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
OPERATIONAL STUDIES GROUP

Wargame Design



CONTENTS

04	EDITORIAL
06	PLAYERS NOTES: ARMISTICE 1813
10	HISTORICAL NOTES: HASLACH: DUPONT'S BAGGAGE
12	DESIGN FILES: HOW NAPOLEONIC SUPPLY WORKS
14	DESIGN FILES: REINFORCEMENT MARCH ORDERS
16	PLAYERS NOTES: RIGA, 1812
18	PLAYERS NOTES: THE INFORMATION WAR
26	DESIGN FILES: LUDWIG AT ABENSBERG
30	DESIGN FILES: WALLED TOWN COMBAT



WARGAME DESIGN, SPRING 2021

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EDITORIAL

CLARITY COMES THROUGH PLAYING THE GAME

This Game Design business is not what it's cracked up to be. You don't spend all day in your white lab coat pointing at the map with the stem of your pipe, contemplating. You're not contemplating, you're running business. You have a team of experts who do the contemplating. They contemplate and then they send in the results of their contemplation.

"I think you'd better change paragraph 152. If you don't someone might get confused..."

So you change it. But someone gets confused anyway.

"You shouldn't have changed that."

Now everyone is confused.

"Why did you change that? It made sense the old way."

Everybody thinks being a game designer is so cool. How do you think up this stuff? It's like being an ant, moving one grain of sand at a time. Carry it through tunnels up to the surface. Drop it on the sidewalk; repeat.

That's what game design is like.

When the new game is released, the red pencils come out.

"What about this statement over at 152? Who wrote that?"

"It makes no sense. It should say 'all of.'"

"Why did you design it this way? Did you even proof-read this?"

Wargamers are, as a group, very smart. They are used to reading complicated rules and figuring them out. Some thrive on this logic activity, and will just study the rules with hardly a glance at the maps, counters, and scenario information. This can lead down many false corridors.

The map is not the territory, and equally, the rules are not the game. They are only a description of the game. As long as you are trying to understand the game without playing the game, you're flying blind. You owe it to yourself to actually play the game. So many things become clear that otherwise seem nonsense.


The rules are there to help you play the game; not a thing in themselves. They are inherently difficult to write, at times difficult to understand, and will always be less than perfect. Playing the game brings the nuances of the rules to life.

Kevin Zucker, Editor

16 June 2021: edited



Talavera, Spain, 2017



Christopher Moeller contemplating

PLAYER'S NOTES

ARMISTICE 1813

Chuck Silverstein, Aaron Tobul, David Jones, Jack Gill, Kevin Zucker

The Pittsburgh Players are engrossed in *Struggle of Nations*. Berlin has fallen, but Silesia remains in Coalition control.

Chuck: The question is the effect on the Prussian Armistice reinforcements when the French occupy Berlin (p. 38 -39). 'Effects on Prussian replacements' says that 1/2 of Prussian replacements are permanently lost. It gives by example the halving of reinforcements listed on the turn record track, but does not directly state anywhere that this loss applies to the Armistice reinforcements.


Looking at the turn track, there are a total of 6 Prussian replacements at play for the month of August, so all that would happen in the unlikely event I hold Berlin for the entire month is the loss of 3 replacements. If that's all that's affected, it seems like grabbing Berlin isn't a very big deal for the French.

We're talking 87 replacement points, halved to 43, so it ain't trivial!

For the Dresden set up (the post Armistice period) it looks like (p 39) a player can choose to leave his forces on the map in their end of Spring positions, but has the option of freely—no APs, no attrition costs—redeploying a force anywhere within that player's 'occupied territory'. That's defined in the asterix on the Turn Record track above the Scenario L track on the Turn record track.

The Dresden scenario gives the set up for the various leaders, and there are some who were not present in the Spring scenario either as set up or reinforcements. I presume since we're playing the campaign, that named leaders already in play remain in their end of Spring positions, with the redeployment option. Leaders who arrived during the Armistice would set up in the cities listed in the Dresden set -up, with the D unit strengths on the organization chart.

For the Allies, Buelow—who got chased off the map—is listed as deploying at Charlottenburg, which puts him behind the 'occupied territory' line that I believe I have established by seizing Berlin. The new Allied leader Winzengerode is also listed to start at Charlottenburg. Buelow should start by entering somewhere



Augustus Bridge by Bernardo Bellotto

on the same map edge, and Winzengerode in Posen or the eastern map edge.

Aaron: The rule on Berlin says that all replacements are halved. The dudes available at the armistice are called replacements, so I would interpret that to mean that they should be halved also. Losing Berlin would have been a big blow to the German nationalist movement, regardless of how many poems Arndt writes! A lot of those guys may have slunk off to join freikorps or ambush supply trains, but even then they wouldn't have been available for the Landwehr. I'm not an expert thought, so I'll bow to Kevin's wisdom if he chimes in.

Winzingerode is already on the map I think, so we'll either leave him where he is or re-deploy him within the limits of the existing rules. I would say Buelow can either re-deploy into an allowed area or stay where he is and re-enter via the existing rules (come back in via the hex he left or, if blocked, the nearest unblocked hex IIRC).

Kevin: I ran this question by two experts who know this campaign very well: Dave Jones and Jack Gill. Both were kind enough to reply...

"The Pittsburgh crew are playing Struggle of Nations, and Berlin has fallen For the Allies, Buelow—who got chased off the map—is listed as deploying at Charlottenburg, which puts him behind the 'occupied territory' line that I believe I have established by seizing Berlin. The new Allied leader Winzengerode is also listed to start at Charlottenburg. Buelow should start by entering somewhere on the same map edge, and Winzengerode in Posen or the eastern map edge.

Jones: That seems pretty reasonable to me.

Gill: Agreed, probably for two reasons:

- The loss of Berlin likely means the loss of Brandenburg as a recruiting area (food and material supplies as well).
- The loss of Berlin, while not "war-winning" in/of itself, would be a major psychological blow and likely dampen recruiting in other regions too (additionally, might increase propensity for Landwehr desertion, etc.).
- And, of course, Napoleon believed a drive on Berlin would force Prussia to defend its capital, thus increase the significant strains inside the alliance, possibly split the Prussian and Russian armies. Russo-Prussian disputes were very bitter after Bautzen as the Russians seriously considered withdrawing all the way to the Vistula, a suggestion that aroused outrage among the Prussian generals as one may imagine.

Kevin: If the French had taken Berlin (in addition to holding most of Silesia), more than likely the Russians would have retired from their toehold in

Silesia. Brandenburg province was important and its loss would have impacted the Prussian Landwehr. However, Brandenburg was only the most important province. You also have East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia. Since the French in your game didn't occupy Silesia, as they did historically, then this province would compensate somewhat for the loss of Brandenburg.

