


Wargame Design

VOL. II, NR. 7 \$5.50

SUMMER 2003

*Napoleonic Operations
The Information War
The Sun of Austerlitz*



Wargame Design, Summer 2003

Copyright © 2003 by Operational Studies Group.
All rights reserved.

Subscriptions

A four-issue subscription to *Wargame Design* is \$18.12.
Scholar Subscriptions are \$48.96 for four-issues.

To Place an Order

Place a credit-card order at 1(410) 367-4004, phone or fax. Alternatively you may place a secure credit card order at our website <http://www.NapoleonGames.com>
OSG's World headquarters is located in Baltimore, MD.

Order Inquiries

All OSG orders for games in print are shipped within *two business days* of receipt. Domestic customers should receive your game within *five business days* of our receiving the order. Contact us if your order has not been received in a timely manner.

Guarantee

If for any reason you are dissatisfied with an OSG product, return it complete and intact (unpunched) along with proof of purchase for a full refund. If your game has a damaged or missing part, send us the damaged component or describe the missing component and we will replace it free of charge.

Game Questions

Please provide a self-addressed stamped envelope with your questions. Email questions will be answered promptly. For international queries, provide an international postal reply coupon. Help us by typing or printing your questions. VERY IMPORTANT: Begin by stating the specific rules heading in question with its case number, if any. If you can, please phrase your questions so they can be answered with a one-word reply.

Wargame Design Magazine

Editor: Mike Welker

Publisher: Kevin Zucker <kzucker@charm.net>

We solicit articles on OSG games and general design.
Write us for more information.

On the cover: *Napoleon at Austerlitz*, by Myrbach.

OPERATIONAL STUDIES GROUP

PO Box 50207 • Baltimore, MD 21211 U.S.A.

email: editor@NapoleonGames.com

<http://www.NapoleonGames.com>

email: osg_europe@yahoo.com

http://www.geocities.com/osg_europe

CONTENTS

Historical Notes:

Napoleonic Operations 3

Scenarios & Variants:

Bonaparte in Italy—the Mincio 6

Pre-Advanced Games:

Work in Progress 7

Design Focus:

Kutusov's Approach in 1805 8

The Campaigns Series:

History as I Remember It 10

Player's Notes:

The Information War 12

Historical Notes:

Sun of Austerlitz Scenarios 21

Order Form

 13

EDITORIAL

The Value of Conflict Simulations by Mike Welker

It is commonly perceived among gamers that the fan-base of our hobby in the United States is constantly shrinking. This perception is an exaggeration. A recent poll on Consimworld, in fact, indicates quite the opposite.

In the 1980s and 1990s the demographics of conflict simulation markets turned the traditional game publishing business model inside out. Players aged into the low income-large debt period of life and stopped buying games to buy homes, get married, have kids, and buy minivans. Well, this was the general trend that game publishers hadn't planned for. But I believe there is another element to the wargaming downturn and the recent upturn as well. I will call this the "separation" effect of gaming, and we all know this happens on and off among gamers (and among anyone that seeks entertainment). By "separation" I mean the tendency of placing the games in the category of frivolity and

(cont'd on page 22)

Napoleonic Operations from Castiglione to Waterloo

by Kevin Zucker

In this article, Kevin offers us the broad view of what the Campaigns of Napoleon were all about. I think you may find the discussion illuminates the design rationale behind the Campaign series of games. The quotes followed by a Roman numeral in brackets are from Napoleon's Maxims. You can view the complete Maxims on OSG's website: Napoleongames.com —Ed.

Definitions

To understand the Campaigns of Napoleon one must know the armies, the terrain they fought over, and the strategies they used. An Army is an organization of men so that they can be moved across the terrain according to a plan. Strategy is the plan guiding all the moves of the army, and in Napoleon's case always implied the destruction of the enemy army. A single strategy may be employed throughout one campaign or a long war. If the strategy changes frequently, it can become difficult to discern at all.

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of art. War should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome. [V]

You will compel the enemy to fight you on your approach; by means of a forced march, you will place yourself in his rear and cut his communications, or, alternatively, you will menace a town whose preservation is vital to him."
—Frederick the Great

"Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary of the latter than of the former; space we can recover, time never."¹ The selection of objectives, and the assignment of forces proportioned to achieve the objectives, takes place at the strategic level. Objectives are selected in the light of overall strategy.

Putting this plan into execution is termed Operations. Prior to Napoleon, military planning was limited either to Strategy—the overall aims of a war—or Tactics—the deployment of forces on the battlefield. Following Frederick's precepts, Napoleon introduced a third, intermediate level between Strategy and Tactics: the Operational Level.² "Unlike his eighteenth-century forebears, who rigidly distinguished between maneuvering and giving battle, adopting different formations for each activity, Napoleon fused marching, fighting and pursuing into one continuous process."³

For Napoleon and some of his later adversaries, victory on the battlefield was determined days or weeks beforehand, by ascertaining in advance where the battle would be fought, and then arranging for a preponderance of force, with mobile columns descending upon the battlefield from widely separated directions at the last minute.

Planning at this level could be most effective against an opponent who was limited in his thinking to 'Strategic' and 'Tactical' levels. At his best, Napoleon concealed from his opponent exactly where the battlefield was going to be.

In the planning process, operations begin the moment a strategic goal has been selected. The coordination of the different masses of men takes place at the operational level. The Operations Plan details the specific marches that have to be executed to accomplish the strategic objective. Excellence in coordinating the march of forces is the whole art. The duration of a complete operation can be as little as five days or as long as 21.

The four steps in an Operation are always:

1. Planning & Preparation
2. A Period of Maneuver
3. Attack: a Major Battle
4. Follow Through: Pursuit

The most interesting moment in this whole sequence is the transition from maneuver into contact, up to the commencement of the battle—the transition from the Operational to the Tactical Level.

Weather

The campaigns of Napoleon were fought in every season of the year, in every type of terrain except for high mountains and swamps. Weather often had a crucial impact on operations. In the campaign in Italy, the mild Mediterranean climate helped provide a rich and supportive environment for troops constantly exposed to the elements.

In later years, the theater of operations moved northward into far more brutal climes. During the morning of the battle of Austerlitz the French took advantage of the ground fog lying in the valleys to conceal important forces from nearby enemies. In 1807 mud proved the worst enemy of an army. Frost, if not too severe, was not as bad, since it prevented the roads from turning to mud. But in extreme cold, it is important to keep everybody moving, to keep the body temperature up. The Russians used snow and blowing cold to devastating effect during the Eylau Campaign, keeping the wind to their backs as they selected their defensive positions. In northern latitudes, the variation in temperature can be extreme, swinging from sweltering heat to severe frost. Entering Russia the French were greeted with

violent thunderstorms, hail, pouring rain, and mud. Thunder is an elemental force of nature whose morale effect was significant.

Planning and Preparation— Logistics, Liaison, Administration

In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum; according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.
[II]

The Operations Plan depends upon the strategic goals dictated by the situation of troops, terrain, and overall geopolitical goals. Once strategic goals are set, the Operations Plan is established to further those goals.

In order to implement the Operations Plan, a controlling hierarchy and a logistical support must be set in place. Depots and Supply Bases must be established in the proper relation to forces and goals before operations can be completed. Forces and Leaders have to be collected in starting locations chosen to protect supply lines.

The theatre of operations has to be selected and defined. In the Napoleonic Era and for centuries before, theatres were of two basic kinds: linear corridors and "overall." When one traces the movement of troops through a linear corridor, the lines of movement appear clear and mirror the evolution of the campaign timeline. In "overall" theatres, the lines of march overlap each other like cooked spaghetti. These differences are given in the nature of the geography in the theatre. For example, the first phase of the Russian campaign took place in an "overall" theatre, while the second stage and the retreat were strictly linear. A theatre tends to be linear if there is a clearly defined strategic objective, like an enemy capital, while it tends to be all-over if there are several separate armies operating on each side.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

It is impossible to discuss Napoleon's system of operations without a mention of Berthier, his tireless Chief of Staff.

To know the country thoroughly; to be able to conduct a reconnaissance with skill; to superintend the transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated movements intelligibly, but in few words and with simplicity: these are the leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected for the head of the staff. [LXXIV]

In order to implement the plan, there has to be a chief of staff and a headquarters capable of issuing the necessary orders in a timely fashion and effectively enforcing their implementation by lower echelons. This requires first and foremost, that the theatre of war be not so far-flung that orders are out of date by the time they arrive at subordinate HQs. This means that the general headquarters must not attempt to control events beyond a certain distance, a distance that can vary somewhat depending upon the pace of operations.

Limited Staff resources may create delays in the order cycle (the 'C3' loop), which is the time it takes for an order to be drafted, copied, dispatched, delivered to the recipient, acted upon, and the results conveyed back to headquarters. "The loss of time is irreparable in war," said the Emperor.

The C3 Loop was normally one or two days. In Russia in 1812, by contrast, the C3 loop at Imperial Headquarters was stretched to about 2.5 days. Forces at the outside end of a rider's 5-day return-trip (about 280 miles) were beyond effective control of Napoleon. Any leader beyond that is largely operating on his own initiative.

The first duty to claim Napoleon's attention was the arrangement of the Supply Service.

—F.L. Petre

If the choice were between fighting a battle and feeding the troops, Napoleon always sought battle. But with his typical thoroughness he often delayed the commencement of an operation in order to arrange the movement of supplies.

All that his commissaries usually had to offer was bread or biscuit, normally 28 ounces per man each day. The absolute minimum necessary to avoid mass starvation during active campaigning was 21 ounces. During lulls in the campaign the troops received a more balanced diet.

Once an operation was under way, Napoleon no longer concerned himself with provisions for the troops beyond the few days supply of bread in their knapsacks and the caissons of the artillery. While on campaign the soldiers regularly foraged to provide for their needs at the expense of the civilians along their route. On the eve of battle, however, every effort was made to feed the troops.

Foraging soldiers always found supply randomly, perhaps arriving in a village where there was nothing or hearing from patrolling cavalry that there was plenty of bread in another town. A supply party was formed to go there and retrieve whatever was available. Supply was often well prepared at the beginning of each campaign, but tended to erode quickly because of the difficulties inherent in following a moving army. Of course, weather often interfered.

TRANSPORT

Bread rations were baked locally in gigantic field ovens—capable of handling 6,000 rations per day—set up by the masons attached to each corps. Civilian vehicles, including all types of light carts, were confiscated and pressed into

service to haul biscuit behind the advancing corps. Up until 1807, a private contractor provided horses and drivers, and built the wagons it sold to the French government. Its convoys moved slowly and lost many wagons due to negligence.

It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate the transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles—as biscuit, rice, &c: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country ... and these vehicles should be arranged in parks [depots] at different points.

