


# NAPOLEON AT LEIPZIG™

*The Battle of Nations  
and the Retreat to Hanau  
October, 1813*

LIEBERTWOLKWITZ, WACHAU-  
MÖCKERN, LEIPZIG and HANAU

**Scenario Information,**

## *Study Folder*





# NAPOLEON AT LEIPZIG

## FIFTH EDITION

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*Die Deutschen Befreiungskriege—Deutschlands Geschichte von 1806-1815*, 1907.

Pflugk-Hartung, J. v.: *1813-1815, Illustrierte Geschichte der Befreiungskriege*, 1913.

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**GAME COMPONENTS:**

3 Map sheets: 22" x 34" x2 and 17" x 22" x1

2 Counter sheets: 560 die-cut playing pieces

2 Booklets: System Rules, Study Folder

15 Player Aid Cards: TRC x5 (French x2, Coalition x2, Hanau x1), Set-up x5 (French x2, Coalition x3), Casualty x2, Weather, Reorganization, Combat Results

• Deck of 100 Cards

• Booklet of Card Instructions, 11" x 17"

• Combat Tables Folder, 11" x 17"

• Orders Slip Sheet/Sequence of Play

• Victory Worksheet

• Game Box

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## 25.0 SCENARIOS

**Napoleon at Leipzig** includes four scenarios, as well as a Campaign Game that links them. Players select a scenario to play, and then refer to the Scenario Information and the Initial Set-up Cards (25.2) to set up the game.

### 25.1 The Scenario Information

Sections 27.0— 31.0 provide Scenario Information.

27.0 Liebertwolkwitz, 14 Oct.

28.0 Wachau-Möckern, 16 Oct.

29.0 Leipzig, 18 Oct.

30.0 Hanau, 29-30 Oct.

31.0 Campaign Game

**25.11 Game-Turn Record:** For the Leipzig Scenarios (Liebertwolkwitz, Wachau-Möckern, and Leipzig), each player has a 2-page Turn Record Card (TRC). An additional one-page TRC is provided for Hanau (total of 5 pages). The Game-Turn marker is placed on the turn designated as the Scenario Start.

**25.12 One-Day and Longer Scenarios:** Players may play either the individual Leipzig Scenarios or the Day of Battle or Approach to Battle Scenario for Hanau (26.5). Approach to Battle allows you to position your forces for the battle to come. It is recommended to begin your exploration with one of the One-Day Scenarios.

**25.13 The Campaign Game:** The Campaign Game (31.0) that links the battles, can start either on 14 or 16 October and may end on October 19th or may continue through the Battle of Hanau (30.0). Depending upon the level of victory in the Battle of Liebertwolkwitz, the winning player may draw "Bonus Cards" on the second turn of Wachau-Möckern, etc. Score this at the end of the 6PM turn on 14 and 16 October and at the end of the game on 19 October.

**25.14 Combat Units:** The troops of various nations are color-coded as follows.

**COALITION PLAYER FORCES:**

- Austrians (white)
- Prussians (light blue)
- Bavarians (green)
- Russians (brown)
- Swedes (light yellow)
- British (warm red)

**FRENCH PLAYER FORCES:**

- French regular (sky blue)
- Polish (crimson)
- Guard (dark blue)

**FRENCH PLAYER MINORS (21.2):**

- Badenians (blue-green)
- Italians (white with green stripe)
- Westphalians (feldgrau)
- Württembergers (dark blue)
- Hessians (gray)
- Saxons (chamois)

### 25.15 French Army Nationalities

In addition to French troops, the French Player controls Polish (VIII), Italian (15<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> Divs.), and German-speaking forces—Saxon (VII), Württemberg (38<sup>th</sup> Div., 25<sup>th</sup> cav.), Westphalian (Henin, 31<sup>st</sup> Div.), Hessian and

Baden forces (39<sup>th</sup> Div), as well as some mixed units (25.16). These nationalities are Friendly to the French Player and behave like French units for all purposes, including command. EXCEPTION: Demoralized Minor Ally units must pass an Initiative check before reorganization (21.2); Saxon Defection Card No. 20 (Coalition).

**25.16 French Player Units of Mixed Nationality**

The Baden vedettes of the French forces belong to the 23rd LC (Beurmann). The 2nd Italian Chasseurs (vedettes) belong to the 10th LC (Jacquet). The 2nd Old Guard division has Italian (Rousseau) and Polish-Saxon elements (Rottembourg). These units have unique coloration. IC/Bordessoulle (1HC) includes the Saxon Cuirassiers. For detailed info, see the Initial Set-Up Charts.

**25.17 Coalition Nationalities**

The Coalition Player controls all Russian, Prussian, Austrian, Swedish, Bavarian and British forces.

**25.18 Russian Infantry Corps**

A Russian Infantry Corps is equivalent to a division for Stacking purposes (3.22). Units all belonging to the same Russian Infantry Corps may stack three to the hex without a leader present.

**25.2 Setting Up the Scenarios**

All units set-up as Hidden Forces.

**25.21 Initial Set-up:** The Units to set-up are listed on the Initial Set-up Cards. The Coalition Player sets up first. The Initial Set-up specifies the location for each unit. This may be modified by Mode Cards (24.5). Units listed with an (\*) set-up on their reduced-strength side. They are treated as having been eliminated and already reorganized. If marked "elim" or "•" they are not placed in the PEU box, but are out of play; if ALT see 25.52.

**25.22 Hex Numbers:** The hex numbers show where units were historically located at the start of the scenario (25.42). Place all combat units and leaders directly on the map in the hexes specified. The set-up may include overstacked hexes; before play begins displace the excess units to adjacent hexes at the owning player's choice (not in an EZOC). The Leipzig map has two panels: N=North, S=South. When the north map is overlapped onto the south map, hex numbers that end in 0001S are equivalent to 0034N. EXAMPLE: Hex 5101S (Steinberg) is equivalent to 5134N.

**25.23 Reinforcements** (25.5): Reinforcement arrival is listed on the TRC as modified by the play of Arrival Cards (24.7). If playing without the cards (25.52).

**25.24 Pontoon Trains and Baggage Trains:** Availability of pontoon trains is specified in the scenario information. Available Pontoon Trains must be set-up within [7] hexes of any friendly Commander (25.71).

All Baggage Trains set-up within [7] hexes of any unit in their respective formation or enter as reinforcements *behind* the main body of their corps, at the back of the column, unless otherwise specified. French and Coalition corps generally have their own dedicated baggage trains (below).

- If a train is mentioned in the reinforcement schedule it enters as specified; or...

- If the formation has reinforcements the baggage should arrive last during the same turn as the non-divisional artillery (corps assets of the same formation); or Determined by Card Play (25.71).

- If a formation's non-divisional artillery does not arrive, its baggage train does not arrive either.

Blücher's Army of Silesia (Russian VIII, OS and L, and Prussian I Corps) has **no** baggage trains unless Card No. 16 is played (25.73). Individual units (not officers) of the Army of Silesia are exempt from the regular Out of Supply Effects (17.2) as long as they remain within 4 hexes of Blücher. The moment they move beyond that distance they are out of supply and subject to the effects of demoralization.

The French IIC, IIIC, and IVC (Cavalry) Corps have no baggage trains. Units of these corps can trace supply to any Friendly baggage train or Supply Source within reach (18.21). The French Guard baggage train is for units of the Old Guard and the Guard Cavalry Corps. The Young Guard baggage train is for both Young Guard Corps.



**25.26 Young Guard Officers:** Oudinot and Mortier may each place units belonging to *any two* of the four Young Guard divisions in command at one time.



**25.27 Leaders:** Leaders set-up in the hex specified, or (at owning player's choice) Commanders may set-up with any Friendly force; Officers in any hex containing units of their Formation. Leaders ignore Mode Cards. EXCEPTION: Card 2, *Late Start*. Leader cards may be played as "inapplicable" (24.35) prior to the named leader's arrival.



**25.28 Arrighi de Casanova:** General Arrighi, officer of the IIIC Corps, was assigned to command Leipzig's Observation Corps, hastily created with new recruits and parts of his own cavalry corps, as he was the nearest officer to Leipzig and the allies were advancing.

Arrighi can command either the IIC or the LO on any given turn, but not both at once.

**25.29 Vedettes:** Vedettes may be deployed at the beginning of a scenario at the owning player's option, anywhere within five hexes of their parent unit (not in an EZOC). The *second* player deploys any/all his vedettes first, then the *first* player deploys his. The cavalry parent unit(s) for deployed vedettes are placed in the Holding Box.

### 25.3 Creating the Hanau Counter Mix

#### 25.31 Coalition Hanau Countermix

Wrede's Bavarian and Frimont's Austrian V Corps units only appear in the Hanau Battle game (30.0). No other Coalition units appear in the Hanau Battle game. Keep the Hanau-only units and officers separate from the rest of the Coalition units.

#### 25.32 French Hanau Countermix

Only certain French units appear in the Hanau battle. These have an entry for 29 and/or 30 October on the Initial Set-up or the TRC. *All* Saxon, Baden, Westphalian, Hessian, and Württemberg units are out of play.

### 25.4 Scenario Information Detail

The following information is provided in 27.0—31.0.

#### 25.41 Card info:

- *Mode Cards at Start*—specifies the number of cards to draw on the first turn only.
- *Card Deck*—remove specified cards from decks (24.2). Disregard if not using the cards.

**25.42 Initial Set-up:** These cards specify a location for each unit on the map at the start of the Scenario. Additional forces may arrive as reinforcements as shown on the TRC.

**25.43 Special Rules:** Rules that apply only to this battle. Additional Special Rules apply to all the battles that take place on the Leipzig maps (25.7).

**25.44 Victory Conditions:** Victory Points (26.1) are awarded for control of places on the map. Certain VP locations that *do not* count in this scenario are listed.

### 25.5 Reinforcements

All regular reinforcement units are listed on the Turn Record Track. (Reinforcement entries are not listed on the Initial Set-up Cards.) Reinforcements enter at the mapped hex specified on the Turn Record Card. All units of the formation enter on the same turn unless listed separately, or subject to card play, depending on size of formation (25.53). All reinforcement units are *in supply* for the turn of entry.

**25.51 Alternate Reinforcements:** ALT Reinforcements are listed in the Scenario Information by group

number. One numbered group of friendly Alternate Reinforcements appears for each Alternate Reinforcements Card (No. 29) played. ALT groups must appear in order of priority starting with #1. Each time a group of ALT Reinforcements enters, the enabling card is *removed from play* permanently after being scored.

If not using the cards—roll *two* d6 during the Command Movement Segment of every Recovery Turn: on a result of 2 or 3, you may enter the next group of Alternate Reinforcements listed; if you roll a 4–12, there is no result. If you roll a 2 or 3, your opponent can roll 2d6 to delay the alternate reinforcements; the attempt is successful if he also rolls a 2 or 3.

**25.52 Hidden Reinforcements:** All Reinforcements enter the map as Hidden Forces. Vedettes may enter instead of their parent LC units, or may be deployed from their parent Mixed Type units.

**25.53 Deploying Off-Map Reinforcements:** For multi-hex forces, prior to entry, all additional stacks after the first are deployed off-map in a column, beginning with the leader at the front of the column, and ending with the baggage (25.24). Reinforcements can enter in road march at the owning player's option.

**25.54 Arrival at an Enemy Supply Source:** When reinforcements arrive at an enemy Supply Source, that hex stops being an enemy Supply Source for the rest of the game. The hex is not considered captured and there is no VP score for the Supply Source.

### 25.6 March Orders

One March Order per player may be issued prior to the start of any scenario, to any friendly force in play on the map, *if* a friendly Commander is on-map at the start of the scenario (20.1).

**25.61 Pre-Programmed March Orders:** The Special Rules may specify mandatory March Orders (also 26.32). These orders represent historical conditions limiting the leaders' freedom of action. They can be removed according to 20.23. One March Order can be changed at night (20.4). *Since there is more than one Night AM Turn, the special 'Night AM' activities take place during the 6 AM Turn.*

**25.62 Late Start Mode Card:** If you want to change one of those pre-programmed March Orders and you drew a Late Start Mode Card, you'll need to wake up first. A "sleeping" leader moves with his units. *NOTE: "Sleep" is shorthand for "an inconceivable oversight." There are 101 ways a general could fail to do the obvious thing. Usually his intel is faulty, he misinterprets orders, or goes off on his own recognizance.*

**25.7 Leipzig Special Rules**

**25.71 French pontoons:** *Historically the French pontoon train never made it to Leipzig. They were turned back by Cossacks just a couple of miles from there. The five pontoon train units can be used to build a bridge across the marshes west of Leipzig, depending on card play.*

When the French “Army Parks” Card No. 16 is played, the die is rolled. If the Parks arrive, the five pontoon train counters appear immediately within *six* hexes of any Leipzig Chateau hex in a chain across the two rivers, not in an EZOC. The pontoons function normally after their initial placement (18.3). The scenario is extended through 5 PM on October 19th.

**25.72 French Ammunition Shortage:** Each time the French player obtains a “1R” result on the Bombardment Table he must make a note of it (by turning over a dedicated d6). When the total reaches six, he must start rolling for ammunition shortage. Thereafter roll 1d6 each time a “1R” result is obtained on the Bombardment Table. If the result is a **6**, the French Army suffers Ammunition Shortage. Then, all French Player artillery—except for units belonging to the OG, YG, and GC—suffer a -2 die roll modifier each time they fire on the Bombardment Table (to reflect the shortage of ammunition). After the play of French Card No. 16, Army Parks, if the die roll succeeds, the French ammunition shortage ends immediately.

