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# Wargame Design



*1813*

*Campaign in Germany*

## Wargame Design, Spring 2007

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*Publisher:* Kevin Zucker

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*Cover:* Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz  
*koenigl.. General-Major u. Inspecteur der Artillerie*  
*1 Juni 1780 - 16 Nov 1831*

In 1813, while still wearing the Russian Uniform, Clausewitz served on the staff of Marshal Blücher.

*Artist:* Karl Wilhelm Wach

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## C · O · N · T · E · N · T · S

*“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” — Carl von Clausewitz*

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## In This Issue ...

This issue has a dual theme, of 1813 and The Campaigns of Napoleon; a reflection of our recent pre-occupation with the mighty campaign of Leipzig, which deserves much greater study and a lot more games than heretofore.

There is such a large body of wargames now in print that many of our grognards derive their ideas of what is “Napoleonic” from playing these games, whether they be miniature or board-games. From time to time they will resurrect an old canard, complaining that “one force point is worth 1000 people regardless of the quality of the troops.”

Gamers are so accustomed to having different troops evaluated differently, that they cannot accept this radical idea.

It’s very easy to make a game turn out the way you want it to if you can assign an arbitrary combat strength to units, that will make it more or less likely for one side to win. A designer can easily “fix” the outcome of a game by re-evaluating the strength of certain units in order to obtain the desired outcome.

Maybe you think we should build the guard’s excellence into their combat strength; but it is far more difficult to create a design that shows the real reasons behind historical outcomes.

Our process is to use our campaign analysis to understand why the French were able to do as well as they did. Our modus operandi is ... “We seem to be having a balance problem with the game. Well, what are the players doing that is ahistorical?” When we hit a problem in the flow of the game it is an opportunity to reveal some hidden “Napoleonic” truth.

It is strange that gamers will not question the decision to evaluate all the troops differently, regardless of how absurd those numbers might be; while they will question equality. Especially at the operational level, equality is closer to the truth. Many times sheer numbers win the day. Throughout history, the smaller force will rarely prevail, regardless of troop quality. *continued on page 23*

# What is Scale-appropriate?

It is axiomatic that it's not appropriate for a theater commander to make deployment decisions for each brigade in the army along the entire front. Historically that would not be possible or desirable. That's just not the role of the theater commander. However, we gamers tend to find it natural, because that is how we've grown accustomed to playing.

Bringing that question to *Four Lost Battles*, we have seen that Ney was not even aware of the situation across the whole battlefield of Dennewitz, and made the decision to shift Oudinot's Corps at the critical moment based on the perspective of a brigade commander. Vandamme didn't know who he was facing or what his own reinforcement schedule was. We added hidden movement to avoid the effects of too much "eye in the sky" and hidden reinforcement cards to deal with the unknowns in force structures.

Normal wargames grant the players instant access to all this information and also provide instantaneous and perfect command and control of all friendly forces. It took a finely-tuned headquarters and a determination not to wade into the battle sword in hand (like Ney) to obtain good information about the conditions on all parts of the battlefield. It took dozens of aides de camp coming and going constantly to insure the flow of information and orders back and forth to headquarters. Even with perfect "order acceptance" there still had to be a time-lag between the receipt of the latest info at headquarters and the execution of the next set of orders; such that any orders would be out of date and irrelevant by the time they arrived, and only a formed reserve or a unit not in contact could be controlled remotely. Hence, at times the Army Commander has to intervene on the spot if he wants to influence events on the ground.

The Army Commander, represented by the player, in reality had no ability to affect the deployment of his forces once they were engaged with the enemy unless he chose to go there in person. But if he made that choice, he had to do so in the hopes that he was in the terrain that would allow for a decisive stroke. It was common for a general to assume that the most important events were taking place in front of him. (Napoleon at Jena has to be the best example of that, since it took hours, even after the battles had died down, for Napoleon to be convinced that Davout had faced the bulk of the Prussian army at Auerstadt.)

It is clear, then, that the overall commander has little or no control over what happens when one of his brigades engages an enemy brigade. All he can do is line them up and point them in the right direction. This fact runs counter to the fighting spirit of the rognard, but he should not take the model of the passionate, aggressive, but often ignorant Marshal Ney. He had better concern himself with intelligence, command and control. That is where we have put the focus.

—Kevin Zucker

# Katzbach Scenario: 2PM

By mid-afternoon the French forces committed to crossing the Katzbach had reached their furthest advance, while Blücher had his forces in position to attack. Petre estimates the French forces on the plateau at 27,000 men; Blücher had 38,000—Yorck's advanced guard between Bellwitzhof and Christianenhöhe, his main body in two columns; Sacken on Yorck's right, moving on Eichholz.

**Duration:** 14.00 - 20.00 hrs. (with possible Second Day).

**First Player:** French Player moves first.

**Card Decks, Victory & Special Rules:** as per regular scenario rules.

**Mode Cards at Start:** none

## French Set Up:

4HCD (0614)

2HCD (1116)

19ID (1023)

16ID (1123)

35ID (1122)

8ID (1617)

4LCD (1614)

36ID (1714)

2LC (2012)

Vedettes (1615,1616)

Souham and III Corps stacked on road between 0413 - 0915.

## Coalition Set Up:

RUSSIANS:

Langeron, VI, IX, X (1224, 1223, 1323)

LC (1125, 1321)

Korff (1326)

Karpov CB (2213)

XI (2015)

Arty (2116)

Wassilchikov's Cav Corps (2017)

PRUSSIANS:

8IB (1718)

2IB (1818)

7IB (1817)

1IB (1919)

Jurgass, Prus. Res. Cav (2019)


Katzeler, Henkel, Bieber, and Yorck (1917)

Any small units and arty unspecified: place somewhere adjacent to friendly units of their formation.<sup>1</sup>

**Reinforcements:** as per 22.23–22.26 in the regular scenario rules (less units already in play).

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Source: Nafziger, *Napoleon at Dresden*, The Battle at the Weinberg Defile, p. 60; map, p. 54



## Four Lost Battles Questions & Answers

### Bombardment CRT column of 1-4

The French gunners are perplexed...can they fire at 1:4? What happens if the artillery bombardment odds are less than 1:4 odds?

A) Bombardment at worse than 1:4 is not allowed (greater than 3:1 treated as 3:1).

### Bülow

Under the new rule for Bülow's semi-active status, does being released also mean Bülow is in command that turn, or must he roll separately for command?

A) Bülow is in command that turn.

### Vedettes and Retreat Before Combat

Section 16.2 states that Cav and vedettes may retreat before combat, as long as they are not in the EZOC of a cav unit with equal or greater Move Allowance, EXCEPTION: Vedettes I am confused by that statement, so I will ask in a two part question to clarify:

1. If vedettes are in the EZOC of a cav unit with equal Move allowance the Vedettes CAN retreat; or,
2. If Cav are in the EZOC of Vedettes with equal move allowance the cav unit can retreat

A) Both 1 and 2 are true.

### Retreat

Are the Stacking Requirements in effect for every hex of the retreat?

A) I have been playing that they are not, and have been backing

up my lines with reserves in case of the dread DR3 or DR4.

### Card 24

Where do the Alternative Commanders enter, I assumed the same place most of the Alt reinforcement did.

A) Correct

The alternative reinforcements in the Dennewitz scenario are so stacked against the Coalition.

A) You have been lucky and pulled a lot of the Alt Reinf cards... I hope you shuffled well. I should have put the French Guard cavalry in the #1 position, then the Imperial Guard and then VI Corps. Cavalry in front is the likely order of arrival.

Does each player have only 2 base cards in their hand during a second day of battle?

A) Each player has only two base cards during the second day of battle. That represents the extra pressure of continuing a battle onto a second day.

Is the command range for units in March Order 2 or 3 hexes?

A) 2 hexes.

### Supply

Are you supposed to check supply in the 0100 turn?

My confusion stems from:

- In 7D09, you checked supply at night.
- The 4LB Sequence of Play under 2.1B says to check supply both

in the Supply Segment and at the end of the Recovery Segment.

- The intro to the Supply rules says to check supply in the Recovery Segment.
- The rules say to have a Recovery Segment in the 0100 turn, but they don't say anything about a Supply Segment, and the night Recovery Segment doesn't specifically say to check supply.

A) Yes, check in the 0100 turn

NOTE: This fact is listed on the TRC for the 0100 turn

#### **Katzbach French Reinforcements, 1400 turn.**

The note with the 29th Division should refer to 22.24, not 22.23. Bring the 29th LC in with all the other units of the XII Corps.

#### **Kulm, French, 23.25 (3)**

St Cyr has 13 units, not 12.

23.25 (4)

Latour has 9 units, not 8.

#### **Dennewitz Coalition Reinforcements, 1500 turn**

AvG = 3 units, 21st = 1 unit, total 4 units. 1700 reinforcements, Prussian III/Art should be excluded as per the note at the end of the Reinforcements. 1600 Reinforcements, the Baggage Train appears with Woronzow.

#### **11.68 Bombardment**

The example states that up to 3 units may be lost from a Bombardment, actually the charts max out at 2 units.

#### **11.63 Determine the Line of Sight**

Cases A, B, A, B, should read A, B, C, D. Furthermore, regarding 11.63C describing the LOS Exceptions, do the reciprocal situations also allow an unimpeded LOS?

A) Not necessarily.

#### **9.13 Trains**

Trains may not enter an EZOC 9.12 says that trains can't enter slopes except on roads or cross streams except at bridges, and 1.4 says artillery units move like trains. I read these sections together to say that artillery can't enter an EZOC, enter slopes except on roads, etc. Correct?

A) Incorrect about the EZOC.

#### **16.52 Cavalry Charges**

The last section (4) states: "If the result on the shock CRT is other than Dr or De, the cavalry unit is eliminated."

So if the Shock result is an Ex, is the cavalry elimination counted towards the losses of the Exchange (like in 16.52-3) or is the unit eliminated BEFORE counting the losses toward the Exchange?

A) YES THAT: the cavalry elimination is counted towards the losses of the Exchange (like in 16.52-3)

I would rather use this rule: The cavalry has to retreat 2 hexes, and the attacker can advance into the first vacated hex (more elegant).

A) Proposed House rule is o.k.

If I'm playing everything right, the French cannot mount an attack on Grossbeeren without going out of supply (they have no baggage, and the town is well beyond any ten hex path to a printed supply source).

A) The French have all their Baggage with their Corps.

#### **Card 27 (Delay - March Confusion)**

Player B is the second Player. Player A's reinforcements already entered this turn and were involved in combat, inflicting losses on Player B's units. Are Player B's losses replaced? What happens if there was an advance after combat?

A) If player B plays card 27, it affects a force that "entered the map... this turn". Meaning, you pick up the forces that entered during player A's turn, and take them out of play. As the French in this scenario, I HATE card 27 worse than anything.

If a force enters AND is involved combat that same turn, I'm not sure what to do. But in Katzbach, at least, that isn't likely to happen. You could house-rule it that once a force has participated in combat, it can't be affected by card 27...

A) You are right, but we tried it both ways and either way works. I prefer the first way (above), because I am a meanie.

If it does happen that recalled troops are engaged (possible, I think, only in Kulm), take out the reinforcements and erase all the results of their phantom combat.

According to our latest Update we have taken out 2x "Delay-March Confusion from the Coalition deck, and put back in the 2x "Commander Arrives." For Play balance purposes I would like to take out all 4 of them but that is impossible to justify given the facts on the ground.

#### **19.43 Reinforcements**

Does this rule mean the Reinforcements must enter in Road March formation?

A) They can enter in road march or not. But there still has to be some order to their arrival. You determine the order of arrival of a formation according to 19.43.

#### **Combining Bombardment and Regular Attacks**

I've got a stack of French units ready to storm over a bridge.

They're opposed by a weak-ish cavalry force. There's a stack of French artillery nearby that bombard the defender's hex. They get a DR result. The cavalry falls back. Can the attacking French force advance into the now unoccupied hex?

At first I thought, no, they can't advance, but when the cavalry resumes its defensive position, it'll have to attack this big, doubled stack in turn. But no... ZOC's don't extend over bridges.

How should this work?

A) That is a good question, not answered by the rules. Assume that the "Dr" was (partly) the result of the (unresolved) regular combat. The Attackers get to do a normal advance after combat (normally one unit only may advance).

Let's forget the artillery, and say the defending cavalry retreats before combat. On their turn, they can walk back up and block the bridge again? So unless you have cavalry that's faster than the defending cavalry (or have enough guns to eliminate them entirely), your infantry CANNOT storm the bridge!

A) We have to assume that the attackers will notice the cavalry withdrawal, and because of the importance of the bridge they would certainly sieze it if it was left undefended even if only for less than a whole turn. This forms an exception to 16.2 which prohibits advance into the vacated hex.



