

AN HISTORICAL SIMULATION GAME OF FOUR BATTLES OF AUTUMN, 1813

☆☆☆☆☆

FOUR LOST BATTLES™

Napoleon's Debacle on the Elbe

GROSSBEEREN, KATZBACH,
KULM, DENNEWITZ

23 August—6 September 1813

Scenario Information,
Historical & Design Notes

Vers. 3.55

Study Folder

OPERATIONAL STUDIES GROUP



Manpower and Unit Quality

August 1813: One million soldiers of the belligerent armies moved into position for the final struggle. For Napoleon, nothing went as planned, and every day saw a deduction of 1,000 men from his fighting strength. Unfortunately, all the historians we consulted write of the strengths of the armies as though nothing happened between the opening of hostilities on August 15th and the start of the respective battles. Yet there were many long marches in the rain and numerous combats and skirmishes leading up to them. As a result most sources that we have used—and cited in the Study folder—tend to overstate the strength of forces on the battlefields.

In order to determine the manpower of each unit we created a model for each army estimating each unit's losses in attrition and in combat, plus replacements.

We calculated attrition based on the known marches during the weeks before the battles, then converted the raw manpower of a unit into strength points on a sliding scale tied to the Initiative Rating printed on the unit.

Infantry were evaluated on a sliding scale, from 350 to 800 men per point; the “good” infantry were around 500. Anything 600 or above would be poor quality. The French Imperial Guard (Old & Middle) were given an Initiative Rating of 4 and their strength calculated at 350 men per point. “Grenadiers” and “Elites” received a 4 for Initiative and 400 men/SP. “First rate” units received an Initiative of 3 and 500 men/SP. “Veteran” rated 2 and 600 men/SP. “Conscripts” received an Initiative of 1 and 700 men/SP. “Landwehr and Trained Militia” rated Initiative 1 and 800 men/SP.

Cavalry rated between 400 and 500 men per SP; Cossacks, 600 men per SP. The veteran French cavalry mostly served in the III, IV, and V Reserve Cavalry Corps (400 men/SP), while the I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps were mostly formed of newly raised squadrons (500 men/SP) (see Table 3). Artillery is rated 1 SP per battery (8–12 guns).

EXAMPLE: Von Bosch's Saxon infantry brigade (25/VII), with an initiative of 2, was rated at 600 men per SP. (“Basis” Number on the Initial Setup.) Its full brigade strength is 5 SPs.

The brigade had 57 officers and 2840 men on 15 August. We calculated attrition at 193 men, leaving 2704 in the ranks at the Battle of Grossbeeren (a strength of 5 SPs). We estimated a total of 407 battle casualties at Grossbeeren and a further 568 who may have fallen out of the ranks during the retreat, leaving 1922 still with the colors at the time of Dennewitz.

For Blücher's Army of Silesia we figured a total loss to attrition and battle of 27,000 men, leaving Blücher with 63,000 men at Katzbach (excluding Pahlen and St. Priest's Corps, who were not on the battlefield).

Table 1.	SACKEN	YORCK	LANG'ON	PAHLEN
Total	3,000	15,000	8,000	1,000
Loss				
at	15,000	23,000	25,000	11,000
Katzbach				

F. L. Petre, in *Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany*, credits Yorck and Sacken with 55,000 and Langeron with 31,000 men, which was about their strength on August 15th.

Table 2.
BLÜCHER'S MARCHES: AUGUST 1813

	SACKEN	YORCK	LANGERON
13N	Hunsfeld-bei-Breslau	Wernersdorf-am-Zobtenberg	Jauernick
15N	Lissa	Sara-am-Striegauer-Wasser	Striegau
16N	Ober-Moys and Eisendorf	Jauer	Bolkenhayn
17N	Kloster-Wahlstadt	Jauer	Jauer
18N	Liegnitz	Goldberg	Schönau
19N	Lowenberg	Lowenberg	Siebeneichen
20N	Modelsdorf	Neudorf-am-Gröditzberg	Pilgramsdorf
22N	Ober-Au	Röchlitz	Wolfsberg
23N	Liegnitz	Christianshohe	Seichau—Hennersdorf
24N			Siefersdorf
26N	Malitsch		Hermannsdorf

Table 3. Infantry Ratings
Initiative Men per SP

4	350-400
3	500-550
2	600-650
1	700-800

(continued on page 22)

Four Lost Battles™

Napoleon's Debacle on the Elbe

www.Napoleongames.com

DESIGN: Kevin Zucker

DEVELOPMENT & SCENARIO DESIGN: Kevin Zucker, Alessandro Fontana

ORBAT RESEARCH: Kevin Zucker

PLAYTESTING: Jean Foisy, John Devereaux, Tim Carne, Dick Vohlers, Kevin Zucker, Joe Youst, Jim Arnold, David Bolt and Jeff Moore.

