


AN HISTORICAL SIMULATION GAME OF FOUR BATTLES OF AUTUMN, 1813



## *Study Folder*



## Manpower and Unit Quality

All the historians consulted for this project referred to the strengths of the armies as though nothing happened between the opening of hostilities on August 15<sup>th</sup> and the start of the respective battles. Yet there were many long marches in the rain and numerous combats and skirmishes leading up to them. As a result most sources that we have used—and cited in the Study folder—tend to overstate the strength of forces on the battlefields.

In order to determine the manpower of each unit we created a model for estimating each unit's losses in attrition and combat, plus replacements.

We calculated attrition based on the known marches during the weeks before the battles, then converted the raw manpower of a unit into strength points on a sliding scale tied to the Initiative Rating printed on the unit, from 350 to 800 men per point. The “good” infantry were around 500. Anything 600 or above would be poor quality. The French Imperial Guard (Old & Middle) were given an Initiative Rating of 4 and their strength calculated at 350 men per point. “Grenadiers” and “Elites” received a 4 for Initiative and 400 men/SP. “First rate” units received an Initiative of 3 and 500 men/SP. “Veteran” rated 2 and 600 men/SP.<sup>1</sup> “Conscripts” received an Initiative of 1 and 700 men/SP. “Landwehr and Trained Militia” rated Initiative 1 and 800 men/SP.

Cavalry rated between 400 and 500 men per SP; Cossacks, 600 men per SP. The veteran French cavalry mostly served in the III, IV, and V Reserve Cavalry Corps (400 men/SP), while the I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps were mostly formed of newly raised squadrons (500 men/SP) (*see Table 3*). Artillery is rated 1 SP per battery (12 guns).

EXAMPLE: Von Bosch's Saxon infantry brigade in the 25th Division of VII Corps, with an initiative of 2, was rated at 600 men per SP. Its full strength is 5 SPs.

The Brigade had 57 officers and 2840 men on 15 August. We calculated attrition at 193 men, leaving 2704 in the ranks at the Battle of Grossbeeren (a strength of 5 SPs). We estimated a total of 407 battle casualties at Grossbeeren and a further 568 who may have fallen out of the ranks during the retreat, leaving 1922 still with the colors at the time of Dennewitz.

<sup>1</sup> Scott Bowden, *Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813*, 1990. We followed the Morale Classification Chart on page 343.

For Blücher's Army of Silesia we figured a total loss to attrition and battle of 27,000 men, leaving Blücher with 63,000 men at Katzbach (excluding Pahlen and St. Priest's Corps, who were not on the battlefield).

Total Loss	SACKEN	YORCK	LANG'ON	PAHLEN
at Katzbach	3,000	15,000	8,000	1,000
	15,000	23,000	25,000	11,000

Petre, in *Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany*, credits Yorck and Sacken with 55,000 and Langeron with 31,000 men, which was about their strength on August 15th.

**Table 2. BLÜCHER'S MARCHES AUGUST 1813**

	SACKEN	YORCK	LANGERON
<b>13PM</b>	Hunsfeld-bei-Breslau	Wernersdorf-am-Zobtenberg	Jauernick
<b>15PM</b>	Lissa	Sara-am-Striegauer-Wasser	Striegau
<b>16PM</b>	Ober-Moys and Eisendorf	Jauer	Bolkenhayn
<b>17PM</b>	Kloster-Wahlstadt	Jauer	Jauer
<b>18PM</b>	Liegnitz	Goldberg	Schönau
<b>19PM</b>	Lowenberg	Lowenberg	Siebeneichen
<b>20PM</b>	Modelsdorf	Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg	Pilgramsdorf
<b>22PM</b>	Ober-Au	Röchlitz	Wolfsberg
<b>23PM</b>	Liegnitz	Christians-höhe	Seichau—Hennersdorf
<b>24PM</b>			Siefersdorf
<b>26PM</b>	Malitsch		Hermannsdorf

**Table 3. Infantry Ratings**  
Initiative    Men per SP

4	350-400
3	500-550
2	600-650
1	700-800

(continued on page 23)

## 19.0 SCENARIOS

Four Lost Battles *includes Four Battle Scenarios, as well as a Campaign Game. Players select which scenario they intend to play, and then refer to the Scenario Information (see 21.0 et seq.).*

### 19.1 The Four Battles

Scenarios One through Four are “Battle Games” and must start on the Game-Turn specified. The Campaign Game starts on 23 August, with the start of the Grossbeeren Battle Game.

**19.11 Universal Turn Record Track:** The Game-Turn Record Track applies to all four games interchangeably—it bears no date, just the 24-hour nomenclature for each Game-Turn—and will be used in each battle game. The Scenario Information will specify the exact turn on which each game begins and ends. The Game-Turn marker is placed on the Turn Record Track in the turn listed in the Scenario Information as the Game Start. Each scenario includes the turns listed under duration as starting and ending turns. If a battle game continues on the second day, just start the marker over at the top of the Track. Reinforcements are specified in the Scenario Information as modified by the play of Arrival Cards (*see 18.7*).

**19.12 The Campaign Game:** All four battle games are played in chronological order (*see 25.0*). Depending upon the level of victory in the battles of Grossbeeren, Katzbach, and Kulm, one or both players may draw “Bonus Cards” on the second turn of Kulm and Dennewitz. (*See 18.32 and the Campaign Scenario Information, 25.15.*)

### 19.2 Setting Up the Scenarios

Each map has a Force Key which shows every major Formation in the game. Sort and store the counters by Formation, and start setting up the game by selecting the Formations shown. All units start on the map as Hidden Forces. Units already reorganized (listed under “Reduced Strength Units”) must set-up on their reduced-strength side.

**19.21 Initial Set Up:** The Coalition Player refers to the Initial Set Up for the Coalition Army and sets up first; the French Player employs the Initial Set Up for the French Army. The Initial Set Up specifies the set-up location for each unit or formation. After setting up, the Initial Set Up may be modified by Mode cards (*see 18.5*). Make sure you check for reduced strength units, listed at the end of the Initial Set-up.

**19.22 Hex Numbers:** The hex numbers show where units were historically located at the start of that day. Place all the combat units and leaders directly on the

map in the hex specified in the Initial Set Up. Should the set up include any overstacked hexes, displace the excess units at the owning player’s choice.

**19.23 Reinforcements:** See separate paragraphs for units and leaders listed as “French Reinforcements” and “Coalition Reinforcements.” Reinforcements arrival is listed in the Scenario Information and may be affected by the Arrival Cards (*see 19.4*).

**19.24 Bridge and Baggage Trains:** Each player receives one pontoon train in each battle, and may set it up freely (as a pontoon or as a train). Pontoon Trains must be set-up within [7] hexes of any friendly Commander. pontoons may be deployed over rivers at the start of any scenario. The various Baggage Trains set up within [7] hexes of any unit in their respective Corps (if on map) or enter as reinforcements *behind* all the other units of their corps, unless otherwise specified. Each corps has its own baggage train. EXCEPTION: (*see 14.41*).

**19.25 Leaders:** Commanders set-up in the hex specified or at owning player’s choice with any Friendly force, if no hex is specified. Officers set-up in any hex containing units of their Formations. Leaders ignore Mode Cards. EXCEPTION: Card 2, *Late Start*.

**19.26 Vedettes:** Vedettes may be deployed at the beginning of a scenario, at the owning player’s option, anywhere within five hexes of their parent unit (not in EZOCs); the cavalry parent unit for such vedettes is placed in the full-strength Units Holding box. The first player deploys all his Vedettes first, then the second player deploys his.

**19.27 Cards At Start:** (*see 18.31*)

### 19.3 Scenario Information

The following information is detailed in sections 21.0—25.0.

**19.31 Introduction:** In this section is listed: Duration (the starting and ending turns of the scenario are listed inclusive); Mode Cards At Start (specifies the number of cards each player will draw on the first turn only). Card Deck (remove specified cards from decks—*see 18.2*). The French Player is the First Player in all scenarios.

**19.32 Initial Set-up:** Specifies a location for each unit on the map at the start of the scenario, followed by a listing of all Reinforcements. Units are listed by *Corps/Division* or *Corps/Brigade*. If a division is listed, then all units of that division appear unless otherwise specified. The quantity of units in a given group is listed in parenthesis. Quantity does not include vedettes, leaders or baggage (*see 19.5*). EXAMPLE: XIV/Illowaiski = Illowaiski’s Bde. of Rus. XIV Corps. ABBREVIATIONS: Res. = Reserve; Bde. =

Brigade; Div. = Division; Gd. = Guard; Art. = Artillery; HA. = Horse Artillery; S/S = Supply Source; GB = Grossbeeren; KZ = Katzbach; KU = Kulm; DN = Dennewitz.

**19.33 Special Rules:** Rules which apply only to this battle (if any).

**19.34 Victory Conditions:** Victory Point awards for control of places.

**19.35 Reduced Strength Units:** Some units may have been eliminated or reduced at prior battles. In all the battle games, units listed under “Reduced Strength Units,” set-up at their reduced strengths. In the Campaign Game, units in the UAR (not PEU) at *Grossbeeren* should be kept together in order to set-up at their reduced strength for *Dennewitz*.

#### 19.4 Reinforcements

Most battles have Regular (1<sup>st</sup> Day) and 2<sup>nd</sup> Day Reinforcements. All Reinforcement entries are shown following the Initial Set-up. Reinforcements enter at the hex specified on the mapedge. If a Corps or Formation is listed, all units which are *not* mentioned separately enter on the same turn.

**19.41 Reinforcement Availability:** Alternate Reinforcements are listed after the Historical Reinforcements. Each side has a numbered list of Alternate Reinforcements. One numbered group of Alternate Reinforcements appears for each Alternate Reinforcements card played. These groups must appear in order of priority in the list. In the campaign game any Alternate Reinforcements that enter into the *Katzbach* or *Kulm* battles are unavailable for *Dennewitz*.

**19.42 Hidden Reinforcements:** All Reinforcements enter the map Hidden. Vedettes may enter instead of their parent Light Cavalry units.

**19.43 Deploying Off-map Reinforcements:** Prior to entry all units in the force are deployed off map in a road march column, beginning with the leader at the front of the road march column, and ending with the baggage. The Reinforcements can enter in road march or not. This rule establishes their order of arrival.

#### 19.5 March Order

One March Order per player may be issued prior to the start of any scenario, to any friendly force in play on the map, *if* a friendly Commander is on-map at the start of the scenario (*see* 7.42). EXCEPTION: 23.34.

## 20.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS

*Victory Conditions apply to all scenarios alike. Victory is awarded to the player with the most points at the end of the game; or, in the Campaign Game according to the ratio of each player's Victory Point total at the end of play (see 25.4).*

### 20.1 Victory Point Awards

Victory Points are awarded at the end of the game, depending upon the strength of combat units eliminated, enemy corps demoralized, control of certain terrain features, for exiting the map, etc.

**20.11 Determine VP Totals:** Determine VPs for...

- Enemy Combat SPs Eliminated (*see* 20.12)
- Enemy Corps Demoralized (*see* 20.13).
- Captured Enemy Baggage Trains (*see* 20.14).
- controlled hexes (*see* 20.15)
- Total the VP Values of each card you have played.
- Units that have exited (*see* 20.4)

### 20.12 Total Combat SPs Eliminated

Determine the number of total Coalition and French Combat Strength in the PEU, plus the Unrecovered and Recovered boxes at the end of play, total the losses in SPs by both sides, and subtract the smaller from the larger total. Award VPs to the side losing the fewest SPs at a ratio of 1:5; differential of 0-4, 0 VPs; 5-9, 1 VP; 10-14, 2 VPs; 15-19, 3 VPs; etc... “Total Combat Strength Eliminated” includes units permanently eliminated and those still awaiting reorganization. (Eliminated Vedettes do not grant VPs.) Do not count units in the Full Strength Holding Box.