**25.73 Army of Silesia Ammunition Shortage:** Employing the same procedure as above (25.72)—except that shortage ensues upon a die roll of **5 or 6**—all the artillery units of the Army of Silesia (Russian VIII, OS and L, and Prussian I Corps) suffer a -2 die roll modifier each time they fire on the Bombardment Table. (The other Coalition armies had plenty of ammunition and do not suffer or contribute to the Ammunition Shortage—their “1R” results do not trigger the ammo shortage die roll.)

After the play of Coalition Card No. 16, Baggage Trains, if the die roll succeeds, the Coalition ammunition shortage ends immediately.

**25.74 Grand Battery:** *For historical interest the Grand Battery comprised II/Mongenot-b, V/Camas-a, IC/Lavoye (reduced), and OG 3, 4, 5 Foot Batteries.*

Each player may form a Grand Battery once per game during the friendly Combat Phase. The Grand Battery can comprise up to any 5 friendly artillery and/or HArt. units from different corps. Consider them to be one formation (the Grand Battery) automatically in command for this and the following friendly player turn. All units in the Grand Battery must be within 2 hexes of at least one other unit in the Grand Battery. In the Combat Phase announced, throughout the following Game-Turn,

all units in the Grand Battery gain a +1 die roll modifier on the Bombardment Table. If there is a friendly Ammunition Shortage in effect, the Grand Battery cannot be used.

**25.75 Congreve Rockets:** *Because of their novelty, the British Rockets had a temporary demoralizing effect on the French and their allies.*

The Congreve unit is an artillery-type unit. It may not make Bombardment attacks, but may attack adjacent enemy forces—alone or with other friendly units. If the Combat Result of the rocket attack (not defense) is Shock, Dr\_, Ex, or De, the Enemy units in the hex being attacked, and those in adjacent hexes if any, must pass an Initiative check or be temporarily Demoralized through the end of the current Coalition Combat Phase, after which the Demoralized unit(s) return to normal. Once used, the Congreve unit is removed from play (PEU).

**25.76 Leipzig Chateaux:** Each hex within the walls of Leipzig (3727, 3728, 3729, 3828, 3829) is a chateau hex. Artillery units and Baggage Trains are permitted to end their move within the walls of Leipzig. All other chateau rules apply to these hexes. If any Coalition combat unit is in or adjacent to any Leipzig Chateau hex at the end of any Game-Turn, depending upon the play of Card No. 27, Destroyed Bridge, the game may end immediately. An artillery unit in a Leipzig hex cannot bombard but may engage in adjacent combat.



If cards are not being used, roll the die:  
 1-4 Leipzig bridge is damaged—game ends at once  
 5-6 the bridge is undamaged and the game continues

**25.77 Guard Commitment:** For all armies in any scenario the Guard starts with non-committed status.

**25.78 Destroyed Bridges:** (see Terrain Key on map) “Destroyed bridges” that are printed on the map are completely demolished, and cannot be repaired within the time frame of the game. The rules for damaged bridges do not apply to destroyed bridges.



**25.8 Team Play/Leipzig**

If there is more than one French Player, one assumes the role of Napoleon (Commander-in-Chief) for the duration of the game. No other Player may control the Napoleon counter. The Commander-in-Chief operates the card deck for his side. Similarly, Coalition Players may represent Schwarzenberg (Commander-in-Chief), and the 4 Bs—Blücher, Barclay, Bennigsen and Bernadotte in order of arrival. The Commanders control their historically-associated formations.

**25.81 Communication Among Players:** Players may *not* freely discuss their plans, tactics or strategy unless the Commanders they represent are within *four* hexes of each other.

**25.82 Aides-de-Camp:** Written notes may be passed among team players. One message may be dispatched per team member every friendly Command Phase. No other game-related comments are permitted besides what is written on the note.

**25.83 Objective Hexes:** Only place names, not hex numbers, may be specified as objective hexes.

**25.84 Arrival Time:** Written notes are dispatched during the Friendly Command Phase and are received during a later Friendly Command Phase. Travel time between leaders:

- on the same map section—*one* complete Turn
- from one map to the other—*four* complete Turns

**25.85 Victory:** After the winning side is determined, each of the Players compares the total VPs that he obtained (or hexes his units were first to occupy for his side). The player with the highest score gains the Commander-in-Chief's role on next playing.

**25.86 Commander-in-Chief:** The C-in-C can send written orders to his teammates. Disobedience has to be justified in a verbal defense at the game's end. If you fail to achieve your assigned objectives, your explanation must pass a vote of your team. Failure to persuade them means you forfeit the Commander-in-Chief's role on the next playing.

**26.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS**

*Victory is awarded to the player or team with the most Victory Points at the end of the game; or, in the Campaign Game, according to the ratio of each player or team's Victory Point total (26.23 and 31.4.)*

**26.1 Victory Point Awards**

Victory Points are awarded at the end of the game, depending upon Enemy Combat Strength Points eliminated, Enemy Corps Demoralized, etc. If playing a multi-day campaign, calculate victory point awards at

the end of each individual battle.

**26.11 Determine VP Totals:** VPs are awarded for...

- a) Enemy Combat SPs Eliminated (26.12)
- b) Enemy Corps Demoralized (26.13).
- c) Captured Enemy Baggage Trains (26.14).
- d) Controlled Hexes (26.15)
- e) Total VPs of cards you have played (26.16)
- f) Leaders in towns through the Night (26.17)
- g) Captured Commanders (26.18)
- h) Units that have exited the map (26.3)

**26.12 Total Combat SPs Eliminated**

At the end of play, total the losses in SPs by both sides, including the total SPs in the PEU, Unrecovered and Recovered boxes. Don't count SPs in the Full Strength Holding Box. Subtract the smaller from the larger total. The side losing the least SPs receives VPs as follows:

Difference	VP Award	Difference	VPs
0-4	0 VPs	20-24	4 VPs
5-9	1 VP	25-29	5 VPs
10-14	2 VPs	30-34	6 VPs
15-19	3 VPs	35-39	7 VPs, etc.

When calculating Total Combat Strength count the units Full Strength. EXCEPTION: For units *starting* the scenario at Reduced Strength, use reduced strength.

**26.13 Enemy Corps Demoralized:** Each Player receives [4] VPs for each enemy Corps Demoralized at the end of play.

**26.14 Captured Baggage Trains:** The Player receives [2] VPs for each Enemy Baggage Train captured.

**26.15 Control:** Each Player receives [4] VPs for each *Enemy* Supply Source he controls at the end of the scenario (25.54). Each Player also receives the number of Victory Points printed on the map for each VP Hex. EXCEPTION: The Scenario Victory Conditions may specify certain VP hexes that do *not* apply in that scenario (25.44). To be considered in control of one of these hexes, a friendly *Combat* Unit *in Supply* must physically occupy the hex, or be the last Combat Unit to have occupied or moved through it. An occupying unit that is Out of Supply at the moment it enters or moves through a hex does not control that hex. If a player begins the game in occupation of an enemy Supply Source, no VPs are scored for that. VPs are not scored for occupying mapedge enemy supply hexes by Reinforcements that enter there. To indicate the control of a hex, place a control marker of the proper side in the hex.

**26.16 Cards:** Add or subtract the VP Value of *each* card you have played during the game, as specified on the card. VPs on the cards are tallied at the end of each daylight period before the cards are reshuffled (24.23).

**26.17 Leader in a town throughout the Night:** Each player receives ½ VP for every friendly Leader who remains in a town from 6PM to next 6AM inclusive.



**26.18 Capture of Commanders:**

A player receives a number of VPs for each Captured Commander equal to that Commander’s Command Rating. *EXCEPTION: The game ends immediately in a Coalition Victory the moment Napoleon is captured.*

**26.2 Levels of Victory**

At the end of the battle the total of Victory Points achieved by the two players is compared as a ratio (French: Coalition), which determines the level of victory—Marginal, Tactical, or Strategic. Divide the French by the Coalition VP total.

**26.21 Find VP ratio:**

1 to 2 or less	Coalition Strategic
Between 1 to 1.5, and 1 to 1.99	Coalition Tactical
Between 1 to 1, and 1 to 1.49	Coalition Marginal
Between 1.01 to 1, and 1.5 to 1	French Marginal
Between 1.51 to 1, and 2 to 1	French Tactical
More than 2 to 1	French Strategic

**26.22 When Total of VPs is Zero:** Convert scores of “0” to “1” in order to calculate VP ratio.

**26.23 Levels of Victory in the Campaign Game:**

In the Campaign Game the winner, Level of Victory and total VPs for each side, achieved in each individual battle, must be recorded (31.0). A given level of Victory will allow the winner to draw “Bonus Cards” from the Card Decks in the upcoming battles in the campaign (25.13).

**26.3 Exiting the Map**

Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the “General Retreat” card.

If not using the cards, the Phasing Player may declare a General Retreat (20.5); or may exit at any exit hexes specified in the Scenario Information (27.42, 29.42, 30.34).

French Player forces may exit his forces only at 1013S. *EXCEPTION: Play of French Card No. 31.* This allows an alternate exit hex 7023N. Coalition Player forces may exit at any Friendly Supply Source hex, and may also exit where French units have exited—negating an equal number of French units exiting there. The exiting unit pays the Movement Point cost of the hex it is leaving once again. Exited leaders may *not* reorganize units. Units that voluntarily exit the map cannot be returned to play and are *not* considered eliminated for Victory Point (VP) purposes. Units forced to *retreat* off the map are eliminated (12.34).

**26.31 VP Award:** If he makes a “General Retreat” the Exiting Player receives [4 VP] for exiting each friendly

baggage train, and [1 VP] for every five combat units exited. *EXCEPTION:* You may not receive more VPs for Exiting the Map than you receive for Enemy Combat units eliminated.

**26.32 Exit by March Order:** A force may be assigned a March Order to exit the map. If a General retreat has been declared, these forces garner [1 VP] for every five combat units exited.

**26.33 No Award:** Even if you do *not* declare “General Retreat” nor play the “General Retreat” card, you may choose at any time to exit individual units to prevent their destruction, either at the Friendly Supply Sources or Friendly reinforcement entry hexes, but you receive no VPs, and they cannot be returned to play.

**26.4 Minimum Loss**

The Player receives [2] VPs if the total of eliminated SPs in the Friendly PEU + Unrecovered + Recovered boxes at the end of the game is zero.

**26.5 Game Duration**

Players have the option of playing the Approach to Battle scenario for Hanau. (There is no Approach to Battle for the Leipzig Campaign or battles.) The game ends with the completion of the last turn specified under “Duration,” or may end immediately upon: Napoleon’s capture (26.18); destruction of the Leipzig Bridge (25.76); or, when all the formations of one side are demoralized and/or have exited. The Level of Victory still has to be determined (26.2).

**26.6 First Player**

The Coalition Player is the First Player in all scenarios and sets-up first.

**27.0 THE BATTLE OF LIEBERTWOLKWITZ**

*Epic Cavalry Battle, 14 October 1813*

**27.1 Introduction**

Reaching the battlefield days in advance, Murat took post at Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz with the II Corps, the V Corps, VIII Corps, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Corps. When he finally arrived, Schwarzenberg intended only a reconnaissance in force, but blundered into an encounter battle. Murat’s orders were simply to hold the line Markkleeberg-Wachau-Liebertwolkwitz. But with typical flamboyance he unleashed his entire cavalry reserve, creating the largest cavalry battle of the 19th century.

**27.11 Duration:** 14 Oct., 10AM—6PM.

**27.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 1 French, 2 Coalition

**27.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

Army Parks (No. 16); Exit to Wurzen (No. 31). Alt. Reinforcement (No. 29) x3.

**27.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

Baggage Train (No. 16); Saxon Defection (No. 20); Destroyed Bridge (No. 27); Traffic Jam (No. 31).

**27.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2** (Battle Game and Campaign): French 3; Coalition 3.

**27.16 Pontoon Trains:** Coalition 1; French 0.

### 27.2 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH

#1. AUGEREAU, IX Corps (27.31)

COALITION

#1. PR II Pirch, Zieten, Braun, 8,10,11 (5434S).

### 27.3 Special Rules

**27.31 Augereau's IX Corps:** The units of the French IX Corps cannot be moved until released by one of the following events: • Alt. Reinforcement Card No. 29 is played the first time • Sound of Guns Card No. 15 is played and IX Corps is within the 10-hex range • Any enemy unit appears within the LOS of any unit of the IX Corps. If any of these conditions occur, the IX Corps is immediately released and may be employed freely.

**27.32 Damaged Bridges at Start:** none

**27.33 March Orders at Start:** none.

**27.34 Map Area in Play:** Set-up all units on the South map in accordance with the 14th column on the Initial Set-up cards. This scenario is played on the South map only. The two French Supply Sources in hexes 3700 and 4200 are for use in this Battle Scenario only. Reinforcements that enter on the North map during the period of this Battle Scenario are ignored.

### 27.4 Victory Conditions

The VPs are earned as per 26.1.

**27.41 Control:** VP Hexes that Do NOT count: none

### 27.5 Two-Map Scenario

If beginning the Campaign on the 14th, add the North Map to the game area in play and set up Marmont's VI Corps. *Do not count* the North map victory locations. Examine the TRC to note the other units arriving on the north map. It's a good idea to add a third player to represent Blücher (25.8).

