clash over crests, where one in three combat roll result in a shock result, the British will be at a historical advantage.

However initiative also affects combat elsewhere and also command. So my current suggestion is to have a ‘+1 to initiative if over crest/in town/chateau and British’ rule for the Shock Table. Whether these tactics worked in woods I don’t know – I cannot find any examples of British troop fighting in woods! But we could assume for simplicity they do, so a “+1 for shock if British infantry” rule wherever they are makes the game simpler.

Cavalry

British cavalry was well mounted on well managed horses. Its besetting sin was ‘galloping at everything’ – not rallying on the objective and having a reserve, but carrying on when it charged and so being caught blown and scattered by an enemy counter-charge. To reflect this I suggest British cavalry units after making a successful charge each have to roll over their initiative NOT to have to make a second charge – as on the Impetus Card, or have to advance after combat (Derek’s suggestion). KGL cavalry should be exempt from this as they were better commanded.

Artillery

The artillery practice was the same as other nations, although the relatively small number of guns meant that Grand Batteries were never an option. There are two British artillery peculiarities. The first is shrapnel shells. Fired from howitzers to burst over enemy troops, unlike common shell which was an iron shell with powder, shrapnel showered enemy troops with musket balls, causing more casualties. But I do not think the overall effect was so great that any special rule is needed. Perhaps a Shrapnel Card – allowing artillery bombardment at troops where the Line of Sight is blocked by an obstacle – would be sufficient flavour.

The other is the Rocket Troop, which only appears at Leipzig and Waterloo. The rules for Leipzig seem to provide a good representation of this weapon; the only addition I would make is that the unit is not removed once it has made a rocket attack, but becomes a normal horse artillery unit – the rockets replaced the howitzer in a normal six gun 6 pounder battery. Any step loss eliminates the unit.



Tactics Cards

OSG is now putting together the card decks for *Napoleon's Resurgence*, and thinking globally about the Tactics Cards. Most of the Tactics Cards have to do with advances and pursuits. There are two artillery cards, two cavalry cards and three that feature retreating. The majority of tactics cards either allow retreat through EZOCs, or cancel or enable a charge or pursuit. In most of them cavalry play some role. They were intended to be played after the combat die roll.

No. 3 Artillery Cover Fire is used to open a retreat path and cancel a Cavalry Pursuit card.

No. 14 Grand Battery does the same and gives a bombardment modifier.

No. 17 Cavalry Pursuit involves cavalry advancing after combat.

No. 18 Counter Charge can stop a cavalry charge.

No. 22 From the Jaws of Death opens up a retreat path.

No. 24 Allows infantry to take a Retreat Before Combat.

No. 27 Secure Flanks is played at the moment a retreat result is obtained and opens up a retreat path.



Summary of Tactics Cards Effects

CARD	open retreat path	cancel a Cav...	bombardment mod	Repeat Attack	+RBC
No. 3 Artillery Cover Fire	Disrupt ZOC	Pursuit			
No. 14 Grand Battery	Disrupt ZOC	Pursuit	+1		
No. 17 Cavalry Pursuit				Charge	
No. 18 Counter Charge		Charge			
No. 22 Jaws of Death	retreat thru ZOC				
No. 24 Disengagement					inf-arty
No. 27 Secure Flanks	retreat thru ZOC				

What is Command?

What goes into the estimation of a general's command rating? It takes more than a pen and a sheet of paper. If that were all it took, then any schoolmarm could beat Napoleon.

Remember that famous "C3" Loop. You have... C1 – Command; C2 – Command and Control; C3 – Command, Control and Communication. Or Command, Execution, and Report. So when we are talking "command," we are talking "C3," not just C1.

Remember that the commander doesn't have a nice map with all the units laid out in front of him, as we do. Before he can give a command, he has to have a picture of how things are "over the hill." Wellington had gradually built up a great ability to be at the right spot at the right time by 1815, but that was because of a trained staff of 37 officers who were constantly coming and going across the battlefield, bringing in situation updates from different parts of the field. The Duke himself was always shuttling to and fro, so he can actually be anywhere within his command radius at a given moment. We know a lot about the Duke's Command apparatus, but next to nothing about the functioning of the Spanish Commanders' staffs.