**20.13 Enemy Corps Demoralized:** Each Player receives [4] VPs for each enemy Corps Demoralized at the end of play.

**20.14 Captured Baggage Trains:** The Enemy Player receives [2] VPs for each Baggage Train captured.



ENEMY CONTROL MARKER

**20.15 Control:** Each Player receives [4] VPs for each *Enemy* Supply Source he controls at the end of the scenario. (If the Enemy controls a Supply Source, place a Control Marker in the hex.) The Scenario Victory Conditions specify additional hexes and the value in VPs for the control of each. To be considered in control of one of these hexes, a friendly Combat Unit must physically occupy the hex, or be the last Combat Unit to have occupied or moved through it. If the occupying unit is Out of Supply at the moment it enters or moves through the hex, the hex is not controlled by that unit.

**20.16: Cards:** As specified on the card, add or subtract the VP Value of *each card* you have played during the game.

### 20.2 Levels of Victory

At the end of the battle divide the French by the Coalition VP total (French: Coalition). The total of Victory Points achieved by the two players is expressed as a ratio, which determines the level of victory.

#### 20.11 Find ratio:

1:2+, the Coalition Player wins a Strategic Victory  
 1:1.5 to 1.99, Coalition Tactical Victory  
 1:1 to 1.49, Coalition Marginal Victory  
 1.1:1 to 1.5:1, French Marginal Victory  
 1.51:1 to 2:1, French Tactical Victory  
 2.1:1+, French Strategic Victory

**20.12 Total of VPs Less than One:** Convert scores less than “1” to “1” for purposes of calculating ratio.

#### 20.13 Levels of Victory in the Campaign Game:

In the Campaign Game the Victor and Level of Victory achieved in each individual battle must be recorded (*see 25.4*). A given level of Victory will allow the Victor to draw “Bonus Cards” from the Card Decks in the upcoming games in the campaign (*see 19.12*).

### 20.3 Capture of Commanders

A player receives a number of VPs for each Captured Commander equal to that Commander’s Command Rating. EXCEPTION: *The game immediately ends in a Coalition Victory the moment Napoleon is captured.*

### 20.4 Exiting the Map

Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the “General Retreat” card. Friendly units may exit the map at a Friendly Supply Source hex or other hex specified in the Scenario Instructions (*see 23.33*). The exiting unit pays the Movement Point cost of the hex it is leaving, again. Exited leaders may not reorganize units. Units forced to *retreat* off the map are eliminated (*see 11.44*). Units which voluntarily exit the map cannot be returned to play, but are *not* considered eliminated for victory point purposes.

**20.41 VP Award:** If he plays the “General Retreat” card the Exiting Player receives [4 VP] for exiting his baggage train, and [1 VP] for every five combat units exited (do not count vedettes). EXCEPTION: You may not receive more VPs for Exiting the Map than you receive for Enemy Combat units eliminated.

**20.42 No Award:** Even if you do not hold the “General Retreat” card, you may wish to exit your units to prevent their destruction, either at the Friendly Supply

Source or exit hexes specified in the Scenario, but you receive no VPs.

### 20.5 Minimum Loss

The Player receives [2] VPs if the total of eliminated SPs in the Friendly PEU and UAR boxes at the end of the game is zero.

### 20.6 Game Ending

The game ends with the completion of the last turn specified under “Duration,” below; or may end in an Automatic Victory, which is declared immediately, upon either event: a) Napoleon is in play and is captured (*see 20.3*); or, b) all the corps of one side are demoralized. The level of the Automatic Victory has to be determined (*see 20.2*), and if less than marginal a “draw” is declared. A “draw” means neither side wins.

## 21.0 THE BATTLE OF GROSSBEEREN

*To the Gates of Berlin, 23 August*

### 21.1 Introduction

The battle of Grossbeeren was a meeting engagement in which the two forces were ignorant of their mutual presence in the area. Grossbeeren is a double battle, with little possibility of interaction between troops that fought in Blankenfeld because of swamps. Oudinot took a risk in separating his three corps on parallel routes as was customary when marching through open country. The IV Corps on the right, held-up as they emerged from the woods, were unable to assist VII Corps at Grossbeeren in the center; while Oudinot, on the left, tended to his own corps, considerably strung out after a long Forced March on the 22<sup>nd</sup>—instead of coordinating the battle.

**21.11 Duration:** 09.00 - 20.00 hrs., 23 August

**21.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 2 French, 3 Coalition

**21.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

2x Delay—March Confusion, 1x “Replacements.”

**21.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove:**

1x “Sick and Tired,” 1x “Replacements,” 2x “Lost,” 1x “Early Start.”

**21.15 Bonus Cards (Battle Game and Campaign):**  
 Coalition: 3; French: 3.

### 21.2 Initial Set Up

#### 21.21 French Set Up:

IV Corps—BERTRAND, 15<sup>th</sup> div. (4 units), 2<sup>nd</sup> Art., 4<sup>th</sup> HA (2605) and/or in adjacent hexes.

#### 21.22 Coalition Set Up:

IV Corps—Kurmark (1504), HA (1604), Lindenau (1605), Dobs. Ldw (1803), Strampf (1805); TAUENZHEN and baggage anywhere (Tauenzien is out of Supply). Wobes. Ldw and Hirsch. Ldw do not set up on the map. These 2 units are Alternate Reinforcements (*see 21.25*).

III Corps—BULOW, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> bdes. and Holtzendorf (0113) and/or adjacent hexes; 6<sup>th</sup> Bde (1117).

### 21.23 Reinforcements

Baggage Trains are not always specified (*see 19.24 and 14.41*).

FRENCH:

09.00—REYNIER, VII Corps from (2616)

*EXCEPTION:* the 32<sup>nd</sup> div., Saxon 5<sup>th</sup> Art and 1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> HA from (2621); Bde Devaux is Alt. Reinf. only (*see 21.25*).

09.00—IV/12 (4 units) from 2604.

*EXCEPTION:* The 38<sup>th</sup> Div. and 24<sup>th</sup> LC (6 Württemberg units) are Alt. Reinf. only (*see 21.25*).

13.00—XII Corps, OUDINOT from (2626).

*EXCEPTION:* The 29<sup>th</sup> Div. (3 Bavarian units) are Alt. Reinf. only (*see 21.25*).

18.00 —ARRIGHI, IIIC/6LC, IIIC/4HC and 1<sup>st</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> HA from (2626)

COALITION:

12.00 — III/5<sup>th</sup> Bde, III/(-) Cav from (0123)

14.00 — III/Oppen, III/HA from (0123)

16.00 — XIV/Illowaiski, Lowenstern from (0123)

17.00 — Sw/2<sup>nd</sup> X, 4<sup>th</sup> X from (0123)

### 21.24 Second Day Reinforcements

If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until 20.00 hrs turn of August 24<sup>th</sup>. In this case the following reinforcement units arrive, late on the 23<sup>rd</sup>.

FRENCH:

23<sup>rd</sup> 20.00 - IIIC/5<sup>th</sup> LC Div (2 units) from (2626)

COALITION:

23<sup>rd</sup> 21.00 - Russian XIV Corps from (0123)

23<sup>rd</sup> 24.00 - Swedish Corps from (0123)

### 21.25 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH:

1. XII/29<sup>th</sup> Div. (3 Bavarian units) from (2626)

2. IV/38<sup>th</sup> Div. & IV/ 24<sup>th</sup> LC Bde. (8 Württemberg units) from (2604)

3. IIIC/5<sup>th</sup> LC Div (2 units) from (2626)

4. VII/Devaux Bde from (2616)

COALITION:

1. IV/Hirsch Ldw from 0833

2. Russian XIV Corps from 0123

3. Swedish Corps from 0123

4. IV/Wobes Lde from 1501

Accelerate the arrival of the Russians and Swedes (21.24) to arrive on the turn determined by die roll.

**21.26 Alternate Commander:** FRENCH: Ney. COALITION: (1) Bernadotte, (2) Winzingerode.

### 21.27 Reduced Strength Units

(none)

## 21.3 Special Rules

**21.31 Coalition Supply:** *The Army of the North was out of supply until after the battle, so it was very heavy to maneuver.* The Swedish and Russian baggage trains may not enter play in this scenario. Swedish and Russian units that enter the game may only trace to Coalition mapedge Supply Sources, and may not share the Prussian baggage.

### 21.32 Bülow Semi-Active (*new Special Rule*)

Bülow's at start force begins in Semi-Active status, and remains so until released (see Card 19 for effects). Roll at the start of each Friendly Player Turn to try and release him. He is released on a die-roll of 1. MODIFIER: At 10.00 hrs, subtract 1 from the die, at 11.00, subtract 2, at 12.00, -3, etc. For each group of French Alternate Reinforcements that have arrived, subtract 1. Bülow is also released if the enemy are within his personal Line of Sight.

**21.33 Historical Note:** On hearing the cannon at Blankenfelde at 10.00, on his own initiative Bülow marched for Lichtenrade to support Tauenzien. On Bernadotte's orders, he turned around and reoccupied his old camp at Heinersdorf at 13.00 in the pouring rain, marching 12 km from Heinersdorf to Lichtenrade and back.

## 21.4 Victory Conditions

**21.41 Control:** The controlling player receives, at the end of *each* Game-Turn:

- 1 VP for control of Blankenfeld (hex 1704)

- 1 VP for control of Grossbeeren (hex 1117)

(Keep a running total VP award per player.) The player who controls Blankenfeld and/or Grossbeeren at the end of the game receives 5 Victory Points for each of the 2 towns.

**21.42 Campaign Game:** *If Grossbeeren had been a French Strategic victory—leading to the occupation of Berlin, which lies just 10 miles from the mapedge—the Battle of Dennewitz probably would not have taken place at all.* A French Strategic Victory at Grossbeeren means no Battle of Dennewitz in the Campaign.

**21.43 Historical Note:** The VPs are based on the day's objective of the French, to control the two towns as preparation for the final advance on Berlin.

## 22.0 BATTLE OF THE KATZBACH

*A Perilous Passage, 26 August*

### 22.1 Introduction

The battle of the Katzbach on August 26<sup>th</sup> 1813 was another meeting engagement; neither commander expected to find his opponent in the area. Cavalry dominated the battlefield as muskets would not discharge in the rain.

**22.11 Duration:** 10.00 - 20.00 hrs.

(May continue on Second Day of Battle, ending on 20.00 hrs., 27<sup>th</sup> Aug.)

**22.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 2 French, 1 Coalition

**22.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

1x “Alternate Reinforcements.”

**22.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

2x “Delay—March confusion;” 2x “Reinforcements Arrive Early;” 2x “Reinforcement Takes Other Route;” 1x “Random Entry;” 2x “Alternate Reinforcements”

**22.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** (*Battle Game and Campaign*) Coalition 3; French 3.

### 22.2 Initial Set Up

#### 22.21 French Set Up:

IIC/2 LC (2 units) within 4 hexes of (0814).

MACDONALD, XI (less 31<sup>st</sup> Div.) within 4 hexes of (0518).

LAURISTON, V (less 17<sup>th</sup> Div.—9 units) and IC/Dermon’s Bde., within 4 hexes of (0722)

#### 22.22 Coalition Set Up:

Prussian I/C Katzeler, Henkel, Bieber Ldw and 1,2 HA, within 2 hexes of (1317).

LANGERON, VI, IX, X Inf. Corps (*see* 22.33), and KORFF, I Cav. Corps, between Buschhausen (1028), Schlaupe (1622), and Herrmannsdorf (1627) inclusive.