EDITORIAL: Kevin Zucker, Dick Vohlers, Jean Foisy

GRAPHICS: Charlie Kibler (Counters, Game Maps), McKinley Bryson (Box), Chris Moeller (Box Map)

BOX COVER PAINTING: *Battle of Kulm*, Alexander von Kotzebue

STUDY FOLDER COVER: Dresden's Altstadt

GAME COMPONENTS:

4 Map Sheets 22" x 17"

2 Counter Sheets: 560 die-cut playing pieces

2 Booklets: System Rules, Study Folder

18 Player Aid Cards: TRC x4, Initial Set-up x8 (French x4, Coalition x4), Casualty x1, Combat Results, Reorganization, Weather, Fog of War Card Instructions x2

- Adding the Cards Folder, 11" x 17"
- Combat Tables Folder, 11" x 17"
- Orders Slip Sheet/Sequence of Play
- Victory Worksheet
- Cards Removed from Deck/Scenario Parameters
- Game Box

NOT INCLUDED: The two decks of 100 cards are *not* included. This game uses the optional "Universal Deck." If you do not have them in another OSG game, they can be ordered at Napoleongames.com.

Contact for parts: info@napoleongames.com

25.0 SCENARIOS

26-27 August 1813: Upon his great victory at Dresden Napoleon saw his chances of victory slip away in four battles lost over a fortnight, as the Allies avoided the Emperor in person while concentrating on his subordinates.

25.1 The Scenario Information

Four Lost Battles includes four Battle Games and a Campaign. Refer to the appropriate section of the Initial Set-up Cards (25.21) and scenario information for each game:

27.0 GROSSBEEREN, 23 August 1813

28.0 KATZBACH, 26 August 1813

29.0 KULM, 29-30 August 1813

30.0 DENNEWITZ, 6 September 1813

Scenarios 27.0 through 30.0 are "Battle Games" and must start on the Game-Turn specified. The Campaign Game begins on 23 August, with the start of the Grossbeeren Battle Game.

25.11 Turn Record Track: The Game-Turn marker is placed on the Turn Record Track in the turn listed in the Scenario Information as the Game Start. Each scenario includes the turns listed under duration as starting and ending turns. Reinforcements are specified on the Turn Track as modified by the play of Arrival Cards (24.7).

25.12 The Campaign Game: All four battle games are played in chronological order (31.0). Depending upon the level of victory in the battles of Grossbeeren, Katzbach, and Kulm, one or both players may draw "Bonus Cards" on the second turn of Kulm and Dennewitz. (*See 24.32 and the Campaign Scenario Information, 26.5, 31.13.*)

25.13 French Player Nationalities: The French Player controls units of the French (blue), Guard (dark blue), Polish (crimson), Baden-Nassau (grey-green or feldgrau), Hessian (gray), Westphalian (blue-green), and Bavarian (green).

25.14 Coalition Player Nationalities

The Coalition Player controls Russians (brown), Prussians (Feldgrau), Austrians (white), and Swedes (yellow).

25.15 French Player Units with Mixed Nationalities IC/4th HArt (Saxon-Fr.), IC/Lessing (Saxon-Fr.), III/Beurmann (Baden-Fr.)

25.16 Cavalry Brigades with Disparate Vedettes

XII/Beaumont Cavalry Brigade contains Westphalian and Hessian vedettes. III/Beurmann Cavalry contains the Baden dragoons. IC/Heimrodt Cavalry contains Polish Lancers and Italian Chasseurs.

25.2 Setting Up the Scenarios

The following information is detailed in sections 27.0—31.0. All units set-up In Supply as Hidden Forces (8.2). All reinforcements (25.4) are in supply upon entry. Units may start in Road March at the owning player's option.

25.21 Initial Set-up: The units to set-up are listed on the Initial Set-up Cards. The First Player (26.6) sets up first. The Initial Set-up specifies the location for each unit. This may be modified by Mode Cards (24.5). Units marked ® in the Initial Setups are reduced at start (25.33). "Composition" and "Comments" are for historical interest.