**27.51 Improved Positions at Start:** 2613N, 2615N, 2718N, 2720N

**27.53 Alternate Reinforcements:** (same as 27.2). In the 2-map scenario Macdonald (XI) and Sebastiani (IIC) will enter at the hexes listed on the TRC (north map).

**27.54 All other Scenario Information:** (same as 27.1–27.4).

## 28.0 THE BATTLES OF WACHAU AND MÖCKERN

*Fire on Two Fronts, 16 October 1813*

### 28.1 Introduction

Marmont's French VI Corps had been ordered to march to the southern front, and had started to withdraw when Blücher's advance began. With the Elster River protecting their left flank at Möckern, the French established a line running toward Wiederitzsch along a ridge protected by an 80-gun grand battery. A large manor with attached farm buildings and a massive brewery anchored the left. Fighting behind barricades and streets blocked with abattis, the French staved-off defeat.

In the south, the Austrian II Corps (Merveldt) advanced towards Connewitz via Gautzsch, while General Kleist's Prussians, moving along the Pleisse River, attacked Marshals Poniatowski and Augereau in the village of Markkleeberg. The Russian II Infantry Corps attacked Wachau with support from the Prussian 9th Brigade. On the far right, Klenau's IV Corps attacked Macdonald and Lauriston in Liebertwolkwitz.

**28.11 Duration:** 16 Oct., 6AM—6PM inclusive

**28.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 3 French, 3 Coalition. The late start Card No. 2 applies automatically so draw that card in particular as one of the three Coalition Mode Cards.

**28.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

No. 29 (x1).

**28.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

No. 5, No. 29 (x1).

**28.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** Coalition 3; French 3.

**28.16 Pontoon Trains:** Coalition, 1 with Schwarzenberg; French, *only* by card play.

### 28.2 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH

#1. REYNIER, VII Corps (7006N)

#2. MACDONALD, XI Corps. Acts as a Cancel Transit Order (28.33).

#3. ST. CYR, XIV Corps, IVC/Weissenwolf (7023N)

COALITION

Take one of each north and south for each card:

North Map: Möckern

#1. BÜLOW, Prussian III Corps (4701N)

#2. WINZINGERODE, Z Corps (4701N)

#3. BERNADOTTE, Swedish S Corps (4701N)

South Map: Wachau

#1. D Corps/AG/Glebow, Bagration (7009S)



#2. BENNIGSEN, D Corps/MB, D Corps/D (7009S)

#3. BUBNA, 2 Lt. Division (7009S)

### 28.3 Special Rules

#### 28.31 Improved Positions at Start:

Place completed I.P. in 2613N, 2615N, 2718N, 2720N, and 3030N.

#### 28.32 Damaged Bridges at Start:

3705/3704S, 3706/3806S, 3806/3905S, 3816/3915S  
3918/4018S, 4018/4118S.

**28.33 March Orders at Start:** Effective at 6 AM, the Coalition Player may assign two pre-programmed March Orders: (1) Klenau, IV Corps—to Gross Posna (for purposes of the March Order only, his force includes the 3 Prussian units near Belgershain); (2) Konstantine, K Corps—march to Wachau.

**28.34 Map Area in Play:** Set up all units in accordance with the 16th October column of the Initial Set-up. This scenario uses both Leipzig N and S maps.

**28.35 Transiting Corps:** At the start of the scenario, French Alternate Group #2 above is under a pre-existing March Order to Transit the North map and march on Klein Posna (5933N) by way of Holzhausen (5203S). NOTE: A Formation can be removed from a March Order according to 20.23 at the player's option. The play of the Alternate Reinf. Card No .29 (or die roll of 2-3 per 25.52) will also allow this March Order to be cancelled, or replaced with a new order to any town on-map at the French Player's choice.

### 28.4 Victory Conditions

VPs are earned as per 26.1

**28.41 Control:** VP Hexes that Do NOT count: none

## 29.0 THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

*Triple Envelopment, 18 October, 1813*

### 29.1 Introduction

On the morning of the 18th, the troops of the French Army once more dressed their lines and made ready to play their part, with the consciousness that this was shaping up to be the last performance for them, their comrades, and most of the Grande Armée. The Emperor had ordered them to pull back, abandoning the battlefields of the 16th, toward the Leipzig suburbs, on a perimeter of under 20 km., with only one way out—a bridge at the Ranstädter Tor (3727/3627N).

**29.11 Duration:** 18 Oct., 10AM—19 Oct., 1PM inclusive; may be extended to 5PM by card play (25.71).

**29.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 1 French, 1 Coalition

**29.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

No. 1, No. 4, No. 26 (x3), No. 29 (x2), No. 31 (x1).

**29.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

No. 12 (x2), No. 16 (x1), No. 23 (x2), No. 26 (x3), No. 29 (x1).

**29.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 3, the French 3.

**29.16 Pontoon Trains:** Coalition 2, French 0. French pontoons may arrive by play of Card No. 16.

**29.17 Demoralized Corps:** None

**29.18 PEU Units:** Such are marked “elim” on the Set up Card.

### 29.2 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH

#1 IVC/Weissenwolf, XIV/Jacquet (7023N)

#2 ST. CYR, XIV Corps (7023N)

COALITION

#1. TAUENZIEN, Prussian IV/Dobschütz, Lindenau, Jeanneret, Bismarck, HArt (English). Strampf Arty., baggage (4701N)

#2. Prus. III/Thümen, IV/Puttlitz, IV/Wobeser (7006N)

#3. Rus. VI/Talysin I, VI/Benardos., VI/19, 28 Arty. (1013N)

### 29.3 Special Rules

**29.31 Improved Positions at Start:** Place completed I.P. in 2929N, 3030N, 3827N, 3927N, 4524N, 4633N, and 4603S.

**29.32 Damaged Bridges at Start:** 3704/3705S, 3706/3806S, 3805/3906S, 3815/3916S 3918/4018S, 4018/4118S; 6134/6235N, 6230/6330N.

**29.33 March Orders at Start:** The French Player may issue March Orders to up to two (2) on-map Friendly Forces.

**29.34 Map Area in Play:** Set up all units in accordance with the 18th October column of the Initial Set-up. This scenario uses the entirety of both N and S Leipzig maps.

**29.35 Ammunition Shortage:** Ammunition shortage is in effect for both the French and Silesian Armies (25.72, 25.73). All bombardment die rolls by these armies are subject to a -2 DRM. The Army of Silesia will receive no baggage trains in this scenario.

**29.36 Sand Pit:** The sand pit is located in hexes 3931-4031. Units may pass through the sand pit by road or trail but may not move directly from one sandpit hex to the other. No unit may end its move in a sand pit.

### 29.4 Victory Conditions

VPs are earned as per 26.1.

**29.41 Control:** Do NOT score any VP Hexes. *Ignore* all Victory Points printed on the map.

**29.42 Refugees:** All French units anywhere on the map at the end of the scenario, that have an unblocked Supply Line (17.4) to the active exit hex (26.3) may be counted

as part of the total of exited units. All French forces without a Supply Line at the end of the scenario will be counted as PEU.

### 29.5 Saxon Unreliability (non-card version)

If the cards are not being used, the following rules are in effect: Saxon units may not voluntarily enter an EZOC, and if forced to attack are eliminated (PEU). If the VII Corps is *demoralized*, all Saxon units convert Dr2, Dr3 and Dr4 results on the CRT to **De** when they are attacked. (In the campaign game these conditions become effective only when the VII Corps is demoralized.)

## 30.0 THE BATTLE OF HANAU

*Battle on the Kinzig, 29-30 October 1813*

### 30.1 Day of Battle Scenario

Napoleon made his headquarters at Erfurt on 23 October and began to reorganise his army. On the 26th, he directed his columns toward Eisenach and Fulda, their ultimate destination Mainz (Mayence) on the Rhine. On 28 October Wrede's advance guard arrived 68 kilometers east of Mainz, capturing Hanau from a small garrison. When Wrede became aware that Napoleon and the Guard were present, he realized there was no hope of getting all his troops back across the Kinzig and organized a delaying action.

**30.11 Duration:** 30 October, 11 AM—6 PM (30.43)

**30.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 1 French, 3 Coalition

**30.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

No. 7, No. 14, No. 16, No. 23, No. 24, No. 29 (x3), No. 30, No. 31.

**30.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

No. 7, No. 14, No. 16, No. 23, No. 29 (x3), No. 30, No. 31

**30.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 3, the French 4.

**30.16 Pontoon Trains:** Coalition 1, French 0. Coalition pontoon may not be deployed at start.

**30.17 Countermix Note:**

Use the counters mentioned in 25.3

**30.18 Improved Positions at Start:** none

### 30.2 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH

#1. REYNIER with VII/Brause, Gruyere, Devaux, Jarry, 0103

#2. VIII/Zoltowski, LO/d'Isle, 0103.

COALITION

#1. I/Karl, Maillot, 3025.

#2. V/ResPark-a, ResPark-b, 3018.

### 30.3 Special Rules

**30.31 Coalition Ammunition Shortage:** Starting on 30 October at 12.00, the Coalition Player must roll for Ammo Shortage (25.73). When the shortage takes effect his forces suffer a -2 die roll modifier each time they fire on the Bombardment Table.

**30.32 March Orders at Start:** The French Player may assign pre-programmed March Orders to any or all Friendly Forces to march to the exit hex (1633). The Coalition Player may assign pre-programmed March Orders to up to 4 friendly forces.

**30.33 Destroyed Bridges at Start:** none

**30.34 Hanau Chateau Hexes:** Hex 1630 is not a chateau. The other three hexes of Hanau are Chateaux.

**30.35 French Cavalry units:** *Sebastiani* was given command of the advanced guard troops and *Arrighi* the rear-guard. Both officers may command *any* non-Guard cavalry units.

**30.36 Alternative Baggage Exit:** Whenever a French combat unit exits at 0108, all baggage trains may exit to count for Victory Conditions (26.14) and hex 0108 will be a French Supply Hex.

### 30.4 Victory Conditions

The VPs are earned as per 26.1.

**30.41 Control:** The player who controls the Lamboy bridge receives 5 VPs, and for Hanau, 10 VPs.

**30.42 Exit:** If the French Player has the most victory points at the end of 6PM Oct. 30th, his units only need a valid supply line to 1633 to count as exited. No on-map units may be counted as exited if the French Player doesn't already have a plurality of VPs.

**30.43 Extended Game:** The scenario may continue on 31 October if both players agree.

### 30.5 Approach to Battle Scenario

The Approach to Battle shows the French and Coalition approach to Hanau.

**30.51 Duration:** 29 Oct., 3 PM—30 Oct., 6 PM (30.43)

**30.52 Mode Cards at Start:** French 0, Coalition 2

**30.53 Alternate Reinforcements:** (*same as 30.2*).

**30.54 All other Scenario Information:** (*same as 30.1–30.4*)

## 31.0 THE CAMPAIGN GAME

*Leipzig Campaign, 16-19 October, 1813*  
*Grand Campaign, 14-30 October, 1813*

### 31.1 Introduction

The Campaign Game is the “Link Game,” consisting of the Wachau/Möckern and Leipzig Battles, plus (optionally) the Liebertwolkwitz and Hanau battles, played successively in order.

**31.11 Duration:** Leipzig Campaign—0600, October 16<sup>th</sup> (or 1100, October 14<sup>th</sup>) ending on Oct. 19; Grand Campaign—the same, ending on Oct. 30.

**31.12 Mode Cards at Start:** same as 28.12 or 27.12.

**31.13 Card Deck:** same as 28.13, 28.14, 27.13, 27.14.

**31.14 Bonus Cards:** Same as 27.15 (see 31.3)

### 31.2 Initial Set-up

#### 31.21 Reduced Strength Units

The units to set-up at reduced strength are listed with an \* on the Initial Set-up.

**31.22 Alternate Reinforcements:** For the 14th and 15th use ALT listed at 27.2; for the 16th and 17th use 28.2; for the 18th and 19th, 29.2; and for Hanau, if playing the Grand Campaign, also use 30.2 for the 28th to the 30th.

### 31.3 Undeclared Truce Days

*During the 15th and 17th of October there was no combat as the armies recovered from the fighting on the 14th and 16th, bringing up supplies, ammunition and reinforcements.*

For a more historical and quicker campaign you can simply skip the 15th and 17th of October entirely and move to the next scenario start for the 16th and/or the 18th. Instead of using the historical set-up positions for either the 16th or the 18th, just leave the troops where they were at the end of the 6 PM turn and implement the other scenario information as provided in 28.0 or 29.0.

Each victory in prior battles will allow the winning player to draw “Bonus Cards” from his card deck in the Wachau/Möckern and Leipzig battle games.

- Each Strategic Victory: 3 Bonus Cards per battle
- Each Tactical Victory: 2 Bonus Cards per battle
- Each Marginal Victory: 1 Bonus Card per battle
- Minimum: 3 Bonus Cards per player

**31.31** If you decide to play out the 15th and 17th, draw one bonus card on the 15th and one on the 17th. Bonus cards for the 16th and 18th—minimum of three per player (28.15, 29.15).

**31.32** If the 17<sup>th</sup> is skipped according to this rule, set up Reynier and the units of the VII Corps at the start of the 18<sup>th</sup> in their locations for the 18<sup>th</sup>. If those locations are

not available, scatter VII Corps according to Card No. 6.