**EXCEPTION:** Grekov’s Bde (*see* 22.24).

BLÜCHER, YORCK, I Prussian Corps within 5 hexes of Alt Jauer (2727).

SACKEN, XI Russian Corps, and WASILTCHIKOW, Cavalry Corps, on the road south of Mahlitsch (2817).

#### 22.23 Reinforcements:

FRENCH:

12.00—III/8th div., III/Beurman’s Bde., HA from (0109)

14.00—SEBASTIANI, remainder of IIC (5 units) from (0109). SOUHAM, remainder of III Corps (10 units + baggage) from (1801). **EXCEPTION:** 39<sup>th</sup> Div. (*see* 22.24).

COALITION:

(No regular reinforcements.)

#### 22.24 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH:

1. III/39<sup>th</sup> Div. from (1901)

2. Puthod’s 17<sup>th</sup> Division of V Corps was sent to guard the flank at Schönau while Ledru’s 31<sup>st</sup> Division of XI was on the Queiss River. Both were guarding against St. Priest. 17<sup>th</sup> Div from 0116; 31<sup>st</sup> Div. from 0109. Add three turns to the die roll result specified on the card for the 31<sup>st</sup> Division’s Arrival Schedule.

3. MARMONT, VI Corps (13 units) from (0109)

COALITION:

1. IC/Grekov Cossack Bde. from (2334).

2. ST. PRIEST, VIII Corps from (1934).

**22.25 Alternate Commander:** FRENCH: Napoleon, (2<sup>nd</sup> card Ney). COALITION: Pahlen, from (1934).

#### 22.26 Reduced Strength Units

FRENCH:

V/Harlet, Penne, Vachot; III/Vandedem, Charriere, Anthing, Stockhorn; XI/Henin, Zucchi.

COALITION:

Russian units:

XI/16<sup>th</sup>, XI/27<sup>th</sup>, C/2H, VI/18<sup>th</sup>, IX/15<sup>th</sup>, X/22<sup>nd</sup>, IC/Witt.

Prussian units: Hiller, Losthin, Lobenthal, 6<sup>th</sup> Sil.,

Weltzien, v. Borke, 14<sup>th</sup> Sil., Henkel.

### 22.3 Special Rules

**22.31 Thunderstorm:** During all Thunderstorm turns the bridge at 2701 is marked with a “Burnt Bridge” Marker (washed-out). It cannot be repaired during a Thunderstorm turn. During all Thunderstorm turns the stream portion of the Katzbach may only be crossed at stream bridges (i.e., it is treated like a river). This portion of the Katzbach is indicated by a special stream symbol.

**22.32 Battle on the 17<sup>th</sup>:** *Many units in this battle set-up at their reduced strength, due to the actions of the prior ten days. This same battlefield could have been contested on the 17<sup>th</sup> with almost the same forces had Ney so chosen.* **Set-up:** Use the regular set-up and reinforcement information, but include: a) the French Player’s 17<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> division with their respective formations at start (they hadn’t been detached to the south as yet); b) Commander Ney—with the III Corps; and c) all units at Full Strength.

**22.33 Langeron’s Formation:** All the units of Langeron’s Formation (comprising three Russian Infantry Corps, VI, IX, and X) share the same officer Langeron and Langeron’s “L” baggage train.

**22.34 Lauriston’s Command:** Lauriston may command Dermoncourt’s brigade.

## 22.4 Victory Conditions

**22.41 Control:** To the player who controls the following hexes:

- 5 VP per hex of Kl. Tinz and Gr. Janowitz
- 3 VP per hex of Weinberg, Schlaupen, Hermansdorf.

## 23.0 THE BATTLE OF KULM

*Enfilade in the Mountains, 29-30 August*

### 23.1 Introduction

After the Battle of Dresden on 26-27 August, several French Corps began the pursuit of the defeated Coalition Army through the mountain passes leading back into Austrian territory. Vandamme's I Corps, with two divisions of the best-trained conscripts of 1813, fought several rearguard actions with Ostermann's Russians, and expected this battle to be no different. The Emperor had already heard rumors of Macdonald's disaster on the Katzbach. With the possibility of having to defend his great depot of Dresden against an advance by both Bernadotte and Blücher, his hopes of being able to pursue far into Bohemia were vanishing.

**23.11 Duration:** 17.00, 29<sup>th</sup> Aug.—20.00, 30<sup>th</sup> Aug.

**23.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 1 French, 2 Coalition

**23.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:**

2x "Thunderstorm," 2x "Hesitant Advance," 2x "Sick and Tired," 2x "Second Day of Battle," 1x "Semi-Active."

**23.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

2x "Second Day of Battle," 1x "Thunderstorm," 1x "Early Start."

**23.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 3, the French 3.

### 23.2 Initial Set Up

**23.21 French Set Up:**

VANDAMME, I/21<sup>st</sup> LC Gobrecht, 32<sup>nd</sup> LC Rousseau (2715)

XIV/Mouton-D Bde (2315)

IC/ILC Pire, Montmr (2815)

IC/ILC Heimrodt, IC/4<sup>th</sup> HA (Italian, 2916)

I/Fesenzac, I/2<sup>nd</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> Art (2317)

I/Pouchelon (2516)

I/Bde Reuss (2214)

I/7<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> Art., I/6<sup>th</sup> HA (2313)

I/Quiot (3507), I/4<sup>th</sup> Art (3706)

**23.22 Coalition Set Up:**

RUSSIANS:

BARCLAY (1816)

YERMOLOV (2017)

OSTERMANN, II/3 Schachowski (2117)

IIC/Shevich (1916)

V/Potemkin, V/Bistram (1915)

II/14 Roth (2015)

II/Art. (2016)

EUGEN, II/4 Pueschnitzki (2116)

IIC/Kretow (2118)

IIC/HA (2219)

GALITZIN, IIC/Depreradovitch (2319)

IIC/Duka (2420)

IIC/Knorrning (2621)

IIC/baggage (1920)

RAEVSKY, III/1G (3 units) (1518)

III/baggage (1218)

V/Krys (1316), V/Schelt (1314), V/art (1312)

V/Baggage (1210)

AUSTRICIANS:

Bde Sorbenberg (2520)

BIANCHI, H-Homburg (0807), Mariasy (0907), Qualenburg (0707), Art (0709).

COLLOREDO, 1Au/Collredo (0215), 1Au/Chiesa (0314); 1Au/Andrassy (0118), 1Au Art (0412).

### 23.23 Reinforcements:

FRENCH:

29<sup>th</sup> 17.00—I/2<sup>nd</sup> div, (3 units) from (3701)

29<sup>th</sup> 18.00—XIV/Creutzer, XIV/7<sup>th</sup> Art from (3701)

### 23.24 Second Day Reinforcements:

*Game always continues for a Second Day.*

PRUSSIANS:

30<sup>th</sup> 07.00—KLEIST, II Corps (9 units) from (1901).

**23.25 Alternate Reinforcements:** Draw from the following four groups in order. (*Campaign Game Note: Any units already received at Grossbeeren or Katzbach may not arrive as Alt. Reinforcements now.*)

FRENCH:

(1) MORTIER, YG/1<sup>st</sup> and YG/3<sup>rd</sup> divisions (8 units)

from (3701); (2) the OG Div (3 units) from (3701);

(3) ST. CYR, XIV (13 units) from (1901).

(4) LATOUR, IC (less 1<sup>st</sup> LC Div; 9 units) from (1901) or (3701).

COALITION:

(1) CHASTELER, Au. 1 Res. Div. (3 units) from (0726);

(2) NOSTITZ, Au. Cav. Div. (2 units) from (0726);

(3) HOHENLOHE'S Div. (4 units) from (0726);

(4) Rus. III/2G (3 units), III/Art from (0726).

**23.26 Alternate Commander:** FRENCH: Napoleon (3701). COALITION: (1) Konstantine (0726), (2) Wittgenstein (0726).

### 23.27 Reduced Strength Units:

FRENCH: I/Reuss. (Deductions have been made for units in combat at Dresden, and for attrition.)

COALITION: II Rus/Pueschnitzki, II Rus/Schachowski, II Prus/Pirch, II Prus/Klux.



### 23.3 Special Rules

#### 23.31 “Alto” Terrain

*In contrast to the battlefields in the sandy plains of Brandenburg, Kulm lies on the southern shoulder of the Erz Gebirge. At 400-500 meters above the valley at Kulm, Alto terrain is a slightly sunken plateau running from Zinnwald to Hinter Tellnitz and on toward Peterswalde. Alto terrain is treated like clear terrain (or, when attacked through a slope, as a hilltop). Alto terrain blocks the LOS of units on other Alto terrain. Any unit or leader on the edge of Alto terrain has a LOS over the lower-lying terrain down in the valley (and may see over but not into the woods lying on the slopes between) for a distance of up to [12] hexes.*

#### 23.32 Track-defile

Another terrain type that is proper to Kulm only, the Track-defile is not traversable by trains (including artillery) and costs 1 MP per hex for other unit types, if entered by a Track-defile hexside, regardless of other terrain. Artillery and Trains pay the cost of other terrain.

#### 23.33 Map Exit

*On the morning of the 29th, Vandamme sent five battalions to Aussig (off map) with a pontoon train, following an order of Napoleon to deploy the bridge on the Elbe there. The French Player can play the General Retreat Card and exit his forces from the map at hex 3921 in addition to his friendly Supply Source.*

**23.34 March Orders at Start:** Both Players may issue March Orders to any [2] on-map Friendly Forces (in effect at start).

### 23.4 Victory Conditions

**23.41 Control:** To the player who controls the following hexes:

- 5 VP per hex of Kulm, Sobochleben, and Priesten.

At the end of the first day, total all VPs achieved by both players and then reshuffle the card deck.

## 24.0 THE BATTLE OF DENNEWITZ

*Collapse in the North, 6 September*

### 24.1 Introduction

Marshal Ney's Army of Berlin set out from Wittenberg on September 5<sup>th</sup>, side-stepping Bernadotte's main body and driving Tauenzien's IV Corps toward Seyda. That night they camped just off-map to the south, unaware that coalition forces were five miles away.

**24.11 Duration:** 09.00 6 Sept.—20.00 6 Sept.

**24.12 Mode Cards at Start:** 2 French, 2 Coalition

**24.13 Card Deck, French:**

(All cards in deck.)

**24.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:**

2x “Lost” 2x “Thunderstorm,” 1x “Random Entry,”  
1x “Early Start.”

**24.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2:** For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 6, the French 3.

### 24.2 Initial Set Up

#### 24.21 French Set Up:

In a Secure Road column (*see 18.58*) along the road from (1614) to Naundorf (2430) in the following order:

ARRIGHI, IIIC/5<sup>th</sup> LC (2 units), IV/24<sup>th</sup> LC & IV/24<sup>th</sup> HA, BERTRAND, IV/15<sup>th</sup> (4 units), VIII/Zoltowski, IVC/Krukowski, IV/12<sup>th</sup> (4 units), IV/38<sup>th</sup> (4 units), IV/HA, IV/art. & baggage (*see 24.51*). (Zoltowski part of VIII Corps, was attached to IV Corps.)

#### 24.22 Coalition Set Up

TAUENZIEN, IV CORPS, XIV/Illowaiski, III/HA—in town hexes of Juterbog (0801, 0802, etc).

EXCEPTION: *Wobes and Hirsch Ldw (Alt. Reinf.)*

BÜLOW, III CORPS—within five hexes of Danna (0934); cavalry within ten hexes of (1234). All must be more than 12 hexes from French Supply Sources.