25.22 Hex Numbers: The hex numbers on the Initial Set-up cards show where units are located at the start of the scenario. Place all combat units and leaders on the map in the hexes specified. If there is no hex number listed, the unit is not placed in the PEU box, but is out of play; or, may be ALT (25.51). The second player may *adjust* any one friendly unit by one hex prior to the first player turn (not in an EZOC). The set-up may include overstacked

hexes. Make sure to observe stacking limits on your first move.

25.23 Reinforcements (19.1, 25.5): Reinforcement arrival is listed on the Turn Record Card as modified by the play of Arrival Cards (24.7). If the Corps designation follows an officer's name, all units of that corps arrive on the same turn (25.53). If a division is listed, all units of that division arrive on the same turn.

25.24 Pontoon Trains: There are no Pontoon Trains.

25.25 Baggage Trains: All Baggage Trains set-up within [7] hexes of any unit in their respective formation or enter as reinforcements (25.26), unless otherwise specified. Each corps formation has its own dedicated baggage train (18.21).

25.26 Train Reinforcements:

- If a train is mentioned in the reinforcement schedule it enters as specified.
- If an entire formation is listed as a reinforcement, the baggage trains arrive *after* all combat units.
- If a formation arrives over several turns, the trains arrive at owner's choice of time.
- If part of the formation sets-up on map and part arrives later as a reinforcement, trains set up or arrive with either group at owner's choice.

25.27 Leaders: Leaders set-up in the hex specified, or, at owning player's choice, Commanders may set-up with any Friendly force—Officers in any hex containing units of their Formation—in supply and not in an EZOC. Leaders ignore Mode Cards unless specifically mentioned. Leader cards may be played as "inapplicable" (24.35) prior to the named leader's arrival.

25.28 Vedettes: Vedettes may be deployed at the beginning of a scenario at the owning player's choice, anywhere within *three* hexes of their parent unit (not in an EZOC). The *second* player deploys all available vedettes first, then the first player deploys.

25.29 Cards At Start: (24.31)

25.3 Forces at a Glance

25.31 French Forces

Corps	GRO	KAT	KUL	DEN
I	•	•	★	•
III	•	✎	•	•
IV	✎	•	•	★
V	•	✎	•	•
VI	•	ALT	•	ALT
VII	✎	•	•	★
XI	•	✎	•	•
XII	✎	•	•	★
XIV	•	•	✎	•

Corps	GRO	KAT	KUL	DEN
YG	•	•	ALT	ALT
OG	•	•	ALT	ALT
IC	•	✎	✎	ALT
IIC	•	★	•	•
IIIC	✎	•	•	★

25.32 Coalition Forces

Corps	GRO	KAT	KUL	DEN
L	•	★	•	•
II	•	•	★	•
III	•	•	✎	•
V	•	•	★	•
VIII	•	ALT	•	•
XI	•	★	•	•
XIV	ALT	•	•	✎
C	•	★	•	•
IC	•	★	•	•
IIC	•	•	★	•
Au	•	•	✎	•
I Pr	•	★	•	•
II Pr	•	•	★	•
III Pr	★	•	•	★
IV Pr	★	•	•	✎
Sw	•	•	•	★

KEY: ★ = in play. ✎ part of formation in play (part may be ALT).
• = Not in play, but may be ALT. ALT = Alternate Reinforcement.

25.33 Reduced Strength Units: Some units may have been eliminated or reduced at prior battles. In all the battle games, units listed ® on the Initial Setup start at their reduced strength. In the Campaign Game, units in the UAR (not PEU) at *Grossbeeren* should be kept together to set-up at reduced strength for *Dennewitz*.

25.34 Improved Positions: There are no Improved Positions in *Four Lost Battles*.

25.35 Markers: Some system markers (Charge, Suppressed) are not included. Use markers from other games.

25.4 Scenario Information Detail

The following information is provided in 27.0—31.0.

25.41 Duration: The game ends with the completion of the last turn specified under "Duration," or may end immediately when all the formations of one side are demoralized or have exited. The Level of Victory still has to be determined (26.2).

25.42 Mode Cards at Start: The number of Mode Cards to draw on the first turn only.

25.43 Remove Cards from Deck: Before play begins remove specified number of cards from each Player's card deck (24.2). See separate list per Battle. *Scenario Parameters* is a summary of all the info you need to play, for all the battles, in one place.

25.44 Bonus Cards: On the second turn of each battle, each player draws a number of Bonus Cards specified for that battle. If playing the Campaign, at the end of each battle, each player draws a number of Bonus cards determined by victory level (26.5).