## The Woods and the Trees.

1.53 Blocking terrain: The rules talk about intervening blocking terrain. But if I am on an hilltop, do I spot a force, up to 12 hexes away, IN a wood hex, even if there is no other blocking terrain? (since the units is hidden in a wood hex, I would say no).

A) If you are on a hilltop that is a special condition that is answered in 1.51, # 4 (such a unit is called a "spotter" and 1.52 applies to it).

If I'm in a wood hex, can I be spotted by non-adjacent units?

A) No.

## Bombardment

Can I bombard a unit two hexes away that is in a wood or in a town?

A) No.

Can you bombard into a town, and if yes, shouldn't there be some penalties to the fire?

A) You *can* bombard a town, says rule 11.66. Not that it's easy with double defense. Can't shoot into woods though.

## Cavalry Retreat

If I have a Light Cavalry (7MP) attacked by one Infantry and one Vedette, can the Light Cavalry retreat before combat? Or does the Vedette stop it from retreating?

A) Yes, it may. The answer is in 16.2: "EXCEPTION: Vedettes."

Does it mean that Vedettes can't stop Cavalry from retreating (which makes sense)?

A) Vedettes are ALWAYS the exception. Vedettes can never be your lead unit (almost—unless your force is all vedettes).

## 11.44 Retreats in ZOCs

If I understand correctly, any unit that cannot retreat (even just one hex) has a 50% chance of being Permanently Eliminated, right?

I find that penalty a bit stiff, and encourages even more the players to use an unrealistic "one stack every other hex" defense, to stop the enemy from surrounding units (most of the CRT results are retreats).

I think that just having the unit eliminated because it can't retreat through ZOCs is more than enough (but not for enemy units and prohibited hexsides, in those 2 cases the rule stands), especially since friendlies cannot negate those ZOC's.

I would at least add this rule:

Friendly units do not negate enemy ZOCs for the purposes of retreat, but DO negate those ZOCs for the application of rule 11.44.

My preference would be this one:

- Friendly units OR FRIENDLY ZOC'S do not negate enemy ZOCs for the purposes of retreat, but DO negate those ZOCs for the application of rule 11.44 or 11.41.

A) The purpose of 11.44 is to address the situation of a unit that receives, for example, a Dr3, but can only retreat 1 or 2 hexes (it has a 50% chance of being permanently eliminated) as opposed to a unit which cannot retreat at all (automatically PEU).

Someone might stack three vedettes in a hex to increase the odds of losing one of them to bombardment. You might be able to recycle the same Vedettes each and every turn right away.

A) True. So...

## 11.68 Execute the Combat Result (change)

One or two units in a stack may be eliminated; the remaining units must make a "Dr." Select the eliminated unit(s) randomly. EXCEPTION: Vedette units may not be used to satisfy the bombardment loss. EXAMPLE ...

## March Orders

What happens to non-infantry units under March Orders that reach the objective before the first infantry unit?

A) They stop when they reach the objective (per 7.44). The march order is still good. Disregard cavalry for that.

## Grossbeeren scenario

If Tauenzien starts the battle out of supply, presumably the Prussian IV Corps cannot control Blankenfelde for VP purposes while it remains in this state?

A) *Correction:* the Prussians get points for control (see change to 20.15 below) even though there is no way to supply a unit in Blankenfelde.

## Card 6

If Formation Scattered do units have to move off-map or stop at the map edge ?

A) The latter.

Which card deck is for which side ?

A) The infantryman is French.

## Bombardment

Example (p. 21): Bombardment into hex 1509 – also not possible because of blocking crest.

A Leader in a stack that is eliminated in combat must roll for capture. Correct?

A) Yes.

The AAR on the OSG website for Grossbeeren says Tauentzien needs a roll of 1 or 2 to move. He is rated a 4 and OOS at start of scenario. I assume he being OOS at the start is an exception since formations only check supply when a recovery card is played.

A) *Correction:* He is *not* Out of Supply until the first Supply Check.

On a Road or Secure Column Mode card, does the formation MOVE into that mode on their first turn? Or, do they redeploy in that mode and THEN move where they would like from there on their first turn (assuming they get initiative).

A) They redeploy before their first move.

## Grossbeeren

If Bulow gets a Road Column mode card and so does Reynier, (I believe both formations are considered the strongest force and would be selected) it is possible Bulow would be able to see Reynier's force at the end of the first turn, thus activating Bulow.

Does that sound right?

A) I guess so, haven't seen it myself.

#### Advance after Combat

If an attacking force attacked from 2 or more hexes and was able to advance, can different units advance from different hexes as long as stacking rules are not violated? Or can only a unit/units from ONE attacking hex advance?

A) Only one.

***4LB is making me (a die-hard ACW wargamer) consider purchasing other Napoleonic games. It is THAT good.***

#### 3.12 EXAMPLE (From Grossbeeren)

Italian 15th Division. The infantry brigades of Moroni, St. Andrea, and Martel could all stack in the same hex. Should Bertrand enter that hex with the division's artillery, all three infantry brigades may remain.

#### 5.23 Chief of Staff (*new*)

Eliminated officers unit counter returns to play on the following turn, stacked with any unit(s) of their formation. Remember to subtract "one" from the Leader's initiative rating henceforth.

#### 8.31 Bridges and Movement

Artillery can *never* cross a Stream hexside without bridging.

#### 11.4 Optional Rule

Demoralized units resolve Shock normally. The "other way" of resolution would be to modify the initiative rating of demoralized units when resolving shock combat. It turns out that some of us have been doing that while others have played it according to the rules. It would be kind of neat for demoralized troops to have their initiative reduced.

#### 11.53 (*change*)

Bombardment in Mud is allowed, apply a -2 modifier.

#### 12.12 Rallying From Demoralization

The last sentence should read: If the unit is eliminated again later then the Casualty Level Marker should be INCREASED by an amount equal to the unit's Full Combat Strength

#### 14.32 Automatic

Both Pontoon and Baggage trains have a Movement Allowance of 5.

#### 20.15 Control (*change; addition*)

"EVEN if the occupying unit is Out of Supply at the moment it enters or moves through the hex, the hex is STILL controlled.

#### Katzbach Optional Rule (*new*)

Though the attempted crossing at Schmokwitz served merely to



take 2 divisions of Souham's Corps out of the fight, someone may wish to have these troops try and cross the flooded Katzbach. Hence the following Optional Rule (Katzbach only).

#### 22.34 Fording a River Hexside

An attempt to ford a river hexside (as well as the Katzbach in flood, 22.31) may take place if neither hex contiguous to the hexside is a slope hex. EXAMPLE: Crossing from 1318 to 1417, or from 1521 to 1620 would not be permitted. The unit must begin the Player turn unstacked, adjacent to the hexside to be forded. This fording attempt is successful on a die roll of "1" or "2" (after the Thunderstorm card is played, on a "1" only). If successful the unit may cross the hexside and then end its move for the turn. On a "3" through "6" the unit may not move. Only infantry and cavalry may attempt to ford. Supply may not be traced through a River hexside.

#### 23.34 Kulm Special Rules (*add*)

The two Coalition March orders are not free and may be given only to Bianchi and Colloredo and their respective Austrian Corps. Both Forces must march to the Coalition Supply Source at 0726. Then they may move freely.

*Historical Commentary:* In the chaos of the retreat nobody knew exactly where these troops were, and they certainly were unaware of the battle about to begin at Kulm. There were other reasons why they were not about to turn around and march across the plateau; they were in retreat mode and knew that the pursuing French XIV Corps was behind them.

#### Counter Manifest

Wargame Design Nr. 9 Counter Manifest for Dennewitz shows a duplicated unit... the Prussian 2-2-6 horse artillery unit.

A) Refer to the printed set-up 24.22. The 2-2-6 is with Tauenzien in Juterbog.

Also shown are cavalry units and their vedettes.

A) Remove the parent unit when the vedettes are placed. Your choice there.

What about units that set up in Secure Road Column?

A) Stack two units to the hex. ☹

# Four Lost Battles

## 16.2 Retreat Before Combat (RBC)

Richard Lawrence

*I have often wondered whether the Retreat Before Combat rule in Four Lost Battles and Days series games effectively reflects Napoleonic history. The rule does not reflect my reading of history, my experience on a wargames table or when managing/umpiring campaigns (which may or may not be relevant).*

This rule appears to give certain cavalry and vedettes an advantage that I feel did not exist. It can force cavalry units into attacking or defending against infantry and foot artillery that they would normally avoid. How often did cossacks and quicker lighter cavalry pin slower moving cavalry in place and then force them to attack against their wishes? I have been unable to find any evidence to support this rule.

Napoleonic infantry rarely attacked cavalry with success. Cavalry were usually able to manoeuvre away from infantry when they had no reason to start a combat. Cavalry generally are not able to 'pin' other cavalry in place so they can be attacked by all arms. I agree that more mobile cavalry should be able to retire from slower cavalry.

I suggest that cavalry movement allowances are more for general campaign movement and not battlefield or close proximity movement. The option would not significantly alter the flavour of the current rules. There is also no mention of the number of cavalry strength points involved and that may also have a significant bearing on any outcome of a Retreat Before Combat. The role of a rearguard was to slow the attackers/pursuers by making them deploy and then the rearguard would retire before they could be drawn into combat. The position they would choose, if available, would be through a defile of some kind to minimise any advantage the enemy had, especially numbers. The advance guard's role is to push on and find the enemy, not to be caught in a disadvantageous position and also to warn the main body.

An example may help clarify my thinking. As the rule stands, my understanding of what may happen follows below.

A two-strength cavalry unit is in an EZOC, 'pinned' in place by an enemy one-strength cavalry unit (equal or faster mobility). The pinning cavalry are stacked with 9 infantry/artillery strength points and the 'pinned' cavalry cannot retreat before combat, therefore they have to attack at 1:5 odds, (attacking mainly troops it would normally avoid). There can be situations when the non-phasing cavalry has to face an attack at 5:1 odds because they cannot retreat before combat and simply must defend against troops it could normally avoid.

If the above example holds true, the rules are forcing more mobile units into combat with troops they would normally avoid. All cavalry (and there will be exceptions), whether outnumbered or outpaced, would endeavour to retire and avoid combat if they so wished and it would be up to the opposition cavalry to intervene and try and stop them. Therefore the player wishing to stop

the enemy cavalry retreating before combat has to make the decision, either let them retreat or try and stop them with their own cavalry. If the non-phasing player wishes to engage the enemy cavalry, they must announce this and the combat takes place **just between the cavalry units (including vedettes, horse artillery and leaders if present)**. The phasing player still throws the die. If the unit that wished to RBC has survived they may then retreat as normal if not already forced to by combat.

### Optional – add/amend to rule 16.2

Attacking or Defending Cavalry (plus any accompanying leaders and horse artillery stacked with the cavalry) may elect to retreat one or two hexes out of an EZOC prior to combat as long as they are not in an EZOC of a **cavalry unit with equal of greater Movement Allowance**.

*EXCEPTION: If the retreating Cavalry are retreating through a defile (towns, bridges or woods with roads etc) they automatically succeed to RBC.*

If the opposing stack contains Cavalry that are able to challenge this RBC (equal or higher MPs) the owner must announce this challenge and a combat will take place only between each force's Cavalry, Vedettes, Horse Artillery and Leaders if present. Use the CRT and SCT as normal. If after combat the Cavalry or Vedettes wishing to RBC are still in an EZOC they may retreat one hex if able to do so and combat is deemed to have taken place for all units in the involved stacks.

In retreats all other units may enter Vedette EZOCs *and the Vedette is displaced*. The enemy units may not advance into the hex vacated by the cavalry retreating before combat. A unit can RBC as many times as required.

During this retreat Vedettes may not enter an EZOC of a Cavalry unit. Vedettes may *always* retreat before combat and maybe displaced as often as necessary unless enemy vedettes want to initiate combat. Combat is undertaken as per rule 6.2 above.

**NOTE:** Cavalry and Vedettes may not retreat before combat if stacked with infantry, foot artillery, and/or non-retreating cavalry and/or horse artillery, or if surrounded.



This option allows all cavalry to RBC unless the quicker moving cavalry wish to initiate combat and the fight is only between each forces cavalry, vedettes, horse artillery and leaders if present.

I am sure there are a number 'holes' in the above. It is one thing to know what you mean and another to explain it to others, and be coherent, inclusive, not alter game balance and also confuse other rules. I have used this option in a couple of battles and it appears to work but only had two examples to work with but there are not likely to be many occasions when it is needed.