EXCEPTION: *III/5<sup>th</sup> Borstell (Reinforcement)*

#### 24.23 Reinforcements:

FRENCH

10.00 from (2925)—REYNIER, VII Corps

11.00 from (2914)—IIIC/4<sup>th</sup>, IIIC/HA

11.00 from (2918)—XII/29<sup>th</sup> LC, OUDINOT, XII/14<sup>th</sup> (3 units)

12.00 from (2918)—IIIC/6<sup>th</sup> LC (2 units), NEY, XII/13<sup>th</sup> (3 units), art., baggage

14.00 from (2918)—XII/29<sup>th</sup> (3 units)

COALITION all arrive at Kurzlippsdorf (1433)

10.00—Prussian III/5<sup>th</sup> Borstell

13.00—Sw / Moerner Bde., HA

14.00—XIV / Kruper and Pahlen

15.00—XIV/21<sup>st</sup>, XIV/AvG (3 units)—total 4 units.

16.00—WORONZOW, XIV/14<sup>th</sup>. Baggage Train

16.00—balance of Swedish Corps (6 units), STED-INGK.

17.00—balance of Russian XIV Corps (4 units)

EXCEPTIONS: *XIV/24<sup>th</sup> is Alt. Reinforcement;*

*III/Holtzendorf Art. does not appear.*

#### 24.24 Second Day Reinforcements:

(none). If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until 20.00 hrs turn of Sept. 7<sup>th</sup>

#### 24.25 Alternate Reinforcements:

Campaign Game Note: Any units already received at Katzbach or Kulm may not arrive as Alt. Reinforcements now (*see 25.24*).

FRENCH:

1. MORTIER, Imperial Guard (11 units—OG Div., 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> YG Divs.) from (2910);
2. MARMONT, VI Corps (13 units) from (2910);
3. LATOUR, I CAV (8 units): 3LC, 1HC, 3HC Divs., Saxon HA from (2910).
4. Remaining Young Guard (8 units) from (2910).

#### COALITION

1. XIV/24<sup>th</sup> from (1433).
2. Wobes Ldw from (0801).
3. Hirsch Ldw from (0934).

**24.26 Alternate Commander:** FRENCH: Napoleon.

COALITION: (1) Bernadotte, (2) Winzingerode.

#### 24.27 Reduced Strength Units:

FRENCH:

IV / Moroni, Belair, Hulot, Stockmayer, Spitzenberg (Doring—PEU.)

VII / Brause, Bosch, Devaux, Menu, HArt.

XII / de Villeret, de Treille, Beaumont.

VIII / Zoltowski

IIIC / Jacquinet, Mouriez, Amiel.

IVC / Krukowski

COALITION:

III/Hessen; Swedish/Lagebring; XIV/21<sup>st</sup> Div.

### 24.3 Special Rules

**24.31 Historical Note:** *The arrival of VII and XII Corps are based on Ney's march plan, since "March Confusion" affected their historical arrival. Oudinot's XII Corps was delayed when the VII Corps failed to show up at Gadegast.*

**24.32 Map Exit:** *Historians surmise that Ney's objective was to exit the eastern mapedge on his way to a planned rendezvous with Napoleon at Luckau. If he plays the General Retreat Card, the French Player's forces may exit at any of the following hexes: 0701, 0801, 0901, 1701, 1801, 1901, or 2901.*

### 24.4 Victory Conditions

**24.41 Control:** For control of the following:

- 5 VP per hex of Dennewitz (1411-1412)
- 4 VP per hex of central Juterbog (0801-0802).
- 3 VP per hex of Golsdorf (1816), Rohrbeck (1607)

and Niedergorsdorf (1116-1216).

## 25.0 THE CAMPAIGN GAME

### 25.1 Introduction

The Campaign Game is the "Link Game." Each Battle Game is played successively, in order.

**25.11 Duration:** The total number of turns in the four Battle Games.

**25.13 Mode Cards at Start:** *(same as battle games.)*

**25.14 Card Deck:** *(same as battle games.)*

**25.15 Bonus Cards:** Each victory in prior games will allow the winning player to draw "Bonus Cards" from his card deck at Kulm and Dennewitz *(see 19.12)*.

Each Strategic Victory: 3 Bonus Cards per battle

Each Tactical Victory: 2 Bonus Cards per battle

Each Marginal Victory: 1 Bonus Card per battle

Minimum Bonus Cards: 3 per player. EXAMPLE:

The Coalition Player wins a Marginal Victory at *Grossbeeren*, and a Tactical Victory at *Katzbach*. He would draw three "Bonus Cards" plus the regular card for a total of four cards, on turn two of *Kulm*. If in that situation the Coalition Player goes on to win a Strategic Victory at *Kulm* he would draw 6 Bonus Cards (plus one) on turn two of *Dennewitz*.

### 25.2 Initial Set Up

**25.21 Grossbeeren:** Separate units in the PEU box after Grossbeeren. These will be reduced units at Dennewitz.

**25.22 Katzbach:** Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at *Grossbeeren* will be unavailable.

**25.23 Kulm:** Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at *Grossbeeren* or *Katzbach* will be unavailable.

**25.24 Dennewitz:** The units in the PEU box at the end of *Grossbeeren* will be returned to play at reduced strength for *Dennewitz*; units in the UAR will be out of play. Any Alternate Reinforcements that have arrived at *Katzbach* or *Kulm* will be unavailable. Alternate Reinforcements that appeared at *Grossbeeren* are available again as Alternate Reinforcements.

### 25.3 Special Rules

*(See 18.32, 18.82, 19.12, 19.35, 20.2, 21.42, 23.25, 24.25.)*

### 25.4 Campaign Victory Conditions

The running total of Victory Points in all four battles is tallied for each side, and expressed as a Ratio.

#### 25.41 Ratio of Grand Total Victory Points

(French : Coalition)

less than 1 : 2	Coalition <b>Decisive</b> Victory
less than 1 : 1	Coalition Victory
less than 1.4 : 1	<i>Draw</i>
less than 2.4 : 1	French Victory
2.4+ : 1	French <b>Decisive</b> Victory

## HISTORICAL NOTES

KEVIN ZUCKER

### Background

After winning two major battles in the Spring of 1813, Napoleon agreed to an Armistice, ostensibly to prepare a path for peace, but actually to allow more time for recruiting his army. During the Armistice, Napoleon's administration completed the organization of five new brigades and six divisions of light cavalry; three divisions of heavy cavalry; two of Young Guard infantry, one division of Guard Cavalry, one of Old Guard infantry, and seventeen line infantry divisions; a force equivalent in size to the entire Grande Armée of 1806.

The line infantry divisions comprised mainly youths officered by survivors of the campaigns in Spain and Russia and recalled old soldiers. They excelled in the use of cover such as woods or ravines. Dislike of the war increased up the ranks from Majors and up; the highest ranking officers hated it the most.

After failing to persuade Napoleon to accept very reasonable terms,<sup>2</sup> the Austrian Emperor agreed to join the Coalition, effective the 12<sup>th</sup> of August; and so, despite the recruitment of his army, Napoleon was not only outnumbered but strategically surrounded by three large armies: Bernadotte's Army of the North, Blücher's Army of Silesia in the east, and Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia. The Allies had devised the Trachtenberg plan by which any one of these armies would retreat when faced by Napoleon in person, coordinated with an advance by the other two Armies. This plan was the undoing of Napoleon.

With the expiration of the Armistice on the 15<sup>th</sup>, Napoleon ordered Marshal Oudinot to capture Berlin while he advanced eastward against the retiring Blücher. Schwarzenberg's countermove toward Dresden caused the Emperor to turn command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, ordering him to hold the river line and shield Oudinot's advance. Instead Macdonald continued the offensive, crossing the swollen Katzbach stream in a driving rain on the 26<sup>th</sup>. Blücher caught him with half his army across and the Army of the Bober fell apart.

On the next day, at Dresden, the Emperor won his last major victory in Germany, costing the Coalition 35,000 men. During the pursuit into the mountains, General Dominique Vandamme with the French I Corps was caught between Ostermann's Russians and Kleist's Prussians, losing 15,000 men at the Battle of Kulm.

<sup>2</sup> The terms were: dissolve the Duchy of Warsaw, return Prussia's and Austria's lost provinces, abolish the Confederation of the Rhine, and restore the Hanseatic towns.

### Coalition Forces, August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1813

The Prussian Army

*in Silesia*

Guard (inf. and cav.)—7,001 men, 16 guns

I Corps, Yorck—38,484 men, 104 guns

II Corps, Kleist—37,816 men, 112 guns

*in Brandenburg*

III Corps, Bülow—41,135 men, 80 guns

IV Corps, Tauentzien—33,170 men, 42 guns

Partisans (Lützow, Reiche, Schill)—4,068 men.

*Siege Troops*—30,070 men, 40 guns.

*Landwehr*

These troops were completely untried and their value unknown at the start of the campaign on August 15<sup>th</sup>. Bernadotte had little confidence in them, and Napoleon shared this opinion. "All this swarm of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr infantry will retreat to Berlin if your march is determined," he wrote to Ney before Dennewitz.

The Russian Army

*in Silesia*

Langeron—34,551 men, 130 guns

Sacken—18,553 men, 60 guns

Wittgenstein—34,926 men, 92 guns

St. Priest—13,586 men, 36 guns

Guards & Reserve—44,347 men, 182 guns

*in Brandenburg*

Winzingerode, Woronzow, Tschernitschew—29,357 men, 92 guns

attached to Bülow—1,160 men, 22 guns

attached to Tauentzien—318 men

*in Mecklenburg*—6,525 men, 16 guns

The Austrian Army

*in Bohemia*—127,345 men, 280 guns

*between the Ems & Traun*—30,070 men

*in the interior*—35,557 men

Of the Austrian forces the cavalry was good, the artillery fairly good, but the infantry was "below the standard of the other armies, having neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians."<sup>3</sup> Two-thirds were recruits of three months training.

### French Leaders

Of the eight original Corps Commanders of the *Grande Armée*, only Marmont, Mortier, Augereau and Ney were available in the theater. Bernadotte, become Crown Prince of Sweden, fought for the Allied cause.

<sup>3</sup> F.N. Maude, "The Leipzig Campaign."

Davout—no longer the “Iron Marshal” of yore—defended Hamburg. Soult fought in Spain. Lannes had died in 1809.

### **Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio**

Oudinot commanded the elite Grenadier division in 1806, expanded to the size of a small corps (21,000 men) in 1809. In 1812 he commanded the II Corps (37,000 men) and fought in battles around Polotsk. In 1813 he was given command of the XII Corps. He allowed his personal feelings to override his military judgement by “deliberately obeying” a catastrophic order of Marshal Ney at Dennewitz. “Though no doubt a capable commander of a division, perhaps even of a single corps, (he) was not of the calibre to command an army of 70,000 or 80,000 men. Whether any of Napoleon’s lieutenants was fit for it is perhaps doubtful. Of those then in Germany, Davout, Marmont, and St Cyr were alone possible. The last-named marshal says ... ‘In my opinion there was not then in the whole of the belligerent armies a single man capable of commanding a greater number (than 50,000 men).’”<sup>4</sup>

### **Marshal Etienne Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum**

Served in Italy, and commanded Armies in Rome, Naples, and the Grisons. In 1809, he marched north and won his Marshal’s baton at the battle of Wagram. In independent command of the XI Corps in Russia, he accomplished little at the siege of Riga, but brought his French division back in good order. He was 48 years old in 1813. Like most other French generals he lacked the qualifications to lead an army.

**Gen. Dominique Vandamme, Count Unsebourg** Another excellent executive officer of a division who had been elevated to corps command. He spoke German, led the Bavarian Corps in 1807, the Württemberg Corps in 1809, and the Westphalians in 1812. His “genuine military talents were unfortunately somewhat blemished by manners too redolent of the camp, and an excessive violence of temper.” Believing he should at length obtain the rank of Marshal, he “hurried him beyond the bounds of prudence”<sup>5</sup> at Kulm, failing to provide security for the rear of I Corps. Napoleon stated that a general should ask himself, several times a day: “What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions he is ill-posted.”