—Jomini (*The Art of War*, Phila: 1862, pp. 131-32)

The problem in nourishing the troops came not with finding supplies, but with transporting them. In the first weeks of a campaign, the French outran their supply wagons. The supplies were there, they just could not reach the troops. In one instance, wagons that left Saxony in June, 1812, reached the Saxon Corps during November.

In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy everything in their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.

—Jomini (p. 131)

In most armies of the Napoleonic Wars, the total of all artillery and supply wagons together averaged about one wagon per 72 men. The artillery normally had one train company (22 wagons and 59 drivers) for each battery.

In 1815 the French had far more drivers (3029 with the line and 1409 attached to the Guard) assigned fewer wagons (700). This number of wagons was far below the intended figure. The Army had four squadrons, each of four companies. The establishment of each company called for 3 officers and 199 men with 16 saddle and 170 draft horses pulling 42 wagons (six of which went to the ambulance service). The best horses went to the first squadron, which had three companies assigned to the artillery because of the shortage of caissons, and to the second squadron which was then divided between the IV and V Corps of the army. The horses remaining to the third and fourth squadrons were pitifully feeble. To remedy this weakness in transport, a decree called for the raising of 26 auxiliary companies—

probably impressed farmers with their farm wagons. Those called out in the northern provinces did not report for service or escaped at the first opportunity. A few of these auxiliary companies from the departments of the Marne and Aisne were ready by the commencement of the campaign. At that time the Army had about 504 supply wagons (in 11 regular and 3 auxiliary companies), of which 216 were serving the Line of Communications back to Paris. The difficulties of the French army were as bad as ever; most of their food had to be found by the troops themselves.

If food was difficult to supply to men, fodder was many times more so. War is more dangerous for a horse than for a man. The fragility of the cavalry arm caused Napoleon to husband his mounts, assigning them to quarter alongside rivers. Nonetheless, an officer who did much riding probably went through three mounts in the course of a campaign. And if life was hard for an officer's mount, things were much worse for the beasts hauling wagons and cannon.

In 1815, a total of 33,200 horses served with the French Army. The 348 guns required 3,384 horses and the artillery caissons added a further 1800. The cavalry had about 23,700 horses and the infantry officers and staff about 200. The engineer park had about 1725 horses and the transport park 2352.

THE SUPPLY BASE

The Supply Base is a city or large town with the necessary warehouses and workforce already in business—a secure location free from marauding enemy troops, the most forward point reached by civilian contractors in the ordinary course of trade.

The supply base had better be garrisoned with an experienced general in command. In 1812, in occupied Prussia, Napoleon ordered the creation of the four-division XI Corps to guard the fortresses on the Oder and to maintain a mobile corps in Berlin.

THE CENTER OF OPERATIONS

The Center of Operations was the location of hospitals, reserves of ammunition and main field parks. Napoleon generally kept the Center of Operations no more than six days march behind the army (102 to 120 miles). On June 16th 1815—the eve of the Waterloo campaign—as soon as the town was safely occupied, Charleroi was turned into the French Army's Center of Operations. Here resided the Army Park, some 5600 strong, as well as the hospitals, the offices of the Chief of Staff, the General Staff, and the staff of the General commissary of Army Stores.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

With the consideration of Lines of Communications, the boundary between Strategy and Operations begins to be approached. There is no distinct cut-off between the Strategic and Operational Levels—(cont'd on page 14)

SCENARIOS & VARIANTS

Bonaparte in Italy

Crossing the Mincio

by David Moody

Following Bonaparte's failure to trap his army along the Adda River and his narrow escape at Lodi, Beaulieu pulled back his weakened force to defend the Mincio River line south of Lake Garda. As long as he held this line the French would be unable to begin the siege of Mantua—the ultimate prize.

Duration: 5 turns

Start Date: 26/27 May

End Date: 3/4 June

French player is first player.

No pre-game Forced March as in Ex. Rules 221.

Victory Conditions: The French player is the victor if at the end of turn 5, he (a) has occupied Citadella or Mantua, or has forced Mantua into siege; and (b) has 10 SPs east of the Mincio with a valid LOC to his supply source. If only one of these two conditions has been met, the result is a draw. Otherwise the Austrian is the victor.

ACCUMULATED ADMIN POINTS:

FRENCH 6, AUSTRIAN 4

Movement Commands:

First Turn French 4, Austrian 1

Thereafter French 3, Austrian 2.

Special Rule: Any force ending its normal Movement Phase (not Forced March) in Mantua or Citadella must roll for attrition on the NO LOC column with a +2 DRM (due to Malaria around the marshes and lakes). When the siege was first lifted on 1st August during Wurmser's campaign, Alvinzi entered Mantua to find 3,500 of the original 13,500 garrison were sick. Actual battle casualties were just under 1,000 men.

SET UP

French

Napoleon 1512 [Brescia]

Augereau 1512 [Brescia]
{Robert - 3 SPs, Beyrand - 3 SPs}

Serurier 1512 [Brescia]
{Serviez - 3 SPs, Pelletier - 3 SPs, Fiorella - 3 SPs}

Massena 1513
{Joubert - 3 SPs, Valette - 2 SPs, Victor - 2 SPs,
Rampon - 2 SPs}

Kilmaine 1915
{Dallemagne - 4 SPs}

Cav. MG1 1915
{Beaumont - 2 SPs}

MG 1 1714
{Rusca - 1 SP}

Austrian
MG1 3604
{March Regt - 1 inf. SP}

MG2 2719
{Liphay - 3/1 C}

Melas 2920
{Gummer - 5 SPs}

Sebottendorf 2922
{Pittoni - 2/1 C}

Cav. MG1 2922
{Naples - 1SP}

MG3 2822
{Nicoletti - 2 SPs}

Beaulieu 3123
(unemployed - he was ill)

Colli 2625

MG4 2625
{Ruckavina - 3SPs}

MG5 2729 [Citadella]
{Rosselimini - 4SPs}

d'Irles 2930 [Mantua]
{Sturioni - 2SPs, Salisch - 2SPs}

MG6 2530
{Vukassovich - 2SPs}

Project Updates:

The Pre-Advanced Games

As the number of orders for any title passes 250 we will put the game on our schedule, and the pre-advanced price will expire when the game is published.

View the current totals of pre-orders by game title at www.NapoleonGames.com

Use the Order Form on page 13.

Pay by credit card: we will not debit your card until the game is in production.

Pay by check: we will *not* hold checks, but will deposit them immediately upon receipt.

Timing: It may take some months to accumulate the necessary orders to put the games on the schedule. We reserve the right to return funds collected and cancel the project.

FRANCOPRUSSIAN WAR: THE WAR ON THE RIVER LOIRE.

I've always been interested in the 1870-71 war; for one thing, it is very well-documented (always a plus for a game designer). Histories tend to focus on the French losses up until the Germans reached Paris; but in the later stages of the war, simulated in the game, the campaign became much more even and interesting, and also a bit more mobile.

The system used is the Napoleon at Bay/Campaigns of Napoleon operational system (see page 6). The scale is the same as all the games in the operational system: 2 miles (3.2 km.) per hex, 2 days per turn, 1,000 men per SP.

The River Loire is a natural defensive line, just like the Seine and Marne. Napoleon had intended to fall back on this line in 1814 and 1815. The campaign scenario commences when the encirclement of Paris is complete. French Forces on the Loire moved against the German vedettes which were screening their southern wing. The Bavarian Corps under von der Tann counter-attacked on the 10th of October, supported by the 22nd Prussian Division. The balance of Prussian forces were otherwise engaged.

There were three main battles: Coulmiers—Aurelle's advance to the relief of Paris—which commenced on the 7th of November (the first French victory of the war). On the 24th, the Prussians received three new corps—III, IX and X—released with the capitulation of Metz. The French advanced as far as Beaune-la-Rolande by the 28th. Finally, Loigny was a desperate effort to support the break-out of the Paris garrison. Each of these battles has a separate scenario set-up. The game ends with the historical fall of Orleans on the 5th of December.

The map stretches from the suburbs of Paris in the north to Bourges on the Loire in the south, and from le Mans in the west to Fontainebleau in the east; there is a little bit of overlap with the Napoleon at Bay map in the area between Paris and Fontainebleau. KEVIN ZUCKER

COMBINED FLEET (*aka Pacific Fleet*)

Combined Fleet is a design that is intended to go beyond the simplicity of AH's *Victory In The Pacific*, yet avoid the complexity of VG's *Pacific War* (both fine games in their own right). It is projected to have one map, 400 counters, and 32 pages of rules (including scenarios and designer's comments), and it will be possible to play it solitaire. With the rules (which have undergone numerous revisions), I have tried to be as explanatory as possible, so that mostly explains the 32 page length.

Currently, the game is semi-dormant as I totally exhausted myself by putting in about 400 hours into the project in a short span of time. I think it wise to allow the project to gestate while pre-orders accumulate. The game has had only limited outside exposure, and with my work schedule changing next month, I hope to get back to playtesting soon.

Speaking of pre-orders, it seems that with OSG being recognized as Napoleonic experts, folks were caught off guard by the announcement of a WWII Pacific game, and not many are aware of it...hopefully that will change shortly.

Try to envision VITP melding with VG's *Pacific War*. My entire design goal was to avoid the simplicity of the former, and some of the complexity of the later. Unique rules for intelligence, random events, solitaire play, are included. Turns are seasonal, one map, and 560 counters.

Individual carriers (with their own counter for crew quality) and battleships, with other ships being in task forces. Air units are represented by a strength counter attached to the air groups. Ground unit size varies. The game starts immediately after Pearl Harbor, and can go the distance through 1945.

After a 6 month layoff, I've recently started back into the project. I'm double checking some historical research, and have completed an entire revised set of rules for Kevin to peruse.

We are very enthusiastic about this project, but business being what it is (and OSG being mainly known for Napoleonic titles), pre-orders have to increase before proceeding to the next step...so spread the word!

PF has an area movement map (30 zones) and seasonal turns (4 per year).

Originally I had a set of cards in mind (a la POG et al), but frankly, Kevin told me the cost was too high for the type of game that we were trying to produce, and now I agree with him. The random events were placed onto a chart that you now roll (add) 2d10 for...so those Japanese midget subs or a USA long-range P-38 strike can still occur. I think it works out even better since I can gauge the common events from the rare ones more accurately due to dice being involved (probability and such).

As you know, the project still needs testing and fine tuning, and I am very interested in your ideas.

As soon as Zucker gives me the go ahead (i.e. sufficient pre-orders come through), I'll shift into gear. STEVE CAREY

Design Focus:

Kutusov's Approach

Determining Attrition Rates in

The Sun of Austerlitz

by Kevin Zucker

One of the least documented aspects of Napoleonic armies in historical sources on the Napoleonic Wars is the loss suffered due to non-combat causes (i.e., 'Strategic Consumption,' or 'Attrition'). Attrition figures always have to be derived from available strength data. Little or no effort was expended on keeping records of non-combat losses at the time, and historians of the later 19th century seem to overlook the matter entirely.