In order to be an effective commander, you have to know more about the enemy than he knows about you. In this era, information about the enemy was at a premium. There isn't any Napoleonic campaign that would have run its historical course if both sides had as much information about the enemy as the player has. That is why we brought in the cards and hidden movement.

Even if you have good information about the position of your own troops and the enemy, and you can guess the enemy's intentions, you need a functioning bureaucracy to write down your orders, keep records, and pass them on to a couple of different riders. Once received, the question is whether your authority is great enough, and your writing is clear enough, that your intentions will prevail. If your subordinate doesn't think very highly of your military qualities, he is not likely to obey. If he does obey, assuming he understands exactly his role and the purpose of his actions in the overall scheme, and he has been given a charge that is tailored to the means available, there is every chance that something will go wrong anyway. It was the experienced non-commissioned officers who often saved things at the point when they began to go off the rails.

Then, the reports of what went wrong (or right) had to filter back up to the top again.

If your C3 Loop is quicker than mine, then I have fewer opportunities to get my licks in. That is what the Command Rating is really saying. I might have the best staff in the world, but if there is a break in the chain anywhere, then our side is sunk.

So should it be easier to command and control a division of 4 brigades than a corps of 4 divisions? Getting information on a small division is a lot easier, for one thing. You can easily see the entire division, whereas it isn't possible to see an entire corps in battle formation—it is too extensive for that. So a French Command is an entirely different thing than a Spanish command. The Spanish commander can see the troops that he is giving the order to—he can sort of bypass the division commander, or just tap him on the shoulder and that is enough to get the troops moving. On the French side, they need an officer who is experienced, reliable, and properly subordinate. This last factor was always a problem in the French Army, as opposed to the Prussian Army for example. The French officers often felt that they knew better, particularly in Spain when their commander was Joseph and not Napoleon. Wherever Napoleon was not present in person, the French Corps officers tended to do their own thing, and that is why we have the Initiative Die roll.

When we first designed *Napoleon's Last Battles*, we gave Napoleon a [3] for a command rating. That was based on his forgetting to send orders to VI Corps on the 16th. We have always looked at actual performance to develop these officer ratings. There is no other criteria really. If we look at the performance of the Spanish Commanders, Areizaga doesn't even rate. He just watched the battle and never sent a single order. However, we want the player to do better than his historical counterpart. He shouldn't have a cannonball chained to his leg.

What about Welly? Should he benefit from the same rule? Of course! Does that mean he will become a super juggernaut? Not really. If you set up Talavera and play the game, you are going to have a more or less straight line which is more extensive than Wellington's Radius, and he is going to be intervening here and there, so that the whole army will be unable to be all commanded at once.

There is one more difference between Wellington's style of command and the French. Welly's style

was a defensive one, and he usually did well when he could manage to get the French to attack him. But his style of command was not suited to attack. His dispositions tended to be defensive-minded, somewhat static, subject to breakthroughs, and lacking in agility; whereas the French had a very nicely-orchestrated machine for attacking (*l'ordre mixte et al*) that had "mixte" success against reverse slope tactics.

Wellington's Tactics

From http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/wellington_strategy_tactics_battles.htm

Wellington is viewed as a defensive general. For example Jac Weller described Wellington as overly cautious and very defensive minded. However some of his victories were offensive battles. In fact, when on the defensive Wellington actually made mistakes, most famously at the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, where his disastrous misplacement of a division was only retrieved by his quick thinking and the steadiness of the British and Portuguese troops in retreating under fire. The offensive tactics that had characterised Wellington's generalship in India and at Salamanca and Vitoria were absent at Waterloo.

In the major battles in Spain Wellington outnumbered the French, which is a positive thing:

- at Talavera Wellington had 55,000 vs 46,000.
- at Salamanca Wellington had 52,000 vs 49,500.
- at Vittoria "Wellington's 105,000 British, Portuguese and Spanish troops, with 96 guns, defeated 60,000 French with 138 guns under King Joseph Bonaparte" (—Wikipedia, April 2008)

Wellington "The Undefeated" Myth

According to historian Jac Weller, none of Wellington's battles in Spain can be called "great." At Salamanca he failed to exploit his success and the enemy quickly recovered. Talavera was near disaster. Busaco was "a technical defeat although claimed as victory ... if Talavera was a victory because the French withdrew, then Busaco was a defeat because the British were forced to withdraw." The alignment of troops at Talavera was not very well thought.