Any comments whatsoever are most welcome, after all these are is just my thoughts on a rule. Please send to Richard Lawrence <Lawrence.family@tinyworld.co.uk> 🍀



# Napoleon at the Crossroads

Update 19 February 2007

## STANDARD RULES

[96.] On subsequent Game-Turns the delayed Reinforcement may enter at the next mapedge hex in either direction free of enemy units or EZOCs but at the full cost of terrain. ...

### [125.] ZOC Bonds

Note: This rule applies to retreats and pursuits.

### [126.] Zones of Control

A Force that starts a phase in a ZOC Bond may commence movement with a Repulse, or it can simply leave the enemy ZOC without a Repulse paying the 1/2 MP cost.

### [174.] Priorities of Retreat

4) This path may include hexes adjacent to the enemy—*if* there is no alternative path. Losses are not doubled when retreating in an EZOC (because of the 2X scale), *unless* the hex is in a ZOC bond (*see* ¶125). Any force which retreats through a ZOC Bond will suffer double the usual losses for all hexes of pursuit, not just those in ZOCs.

### [204.] Concurrent Pitched Battles

Delay the resolution of retreats and pursuits until all nearby battle rounds have been concluded.

## EXCLUSIVE RULES

### [18.] Unit Manifests and March Tables

The unit manifests specify only the strength for each unit. The March Tables list the units belonging to each leader (organic units, substitute units, vedettes). If there is no leader listed at the top, use a Major General.

[20.] The stars on Major General counters are *not* bonus stars. MGs do not have bonus points.

[37.] Reinforcements are available in Battle Scenarios.

[76.] Freikorps may cut the LOC (*according to* S55).

[78.] (*add at end*) If during a Forced March, the Vedette always retreats before combat.

[145.] Levels of Victory (Campaign Game) and

[183.] Battle Scenario Victory Conditions (*addition*) If the Coalition player has any forces off map on 2 sides of the map during the Coalition Morale Phase, Paris Morale gains +2 spaces. (This Morale improvement only occurs once per game, but is *not* reversed by Coalition forces returning to the map.) If the Coalition player has any forces off map on all 3 map edges during the Coalition Morale Phase, the French Player wins a strategic victory.

[167.] Off Map at Start: Coalition Forces (other than Bennigsen and forces entering on turns 2 & 3), and the French Force of Girard, which begin the Scenario Off-Map, are available to enter the map on any turn anywhere along the appropriate mapedge (*see* ¶142). This also applies to the off-map Supply Sources in Scenario A. Enter them at any time by using the procedure for "Changing the Active Supply Source" (the SS is flipped in step Ia2 and in the next turn's Admin segment it is placed to the new site)

### Off-map Movement of Reinforcements

You may treat reinforcements as "exited" forces [142] and delay their entry, moving them by off-map movement to another entry hex.

[168.] German substitute units and Durutte should be reduced by one SP in Scenarios E-H.

[191.] S/S, Bohemia, Scenario F, should read, "—"

## HISTORICAL NOTES

p. 21—August 26 The fourth paragraph should read, "... the Coalition LOC into *Bohemia*."

Turn Record Track—23 August (add)

Army of Bohemia— Konstantine and Alvensleben

Charts & Tables—Attrition Table Modifiers (add) Paris Morale Modifier (*Excl. Rules* 149).

## MARCH TABLES

Where any leader starts with a force greater than his Command Span the owning player should treat as an Insubordinate Stack.

### French March Tables

Give Oudinot's two divisions 2 SPs each, deducting these 4 SPs from Mortier.

Set-up C: III Corps sets-up in 5323; Brayer, 5625.

Set-ups E-H: Raglovich under a Major Gen. sets up with the French Center of Opns. (guarding trains).

Set-up G: Ney sets-up in (1122); Vandamme (replacement leader) is subordinate to St. Cyr.

### Bohemian Army March Table

Reisner is a 2[1]4 not 7[2]4. Ostermann is a 6[1]4 not 5[1]4.

Set-Up A: Hessen should be a separate force leader, not subordinate to Schwarzenberg.

Setups G and H: Kleist subordinate to Barclay (not Wittgenstein)

### Silesian Army March Table, Setup A:

Blücher sets-up in 6126 (not 6124).

Yorck enters FM Phase, 14 August at 6129 (not 6127).

Langeron at 6130 (not 6129). B and C Set-up at 5627.

Pahlen at Landeshut, 5532 (not 6131)

### North Army March Table, Setup A:

Mittenwalde is 2205, Müllrose is 3405.

## COALITION UNIT MANIFEST, page 1

Merveldt-B should be "4" in set-up B and a "3" in set-ups F, G and H.

## UNIT MANIFESTS, page 2

Reference to "repl. counter" should read "March Div."

## QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Q) If the Unit Manifest shows a unit's strength above its printed max, should we use the printed max or the March Table value? A) Follow the Manifest.

Q) Is Gérard (XI Corps) a Major General? A) Yes, were he independent. He is always on Macdonald's track.

Q) Index points to E183 under Garrisons. Should that include E176? A) Yes.

Q) Is Girard available in the battle scenarios (E167). A) Yes.

Q) Prussian garrison names are not on the map.

A) Those are names of the leaders of those garrison units and they may be placed as stated.

Q) Rule E176 calls for the 3 Prussian garrisons to be setup in Berlin and Crossen; can the Coalition player distribute these entirely as he wishes? e.g. could they place all 3 in a single town?

A) Only one garrison per town. That applies to all garrisons. ☺

## Development of NAC Counters

Mikolaj Lenczewski, Forrest Atterberry,  
Richard Hartland, and Kevin Zucker

*We work over every aspect of the leaders. Unidentified writing is from Mikolaj. He has a tendency toward quick and sure judgements that the older generation lacks. His clarity is admirable and generally helped us toward an answer, but sometimes taken with a grain of salt.*  
NOTE: The discussion works backwards from June to May.

### Corps Commanders and Command Span

From: Mikolaj Lenczewski, 6/6/06

Vandamme 4[2]6 star—what happened? A 2[2]4 Vandamme has turned into a superb army commander, the best French commander in the game after Napoleon? In SoN he was a 2[2]4 so in NaC terms he was just 2[2]2. Now he is able to command three corps when in SoN he was able to command a maximum four infantry divisions. I don't understand it.

I do believe that a command span of 4, which allows him to command two corps, is just enough for an average general/marshal. I think Vandamme should have a command span of 4 just like at the beginning.

re: Marmont's command span 5—reason? In SoN he was 4[3]6 so in NaC terms 4[3]4 ... I think a command span of 4 is just enough.



Oudinot 2[3]6. This guy doesn't deserve more than 4 command span. I don't believe that this will stop players from attacking Berlin. They will realise what happened in reality. Oudinot by no means could

take Berlin himself. He needed some kind of support. I don't believe that making him MUCH better in commanding than he was in reality is good just for 'playability'. He had a problem arriving on the battlefield at Grossbeeren, he had a problem



making any decision without deferring to his subordinates. I think 4 is a maximum for him.

Macdonald is a 4[3]6 because he is Macdonald and Gerard in one? Right?



And we have Murat with 4[3]6 in SoN so in NaC terms 4[3]4 ... again he is made better than he was. He has just arrived from Naples, he was just a 'free marshal' and he was employed by Napoleon.

I don't believe he had any organized staff with him at the time he has arrived? So why 6? He was no good in commanding infantry at all and here player can give him three !! corps and have initiative 4! The best general in the game after Vandamme. And you can send Murat anywhere you want because he has no corps to command like everyone else! He fought well—that's OK. But he was by no means able to command three corps at the same time!



Finally, my 'beloved' Ney. In SoN (autumn with optional rule about Jomini) 3[3]5 so in NaC terms 3[3]3.5 ... here 5! Again, his chief of staff was with Tsar and Ney is even better now? He was command-

ing a large number of troops; but he was commanding them badly, not effectively. Command Span represents troops that are fighting, that are used effectively.

Ney can be given command of four corps and move with all of them, but only those who are commanded effectively can fight. The same argument to Oudinot. They were both commanding big numbers of troops, but they were unable to use them all in battle! That is why I propose 4 for Ney and Murat and Oudinot.

To command many corps and to command many corps effectively is a great difference and I do believe that is what command span is representing. Like Eugene in early 1813. He was given command a lot of corps but could hardly command them all alone....nevertheless he was the army commander.



And with subordinate rating. I see the marshals got 3 since they were hard to give themselves under Someone's command. Why Victor is the only exception with 2? I think also that Mortier

should have 3 since he is Mortier & Drouet at the same time

And for allies. Barclay, Konstantin, Miloradowich, Winzingerode are representing more than one general, so they should have command span 3 at last? There were dozen of more Russian generals in SoN....



Bernadotte is himself + Swedish Marshal Stedingk I do believe? They had both initiative "1" in SoN ... I think it should be left as it was. Oudinot was hardly able to command all of his troops

(same to Ney when he was with the Army of Berlin) and they were both beaten by Bernadotte. But at the same time Bernadotte did nothing to pursue, to gain anything more than fame. He was just moving there and here and in reality was no real threat to the French. I think initiative "1" should be given to him again.

Bülow, Kleist and Yorck were highly adjusted.....? They were all "2" in SoN !! I do not remember hearing anything spectacular about them (except Bülow at Grossbeeren and Tauntzien at Dennewitz).

From: kzucker, 6/6/06

I have read your comments now and I see that they all still apply to the current version that I have just sent you.

When I revised the leaders I did so with your suggested Leader ratings in mind. Just to refresh your memory, you suggested the following:

Ney 3[3]5  
Murat 4[3]5  
Vandamme 5[2]5  
Reynier 3[2]4  
Poniatowski 4[2]4  
Macdonald 4[3]5  
Oudinot 2[3]4

Of these, I have followed your suggestion on Ney, Reynier, and Poniatowski. Now you have second thoughts about Ney. According to my notes you previously proposed 5. I will address these thoughts below.

I think the main problem with your analysis is that a command span of "6" in SoN is equivalent to a "4" in NaC. Not true: Subordination ratings of Leaders did not change.

The ONLY difference is that, for a leader like Vandamme, to command his OWN organic units on his track costs him 2 now instead of 3.

Therefore, a Command Span of 6 in SoN is equivalent to a 5 for Vandamme or Oudinot.

Example: In SoN, Oudinot is a 2[3]6. He wishes to command his Berlin Army:

Reynier costs him [2]

Bertrand costs him [2]

Arrighi costs him [1]

His organic units cost [3.5] Or if he sends the Bavarians away [2.5]

Net Result: He can command Reynier, Bertrand, and his two divisions, but not the Bavarians or cavalry.

Compare: In NaC, Oudinot is a 2[3]6

VII Corps costs him [2]

IV Corps costs him [2]

XII Corps costs him [2]

Net result: He can command exactly the same force as in SoN.

Therefore, the proposition that a CS of 6 in SoN is equivalent to a CS of 4 in NaC is disproved.

Now I will talk to your other points.

I think you'll agree that tactically Vandamme handled his troops very well at Kulm; his mistake was his decision to advance against Priesten, and not to keep some troops along his LOC. But that was the French style of fighting. He followed Napoleon's orders and believed according to his orders that reinforcements were coming up.

Vandamme's force at Kulm:



1st Division [1]

2nd Division [1]

Bde Reuss [1]

Bde Quiot [1]

1st LC Div [1/2]

42nd Div [1]

Total: 5.5. Vandamme needs a 6 to command them all. That is why I gave him a '6.'

Gerard was a Division commander who was promoted to command the corps on 24 August, when Napoleon departed. Almost any division commander could be promoted in that way.

Murat is a 4[3]6 in SoN and in NaC he is the same.

At Liebertwolkwitz on 14 October Murat commanded Victor's II Corps, Poniatowski's VIII Corps, Augereau's IX Corps, IV and V Cavalry Corps, 1 LC div. and one YG Div

This will cost him in NaC-

II Corps, 2

VIII Corps, 2

IX Corps, 2

IV Cavalry Corps, 1

V Cavalry Corps, 1

1 LC div., 1/2

YG Div., 1

Total 9.5, far in excess of his Command Span of 6.

From: Mikolaj, 6/7/06

You are right about Oudinot's command span (and others) however Oudinot, Marmont, Reynier, Bertrand, Mortier, St.Cyr, Souham, Macdonald, Murat—all have "6" command span in SoN. Logically since Oudinot has a "6" command span in NaC they all should have "6" command span in NaC too!

Ney, Lauriston have "5" command span, Vandamme has a "4" command span and Poniatowski a "3" command span in SoN. The only exceptions.

From: kzucker, 6/11/06

Ney has a 6 in SoN. Vandamme needs his 6 to command his actual force at Kulm. Poniatowski has a 4 because of prior discussion (*below*) where you listed his various commands since 1792.