In order to really calculate attrition we have to begin with a total army strength given at various periods, taking note of which entire formations have been transferred into or away from the army, and then determine as closely as possible the numbers of replacements received by the army. The difference is attrition. That calculation can be done for an entire campaign or for a brief period.

Another method is to check the strength of an army before and after a long march during which no combat took place and no replacements were received. This is the approach we followed in the *Sun of Austerlitz*, determining Attrition levels of Kutusov's First Russian Army during its march from Poland to Bavaria at the opening of the campaign.

Scott Bowden in his book *Napoleon and Austerlitz* states on page 173:

"When excluding Rosen's detached VI Column numbering approximately 7,500 (including artillery), the units remaining with Kutuzov numbered 38,905 when they left Radziwilow. More than 11,000 of these young Russian soldiers fell out of ranks on the way to the Bavarian border and never rejoined their units. Therefore, Kutuzov's army suffered an astounding strategic consumption rate of 30% on its march to Braunau."

Bowden calculates the distance of the march from Teschen as 265 miles, and the daily average at slightly more than 16 and one-half miles per day. He provides a table on page 293 that shows the strengths of each column of the Russian Army upon their departure and again on their arrival in Braunau, which makes it possible to determine the attrition rate for each column. However, Bowden states incorrectly the distances of the marches and therefore arrives at an incorrect march rate for the Russian Army.

The attrition rates seem not that astounding given the actual distance marched. Attrition rates suffered in the French Army over the same period are shown in Bowden's Appendices. For instance, on 23 September 1805, as Davout's III Corps troops, still far away from the enemy, were about to cross the Rhine, their strength was 25,161.

On 5 November they numbered 22,388, a loss of 11% by the best troops anywhere over a six-week period. The soldiers of III Corps in hospitals or in rear areas increased from 2,855 to 4,873 during the period.

Let's look at the progress of one brigade in III Corps. The brigade of Pierre-Charles Lochet was the second of three brigades in Louis Friant's division, the division that would march so quickly from Vienna to reinforce Napoleon's right flank in the defense of Sokolnitz. This brigade was arguably the best infantry unit in Napoleon's army at the time.

On 23 September the brigade mustered 1,522 men in its 48th Line Regiment and 1,778 in its other Regiment, the 111th Line. (Figures are provided in the Appendices to Bowden's *Austerlitz*, sourced to the Archives of the Service Historique de l'etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes.) As the brigade rested in Vienna on 29 November awaiting the summons northward, the 48th had 1,365 men and the 111th 1,440.

From the time it crossed the Rhine until it came to rest in Vienna two months later, the brigade lost 15% of its manpower without having seen any significant combat. Davout's Lt. Cavalry was engaged at Ried on 30 October, and again at Lambach the following day; his Advanced Guard under Heudelet encountered the rearguard of Meerveldt on 6 November, and destroyed his main body on the 8th; but Lochet's brigade played no significant role in any of these engagements. The number of replacements Lochet may have received during the period is unknown. We know that the other units of the Grande Armée probably suffered a higher rate of attrition. That gives us a good indication of the levels we are looking to recreate.

Here is how we went on to determine the actual attrition rates for the Attrition Table.

I. Kutusov's march from Radziwilow to Teschen

Kutusov's Army was able to march all the way across western Poland in just under a month (29 days, of which about 23 days were spent marching). The troops set out on 25 August and arrived in Teschen on 22 September, the eve of the French crossing of the Rhine.

a) Point-to-point distances

Radziwilow-Radom	50 mi.
Radom-Skarzysko	30 mi.
Skarzysko-Jedrzejów	50 mi.
Jedrzejów-Kraków	50 mi.
Kraków-Teschen	50 mi.
total	230 mi.

b) Allowing for the meander of roads
230 x 1.175 270 mi.

c) Rendered in Game Terms

The Russian Army covered 270 miles in 23 days of marching, for an average of 11.74 mi./day, or 6—2 mi. hexes, expending 3 MP per day, assuming all the roads were Primary Roads (at 1/2 MP per hex). This equals 15 Regular Marches at an average of 4.5 MPs each.

II. Kutusov's March from Teschen to Braunau

Kutusov's Army completed the remainder of the march to Bavaria at a redoubled pace in just 20 days, 16 of which were spent on the road. Departing on 23 September, their lead elements (Bagration's column) arrived in Braunau on 12 October.

a) Point-to-point distance

Teschen-Olmütz	70 mi.
Olmütz-Brno	46 mi.
Brno-Hollabrunn	50 mi.
Hollabrunn-Melk	46 mi.
Melk-Linz	50 mi.
Linz-Braunau	50 mi.
total	312 mi.

b) Allowing for the meander of roads
312 x 1.175 367 mi.

c) Rendered in Game Terms

The Russian Army covered 367 miles in 16 days of marching, for an average of 22.9 mi./day, or 11—2 mi. hexes, expending 5.5 MP per day, assuming all the roads were Primary Roads (at 1/2 MP per hex). This equals 10 Regular Marches at an average of 5.5 MPs each and 6 Forced Marches at an average of 5.5 MPs each.

The total strength of Kutusov's 5 columns on 25 August was 39,040, and the remaining strength on their arrival on 23 October was 27,092. Therefore, they suffered 12 SPs of Attrition, probably all of which occurred in the last 20 days, or 10 Game-Turns, of the journey.

The army moved not in one mass but column by column, at strictly controlled intervals. The army made an administrative march without concern for the march security of the separate columns, since they were moving in friendly territory far from the enemy. Once they reached Braunau and the Inn River—the boundary of Bavaria and the gateway to the theater of active operations—they had to halt and close-up. Concentration of the whole army took about two weeks, from 12 October to 23 October. The spacing of the columns was such that the last column was 11 days behind the leading elements. Thus, we can estimate that the II Column arrived in Braunau about the 14th, the III Column about the 16th and 17th, the IV Column on the 19th and 20th, and the V Column on the 22nd and 23rd.

The Austrian Administration provided food and fodder for the troops en route; they even provided some 2,233

two-horse carts, more than enough for Bagration's leading column to ride forward from Teschen. In order to speed their march even further, Kutusov ordered the Army's baggage train left behind at Teschen.

The Strength of the various columns on 25 August, and on 23 October, 1805, as given in Bowden, were as follows:

I Column (Bagration)	7,324	5,435	(.742)
II Column (Essen II)	7,020	4,992	(.711)
III Column (Docturov)	6,367	4,475	(.703)
IV Column (Skepelov)	6,095	3,629	(.595)
V Column (v. Maltitz)	8,263	5,351	(.647)

As you can see above, each column of troops begins the march from Radziwilow with 6, 7, or 8 SPs. It is assumed that few of these were lost on the first half of the march to Teschen, for two reasons: 1. This part of the march took place within the Russian Empire; and 2. The pace of the march prior to Teschen was half that of the later segment.

Assuming that the army marched in column order with Bagration in front, v. Maltitz in rear, we ought to see a greater attrition rate suffered by the troops at the back of the line than by those in advance, because of the churned-up mud caused by thousands of marching men, horses, and wagons during a rainy autumn. Additionally, the provisions set aside for the army would have been over-consumed by those arriving first. The figures in the third column (in parenthesis) show the percentage of men remaining in the ranks at the end of the journey, indicating that Skepelov's IV Column may have been the last to march, falling behind v. Maltitz's column. Bagration's Advanced Guard column fared the best, losing 25.8% over the two months of marching, while Essen lost 28.9%, Docturov 29.7%, and v. Maltitz 35.3%. Skepelov's column fared the worst, losing 40.5% of the men who set out on 25 August.

If the game would have any value as a simulation and tell us anything about the campaign, it must be able to duplicate historical conditions.

Many of these men may well have straggled-in to Olmütz to rejoin the colors before the battle of Austerlitz on 2 December.

Each column except Maltitz's lost 2 SPs: Bagration and Essen each started with about 7 SPs and ended with 5. Docturov and Skepelov each went from 6 down to 4 SPs, and v. Maltitz went from 8 down to 5.

All the Attrition should be suffered during the six forced marches performed by the troops after 23 September. That means our Attrition table will have a two-in-six chance of losing 1 SP for a force of 7 Strength Points.

It was critical for us to get the attrition figures in the game to fit historical parameters. The attrition table sets the speed at which the armies in the game can operate. If this table is not accurate, it will either allow the armies to move at an ahistorical pace, or cause forces to suffer too much attrition in attempting to duplicate their historical marches.

History as I Remember It

The Longest-Running Series in Game Design History

by Mark Owens

Mark Owens has agreed to join WD as our resident Campaigns of Napoleon editor. What follows is a first installment—a summary of where the series has been and where it's headed.

There have been some questions arising out of the most recent surge in interest in Kevin Zucker's "Campaigns of Napoleon" series, published under the aegis of OSG. To help guide interested gamers, I present the publishing history (as I know it) and some comments about the rules evolution (to answer the questions many have asked).

I was interested in the series from the very first review in *F&M* many years ago, but I did not get a chance to purchase over-the-counter until AH released several titles. I have since purchased them all, mostly as they were published. So, from a player's perspective, here is the history.

Chronology: The "Campaigns of Napoleon" Series

Publisher: OSG (1978-80)

Napoleon At Bay, First Edition

Bonaparte In Italy, First Edition

Arcola (mini-game extracted from Bil of the battle of the same name)

Battles of the Hundred Days (mini-game of Waterloo, drawn from unpublished at that time "The Emperor Returns")

Publisher: Avalon Hill

Napoleon At Bay, 2nd Edition

Struggle of Nations (1813, from Napoleon's return with the new army to the Battle of Leipzig)

Battle For Italy (2nd Ed. *Arcola*, renamed)

Publisher: Victory Games

1809 (Danube Campaign from Ratisbon to Wagram)

Publisher: Clash of Arms Games

The Emperor Returns (The Waterloo Campaign)

1807: *The Eagles Turn East* (Campaign in Poland and East Prussia, from Warsaw to Friedland)

Publisher: OSG (1997 -)

Napoleon At Bay, 3rd Edition

Bonaparte In Italy, *The Quadrilateral* (Part 1 of *Bonaparte In Italy* 2nd Ed)

Highway To The Kremlin (Russian Campaign, first in the new 5X Series for 'larger campaigns')

The Sun of Austerlitz

Frequently Asked Questions

1) What games are in the series that uses the *Arcola*/*Struggle of Nations* rules?

Only at the point of *The Emperor Returns* did Kevin institute 'standard' rules and 'exclusive' rules for the games. Prior to that point, the rules are single entities with special game-specific rules blended into the mix. The rules are generally standard, though, so it is possible to go from one game to another with the minimum of relearning. Even so, one *does* have to read the rules to ensure one catches all the 'specific' rules.

1807 introduced 'vedettes,' smart dummies, representing the cavalry screen which could be used for reconnaissance and for defensive screening, a concept that gets refined in NAB, 3rd.