Of all the bigger battles only Salamanca was the one where Wellington not deliberately set out to fight "at that place and at that time." At El Bodon Wellington was caught too dispersed by Marshal Marmont and was driven back several miles in disorder.



"The real tests of Wellington's defensive abilities are the occasions when his opponents did not give him the opportunity to pick a position and settle his army into it. 'If Boney had been [at Fuentes de Oñoro, said Wellington], we should have been beaten'."

"In the Peninsula 14 general actions fought under his immediate command were considered worthy to be marked by the award of battle honours... Of these 14 only six (Vimeiro, Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes de Oñoro, Pyrenees and Nive) were defensive."

—Michael Glover, *Wellington*



Napoleon's Last Gamble

UPDATE-37 October 6, 2016

Napoleongames.com

TURN RECORD TRACKS

16th June Mini-campaign

7PM Remove Dornberg/Br Cav. The unit is not present.

16th June Campaign

7 PM (not 4 PM 17 Jun) Cavalry Brigade Grant arrives at Nivelles. March Order may be freely assigned.

Quatre-Bras & Mini-Campaign

3PM van Merlen/N Cav arrives, 1101.

8 PM Kruse's arrival is correct—disregard the “Bw.”

Waterloo

4 PM MAJ Bardeleben replaced Braun as Arty/IV.

8 PM The Prussian 2/I and 3/I units that arrive are ones listed in 29.32 of the Wavre scenario as having March Orders. Delete the reference to Prussian 4/I units.

Initial Set-up Cards

- If Initiative Ratings on the Set-up cards are different from the counter, the counters are correct.
- **Set-up, A-A:** A revised version of the Initial Setup has been published (.pdf available for free download). Change van Opstal's set up from S2008 to S2109.
- **Set-up, Prussian:** The 28th Inf Rgt. (2nd Brigade) should be reduced ® at Ligny and Eliminated (E) at Wavre (not set-up in hex 4612).

WATERLOO

Set-up, French: HArt Gronnier/II 1317 (not 1613). Pégot/I 2117 (not 2116). Piré 1317 (not 1316).

LA SOUFFEL

Map: 0734 is a French entry hex.

Set-up, French: 16th Division artillery 1115 (not 0909).

TRC: 11AM (not 1 PM) 4th Division enters at 2701. 11AM (add) WILHELM.

12 NOON (change) French 17th Div., Arty., Grouvel, 0734 enter at NOON not 2PM.

1PM (add) Hessian 2nd Div., 1101.

STUDY FOLDER

25.71 Thunderstorms: Thunderstorms only last for one hour, on the same turn the weather table yielded the Thunderstorm result. The next two turns are rain plus mud.

25.77 Grand Battery Movement: Units in a Grand Battery are limited to 1 hex of movement each turn the Grand Battery is in effect.

26.12 PEU units: PEU units are removed from the Reorganization Display once their VPs have been scored for the day. They should not be counted again on succeeding days of the campaign.

26.51 VP Cards: At the beginning of every day, when

players draw a new hand of cards, the loser draws cards equal to his previous day's hand. The winner draws the number of cards stipulated by his victory level then discards down to his previous day's hand size +1. Shuffle all discards back into the deck.

26.3 Exiting the Map

Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the "General Retreat" card once per game/campaign. If not using the cards, the Phasing Player may still declare one General Retreat per Army (20.5).

30.2 Alternate Reinforcements, Coalition

#2 (add) Anthing, Estorff

30.34 Reinforcement Notes: Delete the reference to the 4/I units as none arrive at this time.

30.36 Frischermont Chateau: Place a Coalition Roadblock (34.4 see below) in hex 2316 at start.

32.12 Mode Cards at start: delete ~~of each day~~ and delete ~~Reshuffle the Mode Cards each night at 9PM.~~

32.2 Alternate Reinforcements, Coalition

#2 (add) Anthing, Estorff, and STEDMAN's 1 N div #2 (change) All of these units enter at N0113.