With Silesia in Prussian hands I think you need to re-think that 50% reduction. In the peace of 1807 Prussia was reduced to only 4.9 million inhabitants. (The province of Posen went to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.) I cannot find the breakdown for the Napoleonic period but in 1864 the populations were as follows (in millions):

East Prussia.	1.8	15%.
West Prussia.	1.3	10%.
Posen.	1.5	12%.
Pomerania.	1.4	11%.
Berlin.	0.6	5%.
Brandenburg.	2.0	16%.
Silesia.	3.5	29%.
TOTAL.	12.1	98%

* Recruitment from half of Silesia was impossible during the historical armistice.

So, if we assume that all recruitment would be proportional in every province, holding onto Silesia (29%) during the armistice would be even more valuable than holding Berlin and Brandenburg (21%). However, as the political heart of Prussia, Brandenburg and Berlin probably provided more men than the other provinces. Let's look at a more realistic distribution of recruitment:

East Prussia.	13%
West Prussia.	8%
Posen.	10%
Pomerania.	9%
Berlin.	8%
Brandenburg.	27%
Silesia.	24%
TOTAL.	99%

This tells us that the loss of Berlin and Brandenburg should cost you 35% (not 50%) and with the inclusion of Silesia instead of Berlin you'd get back 24% of that so the net loss of recruits would only be 11%. It's unlikely the Russians would have relinquished Silesia in the game situation, with Silesia totally under Coalition control. The net effect on the game should be a loss of 11% of Armistice replacements and a proportional reduction of Armistice APs.

Leggiere covers recruitment in Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany, page 166: "There is a lack of military hardware, not bodies—

these we have in sufficient number—specifically:
 Cloth
 Leather
 Equipment (equipage, for horses)
 Arms
 Ammunition
 Money...
 If we had this currently, we could double our strength on the go..." —Gneisenau

Gneisenau is talking about APs... basically manufactured goods. So the effect should include—along with a Prussian loss of Replacements—a reduction of new APs by the same percentages (assuming that industry is spread equally within the population of Prussia).

PRUSSIAN MAIN ARSENALS


NAFZIGER, The Prussian Army 1792-1815, Vol. III

Where were the Prussian main arsenals and where were the cannon made? The artillery general inspection included arsenals in Berlin, Graudenz, Breslau, Glogau, Neise, Magdeburg, Königsberg, Colberg, Cüstrin, Gdansk, Glatz, Cosel, Spandau, Schweidnitz, Pillau, Würzburg, Brieg, Stettin, Wesel and Silverberg.

That's 20 arsenals all of which probably produced some weapons—arsenals in Brandenburg, Posen, Silesia, West Prussia, East Prussia, Pomerania. Some of the above were not in Prussian control, such as Gdansk, Breslau and Wesel. They seem pretty evenly distributed throughout the country...

Handwerks-Compagnien

With the reorganization in 1809 each of the three artillery brigades had one foot artillery company organized as a Handwerk compagnie. These



companies were assigned to perform all the repair of gun carriages, caissons and other rolling stock of the Prussian artillery. The smiths and saddlemakers from each foot company were reassigned to the Handwerks compagnien. Once they were fully trained, they were returned to their parent artillery companies.

The companies spent the peace time working in powder magazines, as well as caisson and wagon shops. They were assigned to work in weapons arsenals. They manufactured as many as 500 muskets a month. They were kept at full strength throughout the periods of peace with the use of cantonists.

The map (below left) shows fortresses under Coalition control at the start of the Spring campaign. (Their western fortresses were all in enemy hands, along with Gdansk, Thorn, Modlin, Küstrin, Stettin, and Glogau above.) The eastern half of Silesia was creating replacements for the Prussian Army, having raised a Landwehr force of 32,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, but only half the men were armed at this time. Just before the Armistice was signed, orders had been issued to the Russian Army to withdraw into Poland. Müffling warned that the Prussian Army could not follow: "We would lose all the resources to feed and pay the army..."

The final map (below right) is taken from Leggiere Vol. 1, page 420. This shows the "Neutral Zone" established between the French and Coalition forces during the Armistice. The French originally held most of the Neutral zone before the armistice; whereas the Coalition were allowed to maintain their current positions, the French had to pull back. There are seven fortresses in this part of Silesia. Historically, Napoleon gave up Breslau (Wroclaw) —which was supposed to be neutralized—while the other six remained under Coalition control.



HISTORICAL NOTES

HASLACH: DUPONT'S BAGGAGE

Tim Carne, Vince Hughes, and Kevin Zucker

It is rarely intended that any troops should have to enter the fight without supply. If so, it is usually mentioned. At Haslach, Dupont has to have the corps baggage train in play at start. Otherwise he would be out of supply. As the whole formation starts on the board, then according to the Study Folder, the Baggage will start on the map. The French player can place Ney's baggage train anywhere within 7 hexes of any unit of his formation. He has the freedom to place his baggage train either with Dupont or with Ney, or somewhere in between.


Ney's formation is spread on the two ends of the map. So the Baggage train has to be placed within 7 hexes of one of the groups. This will either put Dupont's men OOS or if the Baggage start within 7 of Dupont, then the main group would have to try and trace supply from the French supply source, but that would leave the baggage a little at risk.

Playtesting started Ney's Baggage with Dupont, a little to the rear towards Ober Elchingen. Hex 2511 was used—as far away from the front as possible but not blocking the route for any arriving elements of the other divisions. It also covers the road taken by the dismounted dragoons.


I think Albeck makes more historical sense. This is however a long way from where it needs to be for Ney's corps for the rest of the campaign.

There was a lot of apprehension about Dupont's positioning from Ney. He was in debate/ argument with Murat about sending his troops south of the river because he was not fully aware of Austrian positions and therefore concerned about his LOC should Dupont's troops cross south of the river.

It is reasonable to assume that the entire baggage for his corps was still on the north bank. Martin van Creveld writes in "Supplying War..." "As the army approached the Danube, however, the (supply) situation suddenly worsened, probably reaching its nadir round 9-12 October."



Situation at the crossing of the Rhine, about 26 Sept. 1805.



Map by Chris Moeller

Presumably the baggage had been falling behind. Berthier writes on 2 October, "As to subsistence, it is impossible to feed you by magazines (depots), the entire French army, the Austrian army even, lives off the country."

Historically Dupont's division fought hard and aggressively so they were neither lacking initiative nor the ability to advance after combat. The game effects of OOS would not be appropriate. There are, however, significant differences between the standalone Haslach and the Ulm campaign when it comes to supply for Ney's corps.

Supply for the next day is not an issue in the DoB game so it doesn't matter where the Baggage ends up. For the campaign, if the 12th becomes a campaign lull, that allows 33.72, Baggage reorganization.

If there is no campaign lull (no French victory) then it is movement as usual but if there is a lull then the baggage can move on the recovery turns. The baggage train would have to move across the map to get to a position where it could supply the rest of Ney's corps.

Moving during the Lull, 33.74, does make reorganization difficult. The player might want to lose the baggage deliberately and then re-form it south of the Danube.