You are unaware that some ratings in SoN were changed in later errata. Reynier and Bertrand became 4's.

Mortier, Victor and Souham = 5. Eugene = 6.

Marmont was important in 1814, which was why he got the 6 originally. But in 1813 I cannot think of any time that he had more than his own VI Corps units to command.

Only Leaders who commanded more than their own corps in 1813 need a 5 or a 6.

From: Mikolaj, 6/15/06

Remarks about the Coalition. Just few comparisons and my notice/comments.

*First SoN / Second NaC*

Napoleon 4[4]10 / 4[4]10

Blücher 4[4]10 / 4[3]8

They were equal in SoN, now they are not...any reason?

Kleist & Bülow 2[2]5 / 4[2]4

A big improvement with initiative.

Also Kleist, Bülow and Yorck had all 5 command spans in SoN, in NaC Yorck has still 5 command span while Kleist and Bülow's command spans were lowered.

Pahlen III 4[1]3 / 2[2]4

Barclay de Tolly 3[2]6 / 3[2]5

Why the top Russian leader was given less command span?

Bennigsen 2[4]4 / 3[4]5

Why his initiative was improved? I never heard about him making anything important in 1813?

Bernadotte 1[4]4 / 2[4]5

He was slower than Austrian army. I don't think he deserves 2 ... his main goal was to spare his Swedish troops as much as possible and he has done it perfectly.



**From: Forrest Atterberry**

This is what I've found for the corps leader's ability to command.

I: Needs a 3 and Vandamme is rated 4

II: Needs a 3 and Victor is rated a 4

IIC: Needs a 2 and I don't see a Leader for them in the counter mix.

KZ: The intention was to have him covered by a Cavalry Major General (Span of 1.5)

Since that won't cover it, I will ask Mark to convert MG Cav 5 to Leader Sebastiani.

III: Needs a 5 and Souham is rated a 6

IIIC: Needs a 1.5 and I don't see a Leader for them in the counter mix.

KZ: the boxed middle number is the subordination rating, and right now there are no units that cost one-half. Will need to change the cavalry divisions to one-half instead of one.

IV: Needs a 3 and Bertrand is rated a 6

IVC: Needs 1 and I don't see a Leader for them in the counter mix.

KZ: Cav Maj Gen =1.5

IX: Needs a 4 and I don't see a Leader for them in the counter mix.

KZ: In order to command his corps unit he's o.k... all he needs is a 2.

Inf Maj Gen =2. The detachable substitute unit wouldn't stay under command anyway.

**from: Mikolaj Lenczewski**

**Bonus Stars**

I really don't understand why you have given bonus stars for Souham and Lauriston? Did they show any special tactical skills or organization (attrition) skills?

KZ: Let's take away their stars. Also, let's make Lauriston a "3" Initiative.

**Initiative Ratings**

Like I said before I see you have strongly lowered initiative ratings of most marshals and yet give a lot of bonus stars. When I read about 1813, it is always said that each marshal fought bravely and with valor, but yet almost no one showed any initiative...so I think this is it.

Vandamme made hot-pursuit after Dresden, he was really active. Doesn't he deserve "3"? Yes, I know he was captured with his corps, but the same Bennigsen was beaten heavily by Emperor in 1807 and still you have given him "5."

KZ: Let's give Vandamme a "4." Remember though that "active" is only half the story. The other half of the Initiative Rating is "the right direction."

**From Memoirs of General Baron de Marbot**

"General Vandamme was a fine and courageous officer who,

already well-known from the earliest wars of the revolution, had been almost continually in command of various Corps during those of the empire; so that it was surprising that he had not yet been awarded the baton of a marshal; withheld perhaps because of his brusque and abrupt manner. His detractors said, after his defeat, that his desire to obtain this coveted honor had driven him, with no more than 20,000 men, to stand rashly in the path of 200,000 of the enemy, with the aim of barring their passage; but the truth is that having been informed by the Emperor's chief of staff that he would be supported by the corps of Marshals Saint-Cyr and Mortier, and been given a direct order to capture Teplice and so seal off the enemy's line of retreat, General Vandamme had performed to obey."

I do believe Vandamme deserves at least initiative "3".

Yes I know he should also care more if St.Cyr or Mortier are supporting him, but like I said Bennigsen in 1807 has got "5" and he has made such stupid error at Friedland.



St.Cyr in my opinion does not deserve "4". He failed to support Vandamme after Dresden. He has done nothing more than 'sitting' around Dresden, maybe he fought well, but as far I remember initiative has nothing with fighting. He should have maybe a bonus star, but not such high initiative...

KZ. Let's reduce him to a "3."

"Subsequent historical research has made it quite clear that as Napoleon was in control of the operations the two marshals were entirely correct in waiting to receive his instructions, as they did not know to where he intended them to go. As for the order to support Vandamme with two divisions, it did not arrive until the 30th, that is to say at a time when the catastrophe had already occurred, and no blame can be attributed to the marshals."

Nevertheless if you want to be a marshal with initiative 4 or 5 you should start thinking—"Hey, there is Vandamme with 34,000 men pursuing the whole Bohemian Army, maybe at least we [St.Cyr and Mortier] should secure his rear.' Orders cannot replace initiative or/and be an excuse.

I do believe St Cyr should have initiative "3". I do believe he should get a bonus star instead...



Marshal Mortier has initiative rating of "3". I do not remember reading about his independent actions? He was just the commander of the Guard which means he was doing only what Napoleon told him.

Why should he have been better than Reynier, Bertrand, Marmont or Victor?

I do believe Mortier should have initiative "2".

KZ: I understand your point about Mortier. However he gets a better Initiative because of the quality and esprit of the troops he leads. They marched 60 miles before Dresden, when Napoleon wasn't directly with them.

**Command Span**

Murat, St.Cyr, Macdonald and Oudinot are all given "6". I have little information about Murat in 1813 so I skip him.

St.Cyr—he was commanding only his corps in 1813 and nothing more (I don't count temporary command of Victor and



part of Guard corps on 26th August). So why "6"? Why should he have been better than Marmont, Bertrand, Victor? He was just sitting there near Dresden. I could say he has begun this campaign in Dresden and there he has ended it ...

KZ: He has to command the garrison, and we cannot ignore his role on the 25th. Petre ranks St. Cyr highly. Let's make him a "5."

Macdonald was commanding his Bober Army, he made a mistake and spread it too much, but anyway I think he was capable to command more than one corps...so I skip him.

And we have Oudinot, who spread his entire Berlin army on few roads and was unable to coordinate it, which ends with disaster at Grossbeeren. Bertrand had to fight alone... In game terms I would say that he was unable to command all four corps. I think he should have no more than "4" command span.

KZ: I hesitate to do this. I agree with your reasoning, but I want the French to try for Berlin as in history. If we give Oudinot a 4, they will be unable to get anywhere. I think, for game reasons, he has to stay a 6.

When did Poniatowski command more than two infantry and one cavalry division...?



In 1792 he was commanding the Polish Army—about 20,000 men (on paper 30-40,000), divided into three divisions).

In 1794 a brief episode in the Polish insurrection.

In 1807 a brief episode, 1807 campaign.

In 1809 he commanded the Polish Army in Duchy of Warsaw—about 20,000 men.

He led a great campaign in Galicia and managed to capture most of it.

In 1812 he was commanding V Corps—40,000 men.

In 1813 he was commanding what was left and gathered from Polish Army...



Bertrand, Reynier were commanding about 20,000, yet they are given command span "4" and Prince Poniatowski only "3"? Prince Poniatowski had also a great experience in administrating, since he was

responsible for the Polish Army in 1807-1812. That would also have impact on 'command span skill'. I do believe Poniatowski should have command span "4". He was one of the best soldiers Napoleon had.

KZ: You are right. These changes are on their way to Mark Simonitch.

In SoN MOST marshals have command span of "6"—this allows them to command up to six infantry divisions, two corps. In NaC it would be "4".

Yet you have given Macdonald, Ney, Murat and Mortier 5 or 6 command span. In SoN terms that would be 7 or 8 command span ... too big I think...or maybe command ratings in SoN were too little? (this comparison is discussed above, at 6/6/06)

Vandamme has in SoN even a "4" command span so in NaC terms he should have command span "3" (a corps + division).

As for Murat 4[3]6—was he that good in 1813 to be able to

command effectively (4 initiative) three infantry corps? He was good with cavalry charges...but three corps?

Mortier has 3[2]6—You mentioned the high quality of Guard troops. I can understand that in terms of initiative, but command span "6"? Whoaaa Old Guard + Young Guard = 4 command span needed + division 1 = 5 command span. I think Mortier should have a maximum "5" command span...

Also if you make Souham a replacement for Ney I think Gerard should be made a replacement for Macdonald, since both Macdonald and Ney are somewhat 'higher ranking' leaders in this game.

We have Napoleon as "Grand Commander."

We have Murat, Macdonald, Ney, Oudinot as "Army Commanders"—I do believe they shouldn't have more command span than "5"—two infantry corps + cavalry corps ... with exception of Oudinot which I have posted in different mail—he should have "4".



"General Reynier, who formed the head of a column, fell in with the enemy, and attacked him, it is said, rather precipitately, wishing to act independently of his general-in-chief, a practice which had become too common in the army." So maybe initiative should be higher?

KZ: Just the opposite!

If a general takes the "Initiative" to go in the opposite direction, that is regarded as an Initiative *failure*!

In this case Reynier was not marching in the opposite direction, but started battle without informing Oudinot about it. So I think he has judged situation wrongly....in the same way Macdonald spread his forces too much at Katzbach and was beaten even yet he is given initiative "4".

The case of Reynier, I would say, is like Vandamme. Both have gone 'wild' and lost because they haven't checked if the rear is secured. In this case Oudinot was too lazy to hurry up and join Reynier.

KZ: Oudinot's Corps was tied up in combat at Trebbin. I have learned not to be hasty in condemning the generals for things that appear obvious from our vantage point. Sometimes there are circumstances we are unaware of.

"But, at all events, it is certain that Marshal Oudinot might and ought to have arrived sooner on the field of battle. It was his duty to have prevented General Reynier from engaging alone, or he ought to have supported him by his other corps when once he was engaged. Instead of that he remained passive, and Reynier fought alone with his Saxons against the whole of Bülow's corps."

KZ: If an officer goes off in the wrong direction—a direction of his own choosing, or on a timing of his own choosing that is in conflict with his superior's orders—then the game treats that as an Initiative Failure. However, other failures, such as failure to scout properly, can also be considered as Initiative Failures. That is, if a Leader fails to obtain intelligence on the enemy and is therefore surprised, and his maneuver ruined, that is treated in the game as an Initiative Failure.

Initiative Failure in the game covers a range of leadership issues, not just marching; but they are issues that have an *impact* on marching. Similarly, Command Span Rating covers all kinds of





issues that can impact on *how* that Leader's Force is arrayed for battle.

Any historical incident that might take place is evaluated in terms of just *four* dimensions: strength, location, timing, and condition. We have made an overall design decision that any matter that does not affect either the strength of the force, its condition on the battlefield, its timeliness in arriving on the battlefield, or its location, is excluded from the design as irrelevant.

Initiative failure doesn't simply mean a leader sits still. That happened less often (except in the Austrian Army). If an officer takes his corps two hexes in the wrong direction and then has to march back to his starting location, that is shown in the game as an Initiative Failure (no move).

We don't want to reward Reynier with a higher Initiative for going 'wild' and losing the battle, because by giving him the higher Initiative we are increasing his chances of arriving in the right place at the right time and winning the battle.

Oudinot's laziness is a separate factor. Actually, his Corps was tired as they had more fighting and a longer march on the prior days (they had to swing wide from their starting place in Baruth). Oudinot was not a strong leader, and he too often deferred to his subordinates (for instance, allowing Reynier to take the middle of the bataillon carrée).

It is cheaper to command a corps than it used to be (usually

costing just 2), where it used to cost 3, 4 or more. The lower Command Spans on the counters are probably better than what's in the Spreadsheet. I have to focus on that and decide.

#### Forrest Atterberry :

There are fewer counters that make up a corps at this scale. In the other CoN games you can switch out divisions between the various corps. Seems to me that you won't be doing that in NaC.

Of course, you can switch strength which amounts to the same thing. You just don't have all the divisions to play with.

Perhaps Joe Snuffy Corps commander can only command one corps. That's all he has talent for. Give him a rating of one. The corps is already defined by color code and he's already been assigned the corps per the setup/scenario instructions.

I guess the question is will a corps unit (counter) composition change much outside of what is already color coded for it during the game?