Some of the 'standard' rules have continued to evolve, particularly some important changes with the advent of the 'standard' rules for *The Emperor Returns*, for 'critical battles' which were no longer guaranteed for 'small' battles. Further, 1807 introduced 'vedettes' (essentially 'smart' dummies, representing the cavalry screen which could be used for reconnaissance and for defensive screening), a concept that gets refined in NAB, 3rd.

Another refinement arrived in NAB, 3rd. That alteration was to the initiative procedure and provided the possibility of limited movement when close to or slightly exceeding the initiative value of the leader. The leader might not make full movement, but even with a failed roll might be able to make some minor movement to adjust his position.

But for all the games, from the first publication to the last, the operational system (once learned) remains essentially unchanged. Details of implementation have altered a bit, some of the attrition tables vary in format, and some clarifications have now been embedded in the rules. Still, a player of one set can pretty easily move to another set. Let's suppose you play one of the games. When you play another game in the series, you should look at the length of the rivals' dispatch distances, the layout of the attrition tables, and the terrain morale modifiers. For example, in *The Emperor Returns*, attrition is very low as the troops were fresh from their quarters, but look at the Coalition in *Napoleon at Bay*, where their forces bleed off pretty easily.

Of course, there are a bunch of us who'd like to see SON redone with standard hexes, single hex forces, vedettes, and using the newest rules set.

2) How does *Struggle of Nations* fit into the series (since the pieces occupy two hexes in one game and only one hex in the other)?

SON was somewhat early in the series. It was the first game after the original two games in Kevin's own company. Kevin has gone on record saying that he attempted to fit many ideas into SON—ideas he had at the time for the system on the whole. If I recall, every game after SON would have a subset of those rules. The 'package' concept (2 hex force) was one of those concepts that did not survive. As stated above, though, most of the 'standard' rules are pretty easily recognized, so the adjustment to any other game should not be too difficult. The sequence of play, for example, though getting a bit more detailed in later games, still has the same recognizable format. Admin Phase, Organization Phase, Move Phase, opposing 'Force March' Phase, Combat ('pursuit' or 'pitched' battle <trading losses>, but usually ending with a pursuit procedure).

3) Can *Struggle of Nations* be integrated into the other games in the series?

If you mean 'can it use the latest 'standard' rules set?', I think you could. But I do not think there is anything wrong with playing by the original rules. If you go out on the Consimworld site and find the category for the "Campaigns of Napoleon," I think you'll find others play SON with the original rules set. (Of course, there are a bunch of us who'd like to see SON redone with standard hexes, single hex forces, vedettes, and using the newest rules set). Kevin has done more thinking on the 1813 campaign since that time, so a remake would take advantage of his new perspective. I certainly would enjoy seeing a redone SON at the original scale, incorporating Kevin's research and realizations since that time [*Struggle of Nations is one of the titles in the OSG pre-advanced orders. -ed.*]

There are several 'standard exclusive' rules which vary only slightly from campaign rules set to campaign rules set. Particularly, cavalry differential and the Administration rule which uses the 'Center of Operations'.

4) Are all the rules in the 'Exclusive' rules exclusive and not repeated?

Actually, the answer is 'No'.

There are several 'standard exclusive' rules which vary only slightly from campaign rules set to campaign rules set. Particularly, cavalry differential and the Administration rule which uses the 'Center Of Operations'. These rules are very nearly 'standard' as far as wording and impact on game play. Kevin's standard series rules include simple rules for cavalry superiority and administration, which can be used in the Battle Scenarios. In the exclusive rules, the more involved administration rule gets presented with other game specific elements that pertain to the administration. The rules are thus presented in a more easily referenced arrangement; at least I have found it so.

Where can you delay the foe at a bridge? Where can you use your longer Dispatch Distance to confound the opponent by sweeping away a too advanced force like Napoleon himself did to the hapless Olsufief?

The games I have played in this series have nearly always been astounding, both in historical terms and in enjoyment. Particularly in situations where the opposing sides' exact movements cannot be absolutely determined, the game generates a great amount of suspense and excitement. One must really try to get inside the opponent's thoughts. Where might the opponent arrange the LOC? Where would that LOC become and in how many turns? There is excitement in attempting to time a descent on the opponent when the opponent has been planning the same thing. Have you moved the COO to the position that favors your planned movements? How much strength should be set aside to guard the LOC from attack?

Revel in the planning! Probe for the opponent's main force. Lay out your administration and safeguards as Napoleon himself might do, poring over the maps to examine the road network and river lines. Where can you delay the foe at a bridge? Where can you use your longer Dispatch Distance to confound the opponent by sweeping away a too advanced force like Napoleon himself did to the hapless Olsufief? Can you feign weakness to draw your opponent into a vulnerable position, a la Austerlitz? Many operational level activities of the Napoleonic era spring to life on the game board before your very eyes. There are few things finer than anticipating your opponent's move and meeting him with the massed batteries, the hoarded cavalry reserve and your most capable cavalry commanders, to meet, defeat, and pursue the survivors!

Enjoy the operational Napoleonic experience on the grand canvas of Europe!

The Information War

How the weakest units in wargaming can bring victory

by Christopher Moeller

A revolutionary concept hides within the rules folders of OSG's *Campaigns of Napoleon* series: the Vedettes. These flashy characters, the famous Hussars, Chasseurs, Uhlans, and Cossacks of yore, for the first time in gaming, are able to display their true talents. Before OSG, light horsemen were relegated to playing the part of weak but fast infantry. Their primary role as scouts, and as a moving shield for the army, was ignored. Consequently, using your vedettes properly takes some thought. It also requires a significant adjustment to your standard wargaming methods. The following is a primer for all of you would-be Hussars.

Vedettes first appeared in *The Emperor Returns* as traditional dummy markers. Their role was to confuse the enemy about where your real force was. In later games, beginning with *1807: The Eagles Turn East*, the vedettes (touted as "smart dummies") began to come into their own. In the four games released since *1807*, these small, 50-man units, fanning out across the countryside, have become the true eyes and ears of your army. Using them properly will help you pin down the composition and whereabouts of the enemy, while foiling his attempts to discover the same information about you.

There are two fundamentals for using vedettes effectively: 1) Use your vedettes, and 2) Use deception.

Make your vedettes earn their pay. In our obsession with big battles, we players tend to disregard any unit that doesn't have a big combat factor. Vedettes are a crucial part of your order of battle, and should be used at every opportunity, both to confuse your opponent, and keep tabs on him. Except for the first turn of the game (when you know where your enemy is from the set-up), there is really no way to attack an opponent intelligently until you've scouted him out first. There's nothing more humbling than setting up a game winning attack only to find that you've targeted a Major General.

VEDETTE TACTICS

There are four missions you can give to your versatile light horsemen: Scouting, Probing, Screening and Impersonating an Army. The last of these is the traditional role of dummies in wargaming. The first three are what make the vedettes in the *Campaigns of Napoleon* such great history.

1. SCOUTING

Armies in this game series are effectively blind. Without scouts, it's impossible for a field army to know what it's up against until it's too late to do anything about it. Once you've moved your army into an enemy ZOC, or allowed an enemy to enter yours, you are committed to at least one round of battle, and perhaps headlong retreat. You can pick

up clues from your opponent's actions when he's moving, rolling attrition, etc. (these can be put down to spying by your agents), but you're still effectively at the enemy's mercy. A good general, like a good poker player, will mix his signals. Your vedettes have the right tool for the job. It's called the repulse.

Vedettes get information by attempting to repulse enemy targets. If a target is a vedette, it's revealed, and subject to being steam-rolled by your main army when it moves. If the target is a real body of troops, your army now knows that, too, and can either attack it or go around it. When the combat phase arrives, your vedettes simply retreat before combat, having performed their function.

2. PROBING

Scouting (as defined for this article) occurs during the movement phase. It's intended to reveal obstacles and targets when closing in for a battle, clearing the way for the big guns. Probing operates similarly, but has a longer-range goal. The mission of a probe is to gather information on a target hex. Like scouting, it begins with a repulse attempt during the movement phase. Now, assuming your target was a body of troops, you will attack them with your vedette rather than retreat. Nine times out of ten, your vedette will be blown up, but in step 6 of the combat resolution sequence, you will find out exactly what's in the enemy's hex, including commanders. This mission has longer-range goals than scouting because you get the information during the combat phase, but you can't act on it until your next movement phase (two days later). Also, your vedette will be out of action until it re-assembles with a nearby force the following turn. Still, this is the only dependable tool you have for keeping tabs on the enemy. Without it there's no way to take the initiative intelligently. Plenty of Napoleonic generals gave up the initiative voluntarily, and paid for their sins with defeat.

3. SCREENING

Defending against all of the above is also the job of your hard-riding Hussars. A cavalry screen is created by forming a barrier of vedette ZOC's at some distance from your main force, meant to fend off enemy vedettes on the prowl for information. At a minimum, your vedettes should stand two to three hexes ahead of your army on all primary roads and bridges, to keep enemy horsemen from riding in and probing your big stacks at leisure. In situations where enemy vedette activity is heavy, a solid line of vedette ZOC's will help to keep the horsemen at bay. Enemy vedettes can't actually repulse your vedettes, and sticking around for a 1:1 attack is as likely to

(cont'd on page 20)

Ordering from OSG

(Prices valid through 8/31/2003)

To order, please fill out the order form below, and mail it with a check or credit card information in the amount of your order total to:

Operational Studies Group, PO Box 50207,
Baltimore, MD 21211 U.S.A.

Alternatively, for credit card or paypal purchases you may order online at NapoleonGames.com or phone or fax our order department at 1 (410) 367-4004

Your order will be rapidly processed.

Guarantee

If for *any reason* you are dissatisfied with a game, return it complete, intact & unpunched along with proof of purchase for a *FULL refund*.

ORDER FORM

Please provide the following information:

Games in Print.

- | QTY | Price | DESCRIPTION |
|--------------------------|----------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$46 | <i>The Sun of Austerlitz</i> (1805) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$48 | <i>Highway to the Kremlin</i> (1812) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$36 | <i>Last Days of the Grande Armée</i> (Waterloo Campaign) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$48 | <i>1806: Rossbach Avenged</i> (The war between France and Prussia) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$39 | <i>Bonaparte in Italy</i> —(Quadrilateral Campaign) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$54 | <i>La Guerre de l'Empereur</i> (Strategic game of Nap Wars—71 left!) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$48 | <i>Napoleon at Bay</i> (Napoleon's 1814 campaign to save France) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$120 | <i>NAB Deluxe Edition (collector's ed.)</i> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$176 | All SEVEN OSG games in print at 45% off (save \$145). |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$10 | Replacement parts (each)
Parts Desired: _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$ 18.12 | <i>Wargame Design Magazine</i> Subscription (4 Issues) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | \$ 48.96 | <u>Scholar Subscription</u> to <i>Wargame Design Magazine</i> (4 Issues) |

Pre-publication offers.