In fact, Dupont's parks and baggage were captured on the 11th. Dupont was pushed back from Haslach at a cost of one-third of his force including his parks and baggage, two eagles and 10 guns. The Austrian cavalry obtained Dupont's papers revealing that the rest of the French troops were on the right bank.

We don't know where the rest of the baggage from Ney's Corps was. Ney had 54 wagons loaded with fodder passing through Heidenheim on 7 October. Heidenheim is a day's march north of Langenau (map edge hex 4101), by way of Brenz and Giengen.

PLAYER FEEDBACK: By Special Rule, give Dupont his own baggage train, perhaps snagged from another game. This is in effect and in all ways like an extra Corps baggage train.

DESIGN FILES

HOW NAPOLEONIC SUPPLY WORKS

During the run-up to battle, no food and supply is getting through. The troops were issued bread or hardtack rations at the beginning of the campaign, which they saved for the fast-moving times when battle is imminent and the wagons cannot reach them. Generally speaking the camp stove and kettle won't be operating on the battlefield (unless one side has been camping, as at Jena). In other words, your troops are going into the battle hungry.

Similarly, they have been issued enough ammo in their pouches, probably for a day of fighting, and the caissons of the artillery have 2 or 3 days more supply on hand.

When a unit lacks a supply line, there are these effects: 1. It has a modifier for Initiative; 2. The troops are less likely to get reorganized; 3. the unit may not advance after combat - this prevents them from achieving much of an offensive punch.

These are the same effects as Demoralization. So the lack of supply is more of a morale effect. The lack of supply isn't a lack of a physical thing, but a perception of the overall battlefield situation. It's more about psy-warfare.

What is this "Supply Line" supposed to represent? Is it really hardtack and powder? That would be the common-sense idea. However, there is another aspect to this line which is in the area of "command control." So the cavalry unit is over the horizon and we cannot send orders if nobody knows where it is and it is just roaming around. We have to wait for a messenger arriving back at the brigade or division headquarters with news of the unit. If there are enemy units between him and HQ, this messenger might get captured. Unlike the gamer who wants control of that unit, he cannot see where all the enemy units are. So his chances of getting through are fairly random if there is much in the way. We usually figure the messenger can ride about 14 hexes in one hour, so if you are beyond that distance it could take 3 hours for the messenger to ride out and back.



French; Imperial Guard, Train d'Equipages. Art by Keith Rocco.

DESIGN FILES

REINFORCEMENT MARCH ORDERS

Written by Vincent Hughes

Important Change

March Orders for entering reinforcements had me bugged for quite a while. The wording was open to interpretation. As they were to enter as a formation, could only one March Order be issued? Or could each unit be issued an MO? This was even more important if mud was around (think *Patrie en Danger*) and the potential of foot artillery slowing distant reinforcements to a crawl.

Whilst overseeing a game between two players, I noticed the blue insert to rule 20.3 (meaning its relatively new and shown in caps here for ease of spotting it) which added the rule:

"A Reinforcement Force may be placed under a March Order OR SEVERAL DIFFERENT MARCH ORDERS on the turn of its map entry"

So consider the first Wurttemberg reinforcement at Abensberg that consists of an HA, INF and 2 x LC. Imagine mud. Instead of all these units moving a 3MP's per turn in MO, you can now issue 4 different MO's (one to each) and see them move at their own speeds. Very flexible change. Gathering them up into one formation may take time later, but at least the cavalry and infantry can buzz along.

I would assume that each of these MOs would need to have a unique destination, otherwise units of the same formation going to the same location would have a single MO and are subject to the speed of the slowest unit.

In TLS, the Austrian penance for some of the larger reinforcement groups is that they have to hand write each and every unit's MO—like school punishments of writing 100 times, "I will punch the counters and read the rules before my opponent comes over to play."

I was guided by the glossary definition of "A group of combat units with an officer that shares the same command designation"

The obvious lawyer discussion with that one is that it does not say "All the combat units that share the same command designation". Therefore a group being what? Part of the formation? Unfortunately, that's not defined.

Would one reasonably expect two brigades of light

cavalry to be held up to a crawl by their single battery of their own artillery struggling in mud? I'm not sure they would.

For now, we have played it that for entering reinforcements, there is now quite some latitude for the March Orders. Far more flexible than the old rule. If we are wrong, then maybe the wording might be re-jigged in a future volume. The box-set *La Patrie en Danger* will be affected more by this rule as the weather is so bad and will encourage players to itemise their 'forces' into packets of best movers.

I must admit that I have never considered giving individual MO's to units of a reinforcement formation therefore allowing them to travel at their own movement allowance rates rather than the movement rate of the slowest unit. This seems to go against the spirit of 20.22. However I see the reason why you would want to use it in situations where the weather greatly reduces the movement rate for artillery. I wonder if Kevin could provide some guidance on this point.

It would also be helpful if the term Stack (as referred to in the glossary definition of a force) was clarified to only be applicable to units on the map or not as the case may be, as MO's are given to reinforcements prior to entry.

This seems to go against the spirit of 20.22

It did go against it. But this is about reinforcements at 20.3 not 20.22. As my opening post on the subject stated. Have a look at the new rule in version 7.34 of the series rules.

It now says at 20.3 (and this is for reinforcements only, not on board formations remember). "A reinforcement force may be placed under MO's (or several different MO's) on the turn of its map entry."

So its there, in black & white.... Well actually blue and white as its a new line added to the rule

My issue with MO's for reinforcements is that they are often part of the scenario so your opponent can simply block the shortest route and derail the whole reinforcement. I cannot find anything in the rules to clarify what they should do if route is blocked. Caused a real issue in recent game of Lutzen.

I cannot find anything in the rules to clarify what they should do if route is blocked.
20.23 second bullet point.

You continue until adjacent to an enemy whereby the MO is ended. It might not make the owning player happy, but as written, that is the rule.

One idea you can use to guide you is reading the history of the battle you are playing. Berthier didn't go into great detail usually when issuing March orders. He would say, "march to town X and await further orders", or "march to the sound of the guns," or "if you encounter the enemy, drive everything before you."

The commanding generals didn't know the shape of the board on your turn of entry the way player knows it. They could only guess whether the enemy might be encountered, and in what strength.

The March orders were issued far in advance of a unit's appearance (unlike in the game, when the M.O. is issued upon entry). They could not, and usually didn't try, to add a prescription. Some Coalition commanders tried that, but it didn't work out any better. The most practical approach was to simply leave it up to the Officer on the spot (initiative).

Everyone is always trying to optimize the rules and micro-manage to their benefit. That is how the game is played, but the rules try to limit the player's control to reflect as far as possible, what could actually be accomplished with the C3 of the time.

Read Napoleon's Correspondances, to see examples of real march orders. They are very clear and 99% unambiguous. They are definite, short and to the point. Sometimes the orders for all the Marshals are sent in one document, but usually each receives a special missive, with perhaps a copy of the Orders for other Corps he should know about.