32.3 Special Rules: Also apply 28.35.

33.34 All other Scenario Information

Change the reference to 23.37 to 32.37.

CARD DECK

Coalition Card No. 6—Formation Scattered

1-2. Troops Needed Rest (change): “The strongest stack of the scattered formation is removed...”

NOTE: Players may opt to remove both Coalition Cards No. 6 for a more historical opening of the campaign.

CARD RULES

24.2 Player Decks (Ignore the Example)

24.2 Player Decks: When combining scenarios into a mini-campaign, include all cards that are included in any of the scenarios being combined. For instance, include French card 16 in the Ligny mini-campaign.

24.34 Night Turns: Change the reference to 2.2C.

24.57 Scatter (remove words): “~~rolls 1d6~~”

COUNTER MIX

French Young Guard

YG initiative is 3 (not 4). 11.3 does not apply.

HOUSE RULE: Artillery's Initiative in Shock Combat is always one† unless it has the benefit of a crest, sits at the far end of a bridge, or is covered by a town, woods or slope. In other words, if it is defending in an Ar* Shock combat, it should get to use its printed initiative. If artillery is defending in woods, town, behind a crest, on a hilltop, or across a bridge or trestle, and the result is Shock, use the artillery's printed Initiative Rating to resolve the Shock Combat.

†You won't use the artillery unit's shock value unless it is alone in the hex.

Napoleon's Last Gamble Expansion Kit

UPDATE-37 October 6, 2016

Napoleongames.com

35.0 GRAND CAMPAIGN

Wellington's Strategic Reserve

Arrives as follows (except units already arrived as Alternate Reinforcements).

Set up at Anderlecht

Beaulieu/HR, NX0610

June 18th, 11 AM (from Antwerp)

McKenzie, Bodecker, Marsh, enter NX 2101

June 18th, 7 PM (from Ghent)

French Royal Army, enter NX 0708

June 19th, 11 AM (from Ostend)

DECKEN, Bennigsen, Munro, enter NX 0708

June 19th, 12 NOON (from Ypres)

Bülow, enters NX 0708

34.12 Mode Cards at Start

Remove French Card No. 5, "early arrival," and reduce Mode Cards to 2.

34.32 and 35.32 March Orders at Start

Remove all French at start march orders.

34.4 ROADBLOCKS

A roadblock represents a physical obstruction plus some hundreds of men. A roadblock prevents all movement through a road or trail hexside.

34.41 Roadblocks at Start, June 15th: Prussians: 5; Anglo-Allies: 2 to be placed north of the Sam- bre at a *Defile*—bridge, town, up slope, or woods hexside. Roadblocks are deployed like hidden units. Use any Hidden Force marker.

34.42 Construction: Each army can construct up to 3 Roadblocks each Night PM turn, on any road or trail hexside in a defile (34.41), not in EZOCs, within 3 hexes of a friendly unit. Construction is automatic—simply place the Hidden Force/Road-block Marker on the map. Make sure to place the marker on a hexside. It only affects that one hexside.

34.43 Defending: Infantry units attacked exclusively through roadblocks are doubled in strength. The roadblock is automatically cleared when the unit(s) defending the hexside are removed by combat. Cavalry may not attack through a roadblock.

34.44 Clearing roadblocks: It costs an infantry unit 2 MPs to clear a roadblock marker from the map—unless infantry are defending the hexside. To clear a roadblock a unit must be in either of the two hexes adjacent to it.

35.12 Mode Cards at Start: French 3, Coalition 1. Mode Cards are drawn only once for the entire campaign. In addition, French Late Start is in effect at daylight on June 16, 17 and 18. Anglo-Allied Late Start is in effect beginning at 11AM on June 15 (*Card No. 2*). Begin rolling for Wellington to wake up at 6 PM on June 15. Wellington and all forces that begin on or enter the NX map may not move until Wellington awakens. Even if you aren't using the cards, Late Start is in effect for the French Leaders and Wellington as above.