### 31.4 Campaign Victory Conditions

The running total of Victory Points in all battles played is tallied per side, and compared as a ratio. See the “Campaign Ratio” Section of the Victory Worksheet to determine the overall level of victory for the campaign.

**31.41 Scoring VPs:** Score VPs and reshuffle the decks with the discards on the 6AM turn of each day. Reconstitute the decks as for that day’s scenario, adding back in or removing cards as listed. The mode cards are used only during the initial setup, not at the start of each day.

## HISTORICAL NOTES

### Reorganization

During the last days of September, 1813, the Emperor was fully occupied in reorganizing the Army and issuing instructions for placing the towns along his line of communications in a state of defence. Bridgeheads were ordered to be constructed at all important river passages, and all sick and wounded who could be moved were sent back towards France.

Of his dwindling manpower the Emperor had at Dresden 116,000 men and 389 guns (XI, XIV, I, IIC, and the Imperial Guard). Nearby, at Meißen, the III Corps deployed along the Elbe 16,000 men and 61 guns. Further north, between Eilenburg and Bitterfeld, stood Ney, with 72,000 men and 203 guns (IV and VII Corps, supported by VI and IC). Finding trained troops to replace his immense losses became more and more difficult. France was running out of draft-age men. A decree was published calling-up 120,000 men of the contingents of 1810 through 1812, who had hitherto been exempted, and 100,000 men of the contingent of 1815 were ordered to be enrolled in advance.

The King of Naples, Joachim Murat, was ordered to establish his headquarters at Freiberg and take over the II, V, VIII, IVC and VC Corps — 44,000 troops with 156 guns destined to confront the Bohemian Army.<sup>1</sup> Leipzig held a small garrison of 7,000 men and 22 guns, with another 5,000 horsemen and 6 guns under Lefebvre Desnouettes covering the western approaches. The loss of this key center in the road grid would cut Napoleon's Line of Communications. Augereau's new IX Corps and the V-bis Cavalry Corps were enroute from Bavaria to Leipzig with 13,000 men and 14 guns.

<sup>1</sup> F.N. Maude

### Blücher's Movements

The Silesian Army, released from the pressure hitherto exercised upon it by Macdonald's Army of the Bober, took advantage of its freedom of action. Posting Sacken to watch Dresden from the vicinity of Grossenhain, Blücher directed the remainder of his forces by Kamenz-Liebenwerda towards Wittenberg, hoping by his presence to drag the Crown Prince of Sweden into activity.<sup>2</sup>

By marching out of Silesia, Blücher's Army had to make a flank march past Dresden and abandon its LOC at the same time. Henceforth it would be dependent upon Berlin for its supply.

The Russian Commissary-General, Count Thuyl, protested solemnly, and demanded that the proposed plan should be submitted to a council of all the Generals in the command, but Blücher dismissed the suggestion with an absolute refusal to hold any council of war. The risk was extreme, and he knew it; but since the Bohemian Army could not make up its collective mind, and Bernadotte alone was powerless to move, he determined to drag the whole three Armies into motion by the force of accomplished facts.<sup>3</sup>

Napoleon interpreted this move as the preliminary of an attack on Dresden from the north-west, and made defensive dispositions in that direction, allowing Blücher to reach Elster on October 2<sup>nd</sup> without incident.

### Wartenburg

Here a crossing had already been attempted, on September 20<sup>th</sup>, and General Bertrand had studied the locale and placed his defending forces so as to dominate the terrain. Unfortunately, he had not considered the dropping water level of the Elbe, which had been running over its banks because of the heavy storms but now subsided.

After several hours of fighting the Prussians discovered a passage to flank the French position, and by nightfall Bertrand had been forced to pull out. Yorck's Corps, which started the battle with 12,000 men, lost 1,600.

### Across the Elbe

The next day Bernadotte with the North Army crossed some twenty miles down at Rosslau. The two Armies were thus within easy supporting distance, and together constituted a force of about 150,000 men. "Blücher was filled with a very reasonable though very violent distrust of his Gascon colleague."<sup>4</sup> The Bohemian Army fielded another 180,000 men, and Napoleon at Dresden lay midway between them with—including reinforcements—about 280,000.<sup>5</sup> But his numbers were dwindling.

<sup>2</sup> F.N. Maude

<sup>3</sup> F.N. Maude

<sup>4</sup> Petre, p. 306

<sup>5</sup> F.N. Maude, (Leipzig)

*7 October, Thursday, Mühlbeck*

Blücher and Bernadotte determined to march upon Leipzig with a view to facilitating the exit of the Bohemian Army into the Saxon plains by diverting Napoleon's attention to themselves. In pursuance of this plan the Silesian Army was to reach the vicinity of Düben on October 8, and both Headquarters together were to enter Leipzig on the 9<sup>th</sup>. Following these orders, Sacken reached Eilenburg, Langeron Düben, and Yorck Mühlbach.<sup>6</sup>

### POSITIONS, NIGHT OF 7/8 OCTOBER<sup>7</sup>

#### ARMY OF THE NORTH

Bernadotte, 40,000 men—Zorbig and Jessnitz

Tauenzien, Thümen, 30,000 men—Dessau

#### ARMY OF SILESIA

Blücher, Yorck and Langeron—Düben

Sacken—Mockrehna

Detachments—Mühlbeck, Eilenburg

#### FRENCH ARMY

Souham (III)—Torgau

Guard, Macdonald (XI), Sebastiani (IIC)—Meissen

Marmont (VI)—Taucha

Ney (IV and VII)—Bennewitz (near Wurzen)

Latour-Maubourg (IC)—along the Elbe above Torgau

*8 October, Friday, Zorbig*

"On the 8th of October the Crown Prince wrote to Blücher to the effect that, since their mission was to hold Napoleon till the Bohemian army could come up on his flank and rear, there were only two alternatives open to them. The first, which was clearly the one he favored, was immediate retirement to the right bank of the Elbe. The second was retirement (i.e., advance) to the left bank of the Saale. In the event of Blücher's accepting the second alternative, he was requested to take up his bridge at Wartenburg and send it (by land of course, as it could not pass through Wittenberg...) to Ferchland, 25 miles below Magdeburg. Bernadotte would either remove or destroy his bridge at Rosslau, and would leave six battalions to defend that at Acken. Bernadotte was dying to get back across the Elbe, to avoid Napoleon, of whom he was in mortal dread, and to get away by Ferchland if he could not get Blücher over the Elbe direct....

"The first alternative would have spelt ruin for Blücher, who would in all probability have been caught by Napoleon when he was in the very act of crossing the Elbe. He unhesitatingly chose the second, and promised to march at once."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> F.N. Maude, (Blücher and Bernadotte)

<sup>7</sup> Petre, p. 305-06

<sup>8</sup> Petre, p. 308. "Blücher said that Yorck, with his right column, would reach Jessnitz in the evening of the 9th, his headquarters

Then came news that Napoleon was heading toward Düben with 140,000-150,000 men. Napoleon had concentrated about Wurzen and knew that Blücher had only 60,000 at Düben.

### **Murat's Actions against the Army of Bohemia**

When Napoleon left Dresden, Colloredo began to advance from Teplitz on Dresden by the now well-known route. On the 8<sup>th</sup> his advanced guard was at Zehista, outside Pirna. Kleist and Wittgenstein were in Altenburg, and Gyulai was on the march from Chemnitz toward Borna. Murat was at Mittweida. Poniatowski drove the Austrians from Penig.

#### **Pirna**

Bubna—left by Blücher to watch Dresden on the right bank of the Elbe—took the bridgehead opposite Pirna. The French garrison retired to Dresden, taking their boats with them.

#### *9 October, Saturday, Wurzen, 9 AM*

The Emperor wrote to Murat of his intention to strike Blücher at Düben. He underestimates Bernadotte's Army, as 40,000 instead of 61,000 men, unaware of detachments at Zorbig and Jessnitz. He intends to seize the bridges at Wartenburg and Dessau. "The three divisions of Guard cavalry (Lefebvre-Desnoette's at Leipzig, Ornano's and Walther's) were summoned to Eilenburg. Arrighi, at Leipzig, was told that that city was covered in every direction but those of Halle and Dessau, and it was explained with what forces he could defend it. Ney was ordered to march with the III Corps at 6 AM by the right bank of the Mulde on Eilenburg. He was to send Reynier (VII) by the left bank, which he would cross at Eilenburg. Bertrand (IV), who was on the right at Schildau, to move on Mockrehna. Sebastiani was also placed under Ney, who thus commanded the III, IV, and VII Corps, the division of Dombrowski, and the II Cavalry Corps. The Emperor would himself support Ney with the whole of the Guard.

"Marmont to march at 6 AM by the left bank towards Düben—Latour-Maubourg, and all the cavalry of the Guard to go with him. Macdonald to start at the same hour from Dahlen for Mockrehna, in support if necessary, of Bertrand. Napoleon would be in person at Eilenburg at 8 AM, marching with 120,000 men on Düben."<sup>9</sup>

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would be near Mühlbeck. He would only leave a few companies at Wartenburg, which could rejoin Wobeser before Torgau. He also said he would make a demonstration against Eilenburg, as he thought it necessary to cover the westward march."

#### **Düben**

The French advanced sooner than expected, so there was no time to make a demonstration to Eilenburg. Blücher boldly moved to his right, toward Halle, abandoning his communications entirely in order to avoid the blow. He ordered his Army to cross the Mulde in three places: Yorck at Jessnitz; Langeron, near Bitterfeld; and Sacken, who was expected to be in contact with the French, had to march along the Mulde to cross at Düben.

Blücher employed the cover of inclement weather to conceal his direction of retreat. He marched off in the morning just as Napoleon was beginning his advance down the Mulde on Düben. Sacken didn't have time to cross at Düben before the French would be upon him. Marching through the night, his corps continued north toward the bridge at Raguhn.

#### **Düben, 3 PM**

Marshal Ney arrived at Düben with the VII Corps, but encountered only a small enemy rearguard.

"Had the French Cavalry been at all equal to its duties, the direction of Blücher's march could hardly have escaped detection. But the French Army lost touch with its adversary altogether, and Napoleon therefore had recourse to his favorite principle of marching against the most vital point in the enemy's possession, in order to compel him to turn round and fight in its defense."<sup>10</sup>

Napoleon believed that Blücher and Bernadotte would hurry to re-cross the Elbe. He only needed to drive them across the Elbe, so he could turn and fall upon Schwarzenberg, slowly approaching from Altenburg. He therefore sent Bertrand to destroy the allied bridgehead, hoping to catch the Allies in the act of re-passing the Elbe, or to draw them there.

#### **Probsthain**

Sebastiani dispersed some of Sacken's troops and his cavalry pursued Sacken toward Leipnitz, with Bertrand following up.

#### **Penig**

Klenau recaptured Penig, and, threatening Poniatowski's left, compelled him to fall back towards Murat at Rochlitz. His advanced guards fought several skirmishes with Murat and Poniatowski. Murat was ordered to hold Leipzig but not to accept battle with superior forces. St. Cyr was ordered to hold Dresden if possible, and to fall back on Torgau if not.

<sup>9</sup> Petre, p. 307

<sup>10</sup> F.N. Maude

*10 October—Sunday, Eilenburg*

Napoleon remained at work in Eilenburg until the late morning. He reviewed his divisions of cuirassiers and then set off in his carriage for Düben.

*Schlöss Düben, 3 PM*

The Emperor proposes to go to the right bank of the Elbe if Murat could not keep Leipzig. “My intention is, if the King of Naples were obliged to evacuate Leipzig, to re-pass the Elbe with all my army, throwing the Army of Silesia (and the Army of the North) on to the right bank, and taking all the time to destroy it; or, if it prefers to abandon its bridges,<sup>11</sup> to leave it on the left bank and *take my line of operation on the right bank from Dresden to Magdeburg.*”<sup>12</sup> Changing his line of operations would have been worthy of the most brilliant maneuvers of Napoleon at his best, though it would have entailed the loss of all his assets on the left bank.<sup>13</sup>

“He again refers to the idea of passing to the right bank in a letter to Reynier, in one to Berthier, and in one to Arrighi ...”<sup>14</sup>

The Emperor was uncertain of Blücher's and Bernadotte's whereabouts. Some reports indicated the enemy was retreating toward their bridgehead at Wartenburg, others showed all enemy columns retiring on Dessau. In fact, Blücher was heading directly west.

*Düben, 4 PM*

The Emperor orders Reynier and Bertrand to Wartenburg, and passes on reports that Sacken had left Leipnitz at 6 AM and reached Raguhn.

*Düben, 5:30 PM*

Napoleon writes to Murat: “Tomorrow, the 11th, either I shall have swept away the enemy or I shall have destroyed his bridges and thrown him on to the other side of the river (Elbe). Having thus driven off the Army of Silesia, I can, on the 13th, be at Leipzig with my whole army.”<sup>15</sup>

That night, scouts report a crush of enemy trains recrossing the Elbe at Rosslau, protected by a Corps of Prussians. Napoleon convinced himself that the whole enemy force was concentrated at Dessau with that baggage.

Murat retired northwards, on learning that Wittgenstein was moving on Borna.

Augereau defeated Liechtenstein and Thielemann on the road near Lützen.