The pre-advanced titles below, will be published as they reach 250 orders. We will not debit your credit card until your game is in production.

Pre-Advanced price is 30%-off / suggested retail.

- \$67/96 *Struggle of Nations* (2nd Ed).
- \$40/57 *Highway to Leipzig* (1813)
- \$34/49 *Highway to Berlin!* (1806-7)
- \$49/70 *Highway to Madrid.* (1808-14)
- \$40/57 *Death Before Glory* (Ligny, 1815)
- \$46/66 *Swords Around a Throne*
- \$43/62 *1813 Quad* (Four Lost Battles)
- \$40/57 *Bonaparte Expansion* ('96 & 1800)
- \$46/66 *FrancoPrussian War, 2nd Phase*
- \$37/53 *War of 1812—Maryland*
- \$34/49 *Marengo—The Plain of Scrvia*
- \$34/49 *Smolensk—Road to Borodino*
- \$43/62 *Abensberg/Eckmühl/Regensburg*
- \$40/57 *Dark December II* (The Bulge)
- \$40/57 *Combined Fleet, 1941-1945*
- \$37/53 *CD-Rom: Napoleon and Waterloo*

- OSG Subscription—All Napoleonic Games**
Check this box and we will send you each Napoleonic Game (excludes CD-Rom).
—Each game charged separately when produced.

Finish Your Order:

- Shipping costs to US & Canada: add 10% of your order total
- Overseas: add 20% of your order total for surface, 40% for air mail
- Order Total

I'm paying with a: Check Credit Card

Credit Card#: _____

Exp Date: _____ Date of Your Order: _____

Name: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip: _____

Country: _____

email: _____

(continued from page 5)

but with this consideration the two levels to merge into each other.⁴ The maintenance of the Lines of Communications will be an important goal of all Operations.

Communications prior to the advent of the railroad and telegraph implied a road- or waterway. It is important to remember that in this era, all communications had to be carried by a mounted officer, who was a part of the headquarters. He carried written orders to the subordinate units in the chain of command, and delivered reports to the higher echelons. The term 'Communications' therefore has a different meaning than it has taken on in the 'information age.' Anyone with a computer and a modem today has a resource that makes him potentially more powerful than Napoleon, who had secretaries taking dictation from him night and day, gallopers standing by to carry any message anywhere, clerks prepared to file information for easy retrieval, etc.

This system had its limits. Forces in contact with the enemy often had to respond to unforeseen circumstances without waiting for orders from IHQ. For example, in 'friendly' Lithuania at the opening of the 1812 campaign, it took 32 hours for a message to get from Davout in Vishneva (W2323) to Napoleon, a distance of only 50 miles (corr. 18896). By the time a reply could reach Davout at the front, the situation would be completely changed.

The hundreds of wagons bringing supplies forward from the supply base to the army at the front were organized through the selection and maintenance of clearly defined Lines of Communication.⁵ The Line of Communications was generally a primary road that connected an Army's Center of Operations with its Supply Base. Such a link was vulnerable to enemy interruption, and therefore had to be protected. All replacement soldiers, supplies and equipment traveled on this line. At stages depots were established under military authority, with garrisons and defensive preparations to meet the possibility of an enemy foray. The maintenance of this line was among the very greatest of strategic concerns. For this reason, the line of communications was limited to a single route.

An army ought to have only one line of communication. This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. [XII]

Within a week of crossing the Niemen, Napoleon re-examined his Line of Communications into Russia and concluded that a single route would not suffice for an army of such great mass. His prior practice of maintaining but a single line of communications would be inadequate for the massive army he wielded.

The line of communications should not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skillful manoeuvres in war to know how to change it, when circumstances authorise or render this

necessary. An army which changes skillfully its line of communication deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or upon what weak points it is assailable. [XX]

Napoleon always had a primary and an alternate Line of Communications, so that he could switch to the alternate if the primary was threatened. During the retreat from Russia, just prior to the Berezina crossing, Napoleon switched his main line through Grodno to Warsaw. In 1814, the Prussian Marshal Blücher demonstrated his grasp of this technique by switching his LOC through Reims for the final advance on Paris.

An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting upon neutral territories, or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed. Where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front, and the line of communication may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. Where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. The line of communication should be directed towards the wing in support. Where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, [i.e., of his corps] and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; and his line should be perpendicular to the centre of the army's line of march. [III]

The last phrase is a bit garbelled. The 1815 Campaign is an example—neither the right nor left flank was supported: both wings were in the air. Therefore Napoleon adapted the strategic central position and his LOC ran away perpendicular from the front.

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which each have their separate line of communications until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, ... the junction should never take place near the enemy, because, in uniting his forces, the enemy may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail. [IV]

One principle used to great effect by Napoleon was sending

his separate corps along parallel axes of advance. Then, when the enemy was discovered, and his direction fixed, the separate corps would 'unite to fight.' In the opening days of the Russian Campaign, we see the central army group under Napoleon, about 220,000, all traveling by the same road from Kovno to Vilna, and suffering over 10% attrition on that march of 70 miles. By the time the French army reached Borodino, it had been reduced to only about 131,000, while the Russians would field 103,500⁶ at Borodino—down 43% from their original 175,000 fielded at start.

It is contrary to all true principles to make corps which have no communication act separately against a central force whose communication lines are open. [XXVI]

This is an injunction against the strategic of the concentric attack. In 1813 the Coalition used this strategy to devastating effect, benefiting however, from unchallenged communications.

To act upon lines far removed from each other, and without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth to a second. The detached column has its orders for the first day only. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have happened to the main body. Thus the column either loses time upon emergency, in waiting for orders, or acts without them and at hazard. ... An army should always keep its columns united so as to prevent the enemy from passing between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in their operations. They should move towards a point fixed upon for their future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without waiting for fresh orders. [XI]

The Trachtenberg plan employed by the Coalition in 1813 elaborated upon this by enjoining the separate armies from attacking Napoleon by themselves.

At the outset of a campaign, Napoleon issued detailed instructions providing for the organization of communications between the town at which his army had just crossed into enemy territory and the location of Imperial Headquarters and also of the Center of Operations. (See the article "Napoleon in Vilna" in issue 6 for complete details.)

The Administration was to provide centralized commands for the artillery, engineers, administration, and police along the LOC and was charged with stocking the depots and organizing hospitals. Two or three 'chefs de bataillon' (or majors) were supposed to be detached by

IHQ to act as inspectors on these routes.

At intervals of about 20 miles along this line were established small garrisons of 25 men, including one or two gendarmes to protect the posts and provide regular news; to work on the roads and bridges and repair the foundries.

DEPOTS

In addition to the small garrisons, depots were established in the larger towns. The Maxim states this distance as about five or six days march, between 80 and 120 miles.

It is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a center of operations, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations. [III]

The practical limit on the distance supplies could be carried by methods of the time was normally about 90 miles, due to the diminishing quantities of goods (less than half a load) beyond that distance. At 180 miles the entire wagonload must be devoted to fodder for the teams of horses. The horses have consumed a load equal to what they have pulled—perfectly meaningless exercise. However, that is not an absolute limit, and it can be surpassed, utilizing a system of depots at which fodder is collected from the countryside in advance of the moving wagons.

Keeping a store of fodder at each depot is the key to the whole operation. An ever-increasing number of wagons had to be devoted to collecting fodder, as they have to travel farther to find it. The administration was unable to extend the line of communications beyond Smolensk in 1812. During the retreat, the trains, all gathered in that area, were allowed to fall into the hands of the Cossacks. The Russians also captured four million further rations in Vilna.*

Working together with Supply Bases and the Center of Operations, Depots are the middle links in the supply chain. Called "magazines" in Napoleon's time ("supply dumps" in American parlance), each corps might have its own depot (when in quarters or when spread over a wide zone), but the Center of Operations was also a depot, and the primary one, toward which wagons of the corps shuttled to and fro.

At depots resources were collected, whether from friend or foe. Wagons were also collected there to return to the Supply Base, or to range far and wide in search of fodder and forage. Provisions loaded on wagons were consumed last as loading and unloading had to be done by soldiers of the garrison.

In January 1807, each corps had a depot containing magazines, hospitals, transport, repair shops, bakeries, and other facilities. These towns had good dock facilities for unloading barges and boats, always the most economical form of transport.

Ordinarily the establishment of the Corps Depot is not specially mentioned. However, on the rare instance that an

enemy raid reached the depot, some details come out, as happened during the opening Russian offensive of the Eylau Campaign in late January of 1807. Dolgoruki arrived in Mohrungen, encountering Bernadotte's baggage and supply column guarded by a handful of soldiers. Dolgoruki attacked immediately and captured the town; his troops set about to plunder the baggage and slaughter the wounded. On this raid they captured some 360 French prisoners, 200 released Russian and Prussian prisoners, and 12,500 ducats in gold "contributions" levied in Elbing. Later in that same campaign, the French returned the favor, when, at Guttstadt Guyot captured Bennigsen's Supply Depot, with quantities of enemy baggage as well as 1100 sick and wounded, and a battalion of 500 men left to guard the trains. The captured resources, though "not very considerable," were of great value to the French marching far ahead of their own trains.⁷

Despite the occasional windfall, during the campaign troops always went hungry, as on the night before Eylau. Provision trains couldn't follow such a massive concentration of men. Even the store-wagons of the staff remained at Landsberg, and so on this occasion the headquarters too went completely hungry. The staff was lucky to have a little bread. In Eylau, there was nothing but potatoes. Soult's men, who had lived for several days only on potatoes and melted snow, had hoped for more. The 14th Line in Augereau's corps had no time to prepare even this wretched meal.

After the inconclusive battle, the French army prepared to retire behind the Passarge, where supply was easier. Napoleon "had neither sufficient provisions nor ammunition to attempt an operation of any duration."⁸ As a result, in 1807 Napoleon found himself unable to subsist the army in Poland, and therefore ordered a return to the depot system. He told Daru, his Intendant in chief of Administration, "The force of circumstances has compelled me to return to the magazine (depot) system," a system for feeding the army on the march. He was more concerned for the safety of his communications than he ever had been, and was more dependent upon them.

Depots on the French line of communication had a commandant and a commissary-of-war. They contained ammunition, magazines for bread ovens, flour, and a hospital. In these depots were left sick and tired men, regimental registers, papers, and everything that the soldier could not carry. In Russia there was a fortified base every 160-200 miles.

In 1815, the line of communications leading back from Avennes to Paris was made up of depots established in echelons about 20 miles apart, so arranged that as supplies were taken from the forward depot, they could be replaced from the next in the chain. The echelons—Guise, Laon, Soissons, La Ferte Milon, and Meaux—contained enough food and fodder for ten days (one million bread rations and 14,000 hectares of oats). A reserve provision of 16 days stood ready in Paris. Six equipage companies (216 wagons) were ordered to Laon to move supplies forward along the Line of Communications. The office of the Director-in-Chief of administration of the army was established at Avesnes. From Avesnes provisions would be distributed

directly to the soldiers in Maubeuge, Avesnes, Capelle, Cambrai, Bavay, Philippeville, Beaumont and other points in the immediate environs.