### **Marshal Michel Ney, Prince of the Moscowa**

A fairly good Corps commander, his executive ability was much-impaired in the absence of his long-time Chief of Staff, Antoine de Jomini, who departed during the Armistice to offer his services at Blücher’s headquarters. Ney, “the bravest of the brave” had a tendency to forget his rank and join the fray as a grenadier. He had many admirable qualities, but commanding an Army was not one of them.

### **Coalition Leaders**

#### **Ivan Ostermann-Tolstoi, Count**

The grandson of Tsar Paul’s Chancellor, Ivan Andreievitch Ostermann (his daughter married the grandfather of Lev Tolstoi), Ostermann distinguished himself at Eylau and Friedland (1807), Ostronovo and Borodino (1812) and at Bautzen (1813). At Kulm, his decision not to retreat saved the army. Reinforcements arrived after Ostermann attacked all afternoon, losing an arm to a ball while he was leading a counterattack of the Preobrashenski Regt.

#### **Crown Prince Karl Johan Bernadotte**

Commanded the I Corps of the French army in 1805-06, sent home by Napoleon after Wagram, traveled to Sweden where he became heir to the throne. Acted principally with an eye to preserving his Swedish Corps, in which he succeeded perhaps too well.

#### **Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher**

Joined the Swedish Army at age 14, serving against Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. Later he was captured by a regiment of Prussian hussars, a unit which he then joined. An implacable foe of Napoleon, he was still a fiery hussar fifty years later. In 1806, after Auerstädt, Blücher marched to Lubeck only to capitulate at Ratkau. On his release he was received by Napoleon with marks of distinction. He defeated Marshal Macdonald at Katzbach and reached the rank of field marshal after Leipzig. His troops entered Paris on March 31, 1814. The next year he fought Napoleon at Ligny and arrived in the middle of the battle of Waterloo, insuring Napoleon’s defeat. For this his monarch made him Prince of Wahlstadt. He relied heavily on his chief of staff von Gneisenau.

#### **Friedrich H. F. Emil Kleist, Graf von Nollendorf**

Rose to prominence during the campaign of 1813. His arrival at Kulm surrounded Vandamme. He was present at Leipzig, and the following year fought at Joinvilliers where he was defeated, but his troops won the battle of Laon against Napoleon.

<sup>4</sup> Petre, F. Loraine, *Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany*, p. 180

<sup>5</sup> L.A. Thiers, *History of the Consulate and Empire*, IX, p. 145

**Johann David L. Yorck, Graf von Wartenburg**

In 1794 he took part in the campaign against Poland. In 1806 he was taken prisoner by Bernadotte at Lübeck. Promoted major general after Tilsit, in 1812 he commanded the Prussian division, serving under Macdonald on the northern flank. Negotiated the Convention of Tauroggen with Russia. During 1813 he fought at Lützen, Bautzen and Katzbach. On 3rd October he won the battle of Wartenburg damaging the IV Corps of Bertrand. In 1814 he was at Montmirail and Laon.

**Boleslas F. E. Tauentzien, Graf von Wittenberg**

In 1806 he fought at Schleiz, leading 9,000 Saxons against Bernadotte, and commanded Hohenlohe's advance guard at Jena. In 1813 he conducted the siege of Stettin; he led IV Corps at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz. After Leipzig he besieged Torgau and Wittenberg.

**Friedrich W. von Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz**

In command of the III Corps, his distinguished resistance at Grossbeeren saved Berlin. Fought at Leipzig; the year after, at Laon, enabled Blücher to hold his positions and repulse Napoleon. His arrival at 4.00 P.M. on 18<sup>th</sup> of June, 1815, near Plancenoit was critical to the battle of Waterloo.

**THE GROSSBEEREN CAMPAIGN****French Forces****IV Corps (Bertrand)**

One Italian, one French and one Württemberg division.

**VII Corps (Reynier)**

Two Saxon Divisions and one French: Durutte's 32<sup>nd</sup> Division. The 32<sup>nd</sup> assembled toward the end of 1812 from refractory troops to cover the retreat of the Grande Armée at the bridge of Volkovich on 13 November. At Grossbeeren, joined the retreat of the Saxons without firing a shot.

**XII Corps (Oudinot)**

Two French and one Bavarian divisions.

*(Each corps plus cavalry and artillery.)*

**III Cavalry Corps (Arrighi)**

Two Light and one Heavy Cavalry Divisions (French); *horse artillery.*

As the Armistice expired, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to capture Berlin, cut off Bernadotte's Army and perhaps bring about his withdrawal to the coast. The Emperor highly estimated the moral effect of the capture of the Prussian capital, an administrative and recruiting center vital to the Prussian war effort.

The Prussians had built a defense line south of the capital among the marshes between the Nuthe and Notte Rivers. This line was inadequately defended by two brigades, Borstell's Fifth, in Mittenwalde, and Thümen's Fourth, in Trebbin (just south of the Grossbeeren map outlined on page 18). Recent rains had flooded the region and rendered the road to Trebbin impassable.

On August 17<sup>th</sup> Oudinot concentrated two Corps at Baruth, 38 miles from Berlin. Reynier's VII Corps joined the force on the following day. Leaving Bertrand in Baruth, Oudinot agreed to switch places with Reynier, taking the XII Corps on the 19<sup>th</sup> toward Luckenwalde on the left of the advance, with Reynier in the center, following trails to Schönefeld. (Oudinot, as Army Commander, should have stayed centrally located.) Bertrand's IV Corps, which had already marched from Peitz, had a short and direct route to Berlin, on the right.

Thümen, in Trebbin, reported Oudinot's appearance. Bülow marched out of Berlin with two brigades to Klein Ziethen. Bernadotte ordered the Russians and Swedes away to the west, to Beelitz and Potsdam.

On the 21<sup>st</sup>, Bertrand marched to Sperenberg and Saalow, camping in the woods around Schünow. Reynier took Nunsdorf, and camped at Christinendorf. Oudinot and Arrighi attacked Trebbin at 1 P.M. and captured it in a four-hour skirmish. Thümen and Borstell were exposed to defeat. The road to Berlin was now open.

Stedingk with the Swedish Corps was ordered to Saarmund, to meet Bülow's two brigades there. Bernadotte believed that Napoleon was present with Oudinot's Army, and wanted to withdraw over the Spree. Bülow refused to retreat, and Bernadotte agreed to remain south of Berlin until certain that Napoleon was present. He sent Bülow from Saarmund to Heinersdorf to block the road to Berlin, while the Swedes and Russians moved to Ruhlsdorf and Gütergotz.

Continuing his march, Oudinot prepared to cross the Nuthe Canal at Thyrow, Wilmersdorf, Wietstock and Jühnsdorf. XII Corps on the left, was to march via Ahrensdorf, VII Corps in the centre, via Grossbeeren, and IV Corps on the right, via Blankenfelde. The terrain, bisected by streams, gullies, marshes and woods precluded mutual support among the three columns.

Bülow ordered Thümen to Heinersdorf and (disobeying orders from Bernadotte) sent Borstell to Birckholz.

Allied outposts at Trebbin and Munsdorf were forced to retreat. At 3 P.M. on 23 August, Reynier's VII Corps captured Grossbeeren and proceeded to bivouac for the day. Reynier's right was secured by the

town of Grossbeeren and a canal just east of the town. On the left, in open ground, Reynier ordered Lecoq to form a large divisional square protected by a few guns.

Approaching from the north, Bülow was determined to retake Grossbeeren.

The battle opened with an artillery duel at 5 P.M. Borstell's Brigade attacked Grossbeeren from the east. At 6 P.M., Krafft's Brigade was ordered to attack from the north, while Hessen-Homburg attacked the Saxons around the windmill height (in the fields west of Grossbeeren).

This concentric attack by three Prussian brigades was too much for Sahr's Saxon Division. Falling back in disorder, the retreating Saxons took Durutte's reinforcing Division with them. Both Sahr's and Durutte's Divisions took refuge in the woods south of Grossbeeren. An attempt by Lecoq to take the windmill height failed. With two divisions in flight, Reynier had no choice but to order a retreat.

Meanwhile, at 8 P.M., Fournier's Light Cavalry Division appeared on the scene. Half an hour later, Guilleminot's 14th Division arrived. Both had been sent by Oudinot from Ahrensdorf to reinforce Reynier. However, it was too late. The battle was lost. Oudinot withdrew and Berlin was saved.

### Conclusion

Clearly if the Emperor had led the advance on Berlin, the Prussian capital would have been his for the taking. All would then hinge on a great battle in the south. He would be marching to the recapture of Dresden instead of to its rescue. Meanwhile Macdonald's collapse would enable Blücher to intervene on the Elbe by the 31<sup>st</sup>. Blücher and Schwarzenberg's juncture would bring about the decisive battle of the campaign: a battle Napoleon would have had to win without the supplies stored in Dresden.

### THE KATZBACH CAMPAIGN

Instead of heading north out of Dresden toward Berlin, Napoleon headed east, and reached Bautzen on the 16<sup>th</sup>. There he heard of the transfer of the Russian Army from Silesia to Bohemia.

In the evening of the 17<sup>th</sup> Napoleon was at Reichenbach, on the 18<sup>th</sup> at Görlitz. Here he learnt that Wittgenstein, with 40,000 Russians, had reached Bohemia, and that the Austrians had passed the Elbe for parts unknown. Napoleon moved to Zittau on the 19<sup>th</sup>, to get a clearer picture of the enemy's intentions. During the day he went forward in person with a strong reconnaissance as far as Gabel, inside Bohemia.

He was back at Görlitz by 2 P.M. on the 20<sup>th</sup>, ready to move against Blücher. That evening the Prussian was

east of the Bober opposite Löwenberg. By then Napoleon had reached Lauban, on the Queiss, and issued orders for the attack.

Blücher determinedly avoided combat according to the Trachtenberg principles, and played cat and mouse with Napoleon, waiting to turn around and strike at Macdonald once the Emperor moved off.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup>, the Emperor heard from St. Cyr of the danger threatening Dresden. Turning the command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, he hastened back toward Dresden with the Guard.

Napoleon had lost the initiative. Macdonald was ordered to protect Napoleon's communications toward Zittau as well as Oudinot's flank. To prevent Blücher's interference, Macdonald was to push the Prussians back beyond Jauer and then take post on the Bober, with three divisions of III Corps near Bunzlau and three divisions of XI Corps at Löwenberg, the 4<sup>th</sup> division in reserve on the Queiss, and the V Corps near Hirschberg.

Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to Dresden, so as to leave only one marshal on the Bober. Misinterpreting his orders, Ney marched with his III Corps towards Bunzlau.

After some considerable losses in combat at Goldberg on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, Blücher fell back on Jauer on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, expecting to be attacked next day. The French took up their August 15<sup>th</sup> positions on Leignitz, Goldberg and Lowenberg. Descrying Napoleon's departure in the ensuing quiet, Blücher decided to advance. Misinterpreting Napoleon's directives, Macdonald at the same moment decided upon an offensive across the Katzbach. So far in the campaign, the French had lost about 5,000 men in combat and Blücher's Army of Silesia about 8,000. A further 13,000 French and 19,000 Coalition troops had fallen away from the colors.<sup>6</sup>

### French Forces

#### III Corps (Souham) 40,350 men

4 divisions, 8<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup>, Marchand's 39<sup>th</sup> having been provisionally transferred to the XI.