"Napoleon on campaign should not, in any case, be imagined as sitting behind a desk and dictating orders." -Martin van Creveld.

He would rise about midnight, read the reports, and send a new batch of orders. The 6 or 9 PM situation was what Napoleon knew at 3 AM. So a reinforcement arriving in the mid or late morning has orders 12 to 15 hours out of date at their arrival. To put that last in perspective, an infantry unit can move from one end of the map to the other in 9 hours. Napoleon had to be good at guessing where the enemy would go.. If he guessed wrong there would be no battle.

If you want to play it closer to history, write down all your March Orders before the game starts; or write them each day at 3 AM.

A very good idea actually and could be game enhancing.



PLAYERS NOTES

RIGA 1812


On the HttK Update sheet it is pointed out that Drissa (W3012) can be a Supply Source for either side if it has a LOC to Riga.

Napoleon planned to use the Dvina River for supply barges. This is the campaign that Napoleon intended to fight. "Napoleon placed great value upon the capture of Riga, because this would have opened the Dvina to water transport, making it possible to carry massive quantities of supplies deeply into the operations area. In addition to securing the extreme northern flank, Macdonald had, above all, been charged with its capture." — Richard K. Riehn, 1812 (p. 273).

There are many difficulties and complications in setting up a Supply Base at Drissa. However, if this succeeds, your Supply Source is within 10 Primary Road hexes of the East Map. You will enter the East Map without any LOC extension.

According to Lieven, "If Napoleon had stopped in Vitebsk or Smolensk and dispatched part of his main army to help Macdonald, Riga would certainly have fallen. Without additional help, however, the French commander could not hope to take the city. A complete blockade line would have needed to stretch around Riga for more than 50 kilometres on both sides of the river Dvina. MacDonald's 32,500 men on their own could never man such a line."

In "Northern swing" strategy, Napoleon takes the route from Kaunas with other Corps marching directly from Tilsit on the shorter line. These forces overwhelm Essen before the Finnish corps arrives. Meanwhile the Russian Armies are able to unite before Smolensk. So there is a big battle on the Dvina somewhere. (Davout is too late to join in.)



Postcard of the Seige of Riga 1812



The Livonian port of Riga in the 16th century



Map showing The Daugava (meaning "western Dvina")



PLAYERS NOTES

THE INFORMATION WAR

How to estimate your opponent's actual force distribution.
by Christopher Moeller

There are certain styles of playing the hidden movement game. If you know your opponent well, you can begin to guess that he will be trying to deliberately confound you. Once your opponent knows your style of play, then switch it up.

Wargamers are used to knowing the actual force distribution and playing without subtlety. Napoleon's greatest victories were secured by stratagems to confound the enemy. Disguise your forces. Use your baggage train in the front line, create stacks of vedettes, and make it look like what it ain't. Discover the enemy. Use your vedettes to probe for enemy goodies.

Never Be Obvious. If you have a large column heading for a VP town, make sure half of the force is vedettes, while you send your main striking force in little bits and pieces (looking like vedettes).

These flashy characters, the famous Hussars, Uhlans, and Cossacks of yore, are, for the first time in gaming, given their true operational function. This is the only system I know that really digs into the dual role of cavalry: recon and battle. Until now, light horsemen have been relegated to playing the part of weak battlefield cavalry. Their primary role as information gatherers, as a moving shield for the army, was ignored. As a result, because they are a conceptual break from the past, using your Vedettes properly takes some thinking. The following is a primer for all of you would-be Cossack hetmen.

Vedettes first appeared in *The Emperor Returns* as dummy markers. Their role was the usual one of dummies everywhere: to confuse the enemy about where your real army is. In later games, beginning with *1807: The Eagles Turn East*, the dummies evolved into cavalry Vedettes (touted as "smart dummies"), and assumed their mantle as that fabled Napoleonic presence, the cavalry screen.

In the OSG Library games released since 2010 these daring outriders have matured into the true eyes and ears of the army. Using them properly will expose the composition and whereabouts of your enemy, while leaving him to blunder about in darkness. Hidden forces put secrecy, one of the most devastating weapons of any Napoleonic general, back on the table. Think Wellington and his reverse slopes. Think Lannes at Friedland, making his small delaying army seem bigger than it was. One of the problems with Napoleonic battlefield games is that the players know history. They know that Napoleon won't be coming to Pultusk, and that Bennigsen outnumbers Lannes two to one (neither of which was known at the time). In the Campaigns of Napoleon, with its operational scale, such god-like knowledge is less influential, but in a battle game, where all of the grand-scale maneuvering is finished before turn one, player knowledge changes history right from the outset.

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Hidden forces can restore some of that uncertainty. In two recent games of Friedland, I used hidden movement to accomplish the following:

1. I used vedettes to screen my main forces, so that opposing stacks were revealed, while mine remained hidden. From my opponent's side of the board, those stacks could have been stacks of Guards or (as was true in several cases) stacks of small infantry units and more vedettes, trying to look scary.

2. I sent stacks of vedettes mixed with infantry into the woods, extending my line with what my opponent assumed were divisionsized stacks. Those forces held the woods for several hours, uncontested, while my main forces massed elsewhere in overwhelming strength to deliver death-blows. Once he discovered that my line in the woods was fragile, he came after me, but it was too late.

3. Mid-day, I sent a column of cavalry through the woods to burst into my opponent's rear area. The "leading edge" of my cavalry column consisted of, wait for it, vedettes! They seized high ground, probed rear-area units looking for baggage, and, once again, screened my heavy forces from prying eyes. Remembering the way I had fooled him in the past, my opponent sent a few light cavalry and vedettes of his own to chase me away. By the time he realized that what was in his rear area were squadrons of heavy cavalry, he had lost a march, I followed up with an infantry column, and he was forced to fall back all along the line to regroup.

In a "controlled environment" like a battlefield game, where parameters are well-established, surprises very few (mostly consisting of 3:1 attacks that go bad, or a unit holding Hougomont one turn longer than expected), that's a valuable contribution. It makes smaller forces able to fend off larger ones. It makes well-laid plans come unhinged, not because the greatest number of attack factors were leveraged against the least number of defense factors, but because a player was creative and daring.

Any game with hidden movement allows these sorts of gambits to occur. I'm a huge fan of Columbia Games' "block games", which puts hidden forces front and center for just that reason.

What makes OSG's vedettes special is that, in a world of hidden forces, they give Napoleonic cavalry its function back. In Zucker's vision, the player who uses his light cavalry most aggressively gains a subtle but decisive edge. In an elegant design decision, players are never forced to use their vedettes. Light

cavalry can be kept concentrated, preserving its battlefield function, or it can disperse into vedettes. The vedettes have no combat presence at all, so there is a real cost to breaking units down: your army will have fewer combat factors, and fewer combined arms stacks (always in demand). What you will gain is subtle but powerful: the ability to mass your forces and to prevent your opponent from seeing where that mass is concentrated until it's too late. Vedettes allow you to get around the flanks of your opponent and find his weak points, while all he sees in return is either vedettes, the strong-points you want him to see, or, once it's too late to do anything about it, the hammerblow falling on a vulnerable part of his front line.