Command and Organization

REPLACEMENTS

Replacements are men of regiments already in the theater, as opposed to Reinforcements. In 1812 replacement strength for the French was inadequate. One third of the troops should have been kept back from the initial invasion force in comfortable quarters in Prussia, so that they could have been fed-in as needed. Each corps might have left one division in Gumbinnen. That would have reduced attrition and left a much leaner and faster main army group.

Replacements were received in one of three ways:

1. Transferring them from the Replacement Pool to units in the field
2. They were often used to create a new independent force and/or a new March Unit (a temporary formation disbanded upon its arrival at the front).
3. Transferring regiments from one Command to another.

INTELLIGENCE

To reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description, to provide guides that may be depended upon, to interrogate the curé and postmaster, to establish rapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants, to send out spies, intercept public and private letters, and translate and analyze their contents—in a word, to be able to answer every question of the general-in-chief when he arrives at the head of the army—these are the qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts.

[LXXVI]

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, intelligence on enemy forces was gathered by diplomatic missions. Once the campaign had begun, the light cavalry were supposed to provide information on the whereabouts of enemy forces, forming at the same time a mobile screen to detect and repulse enemy cavalry patrols. They were not always able to perform this mission and often lost track of their quarry.

In 1812 Napoleon had a good assessment of Russian army strength at the start of the campaign. However, his understanding of Russian internal politics was weak. He actually thought, that should the Tsar refuse to negotiate, he could still negotiate with the Boyars of Moscow. Napoleon underestimated the array of difficulties he would face in invading Russia, including the abysmal roads, torrential rains, unripe crops, and the will of the people.

LEADERSHIP

The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head—that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives, either successively or simultaneously in the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different impressions that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends. Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything through a highly coloured medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.

[LXXIII]

Napoleon states that a general should be in touch with his troops, sharing their hardships. By 1812 one can see he has become out of touch, ignoring his own maxim.

In that year, the leadership was failing the French Army. The top echelon of commanders was no longer living up to their former performance. Macdonald did nothing against Riga (though perhaps there was nothing he could do). Jerome, Vandamme, Junot—they were all failures as military commanders. Davout was not himself, and Ney was wonderful in the retreat.

Maneuver

The Napoleonic Wars didn't have continuous front lines. If anything they resemble a naval operation, where you have task forces moving independently across the sea. This sort of image is more appropriate to Napoleonic operations. In 1812, however, this notion of maneuver was abandoned.

MOVEMENT COMMANDS

A march order, issued by IHQ, was usually written in duplicate or triplicate and delivered by estafettes. The March orders for the Armee du Nord issued on the 14th of June, 1815 provide examples of the scouting, intelligence, and marching requirements set by Headquarters. The orders called for the Army to be on the move toward Charleroi at 3 a.m. Light cavalry preceded the army, sending patrols in

every direction to reconnoitre the country and capture the enemy's advanced posts. Each cavalry patrol was ordered to comprise not less than 50 men provided with small-arms ammunition.

Each Corps, accompanied by its artillery caissons and ambulance wagons, was ordered to follow toward Charleroi. The Corps baggage was placed under the orders of the Director-General of Transport, General Neigre, and ordered to remain behind until the entire army had passed. So that the army could maneuver better, any baggage wagons attempting to accompany the column of troops were ordered to be burned, and a patrol of 50 Military Police were placed under Neigre's orders.

The Corps officers were ordered to interrogate the inhabitants to get the latest news of the enemy's situation, and seize the letters in the post offices, forwarding any information thus gained to the Emperor. The Corps officers were ordered to contact one another frequently by patrols, and to time their advance to keep in line with each other, so that they would arrive before the enemy at the same time.

The task of coordinating the daily movements of the corps d'armée, moving along several parallel routes, and ensuring that each corps is within one or two days march of its neighbors, was the work of Berthier and his HQ staff.

The Engineers belonging to the Corps, provided with all the materials necessary for the repair of bridges, marched in rear of their Corps' leading Light Infantry Regiment. The Emperor accompanied the Advanced Guard, and instructed his Corps officers to send information of their movements and other intelligence.

When Movement orders arrived too late, his subordinates had to make their own judgements, and yet he always chastised them for doing so.

INITIATIVE

When a Force Leader acts in the absence of up-to date Movement Commands, he has to use his own judgement. If he makes the right move, we say he has passed his Initiative test, and if he fails to act in accord with sound strategy, we show that in the game as simply sitting still. In reality it was more complicated than that, for he might make things worse by going off in the wrong direction. Weather and/or adjacent Enemy Forces may make things even more difficult.

By the time of the Russian campaign, Napoleon's personal Initiative was as vast as ever, but his army, and, therefore his task, was greater than ever. This was the classic 'defeat from past triumphs' that made the Emperor attempt too much.

MARCH ATTRITION

March Attrition represents a non-combat loss of manpower, which will increase the farther a unit marches over a given time. The numbers of men who were lost to non-combat causes is much higher than those lost in combat.

Logistical difficulties in practice would undermine the most brilliant plans. In Russia Napoleon underestimated the state of the roads and overestimated his own troops'

abilities to range over them.

When Napoleon began the drive on Moscow his operational planning was as good as ever, but it was ineffective in the absence of good roads and abundant crops. During the French offensive the Russians removed or destroyed all supplies as they withdrew, leaving nothing for the conquering troops but abandoned towns and scorched earth. This partially explains why fewer than 10% of French soldiers who entered Russia came out alive.

Napoleon seemed to ignore the law that says 'the larger a concentration of troops, the larger the percentage lost.' He seemed to accept the fact of attrition without worrying too much about it. He showed a callous disregard for the welfare of the Polish troops, and he is only considerate of the needs of his own Army Group. The Guard and Davout's corps received the lion's share of his reserves.

BRIDGING

Bridge Trains were always scarce in the French Army. These trains were nothing more than small boats with a low center of gravity transported by wagon. The boats were then strapped together with planks to permit the passage of wagons and guns. Engineers were required to place the incendiary devises that would render bridges temporarily unusable and were also needed to mend damaged bridges. The pilings almost always remained for future reconstruction. The Austrians were always hesitant to destroy a bridge and waited until the last minute. At Leipzig, the premature destruction of the bridge out of town cost the French thousands of men.

MARCHES

This security of marching infantry columns depends upon the presence of vedettes to their front. If the front of a column should run into an enemy attack, the lead formation will endeavor to fall back on troops marching up from behind.

Troops can normally cover 8 miles of road in six hours. When a force leaves road march to prepare for battle, its men must leave the road, to form a front perpendicular to their line of march. The road column must be envisioned as several miles long. First regiment in line is able to deploy immediately. For a defending unit drawing back upon its reserves, this change of formation can happen more quickly than for an attacking unit.

Marching forces are spread out over a large area. Troops are ahead of that (vedettes, light infantry), to the left and right (some troops spread 2 or more miles on either side of the road), and behind (if in road march, quite a long column). If the center of mass of two forces are really within 2 miles of each other, orders can be given that specify one corps to forage to the left, and the other to the right of the road. In practice it doesn't always work. In effect, the two forces are sharing the same resources, stealing each other's wagons, etc. The troops in the rear are coming up empty.

Actually there would be a "super-road-march" column of as few as 1,000 men per mile for a force moving administratively with no fear of encountering the enemy.

Let's look at mileage. The *pas ordinaire* was a steady 76 steps per minute. This could be increased to a route march between 85 and 90 paces a minute. If we call a pace one yard, 76 yards per minute is 4560 yards (2.59 miles) per hour; 88 yards per minute is 3.00 miles per hour. However, the troops were granted a five-minute halt every hour, and one hour after every four. A route march over a nine-hour period would make 22 miles.

Provided with a pair of dividers opened to a distance in the scale of from seventeen to 20 miles in a straight line (which made from 22 to 25 miles, taking into account the windings of the roads).

On average, of every two days in the field, one eight-hour day was spent marching while another day was spent on administrative stuff (baking, waiting for wagons and stragglers)—either that, or else Forced March on the second day. In the opening of the Russian campaign, Napoleon expected his troops to make this distance day after day with barely a day's rest in a month. The French forces under Davout in the opening month of this campaign were moving at Forced March rates *all the time*.

They may have had bread on their wagons for 8 or ten days, but up until Napoleon ordered Davout's headquarters—administration, bakers, bake-oven builders, engineers, and artillery—to depart from Vilna, to rejoin him in Minsk, Davout's corps had for the last three to five days only what they could obtain from the countryside.

The forces on the northern and southern flanks did not have to march as fast as the Central Army Group. For instance, the IV Corps marched 288 miles between July 1 and July 29, 1812 (at which time it rested for 10 days). The corps also rested on the 9th, 13th, and 19th of July and fought an engagement at Ostowno on the 26th. That's 288 miles in 29 days or 20 miles every two days (including the three rest days in July).

FORCED MARCH

Normally troops marched for about 8 hours per day, from 4 a.m. to noon, foraging in the afternoon, and they frequently rested for whole days at a time. In a Forced March troops marched for up to 12 hours per day for days at a time.

Napoleon drove his army faster and farther in Russia, the most thinly-settled and poorest of all the landscapes he ever invaded. Past experience did not provide sufficient knowledge of the new and different kind of campaign Napoleon embarked upon.

During a Forced March, a formation is necessarily more spread-out along the road. [The faster the march, the more road space the formation takes up.] Even following a normal march, a big Force usually needs a night to get arrayed for battle. Napoleon often employed the first Corps

on the scene to provide cover for the concentration and deployment of the rest of the Force.

Again, the larger the force, the longer this change would take. A single regiment arriving in road column could deploy as quickly as the men arrived. In a fairly rapid march, 1,000 men could take up one mile of roadway, which means the last man would arrive at a given point 24 minutes after the first. But a Corps of 30,000 men on a single road could make a column up to 30 miles long.

During a Forced march, the troops are marching longer into the evening, and the leading elements do not stop to wait around for the troops delayed for whatever reason. Such a column would take even more road-space.

So what happens when this column encounters the enemy? In a normal march, there would be a cavalry vedette marching ahead of the column to provide a warning, but in a Forced March this would be less likely, meaning the lead elements might well walk into a trap (as happened repeatedly in Russia). Now, instead of repulsing the enemy, the enemy has repulsed them, and the lead regiment has been knocked-out. Now there is no protective screen for the following units, and they are subject to the same treatment should they arrive piecemeal. So they are going to have to stop and deploy further back. This stopping to deploy from a Forced March takes more time than from a regular march.

On the other hand, in either a regular or a Forced March, the repulsing side really has only a small proportion of its force available to repulse the enemy, normally just a light infantry regiment, plus some engineers, a few guns, and light cavalry.