#### V Corps (Lauriston) 27,814 men

4 divisions, 16<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup>

#### XI Corps (Gérard) 24,691 men

4 divisions, 31<sup>st</sup>, 35<sup>th</sup>, 36<sup>th</sup>, 39<sup>th</sup> divisions

#### II Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani) 10,898 men

2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Light, 2<sup>nd</sup> Hvy Cavalry Divisions

### The Battle of the Katzbach

Macdonald ordered III Corps "to cross the Katzbach below Krotzsch, and to reach the Liegnitz-Jauer road. XI Corps (less Ledru's division) and Sebastiani to

<sup>6</sup> See Table on page 23.

cross the Katzbach at Kroitzsch, then to cross the Niesse and march towards Jauer... V Corps (only two divisions) to advance from Goldberg by Seichau on Jauer along the left bank of the Neisse. He sent Puthod's division of V Corps down the Goldberg-Schönau road (just off the game map) to reach Schönau on the 27<sup>th</sup>. Puthod was ordered to detach one brigade, which would cooperate with Ledru's division of the XI Corps against St. Priest, who occupied Hirschberg.

"Before Blücher's orders of 11 A.M. on the 26<sup>th</sup> issued, the two advancing armies had met and begun the battle.

"At the commencement the opposing forces were thus grouped—

"On the left bank of the Neisse, Langeron with 31,000 men faced Lauriston with 23,000. Langeron's position ran from the Neisse along the Silberfliesz brook and the Plinsengrund.

"On the plateau of the right bank were the allied forces of Yorck and Sacken, 48,000 strong; against these were advancing, though much separated, the XI and III Corps, and Sebastiani's cavalry, about 61,000 in all.

"Blücher was quite as surprised to find the French on the offensive as Macdonald was to find Blücher advancing."<sup>7</sup>

The French reached the plateau in two columns. Their cavalry, mingled in with their marching column, caused much confusion as it pressed forward through the infantry.

By 2 P.M. part of the XI Corps and Sebastiani had reached the line Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinberg while the others were still struggling to climb onto the heights from the Neisse. Souham with the III Corps, which had been off marching on Dresden, had not yet reached the Katzbach.

Blücher advanced with Yorck's men, encouraging them with the words, "I have enough French over there," and telling them to use the bayonet, as their muskets would not go off in the heavy rain. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued. "In one place the pile of overturned guns and ammunition wagons completely blocked the Nieder Krain road.... The whole of the French who had ascended the plateau from the Neisse were sent streaming down again in wild confusion. The river, which had been small in the morning, was now a raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives were drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by the overcrowded bridge at Nieder Krain. That village was captured by the pursuing Prussians before darkness finally stopped the combat."<sup>8</sup> The Prussians lost about

35% of their forces engaged. The French lost 36 guns, 110 wagons, and 12,000 to 14,000 prisoners.

### THE KULM CAMPAIGN

Leaving Macdonald in charge on the Bober, Napoleon arrived at Bautzen by 3 P.M. on the 24<sup>th</sup>. By 7 a.m. the following day, he was at Stolpen, where the road branches toward the Königstein fort on the Elbe. Any thoughts of debouching by that fort into Bohemia were dashed by Gourgaud's report on the incompleteness of the Dresden fortifications, and Napoleon decided to march direct to the Saxon capital with the bulk of his forces.

The Prussians began their attack on the outskirts of Dresden early in the morning of the 26<sup>th</sup>. "The early attacks spread alarm among the inhabitants, who were aware that the allied troops were especially bitter against them."

Leaving Stolpen in his carriage at 5 A.M., the Emperor traveled 12 miles to reach the outskirts of Dresden by 8:30. There he mounted his horse to gallop across the bridge and into town, between 9 and 10 A.M. He received an ovation from troops and citizens alike, and proceeded to direct his last great victory.

### Coalition Forces

The Allies marched on Dresden with over 120,000 men. Of these some 38,000 men were lost in the battle of the 26<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> and the subsequent pursuit. The whole left wing beyond the Weisseritz—manned by the Austrians of Weissenwolf, Meszko and A. Liechtenstein's columns—was practically destroyed. By the 29<sup>th</sup> the French had collected 12,535 prisoners in Dresden; this number had reached 23,518 (including 15,000 Austrians) by the 8<sup>th</sup> of October.<sup>9</sup>

### French Forces

#### Ist Corps (Vandamme) 31,610 on 15 Aug.

Two of the best-trained divisions of French Cohorts, with newly-added Conscripts; one division formed during the armistice of French conscripts. Plus cavalry, artillery and train. *Troops en route—1,415*

Vandamme's force at Kulm comprised the I Corps, above (less O'Meara's brigade of Teste's Div.); plus the 42<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, attached from XIV Corps; Corbineau's cavalry; Reuss's brigade on loan from II Corps; and the bridge train, taken up from Pirna, intended to be thrown across the Elbe further up.

The losses by French units at Dresden, that were near to the Kulm battlefield, are estimated below at a ratio of 20:1 (overall losses : officer losses). In addi-

<sup>7</sup> Petre, p. 252. Petre quotes August 15<sup>th</sup> strengths here.

<sup>8</sup> Petre, pp. 254-255.

<sup>9</sup> The Austrians lost at Dresden 1,164 dead, 5,405 wounded, 3,779 captured, and 5,442 missing.

tion, 12.25% of total strength was deducted from counter strength to represent attrition (roughly estimated at 1% per day from 15 August).

Formation	Combat	Attrition
I Corps	683	4,189
I Cav Corps	765	3,076
VI Corps	393	2,798
XIV Corps	2,649	4,627
Guard Infantry	2,648	5,007
Guard Cavalry	none	1,051

### Topography

The Erz Gebirge (“Ore Mountains”), a ridge running from the Elbe River SW along the Austro-Saxon frontier, has peaks above 2500 feet. From Aussig to Pirna the Elbe twists around this mountain chain in a horse-shoe bend.

Five roads traverse these mountains: (1) from Pirna through *Peterswalde* to Kulm; (2) from Maxen through *Glashütte* and Dittersdorf, Furstenwald and Muglitz to Priesten; (3) from Dippoldiswald to Altenburg, *Zinnwald*, Eichwald and Teplitz; (4) the main road to Dux; (5) the road from Marienberg to Komotau.

### From Dresden to Kulm

After their defeat at Dresden, the Coalition forces were struggling back across the Erz Gebirge via the roads named above into Bohemia. The French pursued, hampered by a lack of cavalry, in several columns: (1) Murat, driving straight west toward Freiburg. (2) Marmont, whose orders were late, to follow the enemy main body on Dippoldiswald; (3) St. Cyr on Dohna and Maxen; (4) Mortier with the Young Guard following the Elbe toward Pirna, where initially Napoleon planned to move his HQ; (5) Vandamme advancing toward Berggieshübel on the Peterswalde road. On the 27<sup>th</sup> his I Corps was still crossing the Elbe at Königstein, Mouton-Duvernet at Pirna, Philippon near Krietschwitz, and Corbineau’s cavalry between Hennersdorf and Berggieshübel.

The original orders for the Coalition retreat were drafted by staff officers Toll and Radetzky, at 4 P.M. on August 27<sup>th</sup>. These called for three separate columns:

- Barclay de Tolly via the Peterswalde road. To avoid Vandamme, Barclay instead ordered:
  - Russo-Prus. Reserves via Zinnwalde, Peterswalde or by Maxen if Vandamme stood in the way;
  - Kleist’s Prussians via Glasshütte;
  - Wittgenstein’s Russians as rearguard on the heights of Leubnitz (Klüt) and Prohlis.
- The Austrians east of the Weisseritz River (i.e., Chasteler, Colloredo, Nostitz, Bianchi and Hohenlohe) would retreat by the Zinnwalde Road. They reached Al-

tenberg on the 28<sup>th</sup>, and Dux on the 29<sup>th</sup>. Their rearguard under M. Liechtenstein was at Wendisch Carsdorf on the 28<sup>th</sup>, Falkenhain on the 29<sup>th</sup>, and Altenberg early on the 30<sup>th</sup>.

- Klenau with the Left Wing (Czöllich and A. Liechtenstein with the remains of Mesko, Bianchi, Crenneville and Weissenwolf) was ordered via Tharandt and Freiberg to Marienberg and Komotau. Due to Murat’s advance, Klenau moved by Potzschappel, Gittersee and Rabenau to Pretzschendorf on August 28<sup>th</sup>; Waltersdorf on the 29<sup>th</sup>; and Marienberg on the 30<sup>th</sup>.

Convinced that the Coalition main body was going by Dohna and Dippoldiswalde, Napoleon hoped to reach Teplitz by the shorter and better road through Peterswalde, with the three nearest corps of Vandamme, Mortier, and St. Cyr. Reaching Teplitz, first he would inflict great damage on their columns as they debouched in disorder from the mountain passes, pursued by the rest of his army. He rode off to Pirna intending to arrive early on the 30<sup>th</sup>.

However, at 4:30 P.M. on the 29<sup>th</sup> he received reports that the “enemy army is retiring by Altenberg on Teplitz,” and, concluding that Vandamme would not encounter any serious opposition near Kulm, he redirected Mortier and St. Cyr, and returned, himself, to Dresden.

That day, Vandamme fought a series of actions on the Peterswalde road against Eugen of Württemberg and Osterman with the Russian Guard. Starting out in the morning at Hellendorf, there were rearguard actions at Peterswalde, Nollendorf, and Vorder Tellnitz.

### The Battle of Kulm

Vandamme took possession of the town at 10 A.M. His troops were still spread-out in a long column in the pass over the mountains. Expecting “another small rearguard action like those he had already had earlier in the morning, he sent Reuss’ brigade to try and cut the Russians from the mountains by their left.”<sup>10</sup> Ostermann had 14,700 men with his left on the wooded heights above Straden (2013), his centre in and west of Priesten (2317), and his right between Priesten and Karwitz (2419).

Vandamme took Straden but was quickly thrown back. Then, as nine battalions of the 42<sup>nd</sup> division arrived, it was taken again. With more troops arriving, Vandamme advanced against Priesten, took the village and then lost it again.

At 2 P.M. Philippon arrived with fourteen fresh battalions. Priesten was once again taken, and lost, by Vandamme. At 5 P.M. Vandamme made his decisive attack. But Coalition reinforcements under Barclay

<sup>10</sup> Petre, p. 234



were now beginning to arrive, particularly cavalry, and drove the French back.

In the mountains Marmont, following Wittgenstein, reached Falkenhain on the Zinnwald road. St. Cyr, following Kleist, had a sharp fight with him at Glashütte. Following an order of Napoleon, St. Cyr continued by the Rheinhartsgrinna valley, leaving Kleist on his own and unpursued.

During the night elements of Vandamme's force continued to arrive. Several columns of Coalition troops were nearby: Colloredo and Bianchi south of Teplitz, Chasteler on the road to Dux, Wittgenstein on the heights of Altenberg. The head of Kleist's column reached Furstenau (1105).

Proceeding directly to Ebersdorf (1909), Kleist learned that the direct roads over the Geiersberg, by Graupen (1216) and (1813), were blocked by friendly troops. The other forest roads, running through deep valleys, were impracticable for large forces, so Kleist chose to march through Streckenwald (2603) to Nollendorf (3603) and cut his way through Vandamme's Corps.

His orders were for assembly at 3 A.M. The troops set out at 5, and by 8 A.M. they had reached Nollendorf, but confusion caused delays and the head of the column only began to appear around the bend (3507) about 11 A.M.

The fighting at Kulm resumed at 7 A.M. Vandamme had his right up in the hills above the Eggmühl, his centre across the Teplitz road in front of Kulm (2714), and his left stretching as far as Böhmisches Neudorf (3019). After his losses of about 6,000 on the previous day Vandamme had about 32,000 soldiers remaining. Having suffered equal losses, the Coalition forces facing him numbered about 44,000 men.