*11 October, Monday, Düben, 1 AM*

The Emperor orders Reynier (VII), Dombrowski, and Sebastiani's (IIC) Cavalry Corps across the Elbe at Wittenberg, to be followed in due course by Macdonald (XI) and the rest of the army. Their object: to move down the right bank of the river and destroy all the bridges. Bertrand (IV) was to insure that the Wartenburg bridge was removed, while Souham (III) marched towards Dessau. These moves would facilitate the transfer of the whole army to the right bank of the Elbe. The Guard held Kemberg with the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg to the fore. Marmont remained behind in support at Düben, on the right bank of the Mulde, leaving Lorge's and Nordmann's cavalry on the left to scout toward Bitterfeld and Delitzsch, with enough infantry to wrest Bitterfeld from the enemy. Ney would halt for the day at Gräfenhainichen, sending scouts toward Dessau, Raguhn, Jessnitz, and Mühlbeck, all the places where enemy forces had been reported. Latour was sent toward Wartenburg, where there was no enemy left.

Napoleon remained “in great uncertainty as to Blücher's and Bernadotte's whereabouts, and reverts to the idea of going to the right bank and leaving them stranded on the left.”<sup>16</sup>

*Raguhn, 10 AM*

Sacken's Russian Corps reached the bridge and completed its crossing of the Mulde.

*Wartenburg*

Bertrand (IV) drove Thümen's brigade, blockading Wittenberg, toward Coswig and made sure the bridge was taken-up, but there was no trace of the Silesian Army. Scouts reported most of the enemy concentrated to the left of the Mulde. Blücher continued his march toward Halle undetected, and Bernadotte withdrew on Rothenburg, leaving Tauenzien's Prussian Corps in Dessau to cover his bridges at Acken and Rosslau. Ney moved against Tauenzien, while Reynier, Dombrowski and Sebastiani crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg. Marmont formed the reserve at Düben and protected the Army Parks gathering in Eilenburg.

<sup>11</sup> as it had, in fact, done.

<sup>12</sup> Corr. 20,746, cited in Petre, p. 309.

<sup>13</sup> According to Friederich, it is not credible that Napoleon ever entertained the idea, attributed to him by some modern French writers, of abandoning everything west of the Elbe ... Surely this passage

indicates clearly that he did intend, at one time at least, to go to the right bank.

<sup>14</sup> Corr. 20,749, 750, and 7752, cited in Petre, p. 310.

<sup>15</sup> Petre, p. 310.

<sup>16</sup> Petre



*Headquarters of Blücher, 5–9 October, and of Napoleon, 10–14 October.*

#### Schloss Düben, 3 PM

Word arrives that Raguhn has been evacuated by the enemy. Trusted spies report Blücher and Bernadotte's withdrawal toward Köthen, with Dessau only weakly held. Reynier would reconnoiter the right bank of the Elbe and follow Thümen's Prussians withdrawing downstream on Rosslau. Because of rain and the state of the troops these moves took until the 12<sup>th</sup>. Oudinot was sent toward Gräfenhainichen to support Ney.

#### Wachau

Murat took post at Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz with the II, V, and VIII Corps, IVC and VC Cavalry Corps, and a division of Guard cavalry. His outposts extended the line through Gross Pösna-Threna-Naunhof.

#### Dessau

Tauenzien heard that Reynier had crossed the Elbe and that Macdonald was behind Reynier. He prepared to retire across the Elbe at Rosslau the next day.

#### Zorbig

Bernadotte and Blücher met near Zorbig. Disregarding the loss of all communication with Berlin, Blücher was confident that the more French troops who went to the right bank of the Elbe, the fewer he would have to fight at Leipzig, where he would find all the supplies he needed.

#### Düben, Night

The Emperor talked for five hours to Marmont, who reported that he had made certain the whole of the enemy's army was on the hither side of the Elbe.

Napoléon then had a hundred and thirty thousand available men in the ranks. It was assuredly time to act offensively in a decided manner, to change the theater of the war and the system of ineffectual demonstrations, of movements coming and going that had so diminished his forces, and caused such great attrition. A

lively offensive against Blücher and the prince royal of Sweden would have carried the campaign beyond the Saale, across the line of operation of the enemy, or well beyond the Elbe, promising decisive advantages. These maneuvers were easy for him, since he possessed all the bridgeheads on the river. He would have been able, with promptness, to move by both banks. Eight days of energetic operations would suffice to destroy the forces in front of him. He could reestablish matters and recall victory to our banners. While doing this operation his army would be increased on one hand by the garrisons of the places: he would call to him the Corps of Davout that would have brought him more than twenty thousand men, while leaving the necessary forces to guard Hamburg.<sup>17</sup>

#### 12 October, Tuesday, Leipzig

On the 12<sup>th</sup> Augereau (IX) and Milhaud (Vbis C) reached Leipzig, coming from Weissenfels.<sup>18</sup> The Austrian Corps of Gyulai seized Weissenfels in their wake, capturing a French hospital.

#### Düben, 3 AM

Napoleon received word that Blücher had marched for Halle on the 10th. Ney is ordered to Dessau, to throw two bridges over the Elbe at Rosslau as soon as Reynier and Dombrowski appeared on the opposite bank. Bertrand is to march from Wartenburg to join Ney. Oudinot's II Young Guard Corps will rest at Gräfenhainichen. Marmont was ordered toward Delitzsch to watch towards Halle, Blücher's reported position, and toward Leipzig. Macdonald was ordered to remain on the left bank unless his assistance was required. Sebastiani was ordered to scout toward Berlin.

Word arrived of Murat's successful action at Borna on the 10th, which suggested there was still time to completely sever the communications of Blücher and Bernadotte. But the crossing behind the allies might have a still greater significance.

Napoleon was in position to upend the strategic situation by changing his line of operations on Berlin. The road to Berlin lay invitingly open. Instead of falling back on Leipzig, Napoleon could flip the game board, by sending Bertrand and Macdonald to take Berlin, drawing Davout up the Elbe to join him, while Reynier pushed back Tauenzien, the only Coalition force of any consequence on the right bank of the Elbe. The remainder of the Grande Armée—which still controlled all the crossings and well-supplied bridgeheads at Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau and Dresden—would prepare to defend the line of the Elbe.

<sup>17</sup> Memoirs of Marshal Marmont

<sup>18</sup> Petre, p. 316

The Emperor averred that if Blücher and Schwarzenberg attacked his supply line toward Naumburg he would “*wish them bon voyage and allow them to go on, sure that they would come back quicker than they went. What is of importance to me is not to be cut off from Dresden and the Elbe; I care little for being cut off from France.*”

Here was the grand gamble—the key moment of the whole campaign. Once Napoleon realized that Blücher had called his bluff and marched toward Halle, abandoning his bridges and trains, he was quite free to transfer his army to the right bank. He held all the bridgeheads; he controlled Blücher’s and Bernadotte’s rear areas with only Tauenzien’s IV Prussian Corps between him and Berlin. The troops in that corps were of the poorest quality. Berlin was Napoleon’s for the taking, whither a new line of communications connected Hamburg by sea with France.

The Coalition Armies would have been forced to return to the Elbe and cross it in the teeth of the enemy. It is not possible that the Coalition armies could have invaded France while cut off from their own homeland. But this picture was muddied by news that Bavaria had changed sides. With Bavaria offering a support base, an invasion of France became conceivable.

### Uncertainty

Bavaria’s intervention, combined with uncertainty as to Bernadotte’s whereabouts, discouraged Napoleon from taking the grand gamble. With his scouts still unable to locate the Crown Prince, he had to allow that his army would be encountered on the farther bank. “Odeleben’s famous description of the Emperor at Düben, sitting idly drawing Gothic characters on a sheet of paper, is not quite consistent with the actual outturn of correspondence. Still, all accounts represent him as a very different person from the ceaseless worker of former times. Fain says: “He remains almost constantly shut up in his room, to which his bed and his maps have been moved.”<sup>19</sup>

### Düben, 9:30 AM

Napoleon was awaiting further intelligence reports. He received from Murat indications that the Bohemian Army had changed its march direction, from Naumburg on the Saale, toward Leipzig. A message from St. Cyr reported Bennigsen’s appearance at Dresden.

### 10 AM

Napoleon draws up a note “on the union of the different corps d’armee at Taucha” (just outside Leipzig). The die is cast—there will be no grand gamble:

“I am ordering Ney to Düben. He will not receive this order till 2 PM; his troops can start at 3; he cannot pass the bridge at Düben til tomorrow, the 13th (when the Guard will have already passed); he can easily be at Taucha in the evening of the 13th.

“Latour-Maubourg being at Kemberg, (already on the hither bank of the Elbe) will have no more difficulty.

“The Duke of Tarentum (Macdonald) will only receive orders at 3 PM; if he has passed the Elbe,<sup>20</sup> he will require the night to recross; he can only be at Düben tomorrow, 13th; during the 14th he will march on Taucha.

“General Reynier, marching on Rosslau, can only get (back) to Wittenberg this night and reach Taucha on the 15th.<sup>21</sup> He can come by Eilenburg (instead of waiting for the passage at Düben).

“It is the same for General Sebastiani (who is with Reynier).

“As for the Dukes of Treviso (Mortier) and Reggio (Oudinot) and the reserve of the Guard, all that will pass the Düben bridge today and reach Taucha early tomorrow.

“The King of Naples (Murat) is today at Cröbern, tomorrow he will be at Leipzig and Taucha, where I shall have arrived tomorrow with Curial, the Old and Young Guard, and the Duke of Ragusa, nearly 40,000 men, which, with the King’s 50,000, will make nearly 90,000. These 90,000 will be reinforced during tomorrow (the 13th)—when the enemy necessarily cannot attack—by Ney, Bertrand, and Latour-Maubourg. On the 15th our whole army will be united. Tomorrow the enemy arrives at Cröbern. He will know that the Grand Army has arrived. He will spend the 14th *in placing himself for battle*. I have, therefore, the 13th and 14th for concentration. I say more; if all my army were at Düben, it could not arrive earlier, unless it had five or six bridges.”<sup>22</sup>

### 3 PM

There is no mention of Bernadotte in the correspondence of the 12<sup>th</sup> until the Emperor writes to Marmont stating that he has seized the enemy’s bridges on the Elbe, and that the Army of Berlin has gone to the right bank.<sup>23</sup>

whole of the enemy’s army was on their side of the Elbe. If he is correct, the Emperor’s letter of the 12<sup>th</sup> is only one of many instances of the way in which he now chose to believe what would suit him.”

<sup>19</sup> Petre, p. 313

<sup>20</sup> He had not.

<sup>21</sup> It took Reynier until the 17th (TRC).

<sup>22</sup> Petre, p. 312

<sup>23</sup> Petre, p. 314. “On this subject, Marmont says he reported to the Emperor, in the evening of the 11<sup>th</sup>, that he had made certain that the



At 3:30 he ordered Marmont to march his corps toward Taucha at 3 the next morning, adding, "I am coming from Düben with the Old Guard to join you, and Curial's and Lefebvre's divisions are coming from Eilenburg, so that tomorrow about noon, we can unite 78,000 men about Leipzig. My whole Army will be concentrated on the 14<sup>th</sup>, and I shall give battle to the enemy with 200,000 men."<sup>24</sup>

Murat was ordered to hold his position throughout the 13<sup>th</sup>; if not, he was to abandon Leipzig and draw his right toward Wurzen and connect it with Napoleon toward Taucha.

#### Dessau

Ney's leading division, under General Delmas, dispersed Tauenzien's rearguard division as it crossed the Mulde capturing 2,000 prisoners. Tauenzien made good his escape with the balance of his force. After crossing the Elbe, Tauenzien was joined by General Thümen who had been blockading Wittenberg. Reynier and Dombrowski attacked the disorganized Prussians and routed them.

#### 8 PM

Napoleon was still hesitating whether to go to Leipzig or not. He wrote to Murat, "If I do not decide to go there (Leipzig) myself, I will send Marmont (VI) to you, which will give you 85,000 to 90,000 men; with that you ought to be able to gain some days."<sup>25</sup>

The Emperor still believed that Bernadotte had retired to the right bank of the Elbe; for Ney, in reporting his action with Tauenzien's division at Dessau, mentioned that he had seen immense baggage columns and packs marching up the right bank from Acken."<sup>26</sup>

#### Rothenberg

Bülow and Winzingerode remained in place while Blücher crossed with the Army of Silesia and took post at Halle.

#### Halle

Blücher reached Halle and his advanced guard occupied Merseburg, due west of Leipzig.

#### Chemnitz

By nightfall, the Bohemian Army lay with its right in Chemnitz and its left on Altenberg, but its advance on Leipzig, in spite of extreme slowness (about six miles a day), had been so badly regulated that portions of the troops were still far to the rear and a couple of days at least were needed to concentrate for action.

#### 13 October, Wednesday, Dresden

After making a reconnaissance on Dresden, Bennigsen left Ostermann to observe it with 20,000 men, and marched by Colditz for Leipzig with 30,000. Chasteler remained at Teplitz with 10,000 men to guard Bohemia.

#### Düben, 5 AM

Ney was ordered to hurry back to Düben. An hour later Napoleon ascertained that Reynier had been fighting, on the previous day, only with Thümen and Tauenzien, whom he had driven to a hurried and somewhat disorderly retreat on Berlin. Bernadotte's headquarters had been at Bernburg on the 11<sup>th</sup>; he had not re-crossed the Elbe, but, on the contrary, was with Blücher behind the Saale. Now all uncertainty had been banished. The Emperor was confident that he had the time to pounce on Schwarzenburg before Blücher could arrive at Leipzig.