Sure, you can switch things around. Oudinot *always* has to command XII Corps, but he can detach his Bavarians. Otherwise the strength of Corps sized units will fluctuate from one scenario to the next but we won't see the details.

For the talented commanders their rating would be higher and of course should command other leaders and not just a bigger corps (read more counters) put together during the game.

Macdonald is a 6. He'll command his own XI corps plus Lauriston and Souham. Oudinot is a 6 or a 5 or a 4. He'll command XII Corps plus one other Corps.

#### Mikolaj :

Woaaaa Kevin. I propose initiative "3" for Vandamme and you give him a straight "4." I'll stay with my proposition of "3" which I think is just enough. Oh and Mortier's command span "6". I understand he commanded both Old Guard and Young Guard ?

Let's assume we give Oudinot a command span "4". Look at the North Army generals who are supposed to stop Oudinot. The best have a "5" command span....so he will be able to command HIS corps + some other corps + cavalry major general. So two corps + some cavalry versus Oudinot's corps + some other corps. I think it is fair... even more North Army does not have any cavalry corps at all so a cavalry major general would not be necessary. So 2 corps vs. 2 corps; I think it is fair enough.

As for the Berlin option the French player always (and should) have sent Murat or at least Ney to the north. Oudinot's skills were far too mediocre for him to gain any success. If Ney will move fast as a free leader he can join the Berlin Army just in time.

I do believe Oudinot's skills haven't improved when he got all those corps under his command just because of 'situation & status.' When the player looks at the map he will notice:

- Napoleon is needed to stop Schwarzenberg
- Macdonald is good enough to stop Blücher (just beware of rain).
- Oudinot should never be given a marshal's baton. I have to send Murat as fast as possible, or at least Ney if I really want to capture Berlin (or Mortier with Guard).

Summarizing. I still propose Oudinot's command span at "4" (or at least "5", but "4" would be more historical).

#### Coalition Generals

Bülow, Kleist, Yorck, Wittgenstein have command spans of "5". In SoN they had command spans of "5". Compare to Marmont, Victor, Souham, Bertrand, etc., with command span of "4". In SoN they had command span of "6".

Logical thinking should say the Allied generals have too high a command span.

I can understand the counter of a Russian general is in reality *this* person + one or two other generals that were in SoN, but are not in NaC. Nevertheless this could be right (if I am thinking correctly) in the case of Russian and Austrian generals, but not Prussian! There were Blücher, Kleist, York, Bülow and Taubertzen in SoN and they are *all* in NaC. I do believe Prussian generals should have command spans of "4".

After I have written about Russian and Austrian commanders, that Wittgenstein is *him* + 1 or 2 others generals I realize that is the same way with Macdonald—Him + Gerard = bigger command span 6 and subordinate rating 3. Same to Mortier—HIM + Drouet. Am I right ?

But I again strongly suggest that Oudinot should be 2[2]4. I don't understand also why Ney is 3[3]5. Command span "5" is too

much for this guy (he had "6" in SoN so it would be "4" here...), he has just lost his best chief of staff .... his initiative and command span were lowered in optional rule of SoN.

Same question about Murat 4[3]6—which I asked in previous mail...

#### Forrest Atterberry :

You'll see there are some empty areas for leaders should you decide to use them there. If any of the text is red that means the list conflicts with the unit picture. Some of the unit names have to be shortened due to space on the counter, I still marked them red to be consistent. I've added some additional columns for better proofing. Any questions give me a holler. Is this easier to read or does it make it more difficult?

#### Richard Hartland :

My main concern is the number of bonus stars for French leaders. I think that far fewer should have them. Napoleon, possibly Matmont, Poniatowski, St Cyr, Mortier. As for the Allies, remove the star from Schwarzenberg and give one to Bülow. The star represents (I think) a special (Grand) tactical ability. Few of the French leaders displayed this during 1813 and similarly the Allies. Bülow was responsible for the Allied victories at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz or at least in part, so I am led to believe.

Schwarzenberg's contribution to each battle was a plan for a general attack across a broad frontage with large, widely dispersed columns. So where is the tactical finesse there? Blücher's star is a given, I don't know about Barclay. Vandamme fought well at Kulm so maybe a star for that but his defeat was due to his own lack of Grand Tactical knowhow. Reynier did well at Grossbeeren but was his performance outstanding? Ultimately he got beaten. Bertrand—at Lützen he stopped when he heard the cannon fire instead of marching towards it; at Leipzig he failed to press his advantage against Gyulai so once he had secured Lindenau he stopped. Victor—no incidents of note as far as I am aware.

Macdonald—got his backside kicked at Katzbach due to a lack of grand tactical knowhow, he allowed his forces to get spread too thin, that doesn't warrant a star in my book. The others I don't know. Regarding the counters the most important number (for the counters at least) is initiative so if the numbers are not all of equal font size then the Initiative should be the largest. Also, Allied Commanders (using the 4LB designation here) have the Army shown as an initial after their name (B, S, N). Both Hessen and Taubertzen were leaders (in 4LB terminology again) and thus commanded individual corps. So their counters should be in keeping with other corps commanders and have the corps designation (they do) but not the army initial. Similar with the French—Macdonald was designated as an army Commander (Bober) so like Ney, he handed over direct command of his corps to a divisional commander (Gerard?). So should his ratings and counter reflect this and should there be a counter for Gerard? Oudinot is different as he still commanded his corps in person. French Cavalry— why do we have a leader counter for Latour but none of the others? 🐾





## Manageable Monster

### 1813 doesn't have to be overwhelming

by Mark Owens

*When I first learned that Napoleon at the Crossroads would exclude the Spring campaign, I was a bit disappointed. Given that the game is subtitled "The Highways to Leipzig," there should be no surprise that the Spring Campaign is not present; however it will be included in the "Struggle of Nations II", a more detailed (and twice as expensive) package I am still awaiting breathlessly.*

The *Struggle of Nations'* majestic scope, ingenious system, and many-sided situation introduced me to the 1813 campaign environment. I had not been much of a Napoleonic player to that point, but I was taken by the operational execution. I was fascinated by how the road network, LOC, rivers, and screening affected the operations of the participants. This angle brought the situation into relief as no 'battle game' ever could.

#### The Spring Campaign

Wargamers tend to play aggressively—like their historical counterparts—but not always to their own benefit. In the Spring of 1813 the Coalition handed the French an opportunity for a quick knock-out blow, tough for the French to replicate in the Spring scenario of *Struggle of Nations*. With hindsight, Coalition players can make it almost impossible for the French to achieve.

The most markedly historical start to "Struggle of Nations" I ever had was with a fellow not well versed in Napoleonic history. Though I gave him the background on the campaign, he really just wanted to "get into it", an aggressive confidence based, like the original participants, on the presumed 'end times' of Napoleon after the retreat from Russia. Though I'd explained about the French army on the map, and the major French reinforcements with Napoleon and the "Army of Mainz," he underestimated the threat. My friend thus advanced with confidence while elements of the French army in Saxony united with Napoleon's "Army of Mainz" which forced a battle and narrowed the escape corridor with Zones-of-Control, and thus the Coalition force was defeated and suffered double losses on a long retreat that sent them down the road to Dresden.

The game stuck in my memory because the game "played like history." The roads and the LOCs led the players, myself and my friend, to meet very close to the historical battlefield. Without the caution derived from historical hindsight, my friend massed the strength of the Coalition to meet the French and defend the road to Dresden. I brought the French together and at a location remarkably near the historical battle location of Luetzen, the French administered serious losses and a long retreat on Marshal Bluecher, down the road towards Dresden. The pursuit was on and he thereupon began the long retreat to the Katzbach! The Coali-

tion side was weakened enough and close enough to French forces that they could not break bridges as a player might do from hindsight. Similarly, the bridges weren't getting broken during an 'early' and 'planned' retreat.

So the first problem becomes modeling the belligerence and confidence of the historical Coalition. It would be difficult to really have a "Spring Campaign" unless the Coalition attempts to hold on to some part of the advanced position rather than performing the 'Run Away' defense.

The politics of the Spring Campaign and the Armistice can be involved. For instance, Austrian participation need not be a foregone conclusion. The armistice table in *Struggle of Nations*, based on the morale tracks, provided a way to measure the success of each side and therefore each side's desire to take a 'breather' to improve the LOC and gather APs, men, and horses. It was noted in *Struggle of Nations-I* that if the French are very successful, no matter what the situation was and how badly the 'Armistice' might be desired, the Armistice was less likely to occur. Austrian policy and statecraft might have to be figured into a new "Spring & Armistice" political unit (though in *Struggle of Nations-I*, Austrian participation was automatic once the armistice lapsed).

#### Into the Autumn

*Napoleon at the Crossroads* focuses on the most interesting part of the 1813 campaign. Bypassing the Armistice period *Napoleon at the Crossroads* provides a good one-map view of the massive Autumn campaign.

Historically the French had to win the campaign outright in the Spring, or else find themselves in a precarious situation in the Autumn. Either the Spring campaign would be decisive, with no continuation in the Autumn; or the Spring would contain no knockout blow and the decision would come in the Autumn.

I had *Crossroads* laid out in all its glory and had been reading the 2X Standard Rules and the Exclusive Rules. I thumbed through the various charts and studied the unit strengths. I cut the counters out of the 'tree.' Though I didn't get much game time going, I was following the approach in the front of the rule book, examining the locations of the leaders during the course of the campaign to develop a feel for the situation. The game's components look very "1X", but the movement rate is a bit slower (4 vice 5 for infantry) and the numbers of SPs are pared-down (3,000 vice 1,000 men per point in the 1X Series). Once you begin to use, and adjust to, the numbers for the LOC length, Dispatch Distance, and the corps level combat ratios, you will find yourself moving operations across a broad theater.

It's a challenge for both players. The Coalition can implement the Trachtenberg Plan, withdrawing before an army commanded by Napoleon (if they can determine Napoleon's presence), and advancing on the less-capable marshals commanding other portions of the theater of operations.

Due to the Paris Morale shifts for Dresden and Leipzig, the French will likely want to maintain some presence in Saxony and along the Elbe if at all possible. Given the other ways of scoring "Paris Morale" shifts, particularly Critical Battle victories and Berlin, a successful descent on some portion of the Coalition forces can create offsetting shifts which might provide flexibility to



the French side on the prosecution of the struggle. Of course, if the French Player is provided the opportunity to score these "Paris Morale" shifts without the Coalition countering with their own combat victories and occupation of capitols, then perhaps the French side could accomplish that of which Napoleon dreamed. One of the beauties of the system and of this campaign in particular, is the imposition of the will of one side onto the other, forcing the enemy onto the strategic defensive.

Napoleon's initial plan for a huge maneuver through Berlin and behind the LOC of the Coalition armies passing through Dresden was never successfully executed as the Coalition kept Napoleon off-balance; and the Emperor ended up on the strategic defensive, attempting to parry one thrust after another. Of course, a major goal of the original participants and also that of the players, is to cut the LOC of the other side. The Coalition goal should include seizing Dresden and Leipzig for their Morale bonus, but better yet, Dresden is a supply source, the only French one capable of supplying operations to the East side of the map and the Silesian supply sources, as well as North to Berlin. Leipzig is one of the two 'bottlenecks', due to the road net, through which French West Map edge LOCs must flow. The Coalition, then, can eliminate most French LOCs by marching through Saxony. The French, since they face 3 separate LOCs, can cut one or perhaps two successfully at any one time, but to do so might leave other parts of the region vulnerable.

### *The French had to win the campaign outright in the Spring, or else find themselves in a precarious situation in the Autumn.*

How then should the French proceed? Let us do as Napoleon did long ago, and lay out the map and examine, as he would, where the roads are located and the rivers that block them. With the hex grid, you do not need compass and dividers. Despite being outnumbered and facing converging threats, it is not as dark as it might seem on first glance.

#### **French Communications**

Napoleon planned on taking Berlin, gathering up some garrison forces and then performing a gigantic "Manoeuvre sur la derriere"

The French LOC runs to Dresden in the early going, but with the crossing of the Elbe if not before that is going to change to the western mapedge. Looking at the map the French depots of Altenberg and Leipzig are the two bottlenecks for the six supply sources on the western mapedge.

The French have several options for LOC paths and possible CoO positions based on those paths. Macdonald's position is a problem. It is difficult to mount a movement command-based drive on Berlin while providing Macdonald with the possibility of a movement command. One must therefore decide from the beginning whether to support a drive on Berlin or to support Macdonald way out East.