35.2 Alternate Reinforcements

Here it says to use the ALT reinforcements from 32.2. Some of the French ALT reinforcements for 32.2 enter at S1433. That should be SX1016 or SX1616 for the Grand Campaign.

35.3 Special Rules: Also use 34.41 in the Grand Campaign Scenario. EXCEPTION: Ignore the last sentence—**do** score points for Ligny and Sombreffe.

35.35 Remove Cards From Deck: The French start with all four Cards 29. On subsequent days, add back into the deck any cards listed as being removed on the first day except for Mode cards and any Card 29 that has been used.

35.43 Baggage Train Movement: All Formations must recover any units awaiting reorganization before their baggage trains move away from the current friendly supply source. If the Formation's Trunk Line (17.43) is increased, roll for each unit of the Formation still on the Reorganization Display: on a die roll of 5 or 6 move the unit to the PEU. All units that are out of supply (or lack a baggage train) upon reorganization must also roll as above.

TURN RECORD TRACKS

15th June Grand Campaign

9 PM (not 6 AM 16 Jun)

Brunswick, Specht, and Cramm arrive NX 2101.

CARD DECK

Campaign Game and Grand Campaign (only)

French Cards Nos. 20 and 24: Ignore the instruction and any VPs for playing the Suchet and Davout cards, if they don't appear within the first 24 hours of the campaign. Remove these cards from play after being scored.

ALT Reinforcement Cards No. 29: For both sides, ignore instruction and any VPs after June 16th, 9 PM. Exception: In the Grand Campaign, the Anglo-Allied player may apply the instructions (and the VPs) at any time on the 17th or 18th to get the Anglo-Allied Forces at Hal into play.

MAP

Ignore the trestle across the S5426/S5526 hexside. There should be a trestle symbol on the S5432/S5433 hexside (which is also north side of hex SX 5400).

Rest & Refit After Battle

The "Asleep" card is representing a lot of very important activities, such as taking care of the wounded and arranging supply. (See the attached article).

After major fighting, the victorious army usually rested on the battlefield for several hours or longer. During this period of rest the Army undertook care for the wounded, promoting NCOs to higher grade, reorganizing and feeding the troops, bringing up supplies and ammunition, so that the army might again become an effective fighting force.

However, we didn't have any mechanism in the game design to mirror this period of inactivity. We had a draft of a very complicated rule, way more involved than necessary. Finally we struck on the idea of using the baggage train to restrain the forward movement of the army.

35.43 Baggage Train Movement: All Formations must recover any units awaiting reorganization before their baggage trains move away from the current friendly supply source. If the Formation's Trunk Line (17.43) is increased, roll for each unit of the Formation still on the Reorganization Display: on a die roll of 5 or 6 move the unit to the PEU. All units that are out of supply (or lack a baggage train) upon reorganization must also roll as above. In other words, if you move your trains forward while units remain on the Reorganization Track, a third of them will be lost. This rule forces you to stop moving forward (generally, depending on the situation) while you reorganize.

That new rule allowed us to get the concept of Rest and Refit in a very simple way. It is only using that supply source as a general direction. There were so many things that a unit had to do after a battle, even aside from beans and bullets (but they are important.) It's just that whether the canteen even caught up with the men was hit or miss during an active fight. If an army marches off too soon after the battle then it will leave behind a portion of its strength.

This rule will impact the side that is advancing, moving away from their Supply Sources But that is an inherent vice of being on the offensive.



La garde recule

The Guard Recule took effect in the Pittsburgh players game back on June 16th, and the French army suffered from higher demoralization levels from that point forward. That may need an extra rule to cover the 5-days of the grand campaign. There has to be a way to remove that status from the guard, either:

- a) with Napoleon making a successful attack stacked with the old guard infantry, or,
- b) automatically at the first daylight turn of the next day.

There were times when the Emperor would drop the guard into battle during the last stages of a fight, to close the battle. At Austerlitz, the Emperor lead the infantry of the guard in person to reinforce Soult. At Jena, the guard was committed to hold the line in the center about noon, but didn't advance until the end of the battle. It was at Jena that Napoleon chided one of the young guard for saying "en avant." Few men were lost in combat from the Guard in 1806, but 800 Guardsmen were killed or wounded at Eylau the next February. Young Guard fusiliers were involved in combat at Friedland.