Macdonald and Reynier were called back on Düben, but the option of an eastward withdrawal wasn't entirely ruled-out.<sup>27</sup> "Napoleon made arrangements for a possible withdrawal over the Mulde by Düben. A force of 2,000 men, 200 cavalry and 6 guns from the IV Corps was dispatched to occupy the bridge. Napoleon learned of the occupation of the town ... and was reassured."

In the night, I received the order of the Emperor to retrograde, and look for a position to the north of Leipzig, to cover the city on the side of Halle and Landsberg. I already had traversed the country enough to know an existing position a league and a half from Leipzig, between Lindenthal and Breitenfeld, the same field where Gustavus Adolphus fought a hundred and forty-two years before, and won a signal victory. I went to occupy it; after reconnoitering the battlefield with care in detail, I assured myself that it was too vast for my army corps; but that with easy works of improvement, and thirty thousand men, I could hold in check, for twenty-four hours, the armies of the North and of Silésie. I relayed this to Napoléon, who prescribed me to execute the works without delay, and announced to me that, when the time comes, I would have the III Corps at my disposal, which would carry my force to the number of men that I had determined.<sup>28</sup>

#### Convergence on Leipzig

A center of publishing, famous for its trade fairs, with markets established six hundred years before Napoleon's birth, Leipzig lies at the junction of the principal highways of central Europe: the ancient roads known as the

<sup>24</sup> F.N. Maude, (Napoleon's Concentration on Leipzig)

<sup>25</sup> Petre, p.

<sup>26</sup> Petre, p.

<sup>27</sup> Petre, p. 315

<sup>28</sup> Memoires of Marshal Marmont.

*via Regia*, traversing Germanic lands in an east-west direction, and the *via Imperii*, a north-south road, meeting where four great rivers flow together—as Marmont observed, forming a funnel in that rainy autumn—the Elster, the Pleisse, the Luppe, and the Parthe. An important center of trade, larger than Dresden, it was home to 40,000 inhabitants.

#### Borna

Schwarzenberg had instructed the leading units of his right wing to report to Wittgenstein in order to carry out a reconnaissance-in-force towards Leipzig. Owing to the usual delays in the circulation of orders, the troops did not reach their allotted positions 'til 4 PM, when it was too late to carry out the proposed advance—a typical instance of the hopeless want of organization of the staff service throughout the whole campaign, and the direct cause of the extraordinary slowness of all its operations.

29

Schwarzenberg was persuaded to give up the idea of moving on Naumberg, making the battle of Leipzig inevitable.

*Troops kept coming from every direction. The roads and meadows were crowded with marching infantry and cavalry, rolling artillery and ammunition wagons. From a distance the troops looked like fields of colorful flowers. The daughter of the vicar of Seifertshain wrote: "The view from the church tower showed us that the entire area towards Leipzig was covered with soldiers. The roads as far as we could see were black with marching troops, guns, ammunition wagons, pouring in endless streams towards the battlefield. An Austrian officer warned us that we should prepare to flee at all costs."*

#### 14 October, Thursday, Liebertwolkwitz

Wittgenstein was directed to execute the postponed reconnaissance on the following morning (14<sup>th</sup>) and out of this developed the sharp action of Liebertwolkwitz, notable for Murat's great cavalry charges in masses; squadrons following one another at six horses' length distance; with which the more mobile cavalry of the Allies, in spite of want of unity in command, found no difficulty in dealing.

30

#### Möckern

Marmont moved from Taucha to Möckern, to delay the Silesian Army so that Ney's Corps might pass into Leipzig behind him on the next day. It was of vital importance to ensure the arrival of all the ammunition trains.

I put myself to the job, and neglected nothing to fill the task. I had many abatis set up in the wood forward of Lindenthal and behind Radefeld. Then I strongly occupied it. This wood became like a fortress. Radefeld was also occupied by my avant-garde, a body of considerable cavalry, supported by a rather numerous artillery.

#### 15 October, Friday, Möckern

The III, IV, VII and XI corps, and the guard, made their movement on Leipzig, and crossed behind me. The third and fourth corps remained at Eutritzsch, behind me. The eleventh corps and the guard went to post themselves against the Coalition Main Army, and the seventh corps occupied Taucha.

Two sapeurs, captured two days beforehand close to Delitzsch, driven to the general neighborhood of Halle, had escaped, and informed me of the combined armies of the North and of Silésie. According to these reports, they would be approaching, according to all appearances, the next day, the 16<sup>th</sup>, in the morning.

I warned Napoléon, whose IHQ was at Reudnitz, close to Leipzig. In the evening, the enemy cavalry and the artillery, that I had in front of me, were supported by infantry. I had my forward posts withdrawn, thrown on the edges of the Elster. I gave notice to the Emperor. Around ten o'clock in the evening, I climbed on the steeple of Lindenthal, and I saw all the fires of the army enemy. The horizon was ablaze. I hastened to remind the Emperor to recall that my position demanded thirty thousand men. I asked him not to lose a moment to put at my disposal the third corps that he had promised me.<sup>31</sup>

#### 16 October, Saturday, 6 AM

##### **The Battle of Möckern—All Positions on North map**

Blücher issued orders for his cavalry to advance: Yorck's cavalry on the main road through Wahren; Langeron's cavalry through Radefeld and Lindenthal. Sacken's cavalry to follow Yorck's, via Schkeuditz toward Leipzig.

Blücher's infantry was ordered to be ready to march at 10 AM Sacken's Corps was held in Radefeld as a reserve, watching for the expected French advance from Hohenossig. Blücher didn't know Napoleon had marched to Wachau. When Souham's 9th division was

should stop in front of you in great force, your corps, the corps of general Bertrand and the corps of the Prince of the Moskowa are destined to be opposed to them."

<sup>29</sup> F.N. Maude (The Bohemian Army)

<sup>30</sup> F.N. Maude

<sup>31</sup> Memoires of Marshal Marmont. "In a letter dated October 15, evening, the Major General (Berthier) wrote to me: "If the enemy

seen moving in from that direction with Polish troops entering Klein- and Gross Wiederitzsch, Langeron was ordered to move toward Eilenburg and find out if there were more enemies in that direction. He would encounter stiff resistance from Dombrowski's small Polish division.

8 AM

Blücher arrived on the heights near Lützschena. Yorck's advanced guard, under von Klüx, occupied Wahren. Blücher's lead cavalry moved toward Lützschena (2220). Scouts reported the French had constructed a few earthworks. Vedettes also scouted Stahmeln, (2520), and the heights north of the village.

Radefeld

Langeron sent out the order for his corps to attack the enemy wherever encountered. His force maneuvered toward Radefeld, (2510), dominating terrain occupied by just one French division and light troops.

Blücher's HQ

Blücher was confused about the location of the enemy. He had news that the main body of the French was to the northeast beyond Podewitz and Hohenossig, arriving from Düben. His calculations were off, for the French main body was already beyond the Parthe. This miscalculation together with Bernadotte's mischief led Blücher to send Bernadotte from Sybitz toward Delitzsch, where there was no enemy of any importance.

Marmont's HQ, 8 AM

I waited with impatience the result of my reports when, on the 16th, at eight o'clock in the morning, I received a letter from Napoléon, brought by an orderly officer, called Lavesaut. This letter criticized all my reports and their conclusions. It claimed that I was in complete error. I did not have, it said, anyone in front of me. It gave me consequently the order to withdraw immediately on Leipzig, to cross this city, and to come to form the reserve of the army on the southern front.<sup>32</sup>

Marmont sent an aide to ask for new orders. Had he marched away, it would have been up to Ney with the III Corps, but as it happened, parts of III Corps ended up marching southward instead.

Napoleon summoned both the VI and III Corps south to the Wachau battlefield, believing that Blücher had

crossed the Saale towards Merseburg and would be "prevented from reaching the scene of action in time to take effective part in it. The VI Corps was actually moving in accordance with this order, when such heavy masses of the enemy appeared in sight that Marmont decided to halt and face them, while Ney promised him the assistance of the III Corps. Marmont deployed his men across a low elevation of the ground, his left resting on Möckern and his right on Klein Widderritzsch. Here he was assailed by Yorck's Corps and part of Sacken's, whilst Langeron's followed in echelon on their left rear."

Radefeld, 10AM

Blücher ordered Langeron to attack Freiroda, (2710), and Radefeld. Langeron reported that he could not advance because the village of Radefeld was occupied by French infantry, cavalry and artillery. Sacken was assigned to follow Langeron as a reserve. St. Priest, who was still marching up, would follow Sacken and Langeron. Yorck's Prussian corps would move along the Parthe through Lützschena and Lindenthal, (2916).

Opposing them, Krukowiecki's 18th Polish Light Cavalry Brigade was in Stahmeln, (2520). Fournier's 6th LC division was conducting recon patrols toward Podewitz and Eilenburg and Defrance's 4th HC Div had arrived in Mockau, 4419.

Souham's III Corps, arriving by night march, was in Lindenthal, moving toward the Mockau heights: Souham's 8th and 11th Divisions arrived at noon with the 9th Division moving in from Hohenossig. Bertrand's IV Corps would be held in reserve in Eutritzsch.

10 AM

Ney sent Bertrand an order to march toward Lindenau.<sup>33</sup> Bertrand had 10,000 infantry and cavalry.<sup>34</sup> Nafziger lists three brigades in the 15th Div., while we have only two.<sup>35</sup> So possibly it was the missing brigade of Martel that was detached. Anyway Martel (2 Italian battalions) is not in our Orbat.

In his best days Berthier would have sent an order to the detachment to rejoin the army once the decision to retreat toward France had been set. If those 2,000 men of IV Corps were prevented from rejoining their corps then they would have joined the garrison of Wittenberg or Torgau.

<sup>32</sup> Memoires of Marshal Marmont

<sup>33</sup> This is on page 146. He writes "Lindenthal" but the march order was in response to Arrighi's call for assistance, and Arrighi was in Lindenau and not Lindenthal.

<sup>34</sup> ± 700

<sup>35</sup> We have more men with the 15th Div. than Nafziger (3,400 versus 1,859).

Bertrand moved from Leipzig to Lindenau on the 16th with 7,000 men<sup>36</sup> and was at Weissenfels (off map) with 10,000 men on the 17th.<sup>37</sup>

Marmont despatched his reserves from Breitenfeld and Lindenthal to Napoleon.<sup>38</sup> These troops were delayed when the IV Corps crossed their path. The approaches to Leipzig were filled with troops and vehicles of the IV Corps and while Marmont's reserves waited in Gohlis for the IV Corps to clear through the Halle gate of Leipzig, they must have been drawn back into the fight at Mockern.

Marmont received reports of the approach of a strong enemy column against Radefeld, and another on the road from Halle, advancing from Stahmeln. The force sent against Radefeld was threatening his right.

### **The Battle of Möckern Begins**

With the IV Corps departing, but as yet no sign of the III Corps, Marmont could hear the first shots coming from Radefeld and Stahmeln. These positions were occupied by his advanced posts: Buquet's Brigade of the 21st division was at Stahelm, and the 22nd Division, supported by Normann's 25th (Württemberg) Light Cavalry Brigade in the woods, the *Tannenwald*, between Stahmeln and Radefeld. There were outposts at Freiroda, Radefeld, and Hayna. After a few cannon shots coupled with a flanking movement by Emanuel's Russian cavalry, Marmont's advanced troops pulled back. The withdrawing French troops were covered by Normann's cavalry and the fire of guns in three earthworks (I.P.) between Lindenthal and Wahren. They established themselves in Wahren where they encountered Hiller's advanced guard of Yorck's Prussian Corps.

1 PM

The troops from Wahren withdrew toward Möckern. At this time Marmont had taken a position between Möckern and Eutritzsch. Dombrowski's 27th Div. had joined his line at Wiederitzsch facing Langeron's Corps.

Möckern changed hands several times, and Marmont was forming his last reserve when they were charged in flank by Prussian cavalry and panicked. Disorder spread throughout the corps, and retreat was the only option.

"Marmont left some 6,000 or 7,000 men on the ground, and Yorck's infantry was reduced from 16,120 according to the morning states of the 16<sup>th</sup> to 9,000 at nightfall. Langeron lost 1,500 men; Sacken's troops only reached the field at the last moment, and suffered less than did the others."<sup>39</sup>

Wachau, 11 AM

Napoleon expected to defeat the Bohemian Army to the south of Leipzig on the 16<sup>th</sup>. "Macdonald's Corps (XI) reached its preliminary position, initiated its turning movement, and about 2 PM—its attack having sufficiently developed—the Emperor ordered the whole line to advance; Drouot with 84 guns galloped out to clear the way for Mortier and the Guards with case shot. But at this moment General Bordesouille, with his Division of about 2,000 Cuirassiers in 18 Squadrons, suddenly decided to launch his whole force against a great Russian battery from whose fire the leading columns of the French infantry were suffering severely. The attack was most gallantly ridden, and 26 guns had been put out of action, when from all sides the cavalry of the Allies, by Brigades, Regiments, or even Squadrons, just as they came to hand, bore down on the blown and disordered Squadrons of Bordesouille's command. Then in turn, to rescue their comrades, all the remaining available squadrons on the French side rode down into the *melée* that speedily formed. The confusion lasted for about an hour and a half, but when at last the turmoil ceased, the French opportunity was lost; the Russian and Prussian Guards had arrived on the scene. Step by step the French fell back, and as darkness put an end to the fighting, they had been driven back to the limits of the position they had held in the morning."<sup>40</sup> In the bitter cold night, about 35,000 dead and wounded lay on this part of the battlefield.