All to say, that if the enemy force being repulsed is no stronger than a light infantry regiment reinforced, then the repulse has a chance to succeed. When Ney was approaching battle at Bautzen, Napoleon intended him to arrive somewhat further in the enemy rear than the actual line of advance he chose. His approach to Eylau, as well as Davout's, does illustrate the same thing. The first priority of these "Forced Marching" force leaders seems to have been to link up with the main force under Napoleon, and then extend their line to envelop the enemy.

The leader's concern has to be that his arrival may not come at exactly the right moment; he may feel that he has been delayed and perhaps Napoleon's diversionary attack, timed for his intended arrival on the flank, may have already gone in and spent itself against an undivided Russian command.

ADVANCE AND RETREAT

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration, but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manoeuvres, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides,

retreats cost always more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements, with this difference, that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only. [VI]

This is an argument for a French attack upon the Russian Army at the start of the retreat from Moscow, as actually occurred at Malo-Yaroslavets. However, another inconclusive battle meant the doom of the army. Napoleon should have pressed on against the Russians with desperation, knowing that his army was doomed as explained in the Maxim above.

The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war. [XIX]

Attack

Rounds of Battle

Battles often developed a certain pacing, with periods of effort interspersed with lulls punctuated with just artillery fire. Between rounds of battle reserves were often committed to the front line.

- A. Organize and form-up the attacking Force.
- B. Designate the places to be attacked.
- C. Decide upon Pitched battle (closed formation) or Pursuit (defense in depth).
- D. The first clash usually involves Cavalry.
- E. Artillery fire will mark the commencement of the battle and will fill lulls in the action.
- F. By this time the opposing generals can see the formations arrayed against them.
- G. The battle itself. The history of a battle is multifaceted; everyone sees a different event.

Most of a division is in reserve at start of battle, at least 75%. Only about one-quarter of the troops begin any battle engaged with the enemy. If Reserves are fed into battle as losses occur, the front line firepower of a given unit remains unchanged. In a "high-stakes" attack you commit your reserves to clinch the battle. Problem is, your defenses are also more brittle if the attack fails.

No unit could continue to fight in the face of 40% casualties, depending on its morale condition.

If the losing side chose to stand and fight ('Pitched Battle'), their forces will suffer more heavily. They will also be obliged to counter-attack. A certain core group will be formed for the purpose.

It was always very difficult to coordinate attacks between a force cut-off inside a fortification and the relief force outside, for the simple reason that, in the absence of communications the force inside is unable to plan for a concerted attack with the outside force.

If the force inside a fort attacks six hours late, the defenders can shift their strength to deal with the new threat in its turn. Such an attack would have no additional effect.

Pursuit

At Pursuit, Napoleon's cavalry were mediocre. Several explanations have been suggested—lack of horses at various times, a lack of natural horsemanship in the French character—but the real reason may have been a lack of emphasis placed on this aspect of battle by the Emperor himself and on his cavalry commander, Joachim Murat. Many French victories on the battlefield failed to be clinched in the pursuit. Battlefield losses in Pitched Battles were usually rather equal, until one side retreated. In the inevitable disorganization entailed by the change of orientation from an assault to a retreat, there was an opportunity to pick up stragglers whose formations had become disordered once the retreat began. However, if prepared for at the outset of battle with a defense in depth ("Pursuit Battle type"), a force could expect to make a successful retreat, which did not generate into a rout.

Morale

Morale is the key to victory. Morale in the armies will change depending upon what they achieved in the preceding battle. Ultimately, the Morale of the Grande Armée gave out in Russia. Morale was destroyed during the wait in Moscow. The last straw was Napoleon's abandonment (at Smorgoni) of those who had struggled to stay together. The Emperor's departure removed his troops main reason to continue the fight.

Conclusion

The Campaigns of Napoleon series of games attempt to provide a model true to the inherently complex facets of Napoleonic warfare. Some of these elements have been considered in this article (with more or less detail, as needed). The period is interesting, since it was clearly a time in which varied tactical and strategic transformations occurred in the art of war. The games are driven by the historical realities discussed here. Hopefully, this course has supplied players with some context and perhaps some ideas for their own campaigning. Enjoy!

¹ *Correspondance*, Vol. XVIII, No. 14707, p. 218

² The term 'Operational Level' was only used for the first time by military theorists decades after Napoleon's death.

³ David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, p. 154.

⁴ We will find the same transition zone between Operations and Tactics, a most interesting area for investigation.

⁵ "Napoleon always used the words *route de l'armée*."
—F.N. Maude.

⁶ not including 10,000 fresh militia and 7,000 kossacks.

⁷ Thiers, p. 419.

⁸ Thiers, p. 443.

slay the attacker as the defender (probably both), so a cavalry screen can't easily be penetrated by enemy vedettes alone. A large force of formed troops (4 SP's) is required to achieve the 7:1 needed to push back a screening vedette, and those SP's could otherwise be bolstering the enemy's main force. It's also often wise to put a vedette in close to the main army, along the axis of most likely enemy attack. A lazy or overconfident attacker may push one of his big armies up next to what he thinks is your main force, only to discover that it's a vedette, wrecking his big maneuver.

4. IMPERSONATING AN ARMY

Vedettes can act the part of vast hosts, helping to divert enemy strength away from the area of main effort. Conversely, big armies can act like vedettes, striking where the enemy least expects it. When your vedette is impersonating a larger force, do plenty of checking back and forth between the map and the organization display. Before moving, peek at the vedette, scratch your head, roll the attrition dice, groan and fiddle about with the display as if recording SP's lost. Of course it's also important to sometimes move your large armies casually, as if they were nothing more than puny vedettes. The key is to focus on two of Napoleon's historical obsessions: security and deception. Keep the enemy guessing, and enhance the likelihood you will surprise him. In general, unless a vedette is going to scout or probe this turn, it is best to activate it with an initiative roll, and keep it's movement down to 5 or 7 movement points so as not to give away its identity. Light cavalrymen were notorious liars and gamblers. Keep this in mind when using them!

There's often an imbalance in the number of vedettes available to each army. In *Bonaparte in Italy*, for example, the Austrians outnumber the French in vedettes by something like 2:1. In this case, the French have to use their vedettes as efficiently as possible, with less luxury for long-range missions and wholesale deception. The French in this case should probe only when possible, reserving their vedettes for the cavalry screen until the moment of attack. The Austrian player must put heavy pressure on the French vedettes, denying them any opportunity to scout their big units.

Examining the history of the period shows the accuracy of OSC's vedette model, particularly in the 1813 campaigns in which the French were hampered by a lack of good light cavalry. They operated almost entirely in the dark and were exposed to the enemy (the Lutzen campaign is a good example of what happens when you face superior enemy cavalry). In the Napoleonic era, cavalry superiority helped determine control of the battlefield. Their role was hiding friendly forces prior to the big moment and allowing the dominant army to maneuver with decision. Before now, players haven't been given this tremendous tool. If you doubt their influence, strip one player of his vedettes for a battle scenario and see who wins!

The Sun of Austerlitz

Set-up Notes for Scenario I

Hollabrunn, 15 November 1805

Notes from Rainer Egger, "Das Gefecht bei Hollabrunn"

12 noon, 13 November

Murat, Lannes and the Cavalry Reserve entered Vienna and seized the bridge over the Danube the same day, but had yet to discover Kutusov's location or bearing. Crossing the bridge at once, Oudinot's grenadier division, and two of cavalry, pressed forward in search of the Russians. Murat found in Vienna more than 2,000 cannon, 100,000 muskets, and enough ammunition to supply the French Army through 3 or 4 campaigns.

Evening, 13 November

Oudinot was in Korneuburg, Walther and Trelliard in Stockerau. That night, Murat himself slept in Vienna.

14 November

Between 11 and 12 in the morning the first French cavalry (Fauconnet) arrived in front of Hollabrunn, in Sierndorf, Unter-Hautzenthal and Hausleiten.

Murat with Soult's IV Corps, Lannes's V Corps (less Oudinot) and the remainder of the reserve cavalry marched for Stockerau, arriving there in the night.

So we have Murat with Soult, Lannes and the cavalry in Stockerau during the night of 14-15 November, Oudinot in Gollersdorf, Walther's 2nd Dragoon Division and Trelliard (Fauconnet's) Lt. Cav scouting Hollabrunn.

After the loss of the Danube bridge, the Corps of Auersperg moved by the Brünner Strasse toward Wolkersdorf and Gaunersdorf, where at 9 in the evening of the 14th, FML Liechtenstein assumed command of the corps.

Murat detached a brigade of dragoons from the 3rd Dragoon Division (under Milhaud) to follow Auersperg. This brigade arrived in Wolkersdorf at midday of the 14th.

The Russian March to Znaim

After sending his wounded on ahead from Krems on the 13th, Kutuzov marched through Hädersdorf toward Hohenwarth and Nebenwegen and thence toward Sitzendorf an der Schmida and Ziersdorf to reach the Vienna—Znaim road. In the morning of the 14th, when word arrived of the capture of the Danube bridge, Kutuzov changed his direction toward Jetzelsdorf (a post house in the Pulkau valley).

In Hollabrunn, Kutuzov found his detached VI Column and placed it under the command of General Czepelow (in place of Rosen). Continuing his march northwards, Kutuzov left a rear-guard under Prince Bagration to bar the road between Schöngrabern and Hollabrunn.

Bagration's rearguard, comprising about 8,000 men, was on the road between Hollabrunn and Schöngrabern, in a position on the height of Sutzenbrunn.

The Austrian General von Nostitz with the Hessen-Homburg Husars and the Peterwardeiner Grenzinfantry Nr. 9 was posted forward in Hollabrunn.

Murat's Advance

After provisioning his troops from the captured depot at Stockerau, Murat advanced on the morning of the 15th November. His advanced guard was already in contact with the Russians at Göllersdorf. The main body of the three corps under Murat advanced about 40,000 men strong, reaching Göllersdorf by midday on the 15th. At that time, Kutuzov was in Jetzelsdorf.

On the afternoon of the 15th the opponents stood in the following positions: Bagration's advanced post under Nostitz (the Hessen-Homburg Regiment, the Peterwardeiner Grenzers, and three Russian Jaeger battalions) in Schöngrabern; and Bagration himself with his corps on the road from Schöngrabern through Grund and Guntersdorf. In Hollabrunn stood the two heavy cavalry divisions of Murat's cavalry reserve and the grenadier division under Oudinot. He felt that this force was not sufficient for an attack, and he summoned Soult and Lannes while scouting the enemy outposts.

Aware that the entire Russian Army was nearby, Murat negotiated an armistice with Bagration, for which he was later censured in a dispatch from Napoleon, who remained in Vienna. Murat then attacked Bagration's position at about 4 p.m. on the 16th. As a result of the 24-hour delay in this attack, Kutuzov's army was able to withdraw through Znaim in complete safety.