The Young Guard fought again at Aspern Essling when the Army was in peril of being thrown into the Danube, holding Essling during the retreat onto Lobau island. Then, during the retreat from Russia, the Guard fought several engagements, and again at Leipzig and Hanau the next year. But it was in 1814 that the widest use of the guard would be made.

The guard fought at Montmirail when Blücher was caught in a compromising position, running little risk. Napoleon had to employ the Guard freely as the rest of the army was composed of dead men walking (Macdonald's Corps), Marmont's excellent VI Corps, the so-called "Young Guard," (8 or 9 divisions of 17-year old conscripts), and the dregs of the regimental depots.

"Between 1805 and 1812 parts of the guard were engaged in combat, but only when its role as a tactical reserve required it—at the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Smolensk, and Borodino. Only minor elements of it were engaged in other battles, notably the battle of Baylen in Spain, where the Guard Marines [sic] were captured. The use of the Guard clearly was that of a tactical reserve."¹

ANOTHER TOPIC

Outside of this particular campaign, the rule exists, functionally, to discourage players from treating the Guard as if it were the 1st SS Panzer. The guard was NOT an elite battering ram, designed to punch through weak spots in the enemy line. Conceptually, it was a reserve that was used, if at all, only at the climactic moment, when the enemy was exhausted and all of its reserves were committed. The guard will always be the most powerful corps on the battlefield, and yet it was almost never committed, until 1814-15, when it was used in a more front-line role. It's difficult to prevent a player from using his the most powerful corps in a wargame.

In our game, Chuck has used his Guard, on both the 16th and 18th, as his attack force. He's led with it on both days, and he's had Garde Recule penalties levied on both days (I believe there were actually two recule events on the 16th, and one on the 18th).

To me, that's reasonable. Over the course of several days of fighting, yes, you can make a case that the penalty would go away, assuming the guard wasn't too badly hurt during the fighting, but I think just having it go away in the morning, while simple, isn't the answer. There would be no reason not to attack with the guard in the late afternoon, because the penalty, if imposed, would "reset" in the morning. Maybe there's a card that would remove the penalty? Play of the Napoleon card, for example, could be given an additional effect, when played, of removing any Recule effects inflicted during the previous day. Because players can't retain cards from day to day, that would prevent abuse.

You raise a good point, too about how GR in the evening would go away immediately... but there is an argument to allow this "abuse." There were times when the Emperor would drop the guard in during the last phases of a battle, after it was already a fait accompli, "to close the battle."

I think that occurred at Austerlitz and Jena. It was at Jena that Napoleon chided one of the young guard for saying "en avant."

This is what George Nafziger says about it. "Between 1805 and 1812 parts of the guard were engaged in combat, but only when its role as a tactical reserve required it. It was present and served as a battlefield tactical reserve at the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Smolensk, and Borodino. Only minor elements of it were engaged in other battles, notably the battle of Baylen in Spain, where the Guard Marines [sic] were captured. The use of the Guard clearly was that of a tactical reserve."

Guard actually had six roles. Those roles were:

1. A personal bodyguard
2. A military formation and tactical reserve
3. A method of building support with influential portions of French society for Napoleon's reign
4. A tool of international politics
5. A tool to minimize desertion and
6. A source of trained cadres for the army.

For my money the "Garde Recule" rule should probably reset at the beginning of each new day. Otherwise, if the Garde retreats on Day 1 what's to stop the French player from just using them indiscriminately for the remainder of the campaign?

35-37 Reculé in the Campaign Game

When any "Ae," "Ar," or "Ex" result is suffered by the Guard, the Demoralization levels of nearby formations are reduced (11.3). This "Garde Reculé" effect only lasts until the first daylight turn of the following day in multi-day scenarios.

There are two ways to remove Reculé status:

(1) the French Player plays the Napoleon card (special effect not mentioned on the card itself); or (2) at the first daylight turn of the next day. If the Old Guard infantry, or the majority of the remaining SPs, are under the direct command of Napoleon, the Garde Reculé effect is removed at the first daylight turn (of the next day), for the rest of the game.

¹ George Nafziger