*17 October, Sunday,*

"All day on the 17<sup>th</sup> there was an undeclared truce. The only firing, and that was halfhearted, came from the northwestern suburbs, where Marmont outpaced Blücher. In the meantime Bernadotte approached with his Swedes, and the Russian General Bennigsen was nearing Wurzen with a considerable reinforcement, the two contingents adding 100,000 to the depleted ranks of the Coalition. The augmentation to French forces was limited to that of Reynier's Corps, perhaps ten thousand men."<sup>41</sup>

*18 October, Monday,*

"Ney held the command of the whole of the right wing, Murat of the left; Napoleon himself with his Guards and Cavalry covered the junction at the centre, and could move to either flank as occasion required. Only Bertrand (IV Corps) and the garrison of Leipzig were absent from the battlefield, the former remaining to cover the exit from the defile of Lindenau.

<sup>36</sup> Nafziger, p. 133

<sup>37</sup> Nafziger, p. 160

<sup>38</sup> What units, if any were really sent is unknown.

<sup>39</sup> F.N. Maude, (Battle of Möckern)

<sup>40</sup> F.N. Maude

<sup>41</sup> R.F. Delderfield, *Imperial Sunset*, p. 119.

“The exact strength of the French Army cannot now be ascertained. Probably 160,000 men with about 650 guns stood in the ranks on the morning of the 18<sup>th</sup>, and against this force the Allied Sovereigns disposed of no fewer than 295,000 men with 1,250 guns, of which some 100,000 never came into action at all.”<sup>42</sup>

### General Retreat

“Napoleon had already realized that further resistance was useless; his first orders initiating a retreat by Lindenau had gone out at 11 AM, and now fighting was only continued to gain space for withdrawal.

“Eventually the Allies carried Leipzig by storm, and owing to the premature destruction of the bridge a large number of French prisoners fell into their hands; but of a pursuit there was no indication.”<sup>43</sup>

“Marbot ... blames Berthier, Chief of Staff, not for the destruction of the bridge over which he had no immediate control, but for his failure to provide alternative crossings during the day-long lull on the 17<sup>th</sup>. ‘The entire army assumed this had been done,’ Marbot says, ‘but when the order to retreat was given on the night of the 18<sup>th</sup> there was not a beam or a plank across a single brook.’”<sup>44</sup>

“All the marshals and senior officers of the Grand Army were disgusted with staff bungling that had occasioned such a disaster and the former street urchin Auge-reau was only voicing a general opinion when he asked, furiously, ‘Does the bugger know what he’s doing?’”<sup>45</sup>

“Why were not numerous bridges built over the Pleisse and the Elster above the Causeway? It is certain none were constructed, and, so far, no orders for them have ever been discovered.”<sup>46</sup> As Marbot says, “the entire Army assumed this had been done.” They didn’t realize that no orders could be issued, because the pontonniers and artisans were not present. Napoleon was waiting for his pontoons and his war chest to arrive before retreating from Leipzig.

Had the additional bridges been in place, the explosion of the bridge on the 18th would not have been so catastrophic.

The lack of extra bridges on the Elster and the loss of the Army treasury meant tens of thousands of troops who might have been available for the campaign in 1814 were lost. The lack of a pontoon train and field forges would explain why no bridges were built over the Elster.

The fact that the treasure was also in that convoy explains in part the evaporation of the army during November. I cannot find any author yet who as yet discusses the implications.

### The Army Parks

Having been turned back by Cossacks when only a few miles from Leipzig, “General Durrieu moved his forces into a position (outside Torgau). He commanded 6,700 men, 2,560 horses, and 540 vehicles.”<sup>47</sup>

In addition to pontoneers and train troops, Durrieu brought in to Torgau “a reinforcement of artillery and engineering troops, the 2nd and 8th Naval Military Artisan Battalions (1,220), two battalion cadres of the 42nd Line, the 5th and 17th Military Equipage Battalions (1,260), and a number of men employed in the various military administrations.”<sup>48</sup>

Durrieu, with the imperial war chest, the engineering park, the pontoon train and the portion of the artillery park that had not accompanied Reynier, had been a major concern for both the Emperor and Marshal (Ney). Reynier was mistakenly instructed to hold the way open through Taucha<sup>49</sup>—a failure of staff work, since it had been reported that the train was actually coming from Wurzen—and Reynier should have realized the mistake and adjusted his deployment accordingly. Part of the Grand Park of the artillery, under General Valaze, got through by accompanying the 9th Division (VII Corps), which enters the game on the 17th.

The “Park” made up the French Center of Operations (minus the hospitals and 90% of the Army’s baggage trains)—the fleet of vehicles, including tools and portable forges that were so vitally important for keeping the cavalry and artillery on the road. With this column were:

- Imperial War Chest (gold).
- Engineering Park. Artisans (craftsmen)
- Pontoon Train (bridge train)
- Artillery Park (ammunition)

There were no ambulances or Headquarters staff with Durrieu’s column, but it carried the crucial war chest, with the Imperial Gold. There were 6,708 men<sup>50</sup> with the park of artillery, pontonniers, engineers and administrative personnel. The artisans were iron fabricators with their mobile forges.

<sup>42</sup> Traditional strength figures overestimate the Coalition. Our research indicates Bohemian Army at Leipzig (detached) 168,000 (15,000); North Army 49,000 (14,000) and Silesian Army 66,000 (9,000), or 283,000 on the battlefield.

<sup>43</sup> F.N. Maude, (The 18<sup>th</sup> October)

<sup>44</sup> R.F. Delderfield, Imperial Sunset, p. 127

<sup>45</sup> R.F. Delderfield, Imperial Sunset, p. 131

<sup>46</sup> Petre

<sup>47</sup> Nafziger, p. 327

<sup>48</sup> Nafziger, p. 327. See also French Garrison of Torgau, p. 377.

<sup>49</sup> Nafziger, Napoleon at Leipzig, p. 191

<sup>50</sup> Bowden (p. 294) states the park of artillery and engineers at 140 officers and 6,568 other ranks on 15 August.

- Pontooneers...8 companies (1,550)
- Miners...1 co. (190)
- Sappers...2 cos. (380)
- Artisans...950 men
- Marine Artisans... 2 Battalions (1,150)
- Artillery Park ...1,300 men
- Baggage... 2 battalions (1,200)<sup>51</sup>

"As Napoleon went on 13th October from Dübén to Leipzig he had the bridge equipment, the artillery and engineer parks and the wagons of the food system which revolved around General Durrieu ordered to Eilenburg in the valley half-way between Torgau and Leipzig to go out and get in readiness to reunify with the Grande Armée in case the coming battle of Leipzig was lost. Durrieu was cut off from this and went under approval of the Governor of Torgau back there where he stood on the 19th between Fort Zinna and the large pond with 6,700 men, 2,560 horses, and 240 wagons."

### Napoleon's orders for the 14th (3 AM)

"General Durrieu was ordered to guard Eilenburg, where he would collect parks, etc., on the left bank of the Mulde." <sup>52</sup>

Eilenburg is only 12 kilometers from Taucha (or only 4 km from the new map corner). So apparently it took days to collect up the wagons (or perhaps they had not received their orders to march on Leipzig). In either case they were still at or near Eilenburg on the morning of the 18th (4 days later).

"During the evening of 16 October ... the high mood in the headquarters was only dampened by concern over Reynier's fate, and that of Durrieu's costly and vital park column. A report from Reynier finally arrived around midnight, stating that the VII Corps had advanced through Taucha ... " <sup>53</sup>

"(On the 17th, Napoleon's) main concern continued to be Durrieu's column of the grand park, and its arrival in Leipzig." <sup>54</sup>

"Durrieu, with the imperial war chest, the engineering park, the pontoon train and the portion of the artillery park that had not accompanied Reynier, was a major concern of the Emperor. Reynier was instructed to hold the way through Taucha open <sup>55</sup>... Ney was very anxious for the army parks. Only a part of the artillery reserve

marched with Reynier.<sup>56</sup> The main portion appeared secure, but it had taken the longer way through Wurzen. Therefore on the afternoon of the 17th, Ney ordered the deployment of two battalions with several squadrons on the heights to the west of the Parthe, by Taucha, to link him with GD Durrieu's forces."<sup>57</sup>

Ney apparently did not know that the grand park was not on the Taucha road but rather had switched to the road from Wurzen. Hence a party of Cossacks seeking to link up with Bubna, were able to send Napoleon's Center of Operations scurrying away to Torgau. Now Napoleon knows he won't be able to feed all his army. This may have decided him on a battle of attrition, knowing that he is going to lose his army now anyway.

The wagons took the road south, turning right at Wurzen. On the 18th the trains were expected as far west as Schönefeld-Paunsdorf, as they approached from Wurzen. The trains were actually on the game map moving from Sommerfeld to Paunsdorf (4926) when they encountered Bülow's light forces coming up from across the Parthe. Cossacks captured Paunsdorf, blocking the road from Wurzen, during the afternoon of the 18th. At this point the trains were only two miles from Leipzig.

Durutte's 32nd Division was supposed to attempt to open a passage immediately in the line Schönefeld-Paunsdorf. If this failed, Durrieu was instructed to take his trains to safety via Torgau. ... Ney deployed his cavalry in pickets (vedettes) before his lines, in order to contact Durrieu." <sup>58</sup> The train could have arrived without problems if they stayed with Reynier, or if Ney had known where to look for them.

Petre says that, around 4 PM on the 18th, "Some Cossacks, sent by Bülow to try and seize Napoleon's trains [coming from] Eilenburg, failed as the Bavarian, Saxon, and Hessian escort remained faithful. The trains retired to Torgau." These Saxons, Bavarians and Hessians are not mentioned as arriving at Torgau, and presumably deserted during the night.

## CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN TO HANAU

*Andreas E. Gebhardt*

"In a few days the Emperor again had in his hands a total force exceeding 80,000 combatants, with which he completely routed the attempt made by a combined force of Austrians and Bavarians (about 50,000 strong, under Wrede) to intercept his retreat at Hanau."<sup>59</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Author's estimate without deducting for attrition

<sup>52</sup> *Petre*

<sup>53</sup> Nafziger, p. 187

<sup>54</sup> Nafziger, p. 188

<sup>55</sup> Nafziger, p. 191

<sup>56</sup> A column of engineers under General Valaze, consisting of 3069 men—4 companies of sappers, train and baggage

<sup>57</sup> Nafziger, p. 185

<sup>58</sup> Nafziger, p. 191

<sup>59</sup> F.N. Maude. See "Continuation of the Campaign," p. 22 below.

26 October, Tuesday, Würzburg<sup>60</sup>

Wrede ordered his Austro-Bavarian Corps to move from Würzburg towards Hanau. A small skirmish took place along the Vacha-Hünfeld road when 2 Bavaria Infantry Battalions and a Württemberg Infantry Division under LtGen Franquemont defected to Cossack General Ilovaisky, this change of sides having been approved by their specific monarchs. The Bavarians were sent to their own army while the Württembergers were detached under Cossack commander Orlov-Denissov. The heights of the Thuringia Forest were already covered with snow. The bulk of baggage- and wounded trains escorted by Marshal Murat and the wounded Marshal Ney passed along the Schlüchtern-Gelnhausen-Frankfurt-Road.

27 October, Wednesday

The following troops reached Aschaffenburg:

- 3.(Bav) Infantry Division de Lamotte
- (Aus) Reserve Infantry Division Trautenberg
- 1.(Bav) Cavalry Brigade Vieregg

Aschaffenburg

Approaching on the left wing from Würzburg southward via Königshofen (Lauda) and Mergentheim, Wrede and his staff reached Aschaffenburg. He was informed that small French detachments joined by Marshal Murat and several Generals and high-ranking celebrities had passed Hanau. Therefore he ordered the just-arrived 1.(Bav) Chevauxleger Rgt to take Hanau.

28 October, Thursday

Approaching from Würzburg via Spessart-Forest towards Aschaffenburg:

- 2.(Bav) Infantry Division Beckers
- Line Infantry Division (Aus) Bach
- Light Division (Aus) Fresnel - except Volkmann

Sent from Rohrbrunn-Weibersbrunn via Heigenbrücken towards Gelnhausen:

- Light Brigade (Aus) Volkmann
- Cavalry Brigade Schwarzenberg Uhlans

Their approaching route would stay very close outside map along hexrow xx01 east of Alzenau (2702).

Aschaffenburg

WREDE got a message from SCHWARZENBERG (written at Coalition HQ Elleben on Oct, 27<sup>th</sup>) at his HQ:<sup>61</sup>

*“FM Blücher moved his HQ the day before yesterday (Oct, 25<sup>th</sup>) into Langensalza (Thuringia) while the enemy is most probably not able to move towards Kassel. Because he must have got notice of*

*Your Excellency’s Army’s approach, it would be possible that he will take direction via Hersfeld-Alsfeld towards Wetzlar to retire behind the River Lahn and to cross the River Rhein at Bonn or Koblenz. I won’t hesitate to inform Your Excellency about this possible direction, because it will have a most important impact on Your Excellency’s operations...”*

He took this written information for more important so he overrode the verbal informations offered by the Russian Streifkorps’ commanders

Hanau

1.(Bav) Chevauxleger Rgt entered Hanau in the morning taking one French General, several French staff officers and men as prisoners.