I enjoy playing these games open as much as anyone. I loved Napoleon's Last Battles back in the day, and still play it from time to time with my friends. That said, I encourage fans of this system, and students of Napoleonic battles in general, to give the hidden force rules a try. What you will discover is a mature, vital game system that brings Napoleonic cavalry to glorious life.

PRINCIPLES

I. Use your Vedettes. It might seem absurd to say this, but USE your Vedettes. In our obsession with big battles, we players tend to disregard any unit that doesn't have a combat factor. Vedettes are a crucial part of your order of battle, and should be used at every opportunity, both to confuse your opponent, and keep tabs on him. Except for the first turn of the game (when you know where your enemy is from the set-up), there is really no way to attack an opponent intelligently until you've scouted him out first. There's nothing more humbling than setting up a game-winning attack only to find that you've targeted a small cavalry unit.

II. Be deceptive. In many circumstances, you'll be using your Vedettes in a straightforward, information-gathering role, in which case deception isn't an issue. When your Vedettes are impersonating a larger force, however, use them to make stacks look bigger. I will often park a stack of two guns and three Vedettes behind a crest, where they can't be spotted easily. I will also often move my large units casually, as if they were nothing more than puny Vedettes, placing them in hexes my opponent might blunder into, assuming they aren't "real" units. The key is to focus on two of Napoleon's historical obsessions: security and deception. Keep the enemy guessing, and try to win the goddess of surprise over to your side.



STACKING

I will often have 5 units + a leader stacked together, and, yes, sometimes the leader gets put on TOP of the counter sled, upside down. The stacking limit (while requiring some mechanical finesse), is one of the things that separates these games from their ancestors. The early NLB games encouraged players to spread out their units in long "fronts", with one or two units every other hex, hopefully with one or both flanks up against the board edge. The ability to concentrate your forces in the Library version changes that whole dynamic. Lines tend to have concentrations where the fighting's heaviest, and thin out towards the wings. Unless you have a river line or a ridge or town to bolster your defense, the classic "one-unit-every-other-hex" deployment is really more like a screen than a line. Reserves can be massed in concentrated numbers (or can "look" like concentrated numbers if you stack Vedettes, leaders and little artillery units). The tactics cards very often key off of forces that contain infantry, cavalry and artillery (encouraging combined force stacks). Assembling a stack after a strung-out road march takes forever (it costs +1 MP to stack). These and many other little ramifications to the stacking rules help make the battles to look like their historical counterparts.

SCREENING

Using cavalry is an endless puzzle. A giant stack of cavalry under Gallitzin is dramatic when it pulls off a big charge, but it means 3 or 4 other stacks have been deprived of combined arms. It also means fewer Vedettes on the board. So, if you're low on cavalry, you have to make some tough decisions about how to use it. There's never enough to do everything you'd like!

I would suggest you think hard before you send Vedettes haring off into the wild blue yonder. They are best deployed closer to home. I use them in at least four ways, and they are, from most frequent to least frequent:

Impersonating a Combat Unit: I use them to make stacks look bigger. That's the function that they had originally as dummy units, and it's still a powerful tool. Scouting & Probing: I use them as the battle lines converge to probe enemy stacks and see what's in there. That is, at most, 5-6 hexes out.

I use them as a LOS screen (units block Line of Sight). Needing an LOS to react to unexpected enemy moves gives Vedettes a whole new function: you'll try to get your Vedettes in LOS range of unusual enemy activity,



and the enemy Vedettes will do their best to get in your way. Hey, wait a minute, is that ... screening? Historical behavior in a simulation, oh joy! So much for the old "fast, weak infantry".

Raiding: Vedettes are not particularly good at deep raids. The cossacks at Eylau are a special case because they have the high-initiative Platov leading them. That's one instance where behind-the-lines, Jeb Stuart-type strategic work can be possible for Vedettes.

VEDETTE TACTICS

Of the main missions you can give to your versatile light horsemen— Scouting, Screening, Raiding and Impersonating a larger unit—the last of these is the traditional role of dummies in wargaming. The others are what make the Vedettes such great history.

1. SCOUTING Armies in this game are effectively blind. Without scouts, it's impossible for a field army to know what it's up against until it's too late to do anything about it. Once you've moved into an enemy ZOC, or allowed an enemy to enter yours, you are committed to battle, and perhaps headlong retreat. You can pick up clues from your opponent's actions when he's moving (these can be put down to intelligence picked up from prisoners), but you're still

effectively at the enemy's mercy, since a good general, like a good poker player, will mix his signals. Just like a "real" 1 SP Light Cavalry unit, whether it is in or out of command, Vedettes can be used for spotting the enemy. When we reveal hidden units, both players will go down the line, checking units to see which are within 3 hexes and which are in LOS, flipping down all units that are in range.

Vedettes can also get "actionable" information by conducting reconnaissance on the recon table (above) during movement. If a target is a Vedette, it's either eliminated or revealed, and subject to being steamrolled by your unit when it moves. If the target is a "real" body of troops, your army now knows that too, and can either attack it or go around it. When the combat phase arrives, your Vedettes simply retreat before combat, having performed their function. The beauty of scouting is that it occurs during the movement phase. It's intended to reveal obstacles and targets when closing in for a battle, clearing the way for the big guns.

The Vedettes are a very clean mechanism, and offer the reconnaissance function rarely seen in wargaming. They help make these games unique in my mind. In one of our games, the battle around Pultusk quickly

developed into a situation where our lines were all face-up, with the only hidden units being Russian reserves behind a hill and Lannes's scattered column coming up through the woods in the south. Around Golymin it was a different story. The French columns, moving to envelop Gallitzin in and around the town, were all hidden. French cavalry screened the larger troop movements from probing Cossacks. The only face-up units were Augereau's advance guard, watching the Russians from the tree line. Then, a reinforcing Russian column came on the map with a march order, to be followed a turn later by Nansouty's French Curassiers. I, as the Russian commander, had neglected to pay attention to Nansouty's entry hex, and watched as the French cavalry swooped in and snatched my baggage wagon at the end of the column. Fortunately for Russian pride, Bennigsen bent Lannes's hapless corps around like a paperclip, surrounded the Marshal and rolled a 6 when his two divisions folded under the assault. A French Marshal in every backpack! The mud was horrendous (as it should have been), particularly for the guns that required all 4 movement points to be hauled one hex up a hill.

2. SCREENING Defending against all of the above is the job of your hard-working Hussars. There are two ways that Vedettes can perform this vital role. In front of the battle lines, Vedettes can probe and fend off enemy Vedettes, trying to prevent them from identifying troop concentrations. Closer in, Vedettes can act like a "mobile smoke screen", blocking Line of Sight to battle formations moving behind them.