I'm particularly fascinated by Berlin's availability as a Supply Source ...and the nearness of the 'N' SS hexes. The use of Berlin as a supply source means that a force could remain centered on Berlin and continue to use the AP total to defend the lower Elbe

and threaten any LOC that might cross there, particularly the North army as the LOC has to pass close by. There is every possibility of actually moving the supply source there while garrisoning Dresden and Leipzig, hammering the North army and then returning to the West bank of the Elbe to drive South and perhaps cut-off and destroy over-eager elements of Silesia and/or Bohemian armies.

#### **Berlin as Operational Objective**

Berlin has several advantages as an early operational goal. There is a morale shift, and, at start, you only need four to win the game. If you cannot hold Berlin with sufficient force, the Coalition will regain it and reverse the morale shift. Berlin offers a French replacement bonus, as elements of garrisons off-map are gathered-in. The good news: once gained, they cannot be taken away if Berlin is lost once more. Bad news is, the maximum benefit can be gained only by retaining Berlin, gaining one point per turn, up to 4 turns.

Once occupied by the French, Berlin becomes a supply source. This marks a significant change from *Struggle of Nations-I*. Any force which draws upon this supply source may use the existing AP total for attrition purposes. That means that a force operating from Berlin neither relies upon the West board edge nor the Elbe/Dresden line. As a supply source, it cannot be cut off from the LOC like depots can. Furthermore, the primary SS could be switched to that position if the French wish.

As is the case with most of the Campaigns of Napoleon series, much depends on the opposing side and you must play against the other side. Depending upon the actions of your opponent it is possible that a trap may be set for the Army of Bohemia.

Looking things over, there are several strong incentives to capture Berlin. Napoleon himself intended a major 'Manoeuvre sur la derriere' by going to Berlin and then east to cut-off the Silesian LOC as well as hammering the North army and probably capturing those SS hexes. Moving enough force north probably means the loss of Dresden and possibly Leipzig—with one morale shift for each—particularly from the "Army of Bohemia", whose LOC would be less vulnerable the further north the primary French force moves.

So early on, one must consider Berlin as a goal, and to provide movement commands, the Center of Operations should be positioned to support the movement to Berlin. Unfortunately, the primary road distance from Dresden to Berlin is 38, and costs some 19 MPs. The Center of Operations should go 7 MPs from Dresden, to Senftenberg in 2919. This position leaves the large French commitment to the east without movement commands.

If you don't advance on Berlin early, can you advance on Berlin once the armies get assembled (Bohemian Army comes on board in the South and the Silesians have moved West closer to Dresden or Berlin itself). Position the Center of Operations to support the large forces to the East, either to engage the arriving Silesians or, more likely, withdraw to a more central position within support range of Dresden (to Görlitz, as one can move the Center of Operations to Senftenberg (2919) and be supported there).

## The Coalition View

I consider the Coalition side to have the easier task. Even so, the Coalition needs their own Paris Morale shifts. From the beginning, the Coalition requires 2 shifts to get into the favorable zone and four more to drive Paris Morale off the chart.

How do they manage six morale shifts against the French? The French forces must get defeated with the occurrence of critical battles and the capture of major personalities. The latter cannot be guaranteed due to the roll against initiative, though it could be a bonus if a French force is destroyed. There are two things the Coalition must bear in mind. (1) The more the French move around without accomplishing anything significant, the more they suffer attrition to no gain. The weaker the French army becomes without inflicting losses on the Coalition armies, the better the situation. If the French army depletes through attrition, then accomplishing (2), the defeat of portions of the French forces in detail becomes easier.

How do we accomplish this? The Coalition must succeed on the field against the French army and its leaders, but there exists no cookie-cutter approach, no perfect plan with units at certain positions at certain times. As the original participants, so must you keep alert and informed using vedettes. Try to gauge the temperament\* of your opponent. Threaten points of value to the French player, most important the components of the LOC that provide the ability to keep forces moving without crippling losses.

Withdraw in the face of a gathering force which will likely include Napoleon to organize the Marshals and concentrate combat force as no one else on the board can accomplish. If the French change the LOC in some fashion, adjusting the CO or changing the SS (to Berlin or the West board edge), go there and obstruct the LOC. The French will likely come to you, but be wary of exposure of your own LOC. With depots and generally high initiative, the French don't have to stop moving if the LOC is obstructed. It might be possible for the French to compromise some exposed portion of the Coalition forces. The French, particularly early on in the game, will react strongly to defend Dresden, as it is both the supply source and a Paris Morale shifting capitol city.

Even though the Coalition forces have to assemble in completely cohesive groups (as they have still to enter the map in some cases), it is still useful to mount a threat on Dresden, even if it's a hollow threat with much vedette movement and little follow-through. Play upon the French fears and attempt to derail any operations the French might wish to attempt, such as a forceful move on Berlin.

Use the vedettes aggressively to attempt to ferret the intentions of the French. If it appears the French will choose a strategic defensive and occupy a central position centered on Dresden, then he has handed the initiative to the Coalition. Make plans to injure the French LOC and confine the French side to an ever-narrowing arena in which to maneuver by utilizing the three separate Coalition LOCs to greatest advantage.

## Considerations on Both Sides of the "Crossroads":

Bear in mind the time and space requirements for any planned operation. You may drive the forces hard by utilizing the FM phase and extended march to accelerate the tempo, but there's the risk of attrition inherent there. How much of your force are you

willing to trade for time that will surprise your opponent?

As an example, if you have a force 19 MPs from the destination, and you move your force with standard march only, you can strike in 5 turns, a considerable fraction of the 24 turn campaign game. If you extend march by 3 MPs, you can strike in 3 turns. If you also successfully FM during the opponent's turn twice, 4 MPs each time, you can strike the target in as few as 2 turns. On the other hand, you may have lost a significant portion of the force that arrives at the target to attrition. You must therefore plan your operations, what they are intended to accomplish, and how quickly, with what resources (APs, men, horses) you are willing to trade to accomplish the operation. Sometimes the resources, particularly APs, will not be sufficient to accomplish the operation in the manner you intend. If there exists no immediate threat, then perhaps preserving and accumulating the resources is a better idea for a turn or two.

Remember also, that the OG and YG under the same leader do not count for attrition purposes. A leader, particularly Napoleon, who can organize and command several cranky Marshals, can act as a "fire brigade" with the Guard, crossing vast distances with no attrition. With no attrition, Napoleon could take advantage of every movement possibility—even Extended March if the French Player considers the quantity of APs sufficient to use this way—without damaging the administration of the French army. Napoleon with the Guard, could cover 4 + 4 + 4 MPs every turn as long as Napoleon made his initiative roll in the FM phase and expended 2 APs for a movement command and Extended March. Presuming the French player moves the full 12 MPs, Napoleon could return from Berlin to Senftenberg in one turn and move to Görlitz on the next turn. With Napoleon's 10 command span, he can command five subordinate- '2' leaders with slightly less commanded when one or more subordinate- '3' leaders are in the mix. Napoleon can appear quickly on a scene of crisis and turn a mix of leaders into a potentially very large attacking force that can surprise and defeat a Coalition force. Napoleon in Dresden (in reserve), could reach many positions around the board since the distance, in primary road hexes, from Dresden to Berlin equals the distance between Dresden and hex 6124 (38 hexes), which is a Silesian Army S/S on the board edge. The Schweidnitz Silesian Army S/S (6131), is itself only approximately 42 hexes from Dresden and is also within similar range of Dresden. Unfortunately, Napoleon 'in reserve' in Dresden is not actively leading an offensive and is in great danger of yielding the initiative.

The movement calculations, above, also apply to many Coalition calculations for a concentration of armaments against the French at Dresden, or with any Silesian Army move to the North towards Berlin and the northern reaches of the Elbe. Decide how quickly the move may be completed with sufficient force to achieve some success with acceptable levels of attrition risk. Remember that a turn or two to accumulate APs might make the movement of the armies swifter, as the AP level might permit more intense marching. Of course, the Coalition has neither a leader with a command span like Napoleon's, nor a force to move without attrition such as the French Guard. Coalition calculations

*continued on page 23*

# A Quandary for Kutuzov

Martin Fuica

*In the following pages Martin provides some guidelines on how to play either side in the Sun of Austerlitz, looking in detail into the most important issues such as March Attrition, Commanders, Marching distances, Movements of Forces, etc.*

## Attrition

Attrition is the most daunting of factors in this series. The march attrition table and weather table show that once the Coalition player has accumulated 11 APs (they start with 10), all their forces with fewer than 20 SPs, moving up to 4 MPs during the Movement Phase (and 1-2 MP during the Force March Phase), will have a 30% chance of incurring attrition losses. This takes into account the fact that the morale point changes for capturing political features cannot be acquired by the Coalition player in games starting on 15 November (i.e. capture of Brünn and Pohrlitz) and that mud will only occur on a roll of 3 or 4 during November turns (30% chance) and on a roll of 5 (16% chance) during December turns. Furthermore if the Coalition forces have fewer than 15 SPs, then there will be no attrition losses, assuming no change in the morale level and no Mud during movement. In conclusion, getting your accumulated AP total over 11 AP, and marching whenever possible at the above rates, will allow you to get to the final stages of the Campaign with a sizeable force, instead of depleting your forces marching back and forth before seriously engaging the French army.

## Commanders

The Coalition player starts with forces commanded by Kutusov, Buxhowden, Przybyszewski, Bagration and Liechestein, with Kolowrat and Kienmayer being subordinate to Liechestein, and Langeron subordinate to Buxhowden—one “5” initiative leader, one “3” rated leader and three “2” rated leaders. Therefore at least 4 AP will have to be expended each turn to get a reasonable chance of moving them all, specially when retreating towards Brünn with the French on their heels. Once Konstantin enters the game, 5 AP will have to be expended making things worse.

After having played almost all published games in the series I have always found that one of the main problems for the Coalition forces arrayed against the French is low initiative ratings and scarcity of Administrative Points. This problem is not so acute in this game—so that, by splitting the Coalition army amongst Kienmayer, Langeron, Bagration, Alexander and Kutusov as the main commanders, you will have your forces commanded by one “5” leader, two “4” leaders and two “3” leaders. In this way, by spending two command points (not taking into account reinforcing Major Generals at the latter stages of the Campaign) per turn on Kutusov and Alexander (when he gets within dispatch distance), you will get a fair chance of coordinating the movement of your forces. This can be carried out during the first 1-2 turns as follows:

- Kutusov to maintain his command of 18 infantry SP and 1 cavalry SP (the 2 SP of Essen Division will be placed under a Major Cavalry General).

- Bagration to maintain his command of 5 infantry SP, 1 artillery SP and 2 cavalry SP (the 2 SP of Wittgenstein Cavalry Brigade will be placed under a Major Cavalry General).
- Langeron to put Buxhowden in command of the 14 infantry SP and 4 artillery SP in hex 2516 (the 3 cavalry SP of Uvarov Brigade will be put in command of a Cavalry Major General).
- Kienmayer to put Kollowrat in command of the 16 infantry SP and 4 artillery SP (the 2 SP of Kienmayer Cavalry Division under a Major Cavalry General) in hex 2942.
- Alexander to take over the 7 infantry SP from Przybyszewski.

Once Konstantin enters the game in turn 6, he should join Alexander’s command at Prossnitz, adding his 5 infantry SP, 3 cavalry SP and 2 artillery SP to the existing force (17 SP in all).

On the other hand, having Kolowrat subordinated to Kienmayer and Buxhowden subordinated to Langeron will take advantage of their high command spans with respect to their low subordination ratings (that is for each subordination point you get units worth 2.5 –Kollowrat- and 2.3 –Buxhowden- command points). This will become relevant by mid game when the Coalition should have concentrated around Brünn with the Centre of Operations placed somewhere to the south of Wischau. It will be then that you should be able to get your forces ready for battle along a 2-3 hex wide front bearing in mind that you will certainly need reinforcing either wing or the centre once strengths are revealed during the initial steps of the Combat Phase. In this way you will avoid having any of your wings destroyed or having your centre pierced by a massive French onslaught which might decide the battle against you. By placing Kienmayer in the centre, Kutusov and Alexander on the wings and Bagration and Langeron supporting either of them from behind, you will be able to move any of those two supporting forces into any of those front line hexes without going above the command rating of either Kienmayer, Kutusov or Alexander.

Adding up all the available Coalition units printed maximum strength the overall available manpower to the Coalition player will be around 120 SP (excluding Ferdinand), so that by subtracting about 10 cavalry SP corresponding to Cavalry Major Generals there will leave 110 SP to be split amongst the above mentioned 5 commanders (i.e. about 22 SP per force). Obviously as will be seen later your replacement SP should be kept for the second half of the game when marching won’t be nearly as intense as during the first half of the Campaign due to having both forces already be situated on their staging areas previous to the major battles that will occur from around December 1-2 till the end.