After taking the Striesowitz Berg, the Russians began to move on Arbesau (3212). Vandamme set up a defensive flank with Quiot's and Duhesme's brigades, and Kulm itself seemed untenable.

At that critical moment, cannon shots were heard from the direction of Tellnitz. Vandamme believed Mortier still had orders to support him from Pirna, and was convinced the guns were French; very soon he realized the truth. Deciding to abandon his artillery, he fought his way through Kleist's Corps about Schande, Arbesau and up the highway. The Prussian Landwehr troops were terrified to see a mass of French cavalry and infantry surging their way. They moved aside and were unable to prevent part of the French escaping. Kleist himself only escaped capture by taking by-paths through the woods. But Vandamme was captured as he sought to escape alone into the hills.

The Emperor finally ordered Mortier to support Vandamme on the 30<sup>th</sup>, when it was too late. Had the or-

der been dispatched by 5 P.M. on the 29<sup>th</sup> Mortier could have reached Peterswalde early on the morning of the 30<sup>th</sup>, and attacked Kleist at Nollendorf.

Marmont drove Wittgenstein's rear-guard from Altenberg, and again from the Zinnwald plateau (0807). Reaching almost up to Eichwald (0118), in the evening he heard through St. Cyr, in Furstenwalde, of Vandamme's disaster.

The French I Corps had been nearly destroyed. Prisoners numbered 8,000 to 10,000 and 5,000 were killed or wounded, 66 guns, 200 wagons and generals Haxo, Guyot and Heimbrot captured. By Sept. 2 the I Corps, that had numbered 33,000, had only 8,400 survivors. The Austrians lost 817 men, the Russians 9,000, and the Prussians 1,500.

### **Conclusion**

Knowing his own worth in battle and the miraculous effect of his presence on the young troops, the Emperor stands accused of not going where the action was.

Why was Napoleon not in personal command at any of these battles? The Emperor could not be everywhere, but might have been present at two, if not three of them. He might have been at the battle of the Katzbach—he had just been with Macdonald days before that battle. He could have planned on going with Oudinot to Berlin. Had he been with Vandamme and Mortier at Kulm, the damage to the Bohemian army would have been severe.

He originally planned to follow up behind Vandamme with the guard, so he could better evaluate the intelligence he was getting. He changed his mind, some authors speculate, because of a dish of rabbit with garlic that made him feel ill. Perhaps it was the news of the first two defeats. Anyway he returned to Dresden instead of leading the pursuit.

Napoleon is out of step in this campaign, allowing the Coalition to hold the overall initiative and control events, while he is reduced to delayed reactions, usually to cancel or weaken an offensive of his own—the only thing that could restore to him the initiative.

## THE BERLIN THEATER OF WAR, 1813



## THE DENNEWITZ CAMPAIGN

**Coalition Forces**

**III Corps, Bulow:** 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde Hesse-Homburg, 4<sup>th</sup> Bde Thümen, 5<sup>th</sup> Bde Borstell, 6<sup>th</sup> Bde Krafft.

**IV Corps, Tautzien:** 1<sup>st</sup> Bde Dobschutz, 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde Lindenau

**French Forces**

**IV Corps, Bertrand:** 12<sup>th</sup> Div Morand, 15<sup>th</sup> Div Fontanelli, 38<sup>th</sup> Div Franquemont, 24<sup>th</sup> Lt Cav Bde Jett, 27<sup>th</sup> Div Dombrowski, 18<sup>th</sup> Lt Cav Bde Krakowski.

**VII Corps Reynier:** 24<sup>th</sup> Div Lecoq, 25<sup>th</sup> Div Sahr, 32<sup>nd</sup> Div Durutte, 26<sup>th</sup> Lt Cav Bde.

**XII Corps Oudinot:** 13<sup>th</sup> Div Pachtod, 14<sup>th</sup> Div Guilleminot, 29<sup>th</sup> Div Raglovich, Cav Bde Beaumont.

**III Cavalry Corps Arrighi:** 5<sup>th</sup> Lt Cav Div Lorge, 6<sup>th</sup> Lt Cav Div Fournier, 4<sup>th</sup> Heavy Cav Div DeFrance.

By the end of August, Napoleon's strategy was in disarray. With Oudinot's reverse at Grossbeeren, Bernadotte was free to descend on the communications of the Grande Armée and its vital supply barges on the Elbe. To parry this threat the Emperor was determined to secure his northern flank by capturing the Prussian capital. Leaving four corps at Dresden under Marshal

Murat, Napoleon prepared to move north with the Imperial Guard, a portion of the I Cavalry Corps, and others. These units, numbering 18,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry as they reached Grossenhain on the 31<sup>st</sup>, were recalled to Dresden upon tidings of Vandamme's reverse at Kulm.

On September 2<sup>nd</sup>, Ney was placed in charge of the Army of Berlin and ordered to march to Baruth by the sixth, to attack Berlin on the ninth or tenth. Ney was instructed to avoid Oudinot's mistake: "He was so clever that he allowed one of his corps to be isolated and defeated. If he had boldly attacked the enemy, he would have defeated him everywhere." The Emperor was prepared to resume his march on Luckau to support the offensive on Berlin, but a renewed offensive by Blücher caused him to delay the Guard's march on Luckau and again to recall the troops that had already set out. He promised Ney on the 3<sup>rd</sup> that he would quickly march on Berlin after dealing with Blücher, but only started to move the VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps north early on September 6<sup>th</sup>. (This move was cancelled again with news of Schwarzenberg's advance toward Dresden.)

Marshal Ney, still believing in a junction with Napoleon, started the offensive with an eastward move toward Dahme. On September 5<sup>th</sup> Oudinot's Corps advanced to Zahna, Reynier to Bülzig and Bertrand to Euper. At Zahna, General Dobschutz's twelve battalions, supported by cavalry and artillery, were driven back upon Zallmsdorf. The French bivouacked for the night at Leetza, Zallmsdorf and Sayda, Seehausen and Naundorf.

The Prussian von Bülow ordered his Third Corps to Werkzahna in order to shadow Ney's advance on its left. However, Borstell's 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade was retained by Bernadotte to cover the defiles of Köpnick, Woltersdorf, Werkzahna and Kropstädt, depriving Bülow of a quarter of his strength. Bülow's cavalry reached Kurzlipisdorf in the evening—one mile from the French IV Corps at Seehausen and Naundorf—followed by his three brigades and guns, which arrived by daybreak. Bernadotte ordered the Swedes and Russians to concentrate at Lobbesse.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> Ney continued his march toward Dahme, with Reynier moving on Rohrbeck and Bertrand marching through Dennewitz to reach Jüterbog. Oudinot was ordered to Öhna, but to await VII Corps' passage first through Gadegast. Reynier directed his VII Corps, meanwhile, to march direct on Dennewitz, and so did not appear.

From a hill, Bülow himself observed Bertrand's IV Corps marching along the main highway toward Dennewitz. He ordered his Corps to Eckmannsdorf, where

a chain of low hills provided cover for an attack, each brigade forming two lines with the right on Dahna and the left on the road to Dalichow.

At 9 AM the lead units of Bertrand's column crested the chain of hills south of Dennewitz. Tauenzien, who attempted to maneuver around Bertrand's column to unite with Bülow, was caught in the open plain north-east of Dennewitz. Bülow advanced with Thümen's brigade on his left and Krafft on the right, marching past Kaltenborn to Niedergörsdorf. The marshy Ahebach stream, fordable only with difficulty, divided the battlefield. A strong southwest wind created swirling dust clouds that intermittently reduced visibility to 100 yards.

Tauenzien's single reserve infantry and four Landwehr regiments were driven back—the Kurmark Landwehr broke and ran. He launched his nine squadrons of Landwehr cavalry against Fontanelli's Italian Division which succumbed to this unexpected charge. French cavalry under Lorge, sent to break up the charging Prussians, were thrown back through their supporting infantry in turn. Finally the experienced Morand stopped the Prussians in their tracks. But the panic continued to spread through Dennewitz, infecting Bertrand's baggage train.

During the respite following the Landwehr's charge, Bülow deployed his corps from Niedergörsdorf, causing Ney to withdraw upon Dennewitz. The fate of the battle then devolved upon control of the hills northwest of the town, the commanding Denkmalsberg and the adjacent Windmill Hill. Morand was driven off the hills and back into a gully between the Windmill Hill and the Pine thicket. Supported by Durutte's division, just arrived (from VII Corps), Morand retook the Windmill Hill until forced off by Prussian guns on the Denkmalsberg.

Ney refused to abandon the ground north of the Ahebach, counting on the arrival of Reynier and Oudinot to redress the balance of forces. The arriving VII Corps deployed between Dennewitz and Gölsdorf; while further reinforcements drove the Prussians from Gölsdorf. Panic was beginning to spread in the Prussian ranks.

Borstell had spent the morning awaiting permission from Berndadotte to leave his assigned position. Marching to the sound of the guns, he arrived at 3 P.M., deploying west of Gölsdorf.

A Saxon advance beyond Gölsdorf would decide the battle, and the approaching Swedes could not arrive in time to stop them (some Swedish cavalry and horse artillery were in time to join in the pursuit).

Seeking to regain the northern sector, Ney sent Durutte's second brigade against the Dennewitz Windmill Hill, against a murderous fire from the Denkmalsberg. Outflanked by Thümen's troops from the Pine Thicket,

they were forced to relinquish the hilltop again. By 4:30, Durutte's division was back behind the Ahebach.

Still determined to reach Jüterbog, Ney ordered Bertrand into one more attempt. Fatally depriving the Saxons of their moral support, he called-up Oudinot's XII Corps toward Dennewitz.

To restore his own morale, Bülow ordered his right wing to advance. This attack, corresponding with Oudinot's withdrawal, spelled the end of Ney's offensive. Krafft's Prussians pried the village away from Lecoq's Saxon troops by 4 P.M. The Prussians lost 40 officers and 1,228 casualties in retaking Gölsdorf; and 49 officers and 1,318 men in storming the hills north of the village. The Saxon defenders lost 1,500.

The victory cost the Bülow 6,700 men, plus 3,000 in Tauenzien's Corps. The Army of Berlin lost 8,000 dead and wounded, 13,500 prisoners, 53 guns, and 412 wagons—a third of the army.

## DESIGN NOTES

ALESSANDRO FONTANA di VALSALINA

*Four Lost Battles* explores some of the greatest “what-ifs” of the Napoleonic Wars.

When the Allies decided to use the Fabian strategy to avoid direct engagement with Napoleon, while trying to defeat his generals instead, nobody could have imagined the success this would have.

With the notable exception of Spain, the French generals and marshals proved very able on different occasions. What would have happened, if Napoleon had supported them in person? The bad weather, young soldiers without experience, insufficient cavalry, almost 20 years of wars, the violent hatred of Russians and Prussians: all were important in these battles. Both sides made big mistakes although the forces, at least on paper, were balanced.

The aim of a designer should be to recreate the historical problem facing the opposing commanders at set up while the so-called “quid obscurum” of battles (Victor Hugo) is completely simulated by the ability of the player in conjunction with the luck of the die.

With these ideas, we wanted to design this quad with the *Napoleon's Last Battles* system.

*NLB* is one of the most beautiful wargames ever created. It encompasses opposites and contains a balance among different elements: it is easy and difficult, dynamic and static, requiring ability and luck. It can be short or long, it depends on the scenarios, but anyway it is always amusing. The only “negative” element that if today you are not lucky (you always roll a “6”) you will finish the game with your blood pressure at 250! Many complain about the luck element of *NLB*.

But recently a friend of mine amazed me by saying “*NLB* is like playing chess!” Only the best players win consistently.

In *NLB*, “fortune favors the brave.” The risk-taking wargamer with the better plan almost always wins and this is the aim that everyone should have. *NLB* is a game that over the years gave me great satisfaction. Thanks to *NLB* I met good friends at many game conventions.