The classic cavalry screen is created by forming a barrier of Vedette ZOC's at some distance from your main forces, meant to fend off enemy Vedettes on the prowl for information. At a minimum, your Vedettes should stand two to three hexes ahead of your army on all roads and bridges, to keep enemy horsemen from riding in and probing your big stacks at leisure. In situations where enemy Vedette activity is heavy, a solid line of Vedette ZOC's will help to keep the outposts at bay. Enemy Vedettes can't repulse your Vedettes, so a cavalry screen can't easily be penetrated by enemy Vedettes alone. A force of combat units is required to push back a screening Vedette, and those SP's could otherwise be bolstering the enemy's main force. It's also often wise to put a Vedette right in close to the main army, along the axis most likely to be attacked. A lazy or overconfident attacker may push one of his big units up next to what he thinks is your main force, only to discover that it's a Vedette, wrecking his big moment.

The Library series has less than total fog of war, but with Vedettes I've found you can create confusion

where it matters... up near the front. The hidden units in these games make your opponent uncertain what exactly he's facing in that forest across the way. That's really obvious in Leipzig, which I've played in so many incarnations now I feel like I know, in broad strokes, how everything's going to go down. Not so in the new edition. I'm amazed at how tentative my French opponent is in the South. Without fog of war, he would have been all over me from turn 1, getting optimal attacks, pushing me hard, killing weak units. I have had fun with portions of my line containing nothing but Vedettes while (holding my breath) concentrating all my best units to put my opponent off-balance. In our current game he's only pecked at me, sending Vedettes out to see what's what before committing himself, wasting valuable time while my reinforcements march toward the battlefield. Two hexes in my line are just pairs of Vedettes, stacked behind a ridge where they can't be spotted easily. Those four regiments are "holding" five hexes of my front line! Try that in one of the old editions...

3. IMPERSONATING A COMBAT UNIT Vedettes can act the part of a vast host, helping to divert enemy strength away from the area of main effort. Conversely, big units can act like Vedettes, striking where the enemy least expects it. In general, unless a Vedette is going to scout or probe this turn, it's best to keep it's movement down so as not to give away that it's not the real deal. Light cavalrymen were notorious liars and gamblers. Keep this in mind when using them! You can keep your opponent honest by forcing him to slow down and scout out your forces. Using uncertainty to your advantage isn't just a trick. In certain situations it's THE strategic tool. In fluid battles it can be decisive: the 1809 mini-campaign, Friedland approach to battle, Eylau approach to battle and most of the other ATB scenarios. In stand-up fights like Wagram and Leipzig, it's less of an issue, but even there it can often create a false impression of strength. Talking to my opponent after a recent session, he gestured at a section of my line in frustration and said, "there's still a lot of stuff back there." Well, WAS there a lot of stuff? Or did I break down a couple of light cavalry units into stacks of Vedettes? Did I really have reserve forces or didn't I? The guys he was facing in the line were real enough, but did they actually have backup or were they just a shell, stretched to the breaking point? That's the genius of hidden forces... you have to take a risk. You have to call your opponent's bluff, and sometimes that can get you into trouble.

The Library games can't disguise mass as well as the Campaigns series, which has rules built for that, but it doesn't mean that you can't use hidden forces to flummox your opponent. In our Leipzig game, I'm in

a delaying situation. I have to maintain my position and occupy as many hostile forces as possible while my teammate rolls up the Northern front. Keeping my forces hidden and shifting up and down the line has been the difference between success and failure. After a day and a half of fighting I've given up ground, but I've only lost a handful of units, and as far as I can tell, no French formations have been pulled out to reinforce the beleaguered Northern flank.

Using hidden forces properly boils down to maximizing your opponent's confusion and minimizing your own. Vedettes are OSG's primary mechanism for managing that. The Prussians at Jena benefit less from hidden movement than the other battles. They don't have enough Vedettes to bluff/scout/screen, and their line units are so weak that Napoleon can be confident that WHATEVER stack he hits won't be able to hurt him very much. It lets the French advance without a lot of fear. On the other hand, whatever uncertainty you can throw Napoleon's way (particularly on the Jena front) will help.

In the Napoleonic era, cavalry superiority helped determine control of the battlefield, hiding friendly forces prior to the big moment, and allowing the dominant army to maneuver with decision. Before now, players haven't been given this tremendous tool. If you doubt their influence, strip one player of his Vedettes and see who wins!

4. RAIDING There are things you intuitively want to do with Vedettes that the rules prevent: surrounding vulnerable units, capturing baggage trains, occupying victory point hexes. Trains are only captured if in the ZOC of a combat unit, and Vedettes are non-combat units. So Vedettes can't capture a baggage train. The only offensive ability a Vedette has is the ability to block supply lines (and sources) by its presence in the hex (its ZOC alone is insufficient).

I don't have an intuitive need to use 50 or 100 light cav to do things like capture guarded trains, occupy hexes (insufficient to garrison) or surrounding. I'm speaking as a gamer, not as a "simulator". I think one of the issues gamers have with Vedettes is that their function isn't what gamers have come to expect from their cavalry units. I use the word intuitive in that sense.

Vedettes can be used to trick an aggressive opponent into a trap by luring them into repulsing. This occurred in a game of Napoleon at the Crossroads where I placed a real force behind a vedette counter. My worthy opponent had been blithely pushing back my vedettes the turn before, and he obligingly continued

doing so until he hit my real force! This forced him to suffer a one column left shift in the ensuing combat phase!

That DOES work, but only once: as soon as the enemy runs into the Vedette and reveals it, all follow-on units will kick it aside with repulses. So it's not a "hard" speed-bump. I use that tactic ALL the time. Even in our Wagram game, which is a pretty linear battle, when the rain came, I pulled back my line but created a "false" salient with a couple of Vedettes to tempt the French to either hesitate or move a large stack up into attack position (he chose the latter). After my Vedette danced away, the rest of his forces went on to attack the main line, but that first stack was done for the turn.

CARDS AND CAVALRY

At Dennewitz, I secured victory for France by playing "The Battle Ends" just as evening was about to fall. Aaron would be prevented from attacking me for two turns, after which the game would end without me having to declare a general retreat. I cackled, made the obligatory victor-washing-his-hands-gesture, and he played "Second Day of Battle". ...which resulted, in the morning, in Arrighi's cavalry being caught and unceremoniously bagged and the rest of the French army sent streaming off the map to the North. Aaron won a Marginal Victory, instead of my winning more decisively. Vedettes were no help except to screen my humiliating withdrawal.

LAST WORD

There's often an imbalance in the number of Vedettes available to each army. In Jena, for example, the French outnumber the Prussians in Vedettes by something like 2:1. In this case, the Prussians have to use their Vedettes as efficiently as possible, with less luxury for long-range missions and wholesale deception. The Prussians in this case should probe only when possible, reserving their Vedettes for the cavalry screen until the moment of attack. The French player must put heavy pressure on the Prussian Vedettes, denying them any opportunity to scout their big units. Examining the history of the period shows the accuracy of OSG's Vedette model, particularly noticeable in the 1813 campaigns, in which the French were hampered by a crippling lack of good light cavalry. They operated almost entirely in the dark, and were exposed to the enemy (the Lützen campaign is a good example of what happens when you face superior enemy cavalry).