## Administrative Points

Having to expend two command points per turn to get your “3” initiative rated leaders moving is only part of the equation. What about the AP availability per turn with respect to the distance in primary road hexes between your Centre of Operations and the S/S?

The Administrative Point Pool shows that by rolling on the 0-20 hex column you will get 4 AP on average each turn, dropping to 3 AP per turn when rolling on the 21-40 hex column. Thus by subtracting those two AP needed to keep Kutusov and Alexander moving, you will still get a net 1-2 AP per turn which will be saved for future use (battles, unexpected situations, moving reinforcements such as Meerveldt and Essen forward, etc.). You will also find that you will be rolling on the +11 AP column on the March Attrition Table for most of the game so that if your forces are kept below 20 SP as proposed earlier, attrition will be reduced dramatically. In fact getting over 20 AP is not a problem for the Coalition in the decisive last half of the game.

### Centre of Operations and Supply Source

After setting up the French and Coalition forces for campaign game starting on November 15-16, both the S/S and the centre of operations are to be placed. Three things to consider: Dispatch distance, supply distance and LOC. LOC would be the distance between the S/S and the Centre of Operations in primary road hexes. Dispatch distance is traced between your field forces and the Centre of Operations, should be 18 MPs long (assuming a primary road hex cost of 1 MP) and would serve for issuing command points to those forces. Supply distance would be traced between either the Centre of Operations or the supply source or the Depot and the field forces, being active depots those through which LOC is traced (i.e. those placed along the primary road existing between the Centre of Operations and the S/S). The supply distance is also 18 MPs.

Taking into account how your major troop concentrations are disposed at the beginning of the Campaign Scenario and the fact that both Bagration and Kutusov are in the French direct line of advance a few hexes away from Murat and Lannes, I found that by placing the S/S in hex 2501 and the Coalition centre of operations in Znaim all Coalition forces, except the Austrians and those north of Brünn (Langeron and Alexander), will be placed within dispatch distance. This means that the both Kutusov and Bagration as well as the Major Generals nearest to the French army line of advance will be issued command points.

As far as supply is concerned all forces, except Kienmayer's Austrians, will be placed in supply and in the later case, the Pohrlitz depot will place the latter in supply by just marching a couple of MPs along the road leading to Nikolsburg. The rest of the Coalition forces are well behind the lines and therefore out of dispatch distance but still within supply distance (depots in Prossnich, Wischau and Brünn and S/S in 2501), so even though issuing command points at the first stages of the campaign is not possible, attrition will be calculated under the corresponding accumulated APs.

Thus the main idea for setting up both the S/S and CoO would be to make sure that by using command points the Coalition southern forces (Bagration, Kutusov, etc) will be able to withdraw towards the north to avoid battle against the French before they are ready (i.e. before having the chance to concentrate with the rest of the Coalition army on a field of their choosing).

Marching distance

### Size of forces

We have established at the beginning of this analysis that by marching 4 MP during the Movement Phase and 1-2 MP during the Force March segment, the Coalition player will keep attrition losses at a minimum. The latter should only be used when deemed essential due to either bad rolls during initiative (1 or 2 over the initiative rating) or for supporting forces being attacked. This is extremely important as the following balance of forces will show.

Overall the Coalition might gather on Turn 10 a theoretical maximum of 96 infantry SP, 14 artillery SP and 19 cavalry SP divided up as follows:

- Starting forces comprise 62 infantry SP, 9 artillery SP and 13 cavalry SP
- Replacements: 16 infantry SP, 3 artillery SP and 3 cavalry SP
- Reinforcements on or before Turn 10: 18 infantry SP, 3 cavalry SP and 2 artillery SP
- Reinforcements after Turn 10: 9 infantry SP.

Taking into consideration the units printed maximum strength the overall available manpower to the Coalition player will be reduced to 89 infantry SP, 12 artillery SP and 18 cavalry SP. If we want to take full advantage of numbers, this will leave a very small margin for attrition losses.

### Coalition strategy

By taking the previously defined march rate, the main objectives for the Coalition player to accomplish during the first 3 turns of the Campaign game should be :

- a) To get both your forces (Bagration and Kutusov). At this rate Bagration should take 2 full turns to get to Znaim and to blow the bridge on its primary river and then moving on to the northeast of Znaim (hex 1237) and damaging that bridge as well. As for Kutusov he should take about three turns to get somewhere between Lechowicz and Bronisowitz (it should not be more than a march away from Bagration to be able to support it in case of some unexpected situation arising and also supporting Major Cavalry Generals defending the bridges at Erdberg and Hevlin over the Thaya river).
- b) To get your Centre of Operations well behind the Znaim river line (south of Bronisowitz).
- c) To "concentrate" your Russian and Austrian forces somewhere near Pohrlitz (the town of Musoff on the Thaya river could be regarded as the objective to reach at the end of those three turns, having to damage that bridge).
- d) To get Langeron somewhere along the primary road between Brünn and Pohrlitz.
- e) To get the bridges at the following secondary rivers damaged by Cavalry Major Generals: 2942 (Wilfersdorf), 1640 (Jaroslavetz) and 1242 (Jetzelsdorf).
- f) To get the bridges at the following primary rivers damaged: 2232 (Mussof), 1038 (Znaim) and 1237 (Tasswitz).

Once this is accomplished the next step will be for the Coalition forces to get to Brünn from the Znaim-Pohrlitz area. There are two secondary river bridges, Lechowicz and Pohrlitz, that will serve as a



buffer between your rearguard forces and the French advancing corps. Both these two bridges plus the ones at 1835 near Litobratiz, hex 1536 and hex 2130 to the southwest of Gr Niemtschitz should be damaged.

So during the next 3-4 turns the Coalition will be retreating towards Brünn with 2-3 Major Cavalry forces acting as on the roles described above, with Bagration acting as rearguard behind river lines whenever possible and Kutusov and the Austrians being one force march away from him (in the campaign game the French got bold and there were two minor battles to the south of Brünn in which the leading French corps were sent reeling backwards). Also Russian reinforcements (Alexander leading Konstantin's and Przybyszewski's units) will start moving from Prossnitz towards Brünn for concentration.

As far as the Centre of operations is concerned it will take three more turns to get to the south of Wischau for somewhere to the south of Bronisowitz. By placing it near Wischau it will get forces south of Brünn within dispatch distance as well as the reinforcing forces of Essen and Meerveldt. As the Centre of Operation is moved once all command points in the current turn have been issued, the Coalition will only have three turns in which he will have to roll for initiative to get his forces away from the French whereas as the French moves northwards away from their Centre of Operations they will have to roll on initiative every 2-3 turns. Therefore by keeping track of the French Centre of Operations and the distance between it and major French troop concentrations, you might guess when it is best to move the Coalition Centre of Ops.

Now it will be the time to take the decision that will define the strategies of both players for the last half of the game:

**Option 1:** Have Kienmayer, Alexander and Kutusov defending the Schwarzwawa river line to the south of Brünn (centred on the town of Chirlitz) with Bagration and Langeron behind them to be able to reinforce any two of them (rivers are affecting terrain so a refuse battle chit can be chosen by the Coalition player). Some vedettes and/or Major Cavalry generals will have to be placed on the flanks. By then Kienmayer should only have Kolowrat in its organisation display, Alexander should only have Buxhoden in its organisation display and Kutusov will have a maximum of 5 subordination points worth of units in its organisation display. In this way Bagration and Langeron (subordination rating of three) will be able to reinforce any of those three forces. Optionally defend Brünn by placing 8-10 SPs inside under either Liechestein or Konstantin.

**Option 2:** Give up Brünn without a fight to defend along the 2120, 2220 and 2321 line (Kutusov, Kienmayer and Alexander respectively) with Bagration and Langeron on the 2219 and 2320 hexes respectively, leaving an Infantry Major General in 2119 and some strong cavalry (3SP) defending the southern approaches to the town of Austerlitz.

Whatever option is chosen including many others not reflected above, during this last 9-10 turns of the game the Coalition player should keep in mind six factors:

- Once the Austro-Russian forces do not occupy Brünn, the Negotiation Table rolls will commence.
- The French will be ill advised to start major battles before Davout reaches the field of operations (about 27 MPs) which should occur on turn 10-12. So you should have until then to organise your forces, replace combat and attrition losses with replacement points, etc.
- The French have to channel their advance along the Brünn-Wischau-Olmutz road (no chance of flanking operations) so it is up to you to choose your own battlefield..
- Once the game reaches this point, marching will not be a factor towards attrition so replacement points should then be added up to take your divisions near their maximum strength previous to the major battles that will come.
- Once major battles start, critical battles should be avoided unless the SP count loss is going against the French player or you are exchanging losses on a 1 to 1 ratio. Wischau and its river lines is a good rallying point if things on the south are not going well for the Coalition.
- Battles will take place along a 2-3 hex front at most so that by maintaining two significant forces behind the forces occupying the centre and flanks on the front line, you will be able to reinforce at least two of the three stacks to prevent any massive French onslaught against your line that might break it changing the course of the battle.

#### Role of Cavalry Major Generals

Cavalry Major Generals have a very important role to play apart from screening your main forces from vedettes and enemy Cavalry Major Generals. First by looking at the map, it can be seen that Brünn should be the main staging area for the French army before attacking the Coalition forces somewhere behind the Schwarzwawa River. It is important to note that there are 3 secondary and one primary rivers before reaching Brünn, and that it takes only 2-3 MP to damage a bridge whereas it takes 4-5 MP (one full march) to repair it. By using Major Cavalry forces to damage bridges you will force the French player to slow to get them repaired so as to get a clean route between their Centre of Operations and their S/S. On the other hand by damaging bridges along the Florindsdorf-Nickolsburg-Pohrlitz route you will delay the advance of Davout's Corps by making him expend additional MP and by disrupting dispatch distance. The other important role for Major Cavalry Generals will be to delay the French advance northwards by leaving them on clear hexes adjacent to the primary road hexes. In this way you will force the French player to move away from road hexes to repulse these cavalry forces having to expend 2 MP each time this is done (one to get on clear hex and one to get back on the road).

#### Historical outcome versus proposed strategy

In comparing the above strategy with the historical moves carried out by Kutusov, whereas Kutusov evacuated Znaim on November 16, the proposed strategy will still see Bagration around Znaim on November 19. After that on November 19-20 the French had entered Pohrlitz and Brünn, during November 21 through to 28 the French consolidated around Brünn and stayed there until November 29 before moving forward over the Schwarzwawa river line. In the meantime the Coalition forces had reached Olmutz on November

21-22 and stayed there until November 27-28, reaching Austerlitz on December 1-2. According to our proposal the Coalition forces will fully concentrate behind the Schwarzwawa river line (50 miles to the south of Olmutz) by November 29-30 and will avoid a 50 hex trip all the way to Olmutz and back to Austerlitz. To enable this, the French should not get hold of Brünn and should not be over the Schwarzwawa river before December 1-2 at the earliest, in case the Coalition decides to defend it (Option 1) and the French decide not to wait for Davout. In case the Coalition decides to give battle near Austerlitz without defending the Schwarzwawa river (option 2), this will take place on December 2-3 (if the French decide not to wait for Davout) or December 5-6 if Davout is to join the attack.

Although the net result would be about the same as far as the date and locations in which the major confrontation took place, there are still significant changes between how the game will develop and how history unfolded. This is mainly due to the fact that whereas Kutusov panicked and both marched towards Olmutz at a very high marching rate (55 primary road hexes with 10 rivers in between in 8 days or 4 turns, averaging 9 MPs per turn) incurring high attrition losses (on average 8 SP per 20 SP force) and didn't prevent the French advancing, not bothering to slow them down using typical rearguard tactics, you as a Coalition player will see things in a different light and act accordingly.

Therefore we can expect to see that the manpower available to the Coalition player will be significantly higher by using the proposed strategy as well as putting the French player in a difficult situation by delaying tactics and sharp rearguard skirmishes.

## Increasing Difficulties for Napoleon

### March Attrition

As the same assumptions that apply to the Coalition player are also applicable to the French player, it is clear that forces should have a strength lower than 20 SP. In their case the fact that almost all commanders will have a Bonus Point will reduce the chances of incurring attrition losses so theoretically they could march farther than the Coalition. Nonetheless the facts that the French start with only 3 AP and cannot roll on the Administrative Point Pool during the first turn, and that the French player will have to move his Centre of Operation towards Brünn in the first 9 game turns will offset this advantage.