Liechtenstein Joins the Russians

On the 15th the Austrian Avant Garde under FML Kienmayer, and the six brigades under FML Vinzenz Graf Kolowrat, stood in Wilfersdorf. By the evening of the 16th both reached Muschau (Musoff) in Moravia. On the 17th, at Pohrlitz, the Austrian Corps met up with the Russian Army which had marched there from Znaim. A vedette detachment of Chevauxleger Regt. O'Reilly Nr. 3 and 100 Uhlans remained in Laa.

Set-up Notes for Scenario II

27 November 1805

Notes from: Kutuzov, M.H.: Sbornik Dokumentov, Tom II, Moscow, 1951, pp 196 -224. This is the great compendium of Kutuzov documentation compiled and edited by Beskrovni between 1950 and 1956.

Olmütz: 26 November (Document #222, p.202)

Kutusov had his headquarters at Olmütz when he issued an order setting out the order of march from Olmütz to Prödlitz.

Neugasse: 27 November (Document #225)

Kutusov issued an order regarding despatch of wagons to Ivanovitz. The order is dated Neugasse. There are also several GHQ orders datelined Olmütz but signed either by the General-of-the-day, Inzov, or unsigned.

Gabrau: 27 November (document #227)
Bagration sent a report dated from Gabrau.

near Raussnitz: 30 November (document #231)
Bagration sent a report describing actions of the avante-garde on their advance. —Thanks to Nick Gorsky.

Biographical Notes on the Russian Generals

Notes from Louis Adolphe Thiers, "History of the Consulate and Empire of France under Napoleon." Phila: 1893, page 26

Mikhail Ilarionovich Kutusov

An elderly man, had lost the sight of one eye in consequence of a wound on the head, very corpulent, indolent, dissolute, greedy, but intelligent; as active in mind as he was heavy in body, lucky in war, a clever courtier, and capable of commanding in a situation that required prudence and good fortune. His lieutenants were men of moderate talents, excepting three, Prince Bagration and Generals Docturov and Miloradovich.

Prince Bagration

A Georgian of heroic courage, making amends by experience for the lack of early instruction, and always charged, whether at the advanced guard or at the rearguard, with the most difficult duty.

General Miloradovich

A Serbian, of brilliant valor, but absolutely destitute of military knowledge, dissolute in manners, uniting all the vices of civilization with those of barbarism.

General Docturov

A discreet, modest, firm and well-informed officer.

Ignacy Przybyszewski

Commander of 11th Infantry Regiment in the Polish Army. Took part in 1792 war against Russia. Awarded with *Virtuti Militari* (highest Polish military medal, created 1792). Entered Russian service in 1793. Captured at Austerlitz, he was convicted of a number of basic misjudgements after his return from captivity and played no further role in the wars.
—Thanks to Jarek Andruszkiewicz.

Notes from Christopher Duffy, "Austerlitz 1805,"
Leo Cooper, London, 1977, pp. 30-31.

Marshal Buxhöwden

Buxhöwden was an Estonian German who had advanced himself by marrying an illegitimate daughter of the Tsarina Catherine. 'A man of extreme conceit and pride, but also ... of very little education,' he carried about with him a train of hunting dogs and female courtiers.

Tsar Alexander's inclinations drew him more to the company of aggressive and arrogant aides-de-camp like Winzingerode, Lieven, Volkonsky and Dolgoruky. Buxhöwden complained, 'At the present time authority has declined to such an extent that everyone from ensign to general treats one another with the same familiarity.'

EDITORIAL

(continued from page 2)

unimportance, whereas the really important aspects of life are handled in another realm altogether. Today, we can sense this problem when the hobby is not taken seriously, let us say, by the typical spouse (or girlfriend) of a wargamer. I propose this is precisely because we haven't taken the games seriously enough to learn the lessons they attempt to teach us, whether they be history lessons, strategy lessons, or simply sportsmanship lessons. I do not want to imply that all the games we play can offer valuable lessons.

There is good news in the recent renaissance of conflict simulation—witness how Consimworld.com has brought together this far-ranging community. Consider the strides made to learn the tastes and preferences of serious aficionados via the use of pre-order systems. I see these events as indicators that gamers and publishers are learning from the games. It was summarized well by Clausewitz: "It would be better, instead of comparing [war] with any Art, to liken it to business competition." Let's face it. We expose ourselves to war in these games. Maybe we do it as history buffs. That is fine. But if you start out this way, slowly and perhaps in a subtle and unconscious manner, you begin to see the better games as tools for living. If you can accept my premise that the games can teach us more than history, then I believe you can become another advocate for the hobby. Outsiders might discover through you that the hobby and real-life may benefit from each other.

It would be better, instead of comparing war with any Art, to liken it to business competition.

Conflict simulations should be a place where we have fun while learning some history and pushing around the cardboard. But let me add that conflict simulations also may be a source of personal development. The games can teach us the mental skills and pragmatic skills of playing well and living well—how best to use all your resources to achieve your objectives. One thing a conflict simulation highlights in this real-world notion of strategy is the planning needed before action. The conflict simulations do not provide simple recipes for action. Instead, you learn in a kind of experimental setting certain basic principles that are common to many contexts. If in a real world situation, you supplement the general principles you have learned with information specific to your actual situation—then you can derive a successful strategy. For example, if you play enough tennis or racquetball, you discover a general principle known as exploitation avoidance. You keep your opponent guessing, so that he doesn't take advantage of your weakness while you get the chance to surprise him. Tennis teaches you to exert maximum effort at the most crucial times, not at all times (otherwise your strength and stamina will fade and your opponent will dominate you). Another example I derive from the Campaigns of Napoleon series I call the trick-counter trick. You learn how to distin-

guish the real attack from the feint, while masking your own maneuvers that give you the advantage in the crucial battles. We can find lessons that apply to the real world concerning movement and attrition. You need to preserve your resources until the crucial moment, and then use them with greatest intensity once that moment has arrived. Such lessons hold for real-life situations as well if we make an effort to learn from the really good games in the market—I mean to say the Really Good Games are just those that might help us in real world situations.

This is the most important and advantageous aspect of conflict simulations, even more important than the inherent history of the situations depicted in the games. The history in the games is important and often intellectually stimulating. I view conflict simulations as classrooms that can teach us about conflicts in personal relationships, decision making in business and finances—indeed any sort of interactions with individuals in varied walks of life. The way game publishers have made it to the Twenty-first Century, for example, is enlightening.

The revival of gaming in the last few years—some people have called it a renaissance—is partly savvy marketing by publishers. The lesson that the game publishers learned was that pride goes before a fall. Well, that's something we learn from books like *The Iliad*, but we don't really learn this lesson unless we experience it firsthand. The old model worked so well, the game publishers were not ready for the market crash. Publishers like AH and SPI thought their simple model, "if we build it, they will buy it," would work continuously. It didn't, so game publishing adjusted (we lost companies, founded new companies, struggling all the way in search of better ways to accomplish the tried and true model of game publishing). The Golden Age of Conflict Simulations we could call the 1970s (if I had to pick only one decade). The Dark Age would be the 1980s and most the 1990s. We have an opportunity now to analyze the situation of the past—maybe someone will make a game about all of this?

The gamers aged and married. The demand for conflict simulation games fell through the proverbial floor, and gamers' kids played video games. Now most if not all of the current game companies are doing well, though it is not a sort of business marked by the level of sales and profit margins of the 1960s and 1970s. Partly the recovery in conflict simulations is due to demographics—many gamers are back. Their kids are in college (or beyond) and the gamers have reached their income-earning peak. Less family expenses and more income translates into more money for spending on games. This demographics event connects to the publishers who have learned from the past, so we feel ready for this new and Better Marketplace. Oh, and note that many of the better selling games are larger counter, larger hex types of games—these products appeal to the bifocal crowd.

But if game publishers are playing these games, they are likely learning from them as well. We must plan for the coming friction. The demographics shift that is coming within 10 to 15 years is going to make conflict simulation publishing once again a rocky road. We need to step back

and learn a lesson from the games. We have to plan for the circumstances, and we must realize that there will come a time when publishers will need to exert maximum efforts to keep loyal customers and attract new, younger, gamers. The lesson of trick and counter-trick may come in handy. For example, consider the recent marketing of the new 'toy soldier' games jammed with plastic pieces (and there are many more to come if we look at the marketing plans of a couple of the conflict simulation and game companies). This is a bold step, an attempt to marry the traditional board wargames and miniatures (used in the past with success). I recently bought \$50 worth of 20mm Napoleonic figures to supplement my strategic-level Napoleonic wargames (like *La Guerre de l'Empereur*) and my 2-year-old has a bunch of extra pieces as well. This is no market thievery, because in the end it is a win-win kind of game—we can crossbreed board and miniature gamers for the benefit of both communities.

"Only an immense force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance admired by present and future generations, can conduct us toward our goal."

We can learn another strategy from the miniatures community: bring the kids, get them involved and playing the games. This is one reason the miniatures gamers have more numbers and resiliency. Possibly, we should recall Clausewitz again: "...only an immense force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance admired by present and future generations, can conduct us toward our goal."

Things look bright for Operational Studies Group. Witness the many pre-order titles in the design and development queue that will come to market if you, the customer, decide to choose the title(s). A new Campaigns series game (the first new one in a long time!) dedicated to the Austerlitz campaign is on its way through production. And *Wargame Design* available in an on-line format for a very low annual subscription rate. Please have patience with us in the transition process. And take notice: we will maintain a hard-copy magazine for readers that like to feel the paper and smell the ink.

This bright future holds for other game publishers we know and support. The fan base is not shrinking. Instead, a better way to describe the market is that it is dynamic. The great news is game publishers have learned from playing the game of business the key to success—to Operational Studies Group's success especially—good people. You are an integral part of the Group.

OSG PUBLICATION SCHEDULE

SUN OF AUSTERLITZ is now shipping! NAPOLEON'S GAME—re-titled SWORDS AROUND A THRONE— is on the back burner while we focus our design resources on the FOUR LOST BATTLES —1813 Quad.

The Sun of Austerlitz

NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN IN MORAVIA

- One 22" x 34" map, 188 counters
- Quick-playing, low counter density
- 2 miles / 2 days / 1,000-man SPs

- EXTRA! EXPANSION SET INCLUDED FOR
La Guerre de l'Empereur (Emperor's War)**
- 92 counters plus new 1796 scenario


Latest installment in the *Campaigns of Napoleon*. The map covers Moravia from Vienna to Olmütz.

SCENARIOS

The Maneuver of Hollabrunn, The Austro-Russian Advance, The Battle of Austerlitz. Two Campaign game starts.

PLAYER AIDS

Two Organization Displays, Two Leader and Unit Manifests, Turn Track, and Two Record Tracks, designed by Mark Hinkle.



\$46 plus s&h

**Operational Studies Group
PO Box 50207
Baltimore, MD 21211 USA**

MAKE WARGAMES NOT WAR



Deliver to:

Wargame Design Magazine from OPERATIONAL STUDIES GROUP