As for hidden movement, you can certainly play without it, but it's not the same game. Not even in the same zip-code.



DESIGN FILES

LUDWIG AT ABENSBERG TLNB STYLE

What was seen in this game could not have happened in standard play
by Vincent Hughes

Everyone has read of a general being a bit too slow to respond to circumstances—if they responded at all. Perhaps they are accused of ignoring signs of doom. Maybe it is suggested they were just too lazy and non-proactive. At times these suggestions can leave the reader with a “What was that soldier thinking of?” view of the campaign.

In our recent play of a double-blind Abensberg Approach to Battle game, I was, as umpire, able to see such an incident unfold over the course of the scenario that would likely never have happened during an all-seeing standard game, even with the Hidden Units rules. It revealed how the combination of the volume of intel—or lack of it—balanced with prediction and supposition, and based on assessed probabilities, along with a fine sprinkling of knowledge about the enemy commander—led to decisions that in the end proved erroneous. This is no slur on the player. Whilst I could see everything, he was left to rely on snippets he had picked up during the game and its blind scouting mechanics. The decisions made from the intel to hand would have been justifiable, but of course, when things do not work out, it is very easy with hindsight to look at the other options.

Erzherzog Ludwig's Austrian V Corps began the scenario deployed on the western flank of the Austrian army around the town of Siegenburg overlooking the small river Abens. Deployed opposite were numbers of Lefebvre's VII Corps Bavarians. In this battle, both sides are seriously hampered by command-control issues. Neither side has a proper C-in-C but instead has to rely on corps commanders. In an approach to battle scenario, this concerns quite a large area. Whilst Lefebvre's initiative is quite good (66% chance of activating and handing out command), Ludwig's is pretty poor (33%). However, Austrian brigades are more likely to move on their own initiative than Bavarian ones—50% more likely. So there is a certain balance here. As the battle unfolds, the Austrians will find themselves eventually outnumbered and on the 2nd day, Napoleon



Napoleon Addressing Bavarian Troops by Jean-Baptiste Debret

and Lannes arrive to give the best command possible. Therefore, the Austrians will find themselves in a position where they need time to be eaten away and inflict delay after delay to their enemies; at the same time, trying to lose as few troops as possible and not handing over 5 VP locations, especially Rottenberg and Pfeffenhausen located near the southern edge of the map. As the two-day encounter wears on, it can get tougher and tougher for the Austrians.

Ludwig at Siegenburg on the western flank was able to see scattered Bavarian forces on the opposite bank. The view across the Abens was decent as the church tower gave extra elevation than the enemy had across the other side. Ludwig held this line throughout the 19th. Looking at the Turn Record Track, he knew that Vandamme's VIII Corps Wurtembergers would be arriving just north of this position around 7pm (19th April). Surmising his enemy's style, he had good reason to think these may be employed against V Corps along with French cavalry corps units and an attempted thrust made down the western flank towards the VP's of Pfeffenhausen.

During the night of the 19th/20th, Ludwig received March Orders to pull back and to make haste south, through the valleys and to Ober Lautenbach near Pfeffenhausen. On the morning of the 20th, Ludwig's corps began their march in good weather eventually reaching their new positions in about 3 hours. Over the next 3 hours, Ludwig deployed defensively between Ober and Unter Lautenbach and behind the Laaber river to protect Pfeffenhausen. By 11am, V corps appeared ready to receive an enemy attack but were yet to see any enemy. I shall return to this situation later.

During Ludwig's Abensberg deployment, Feldmarschall - Leutnant von Kienmeyer, in charge of II Reserve Corps, had been battling the Bavarians and some French from III Corps with his combined grenadier battalions and dragoon regiments, plus the help of a few attached brigades, such as Schneller's heavy cavalry brigade of two cuirassier regiments. Kienmeyer was doing his best to give up ground slowly and to retire in the face of the enemy in orderly fashion. His force had taken more casualties than they had inflicted, but overall, he was fighting a good fight. This had begun around the Offenstetten area in the north and then slowly back through Rohr and now south of that town. Things were getting serious as casualties began to mount and the enemy appeared to be getting plenty of activations going their way. The other side of the story was that Lefebvre's excellent command rating was allowing him to use his Initiative to order his concentrated Bavarian force. He had left a tissue of a line facing Ludwig and with French III corps troops had been hammering away at Kienmeyer constantly. There had been, the day before, an overly long respite

around Offenstetten when Lefebvre was unsure of the true amount of Austrians in the area. But once satisfied via light cavalry and vedette movements, he continued onwards, albeit occasionally hampered by failing Initiative. The surprise for Kienmeyer however came between 11am & midday on the 20th. This was when he first spotted Wurtemberg troops in his area. Their presence meant that more than likely, that there were NO forces of size fronting, or about to front Ludwig. Instead, the Franco-Germans had gone for a sledgehammer blow through the pressured Austrian centre. Kienmeyer did have parts of Lichtenstein's I Reserve corps arriving east of him in an unexpected about face they made, but this was more than balanced by the arrival of both Napoleon & Lannes to the battlefield to give out authoritative Command. At this point, there was only one way the battle could go for the Austrians. It was just the margin of defeat that would be in dispute.

So, here we have a story of an Austrian corps officer becoming unemployed throughout a battle. V corps at Abensberg constitutes 9 counters, of which 2 are 1SP, but the other 7 are of decent size. I'd hazard that 9 combat units could probably handle between 10-20 enemy units. In other words, had V Corps been employed, they may well have soaked off a sizeable attacking contingent and relieved so much pressure on Kienmeyer's centre.

If we look at this double-blind play versus face-to-face standard play, there is quite a difference in how I believe the story would have unfolded. Had the players been playing a standard game, V Corps, at some point, seeing where the stacks of enemy were moving would have reacted accordingly and either have marched east and given support to Kienmeyer, or, had the French player still left the west fairly empty, then V Corps may have attempted a push northwards with numerical advantage and attempt to ensnare the French line of supply and supply source. In the double-blind game, V corps could not see the enemy movements but may well have expected Vandamme's VIII to fall on him with extra support from the French cavalry corps units? With this in mind and probably also the fear that the battle in the centre was progressing further south than V corps own position, Ludwig was pulled back to protect the VP area of Pfeffenhausen, effectively leaving the corps unemployed for a second day.

What could have been done to help avoid this situation? Using perfect hindsight of course, I believe in a standard game, players, with the omnipotent knowledge they possess, can only carry out diversionary attacks. Some might say they can feint also, but it has to be a very good one to work IMO. In double-blind, players can make demonstrations, feints and diversionary attacks. What's the difference

with all these named activities? In what context could they be seen when speaking of V Corps and their start position at Siegenberg? My definition of each would be as follows.