### Size of forces

On the other hand, overall, the French player might gather on Turn 10 a theoretical maximum of 82 infantry SP, 11 artillery SP and 16 cavalry SP divided up as follows:

- Starting forces comprise 40 infantry SP, 1 artillery SP and 9 cavalry SP
- Replacements: 14 infantry SP, 2 artillery SP and 1 cavalry SP
- Reinforcements on or before Turn 10: 28 infantry SP, 6 cavalry SP and 8 artillery SP
- Reinforcements after Turn 10: 7 infantry SP and 2 cavalry SP.

## Commanders

Taking into consideration the units' printed maximum strength, the overall available manpower to the French player will be reduced to 69 infantry SP, 10 artillery SP and 17 cavalry SP. As for the Coalition, the French forces should be optimised as far as commanding leaders are concerned. Murat, Lannes, Napoleon and Davout should be the four major formations in the game, having Soult as subordinate leader for Murat and Bessieres as subordinate leader for Napoleon. Bernadotte's divisions should be split amongst the other corps as his low command and high subordination ratings does not make him worth using.

The initiative ratings of these four leaders (4 for Murat and 5 for the rest) will allow you to keep moving under initiative whenever your Centre of Operations is inactive (once for each 2-3 turns, depending on how fast your forces advance) and will require the expenditure of 1 AP for Murat per turn (not taking into consideration either reinforcing Major Generals or Cavalry Major Generals). This is important insofar as the French start with only 3 AP and cannot roll on the Administrative Point Pool during the first turn. So getting the accumulated AP up to 11 asap will be one of the major concerns for the French player during the first 3-4 turns.

So taking into consideration the fact that adding up all the available French units printed maximum strength the overall available manpower to the French player will be around 100 SP (excluding forces after Turn 10), subtracting about 10 cavalry SP corresponding to Cavalry Major Generals will leave 90 SP to be split amongst the above mentioned 4 commanders (i.e. 22.5 SP per force). Obviously as will be seen later your replacement SP should be kept for the second half of the game when marching won't be nearly as intense due to having both forces already situated on their staging areas previous to the major battles that will occur from around December 1-2 till the end.

## Centre of operations and Supply source

As for the French line of advance, two avenues are open to them:

- a) If the S/S is placed in Vienna (Florinsdorf) they can advance northwards either following the retreating Coalition forces through Znaim, Pohrlitz and Brünn or moving back towards Florinsdorf and then northwards to Lundenburg and Brünn.
- b) If the S/S is placed in Krems they will have to advance northwards following the retreating Coalition forces through Znaim, Pohrlitz and Brünn.

There are three major factors to be taken into account:

- Davout Corps will enter the game by Florinsdorf so if the supply source is placed there we will ensure supply along the Florinsdorf-Nickolsburg stretch of road without having to resort to forage.
- The 0-20 and 21-40 columns on the Administrative Point Pool for placing the S/S at Krems are more restrictive than the columns corresponding to the S/S at Vienna as far as accumulating APs on a turn basis is concerned. So whereas the S/S at Vienna will produce on average 4 AP (0-20 hex column) and 3 AP (21-40

hex column), the S/S at Krems will produce 3 AP (0-20 hex column) and 2 AP (21-40 hex column).

- **Placing the S/S at Krems you will get 3 depots in the LOC once the French player occupies Brünn whereas by placing the S/S at Vienna you will get 5 depots in the LOC from Brünn. Therefore you will be able to roll on the 0-20 column sooner as your Centre of Operations nears Brünn.**

So if option (a) is chosen, as far as setting their centre of operations, Stockerau seems to be the best location for both maintaining your S/S between your forces and the Coalition as well as putting your reinforcements within supply distance (specially Bernardotte with a Initiative Rating of 3).

### French Strategy

The French marching order should be a screen of vedettes in front, behind which Cavalry Major Generals should be placed with Murat and Lannes on the first line and Napoleon behind to reinforce either of them. The 2 SP Cavalry Major Generals will be used both for screening forward, supporting the vedettes in combat and repairing damaged bridges as well as supporting the flanks of the main forces as they engage in combat against major troop concentrations.

Once Davout joins the army, it will either join Lannes on the forward line with Napoleon and Murat behind them or will make a three corps front line with Napoleon and /or Bessieres on the second line. The French plan of campaign should be as follows:

**Turns 1-8:** the main objectives for the French player to accomplish during the first half of the game will be as follows:

- a) get both your forces along the Pohrlitz river line and your Centre of Operations to the south of Pohrlitz.
- b) get your AP total above 11 to be able to roll attrition using the +11 Column on the March Attrition Table. This will be difficult as the Centre of Operations will be inactive 5 full turns if (a) is to be accomplished
- c) Take Brünn if the Coalition forces have abandoned it. Otherwise concentrate on the south of Brünn behind the Schwarzawa river.

**Turns 9-16:** Once Davout enters the game, you should either wait for him to concentrate with your main field army, as this will give you time to increase your accumulated AP for the battles to come, or you should start moving aggressively against Brünn depending on what the Coalition player does. Anyway as soon as Davout reaches dispatch distance, you should use extended march to get him forth by turn 10 at the latest.

From here on the French should try to engage in battle against the Coalition forces as they will have less than six turns to defeat them decisively, hoping for the Guard (can be staked at least twice due to the 2 infantry replacement points that the French player will get throughout the game) and the French leaders' Bonus points to win the day by first breaking the Coalition battle line, either at one of the wings or the centre, and then pushing the rest back. One drawback for the French player will be the weather. It should be noted that the French are outnumbered in infantry by about 25% so that exchanging SP won't do. ☹

### Design Analysis (cont'd from page 18)

of march distances and arrival times must take into account the less-capable leaders in those armies.

The Bohemian army must time its concentrations against French actions and coordinate its actions with the other armies. The Army of Bohemia represents a big hammer, placed close to the French initial S/S of Dresden and with S/S alternatives to provide a major threat to Leipzig and Altenburg (bottlenecks on the road net from the West Edge S/S hexes), the West edge S/S hexes themselves, and the West bank of the Elbe to interrupt the tow path. There is only one S/S hex the Army of Bohemia doesn't threaten, and that is the one traced "to Magdeburg."

### Conclusion

NAC provides a higher-level view of the 1813 Autumn campaign, filled with the same decisions familiar to players of the *Struggle of Nations*, placed in a taut package with fewer turns, units, and 'table space', but no less enthralling in the complexities of devising a strategy to achieve a notable victory. ☹

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### In this Issue ... (cont'd from page 2)

For some gamers, wargaming = combat, easily losing sight of the fact that Napoleon lost 200,000 men to attrition in 1813, but only about 70,000 in all combats up until the day before Leipzig. Battle was the least of Napoleon's problems.

In the Campaigns of Napoleon series, if we decided to make some troops worth 500 (or 900) men per SP instead of 1,000, these troops would lose strength to attrition faster than poor troops (on a man-for-man basis), because attrition depends upon the number of SPs in a force, and a "larger" force loses more men: the reverse of the effect you should have.

As soon as you begin making judgments about whether 500 of these troops are worth 900 or 1,000 of those, it's very arbitrary. A thousand is 1,000 is also arbitrary but it comes out in the wash. Many people have seen that the troops in the Imperial Guard were better than the National Guard troops. But at the outset we decided to bring out in other ways the reasons why those troops were better. For instance, the Imperial Guard is impervious to attrition—you see this makes them quite more powerful in the long term, because they don't melt away like other troops. Remember that mass x velocity = impact. Quicker troops can fight more battles and can reach the battlefield ahead of the enemy.

OSG's grand tactical games have allowed for some deviation from 1SP = 1,000 men. Only a little difference is allowed in the *Days* series, more so in the *Last Battles* series. That is because (1) at these lower scales attrition is not present; (2) Battle looms larger because these games focus upon the period of major battles; and (3) Except for the Guard, all troops maneuver pretty much the same. Therefore at operational and strategic levels, the difference in troop quality disappears. Only when troops are in battle do their qualitative differences show up.

In the Napoleonic era these qualitative differences are due to only one factor: training and experience. Troops who have never seen combat before can be shaky. Troops who are trained to quickly change their formation depending upon the immediate situation are luckier than troops who have less facility. ☹



# NAB Solitaire System

Mark Herman

*This system is designed to enable someone to play any of the Napoleon At Bay series in solitaire mode with the Vedettes. The rules are intended to bring a bit of uncertainty to playing solitaire and offer a rationale for using basic Napoleonic screening and support march formations. This system is not an ironclad set of rules without exceptions. These rules are easily circumvented if desired. If this is the case do not use them.*

(1) All units are played face up and visible. When a moving force (normal or force march) enters the ZOC of a non-moving force (hereafter known as the contact force) that has no enemy force already in its ZOC or adjacent to it, the moving force determines whether the contact force is actually in the hex or is substituted for a nearby friendly force (hereafter known as the supporting force). This is known as 'fixing' a force's location. When more than one supporting force is eligible, choose the force that is closest in movement points with a die roll adjudicating ties. **Note:** When a moving force is force marching and attempts a repulse, the 'fixing' procedure is used exactly as it would be used for a moving force using a command or initiative.

(2) The results of 'fixing' a force's location are either: a) the contact force is really at that location or b) another nearby support force is substituted for the contact force. Once a force's location has been 'fixed' it cannot be substituted for another force while it remains adjacent to an enemy force, whether it is or is not in an enemy ZOC, because the force's position has been 'fixed' to that location.

### (3) Location 'Fixing' Procedure

Roll one die. On a die roll of:

1-3 = The contact force remains in place, continue the phase.

4-6 = The contact force is substituted for a support force that is within 10 hexes (1x series), 5 hexes (2x series), or 3 hexes (5x series) of its location. Garrison units, Bridge Trains, and Centers of Operation do not constitute a force for this purpose.

### Die Roll Modifiers:

1. If the moving force contains a cavalry SP or a vedette and the contact force does not contain a cavalry SP or a vedette, subtract 2 from the die roll.

2. If both the moving force and the contact force contain a cavalry SP or vedette, the side with more cavalry/vedette strength points subtracts 1 (moving force) or add 1 (contact force) to the die roll.

In case of ties, no die roll modifier.

3. If the contact force contains a cavalry strength point or a vedette and the moving force does not contain a cavalry strength point or a vedette add 2 to the die roll.

4. If neither force contains any cavalry strength point or a vedette there is no die roll modifier.

(4) When a unit substitution is determined by the 'fixing' die roll and there are more than one potential supporting force within range determine the appropriate force randomly. To substitute a supporting force for a contact force physically switch the forces. If the force chosen for substitution is a multi-hex force, the entire force is arrayed in the new location with each component of the force placed in the ZOC of the moving force, if possible. If not, player's choice. The contact force that originally generated the 'fixing' procedure can be placed in any of the multi-force hexes or if it is itself a multi-hex force array it in the new location in a logical manner. If for any reason a series of factors conspire, such as terrain, to make the substitution illegal, either choose another force or do something reasonable. If no substitution forces are within range the force is 'fixed'.

(5) After all movement and 'fixing' of forces is complete execute the combat phase normally.

### Design Note

The design intent, at a high level of abstraction, is to capture the interaction of the opposing cavalry screens as represented by the Vedettes. The notion is that if the moving side has more cavalry than the non-moving side, then their cavalry is likely to penetrate the screen and find and fix the real force. If the non-moving side has more cavalry then it is less likely that the screen will be penetrated making it more difficult to fix the location of the enemy. The fact that the forces switch locations is just a simple mechanic, instead of going through some detailed choreography that simulates the entire evolution of the situation.

### Example (see Table below)

*Series 5X Highway to the Kremlin*

Each example will use the same section of map. The moving force will always begin in Vilnius (W1920), the contact force (the force whose ZOC the moving force enters) will begin in Asmjany (W2121), and the supporting force (one hex) begins in Smorgoni (W2421) which is three hexes from Asmjany. If the supporting force is a multi-hex force then it occupies Smorgoni and the adjacent SE hex (W2522).

**Key:** Fr=French, Ru=Russian, Inf=Infantry, Cav=Cavalry, Mx=Mixed Infantry and Cavalry

Moving Force	Contact Force	Support Force	Outcome
Fr Inf Only	Ru Vedette	Ru Inf	1d6=3+2 (only Ru has Vedette)=5, Vedette and Ru Inf switch places
Fr Mx w/2 Cav SP	Ru Vedette	Ru Inf	1d6=3=1 (superior Fr Cav)=2, Vedette remains in hex
Fr Cav w/1 Cav SP	Ru Cav w/ 2 Cav SP	Ru Mx	1d6=3+1 (superior Ru Cav)=4, Vedette and Ru Mx switch places
Fr Inf Only	Ru Vedette	Ru Mx (2-hex force)	1d6=3+2 (only Ru has Vedette)=5, Vedette and Ru Mx switch places*

\* with part of force placed in hex W2121 and part in a hex adjacent to W2121 and adjacent to the Fr force