Kesselstadt

A detachment sent to Kesselstadt (just outside map, say 1935) took a transport boat filled with food (rice) for Mainz on the River Main. The Bavarian Chevauxlegers reported at noon that a larger French detachment was approaching from Gelnhausen.

Hanau, 9 AM

French troops under General Grouvelle attacked the Bavarian troops in and around Hanau.

Hanau, 3 PM

Parts of AdvGd of Rechberg’s 1.(Bav) Infantry Division reached Hanau, but they spread wide to cover all approaches (Kinzig Bridge and Lamboy Bridge). When the Bavarians took troops from the Kinzig bridge to bolster their defence line at Lamboy Bridge, the French managed to enter Hanau via Kinzig Bridge. The Bavarian Cavalry units had to withdraw from inside Hanau and joined the infantry positions outside town from Nürnberger Gate (towards Groß-Auheim) near the Obelisk at the Lehrhof.

Gelnhausen, 4 PM

Cossack General Czernitchev arrived at Gelnhausen with about 5,000 men. Thousands of French wounded rushed out of town, streaming along the main road towards Hanau, followed by some Cossacks. The mass of the Cossacks camped outside town towards Lieblos, while others entered Gelnhausen. The next morning they departed.

Hanau

The Bavarian Cavalry units had to withdraw from inside Hanau and joined the infantry positions outside town from Nürnberger Gate (towards Groß-Auheim) near the Obelisk at the Lehrhof.

<sup>60</sup> Gyßling, p. 12ff

<sup>61</sup> Gyßling, p. 13

### Aschaffenburg

Wrede ordered the rest of 1.(Bav) Cavalry Brigade Vieregg towards Hanau, followed by 3.(Bav) Infantry Division de Lamotte.

3.(Bav) Infantry Division de Lamotte arrived at Hanau late at night and reoccupied the town, deploying 2.(Bav) Infantry Brigade Deroy on the main Gelnhausen-Frankfurt Road, northeast of town (about hexes 1129-1328-1527).

### Hünfeld

Sebastiani (with 2 Cavalry Divisions Exelmans and Berkheim) was sent to Schlüchtern, reaching town at evening.

3. Cavalry Division d'Hurbal was spread from north of Schlüchtern back towards Eisenach to secure the retreat road and to keep contact to Léfèvre-Desnouettes east of Eisenach.

### Schlüchtern

Empereur Napoléon I. marched from Hünfeld towards Schlüchtern, reaching there at night.

## FRENCH POSITIONS, NIGHT OF 28 OCTOBER

V. and XI. Corps (Macdonald) at Steinau  
(between Schlüchtern and Gelnhausen)

III. Cavalry Corps (Arrighi) around Schlüchtern

II. Corps (Victor) around Fliesen

VI. Corps (Marmont) in Neuhof

Parts of Imperial Gde (Oudinot) at Marbach

IV. Corps (Bertrand) near Hünfeld

IX. Corps (Augereau) astride Rasdorf

Mortier (Rearguard) in and around Buttlar,  
between Hünfeld and Vacha.

### 29 October, Friday

1.(Bav) Infantry Division Rechberg marches from Würzburg via Mergentheim and Walldürn towards Aschaffenburg, partly using River Main as transporting line from Miltenberg onward

Early morning French detachments approached Hanau west of Lamboy Forest, being attacked by Deroy. At the same moment the Russian Streifcorps commanded by General Kaiseroff who marched right in-between French detachments approached and encircled the French who got taken prisoner.

After the Cossacks left Gelnhausen early in the morning, the Austrian Jägers (3.Light Brigade), accompanied by Schwarzenberg Uhlans and Archduke John Hussars approached town, occupying a position in the forest between Hailer and Altenhaßlau (off map East of 0501).

### Aschaffenburg

General Rechberg's 1.Bavarian Infantry Div, supported by 2 Batteries and 5.(Bav) Cavalry Rgt was ordered to march towards Frankfurt from Aschaffenburg via Seligenstadt, Offenbach towards Sachsenhausen (outside map).

### Hanau, 12 Noon

Wrede met Cossack General Czernitshev and Orlov and Austrian General Mensdorff.

### Langenselbold, 3 PM

Bavarian General Lamotte sent some troops to occupy Langenselbold, meanwhile French troops approached from Rothenbergen opening fire and forced the Bavarians out of town. The Bavarians fearing to get surrounded retired into Rüdgingen.

### Gelnhausen

Approaching French troops (about 6-8,000) forced the Light Brigade (Volkman) to retreat during the whole night from Gelnhausen-Haiger via Gundsrod (1001) along road via Nieder Rodenbach towards Hanau.

Sebastiani (now supported by parts of V. and XI. Corps had his Cavalry Divisions march on both sides of the River Kinzig. One of the two bridges at Gelnhausen which had been destroyed by the Cossacks got repaired again for the baggage trains.

### Rothenbergen, 3 PM<sup>62</sup>

The main French column accompanied by Napoleon and the Cavalry reached Rothenbergen. The Emperor awaited news from the skirmish that took place outside a Gasthof, where he was taking a rest. He reached Langenselbold at about 18:00, ordering the main baggage and wounded-trains accompanied by Lefebvre-Desnouette's Guard Cavalry, the Division Dombrowsky (altogether about 1,200 men) supported by Arrighi's III. Cavalry Corps to march from Langenselbold via Bruchköbel-Bergens-Breungsheim towards Mainz.

### Salmünster

The rest of the French contingent camped overnight around Salmünster or on the roads approaching from Fulda.

### Langenselbold 6 PM

Napoleon reached town at evening with most of the Cavalry, V. and XI. Corps, later met by Macdonald who arrived during the night. Here he learned about the presence of the Austro-Bavarian troops.

<sup>62</sup> Richter, p. 369



He assembled his remaining fighting force of about 60,000 Inf, 12,000 Cav and 140 guns to fight next day's battle.

Macdonald should lead V. and XI. Corps followed by the Old Guard, while Victor and Augereau stayed in Gelnhausen together with II. Corps which reached town this night, followed by Mortier with 2 Infantry Divisions and I. Cavalry Corps.

Oudinot with the remnants reached the battlefield next evening.

*30 October, Saturday*

The Army of Bohemia approaching from Meiningen (Thuringia Forest) reaching Schmalkalden this day being more than 10 miles away. Napoleon learned about the Bavarian-Austro troops near Hanau.

### **FRENCH FORCES, DAWN 30 OCTOBER** <sup>63</sup>

Léfèvre-Desnouettes (about 4,000 horses)

Macdonald + Victor (5,000 men)

Old Gd (4,000 Grenadiers and Chasseurs)

Hvy Gd Cav under Nansouty (2,000-3,000 horses)

Reserve Arty (Drouot)

TOTAL about 16,000-17,000 men

#### **Still far behind...**

Marmont with remnants of V., III. and VI. Corps

Divisions Séméle and Durutte

Oudinot with the Young Guard

Bertrand with IV Corps

Napoleon decided to accept the offered battle. He was happy to take the chance of lecturing his former General how to fight a battle, thereby restoring his credibility and boost Army Morale.

At dawn Macdonald with V. and XI. Corps moved out in the lead. He was followed by the Old Guard and Victor with the rest of the troops; Oudinot with the tail of the Army. No matter how accelerated the march, Oudinot only reached the battlefield in the evening, and Mortier, who was forming the rear guard with his two divisions and the I.CavCorps, was only arriving in Gelnhausen by evening.

10 AM

XI. Corps under General Charpentier deployed in dense skirmish formation all 3,000 men, followed by II. Cavalry Corps, Div Friant of Old Gde and Gde Cavalry Division marched against outposts of Bavarian Brigade Deroy and destroyed both artillery pieces at Rückingen bridge. Macdonald stretched his left wing with remnants of II. Corps under General Dubreton (about 2,000 men)

against the Austrian Szekler Grenz-Rgt that led into a long-lasting skirmishing in the Lamboy Forest without a proper place to bring the French troops into position. At this point Wrede ordered General Graf Pappenheim (1.Brigade/ 2.Bavarian Infantry Division) to advance into the forest and support the Austrian Grenz-Rgt. The wording of this order shows that Wrede didn't have any idea about the true strength of his opponents, who and which forces opposed him.

## DESIGNER'S NOTES

*Kevin Zucker*

The battle of Leipzig occupies a powerful place in history, the culmination of the war's most costly campaign and the century's largest battle. With this 5th edition we have revised all the units, the set ups, maps, added playing area, XIV Corps as Alternate Reinf., and have brought the whole thing into the standard rules of The Library of Napoleonic Battles (adding vedettes, baggage trains, pontoons, and cards). However, these new elements were grounded on the sturdy basis of prior editions, a game that held its replay value and has remained a perennial favorite.

Obviously we didn't want to lose the flavor of the original. To that end, we kept intact the time scale (1 hour turns), the brigade unit scale, the ground scale (480 meters per hex), and the general layout of the terrain (even down to the hex numbering)—although we have added innumerable details, such as the sandpit outside Leipzig, many chateaux, and increased playing area.

We have revised the unit strengths, with an overall strength increase of about 3% to both sides. Each unit now has an Initiative Rating based upon the troop quality. There are vedettes for Light Cavalry in the first wave of units. After the board is full and the positions of the armies are known, the scouting rôle of cavalry is over. The ever-critical baggage and pontoon trains are now included. Perhaps the biggest game-changer is the possibility of hidden forces. But the impact is limited, once the armies close for battle, since units within visual sight distance are revealed. We have added bridge destruction and repair. Command works differently—now units must either be in Command or make their Initiative roll to move at all.

One big change to combat is a recent innovation—"Shock"—an idea we stole from Mark's game *Ardennes '44* (inspired, he says, by Evan Jones' combat table in *Blue vs. Gray*.) If you obtain a "Shock" result on the regular CRT, you go to the Shock Combat Table to compare

<sup>63</sup> Richter, p. 369ff

the Initiative of the Lead Unit on each side. The point, as Mark put it, is to show the importance of troop morale without adding complexity. He writes, "Troop morale is only important occasionally, but when it is, it is the deciding factor. ... At that point you can forget about the combat odds and look for a lead unit to use in a separate combat table ... odds play no part on the [Shock] Table, so troop quality is brought into a sharp focus." This Shock Table has been a part of the series for the last three games and it works well.

## THE MAP

Our point of departure was Rick Barber's map produced for the 3rd edition. Rick did excellent research for that version. We found some terrain had been distorted around the Goselbach stream, and based our new version on the following sources. We owe our heartfelt thanks to Andreas E. Gebhardt for checking the orthography and other details (he submitted a list of over 100 corrections), and providing us with many sources:

- *Meilenblätter von Sachsen*, 1780-1806, F.L. Alster (1:12,000)
- *Sächsische Karten 1897* (1:25,000)
- *Kartenwerke von Sachsen ab 1850*
- *Geologische Spezialkarte des Königreichs Sachsen* Königlichen Finanz-Ministerium (1:25000)
- *Geognostische Specialcharte des Königreichs Sachsen*, 1846 (1:120,000)
- *Topographical Atlas of Saxony 1836-1860* (1:57,600)
- *Topographical Maps, Kingdom of Saxony 1863* (1:100,000)

... among many others.

## BAGGAGE TRAINS

It takes a little imagination to remember the importance soldiers of the Napoleonic era attached to their road-bound supply lines.

People see combat as the main event and baggage trains as a minor side-issue. After all, if I win the battle my troops can go out foraging. For the troops, however, the status of their baggage train is of critical import, and not just because of the wagons and what was in them. Symbolically, the baggage train counter represents the line of retreat. If this vulnerable area is threatened, every soldier will be looking over his shoulder. Each army has a line of retreat and it happens to be where the baggage trains will be collected, far enough away, but not too far, from the fighting.

The counter represents the "trailhead" of wagons, stretching back along the primary road to the Supply

Source. A French Corps might have 100 wagons in constant motion, but the train counter just represents the main forward collection point. Capturing it implies physical possession of that important road junction, village, or bridge.

*The Forward Line of Supply has been changed to 14 hexes for NAL (and this applies retroactively).*

Wittgenstein's battle orders for Wachau: "The baggage shall be behind Espenhain on the road in order to be later directed towards Borna where the wounded shall also be sent, via Espenhain. I shall remain on the heights of Gùlden-Gossa between the first and second lines." <sup>64</sup> Here is a commander adjacent to the first line. The heights mentioned are the Wachtberg, 14 hexes from Espenhain. Borna is off map, another 15 hexes from Espenhain, where the wounded go, with the empty wagons. That represents your Supply Source.

A Baggage Train is literally a "train" of wagons two-abreast running along rutted and often torn-up roads. There will be breakdowns. Horses will falter and fall. New teams will have to be fetched. Drivers have a tendency to straggle, as they water and feed the horses. We allow the Baggage Train to move quickly because this counter presents a compact target in a way that the actual strung-out column did not. The counter represents the "trailhead" that can be moved up and down and around in the column anywhere for free.

We only need a little bit of vulnerability to force the players to pay attention to the safety of their baggage train when they deploy for battle. We are using a marker in a specific hex to represent something more ephemeral, but to occupy that somewhat fictional point indicates your enemy's line has been enveloped and his morale will suffer accordingly.

*Vers. 1.5, 26 Mar 2020*



<sup>64</sup> Nafziger, p. 105



**Vohlers Notes to Tables**



## Combat Tables