A Demonstration in game terms would be to throw some artillery fire over the Abens river/stream. Make some small attacks on the forces seen directly facing your own, but with absolutely no intent to press further. In other words, a lot of noise from either where you stand or perhaps a hex or so forward. Stamping the feet so to speak. Encourage the Bavarians to think there may be an attack here.

A Feint would have been an attack in some numbers, pushing the enemy back and tentatively continuing to do so whilst keeping in mind your own needs to head back when able and required. Again, this should encourage the Bavarians to think they need more troops there to protect the line of supply and supply source and because of that, deter them from sending their troops to the main and decisive point of the battle elsewhere.

A Diversionary Attack would have been an attack of a large force, probably the guts of V Corps in this instance and with the intent to reach a pre-determined destination, such as the enemy line of supply. But most importantly to take focus off of the main contest.

Perhaps, dependent on how the situation evolves, even making the 'main' contest becoming secondary for the French/Bavarian player as he draws more of his forces from there to divert and address the diversionary attack itself.

Little to none of these options were employed by Ludwig and V Corps in our playing of the AtB scenario and in a double-blind game, could have made a world of difference. In effect, Ludwig's V Corps did nothing throughout the whole battle and this is a very large slice of the Austrian forces available. Without doubt, it was the main cause of defeat in this instance as Kienmeyer was left to fend off 90% of the Franco-German army and that was simply beyond his means available. It seems even more of a loss of resources when it happens against a more cautious opponent too. No matter the opponent, the French could not have let such things pass had Ludwig tried any of the three options referred to above and they would have had to have employed some form of action plan in case of trouble.

So next time we read of a senior officer not responding to the seemingly 'obvious' in our history books, spare a thought for how much information he actually had available concerning the enemy's positions and the overall battle situation ... Or indeed—Consider how much he did NOT know.



Napoleon at Abensberg

DESIGN FILES

WALLED TOWN COMBAT

Eckmühl, Leipzig, Smolensk, Laon, Ocaña, Talavera, Ulm...

The usual suspects: Vince, Chuck, Kevin, and Gene

Both armies tended to try and avoid fighting inside Fortified Towns, because it could be quite murderous, especially if the town caught fire. The preferred method was to bypass them whenever possible. Some of the most terrible fights took place inside the towns of Friedland, Smolensk and Leipzig.

GENE: Combat inside a walled town is the same as combat inside a town. Is that correct?

Combat inside a walled town isn't clear. Charleroi is a three-hex walled town. With opposing combat units inside the walled town (p33, below) the French (blue) attacking the Prussians, what combat modifiers are there? I would guess 2x for a town, but as there is no walled structure directly involved, Ar* results would not be converted as they would if it was a chateau.

In addition, if one cannot attack across a wall without a road passing through it, I would guess that one cannot retreat across a wall without a gate. So in this case, should the Prussians have to retreat, they would need to go south to 1511. 1610 would not be available as a retreat since there is no break in the wall.

KEVIN: Unfortunately, despite the logic, from a game rules perspective, we cannot have units in a Chateau using the Town combat mods. We'd have to re-write the rule completely. Here below is an update with limited changes to the Walled Town paragraph:

RULE: 25.76 Walled Towns: Each hex of a town enclosed by a red enceinte line is treated as a chateau hex. A unit of either side may enter or exit a Walled Town only via a gate hexside (gray). Occupying a Chateau relieves a unit of the requirement to attack an adjacent hex (10.31). In combat between opposing combat units inside the Walled Town, combat modifiers for Chateau are used.



Battle of Smolensk on 17 August 1812

Treat Wall hexsides as primary rivers (4.2). Combat between adjacent enemy units on either side of a non-gated, walled hexside is not permitted. Artillery may bombard across the wall. Command may be traced across gate hexsides but not walled hexsides.

VINCE: Walled town hexes WITHIN the wall all count as chateaux hexes. The trouble there was that 15.11 and 15.12 contradict about having to attack a chateau and not having to attack out from a chateau. On that question, the final resolution was that units in a walled town do not have to attack others within the town. Other than that, chateaux rules prevail.

There is no retreat through prohibited hexsides, so I'd think rule 12.34 applies. That said, being a chateau hex, any retreat result would initially be ignored and a Shock combat applied first per 15.22.

I certainly agree with you that a goose and gander approach should apply. By that I mean roads in are possible escape routes. Walled movement prohibition should apply both inbound and outbound.

KEVIN: In the illustration (opposite, below) we start the French game turn with French units in the VP triangle and the Russians boxed up where the green dot is. The third hex is vacant. Can the French units in the VP hex move into the vacant Charleroi hex? I'm invoking rule 4.3—ZOCs do not extend into a chateau hex, and so the move does not go through or into an EZOC. But, does 15.1 prevent the move? A unit that enters a Fortified Place adjacent to an enemy combat unit must stop moving. I think 15.1 does not apply because of the unique nature of adjacent chateau hexes.

Also, in our game there is a Roadblock in the woods pointing south at the north gate of Charleroi. Roadblocks do not have ZOC, nor do they block ZOC, so if I place a unit next to the roadblock and the Prussians must retreat, since their only exit would be through the gate into an EZOC, they would be removed to the UAR box and have to roll as per 12.34? This assumes that in my movement phase I can move a unit into the vacant Charleroi hex to block a retreat move there.



Charleroi, a fortified town, criss-crossed with many walls.



The Sambre at Charleroi

VINCE: Keeping it simple, all the hexes are chateaux. So, ZOC does not extend into them. However, I do stop units when they enter a walled town hex adjacent to a unit WITHIN the town that is not blocked by the wall. I also allow a unit as per 15.11 to move from a chateau that is adjacent to an enemy, but it will stop the moment it enters another hex adjacent to an enemy unit.

KEVIN: 15.1 says, "Adjacent units must attack enemy units in Fortified places. A unit that enters a Fortified Place adjacent to an enemy unit must stop."

VINCE: Although 15.1 says you must attack fortified locations, 15.12 then says, units in Chateaux do not have to attack. In other words, they contradict when it comes to fighting in hexes such as a walled city where all the hexes count as chateaux and are adjacent to each other. It was agreed that although units must stop after ENTERING a hex adjacent to one of these pseudo-chateaux, they do NOT have to attack. That way, we get extended street fighting and the need for superior numbers gathered to help push through the streets and buildings.

KEVIN: 15.12 says "units in Fortified Places are not required to attack, but if they elect to attack, all adjacent enemy units must be attacked by some friendly unit." This should apply even when all hexes are inside the wall. The multi-hex chateau (aka Fortified towns) are a whole game in themselves, or they want to be. I tried to hold to the wording we

have and not introduce extra stuff. In the Series Rules (vers 7.34), 15.12 should be marked as an exception to 15.11—not a contradiction but a special case (both adjacent units in Chateau).



Fortified towns are surrounded by an Enciente wall, indicated on the map by a red line.



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