The original idea to design “some battles that we will never see” came from Stefano and Umberto, two friends who began to design the battle of “Piave 1809.”

In some way I took up their charge and designed eight battles. *NLB* can become a mania, but in reality what we enthusiasts have in common is the love of history, and enjoying each other’s company with something easy and pleasant.

I would like say “grazie” to all the persons who contributed to this design. Thank you friends: I dedicate this game to all of you—the many who, directly or indirectly, contributed to its creation.

To all who have promoted the *NLB* system all these years:

New England Simulations, Decision Games, and Clash of Arms.

The *Anschluss* staff for their wonderful books.

Scott Bowden and R. M. Epstein for their painstaking researches.

George Nafziger, author of 3 volumes on the 1813 campaign.

Umberto “Santo Martire” who published the early drafts of these battles in the *Torneo Master*, and Pierluigi “Pigi” who with patience created our playtest counters.

Above all I want to thank the terrific playtesters. Claudio “Bafo,” Alberto “Il Conte,” Stefano “ghicipopoci!” Lodovico “Mr. Regolamento,” Gianmarco “ho battuto il Bafo a *Blue Max!*” Franco “Gufo Bulgaro,” Enrico “io abito molto distante dal club!” Pierpaolo “oggi non combino!” Francesco “io amo giocare a *NBL!*” Gabriele “verme solitario,” Giampi “no xe per barca,” Alberto “il bergamasco,” Fabrizio “culandrone,” Fabio “Gabriele me la pagherai!” Gianni “schiavo del suo capo,” Marco “verme solitario con il verme solitario,” Stefano “il migliore amico dei Lapponi,” Domenico “compagno fedele,” Marco “come mia mamma non cucina nessuno!” Paolone “mo ci sono le pesche al vino!”

Last but not least, Silvana, who supports me in my enthusiasm.

## DESIGN NOTES

KEVIN ZUCKER

Alessandro Fontana created the original version of the four battles in this package because of a love of what he is doing. These four critical battles share an accidental quality, unlike the massive battles of Lützen and Bautzen in the Spring, and Dresden and Leipzig in the Fall—and occurred without Napoleon in person. It's like *Quatre-Bras* or *Wavre*, with only Ney and Grouchy. While the Allies attacked desperately in the Emperor's absence, the French Marshals failed to help each other when their master's eyes were not upon them. The outcome of these battles more than erased the French victory at Dresden, and led inexorably to Leipzig.

The basics of the four battles are the same as *Napoleon's Last Battles*. All leadership and command rules remain the same. As in *Last Battles* Leaders can fail, and units can be wasted, leaving players hesitant to commit them, like the real generals.

But since *NLB* time has not stood still.

From *Seven Days of 1809* and other games in the "Days" Series, we borrowed rules for Hidden Forces, Vedettes, Leader Escorts, March Orders, Road March, Trains, Repulse, Shock Combat, Heavy Cavalry and Bombardment (with a new Bombardment Table).

Then came the real challenge of this design.

In most wargames, the force structure and arrival schedule is not a mystery. Everyone on both sides knows exactly who is coming. But in the Napoleonic era, the uncertainty faced by commanders on both sides played an important role in the way battles developed. In these four battles nobody really knew where the enemy was and in what strength, or even which other friendly corps might be arriving. We have used the cards to provide a taste of this uncertainty. The player will not really know whether he's facing all the troops he's eventually going to face and from which direction they will come.

In the Battle of Kulm uncertainty will play the largest role. Vandamme thought Mortier and even St. Cyr might be joining him. Instead, he got Kleist coming up behind him. When he began the engagement there was only one weak Allied corps in front of him. He ended up facing more than 40,000 enemies, even before Kleist arrived.

The deployment cards keep your reinforcement schedule hidden from you and the other player. Still, the French Player will know more than Vandamme knew.

That will make it possible to arrive on the battlefield more cautiously. He's going to know what forces are within striking distance of the battlefield, and will make allowances. If Vandamme had had scouts combing through those mountains in other directions, he would have had plenty of time to withdraw from the battle—possibly toward Aussig and safety behind the Elbe River—before Kleist arrived.

The second goal of the cards is to reveal in the Campaign Game how success or failure on one battlefield impacted the other battles. That is done through the provision of additional "Bonus Cards."

If you have a copy of *Struggle of Nations* (published by AH and long out of print), you will see each of the four battles taking in an area of eight by ten miles (4 x 5 hexes on that map). We studied the campaign on the *SoN* map to determine the attrition the forces would have suffered before arriving in battle.

### LINE OF SIGHT

On a completely flat surface such as the ocean, the horizon is seven miles distant. The means of communication of the time would not allow the control of large forces at that range, even though one might be able to catch a glimpse of something through a gap in the trees and hills.

### COMMAND AND TIME

A lot can happen in a short hour's duration. Units may await orders for minutes on end, then start in motion at a rate of up to 3 miles per hour (on roads), potentially attacking from the march (that has to take some time). It is unlikely that a single unit could march for more than 30 minutes in a turn when it also attacks.

### COMMAND RADIUS

An army is an organism. It can only move in certain ways. It has to move in a coordinated way, and it has to remain in a relatively compact formation in order to be coordinated. Coordination on the battlefield comes from the top down, through the chain of command.

By the time word of an event reaches the commander, he issues an order and sends it off, 15 minutes may have been lost, hence the 4-hex Command Radius (just over one mile). The officer's 3-hex radius is based on keeping his entire corps in visual contact; he has to see in order to coordinate the action of his units. Possibly the officer's radius should be subject to LOS, blocked by crests and woods, but to avoid imposing a burden on the

players, some latitude was allowed for the use of gallopers in the case of officers too.

An aide carrying an order can reasonably travel about 5.6 miles (18 hexes) on the battlefield in one hour. That is the figure we have traditionally used. However, we found the rate of travel reduced in 1809, partly because of the “cumbrous troopers” borrowed for the staff from Nansouty’s Heavy Cavalry Division. These rates varied depending upon whether orders were dispatched and received during the day (range 4.2–8 mph; avg. 6.1 mph) during the night (range 1.2–5.7 mph; avg. 3.13 mph), or dispatched night and received day (range 0.8–2.6 mph; avg. 1.7 mph).

The most significant complication for the courier is when the recipient HQ is on the move. The average speeds above do not reflect wrong turns taken in trying to follow in its wake.

A table in van Creveld’s *Command in War* on page 88 covers 11-12 October, 1806. The speeds there are significantly higher: range 4.5–5.8 mph; avg. 5.6 mph; dispatched night/arrived day.

We don’t have any data on 1813 but have retained 5.6 mph in the rules, guessing that 1809 was an aberration because of the torpid pace of the mounts.

Once an order arrives, how long did it take to respond? If it was an order to march, the time lag before the start of the march ranged from one-half to four hours; average was 1:20.

## MARCHES

Infantry Marches are based upon an average speed of 2.4 mph over roads. At 14 hours per day a unit could cover 28.8 miles, including two one-hour halts in that period. A normal march would take 8 hours on the road and two at rest (19.2 miles), then Forced March would add another 4 hours and another 10 miles or so.

The rules on Command and Initiative, in conjunction with the Cards, will cause most forces to sit on their heels from time to time, if only to catch their breath.

### Marches

<i>Pas</i>	<i>accéléré</i>	<i>Lt. Inf.</i>	<i>ordinaire</i>
Steps	100	85	76
Pace	x36"	x30"	x30"
	3,600"	2,550"	2,880"
meters	91.46	64.78	58
min.	x 55	x 55	x 55
	5030m	3560m	3186m
hexes	10.5	7.42	6.63
MPs	5	4	3

Note: “Steps” is steps per minute. “Pace” is the length of stride, estimated. (A military pace varies between 30" and 36" on good quality road.)

## REORGANIZATION

Demoralized troops are harder to reorganize (*see 12.24*). The presence of cavalry was enough to keep units with wet powder from reforming just about anywhere on the battlefield.

When units broke they often fled (right through standing formations to rout them in turn) and that ended their part in the battle. One Prussian brigadier was mortally wounded by his own lancers at Katzbach, trying to rally them.

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 MAP SOURCE: Woerl, J.E., *Schlachten-Atlas von 1792 bis 1815*.

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It is the most difficult to assess Attrition. We created March Tables for each formation to determine its rate of march (this would tell us whether it suffers for extra long marches at Forced March rates).

Here is the March Table that we used to determine Macdonald's Attrition prior to Katzbach.

	<b>Souham</b>	<b>Lauriston</b>	<b>Macdonald</b>	<b>Sebastiani</b>
<b>13 PM</b>	40,000 Liegnitz	27,000 Goldberg	24,000 Lowenberg	11,000 Liegnitz
<b>14 PM</b>		"		
<b>15 PM</b>		"		
<b>16 PM</b>	1,500 5 MPs			125 men 5 MPs
<b>17 PM</b>	1,500 4 MPs	"		1,500 4 MPs FM
<b>18 PM</b>	Bunzlau	"		1,000 4 MPs FM
<b>19 PM</b>		375 men 5 MPs	125 men 2 MPs	-0- 2 MPs
<b>20 PM</b>	Bunzlau	Lowenberg	Lowenberg 125 men 2 MPs	Bunzlau -0- 2 MPs
<b>21 PM</b>	1,500 5 MPs	125 men 2 MPs	Lauterseiffen 125 men 2 MPs	-0- 2 MPs
<b>22 PM</b>	Haynau	Seiffenau 1,000 4 MPs	Seiffenau 1,000 4 MPs	625 4 MPs
<b>23 PM</b>	375 men 3.5 MPs	Flensburg		
<b>24 PM</b>		1,000 4 MPs	1,000 4 MPs	
<b>25N</b>	Liegnitz	Goldberg	Schmoglitz	Schmoglitz
	4,875	2,500	2,375	3,250

**Attrition losses for this period:** 13,000 men

*Not shown:* the 35<sup>th</sup> Division's 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde which starts at Lahn.

### Combat Losses in the Silesian Campaign

("Fr" means the French Army of the Bober and "Co" means Blücher's Army of Silesia.)

Estimated losses in men, killed and wounded, with prisoners included where known.

<b>Goldberg (Rochlitz), 17 August</b>	<b>Fr.</b>	<b>Co.</b>	
Blucher's Adv Gd (Lobenthal)	40	41	k/w
<b>Siebeneichen, 18 August</b>			
Italians - 2,000	200	120	pris
<b>Siebeneichen, 19 August</b>			
	260	200	pris
<b>Wolfshayn, 19 August</b>			
French 10 <sup>th</sup> Div, 11 <sup>th</sup> Div - 3,000	544		k/w
Russian 27 <sup>th</sup> Div.		400	
<b>Bunzlau (Modelsdorf), 21 Aug</b>			
French 8 <sup>th</sup> Div, 9 <sup>th</sup> Div, II Res. Cav - 2,000	500		k/w
Sacken		750	k/w
		400	pris
<b>Plagwitz, 21 August</b>			
French V Corps , 16 <sup>th</sup> Div. - 1,000	500		
Yorck (Karl v Meck) and Kapzevich (X Corps)		500	
<b>Lauterseifen and Pilgramsdorf, 22 August</b>			
(Pursuit of Blucher) - 1,000	500	500	
<b>Goldberg, 23 August</b>			
French V Corps - 3,000	1200		
Mecklenburg's Bde		1780	k/w
<b>Wolfsberg Hts, 23 August</b>			
1,000	350	497	k/w
Subtotal of losses listed above	4094	5188	k/w/ pris
<b>Combat losses for this period</b>	<b>5000</b>	<b>8000</b>	

**Attrition** 13,000 19,000

**TOTAL LOSS** 18,000 27,000