25.45 Alternate Reinforcements (ALT): (25.51)

25.46 Special Rules: Rules that apply to this battle; at start conditions and map area in play.

25.47 Victory Conditions: Victory Points (26.1) are awarded for control of places on the map. Certain VP locations that *do not* count in a battle may be listed.

25.5 Reinforcements

Battles may have 1st Day and 2nd Day Reinforcements. All Reinforcement entries are shown on the Turn Record Track. Reinforcements enter at the mapedge hex specified. If a Corps or other Formation is listed, all units of that formation which are *not* mentioned separately enter on the same turn.

25.51 Alternate Reinforcement Availability: Alternate Reinforcements (ALT) are listed in the Scenario Information. Each side has a numbered list of ALT. One numbered group appears for each ALT card played. These groups must appear in order of priority in the list. In the Campaign Game, any ALT units that enter into the *Katzbach* or *Kulm* battles are unavailable for *Dennewitz*.

If not using the cards—roll *two* d6 during the Command Movement Segment of every Player Turn: on a result of 2 or 3, you may enter the next group of Alternate Reinforcements listed; if you roll a 4–12, there is no result. If you roll a 2 or 3, your opponent can roll 2d6 to delay by one turn the alternate reinforcements; the delay is successful if he also rolls a 2 or 3.

25.52 Hidden Reinforcements: All Reinforcements enter the map hidden. Vedettes may enter instead of their parent Light Cavalry units.

25.53 Deploying Off-map Reinforcements: Prior to entry all units in the force are deployed off map in a road march column, beginning with the leader at the front of the column, and ending with the baggage. Artillery follows its division; corps assets at the end, in front of baggage.

25.6 March Orders

One March Order per player may be issued prior to the start of any scenario, to any friendly force in play on the

map, *if* a friendly Commander is on-map at the start of the scenario (*see* 20.1). EXCEPTIONS: 27.32, 29.32.

25.61 Pre-Programmed March Orders: The Special Rules may specify mandatory “pre-programmed” March Orders. These orders represent historical conditions limiting the leaders’ freedom of action. They can be removed according to 20.23. One March Order can be changed at night (20.4, 2.2B).

25.7 Saxony-Specific Rules

This section applies to all four battles.

25.71 Night Combat: Darkness creates certain exceptions to the rules of Movement and Combat. Any turns marked with the diagonal shading on the TRC use the *Day* Sequence of Play with the following modifications:

- There is **No Command Movement Segment**: All Movement during the shaded turns is by *Initiative*. EXCEPTIONS: • Units with a current March Order in effect (20.4) • Commanders can move freely (individually).
 - There is **NO LOS** during shaded turns. You *must* define attacks before revealing enemy units.
 - All “Ar*” and “Dr*” results become “*Shock*.”
 - Arty. and HArt. may *not bombard* or contribute their strength to an adjacent attack; they may *defend* against enemy attacks as they would during daylight hours.
 - Cards are not drawn or played during shaded turns. Movement Allowance is 2/3 MPs (inf/cav).
- 25.72 Weather (WX):** Roll one d6 to determine WX on the first turn of each day. Consult the table every three hours (0600, 0900, 1200, 1500, etc.) The time of die roll and/or previous condition may provide a die roll modifier. Results obtained endure for three hours.
- All listed weather conditions apply each turn until the next WX check. Weather effects do not apply at Night.
 - The Maximum MP Cost increase from all effects is x2.

25.8 Optional Rules

May be adopted by consensus of players.

25.81 Artillery as Wheeled Units: Treat all artillery like trains, moving at cavalry costs. Artillery may not enter Slope hexes except by Road or Trail. Artillery may not cross Rivers (even if frozen), or streams, except via bridge or trestle.

25.82 Officer Initiative Checks: If an officer is located 2 or 3 hexes from an enemy unit when he fails his Initiative die roll, the leader, plus all of his units in Command Range may move one (and only one) hex. They are Out of Command. Mark the officer with a “1 Hex” marker.

25.83 Road March: Two units of 3 SPs or less may be adjacent to each other when in Road March (7.53).

26.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS

Victory is awarded to the player or team with the most Victory Points at the end of the game. In the Campaign Game, the level of Victory is according to the ratio of each side's Victory Point total (26.23).

26.1 Victory Point Awards

Victory Points are awarded for the conditions listed (26.11). Calculate victory point awards at the end of each battle.

26.11 Determine VP Totals: VPs are awarded for...

- Enemy Combat SPs Eliminated (26.12)
- Enemy Formations Demoralized (26.13).
- Captured Enemy Baggage Trains (26.14).
- Controlled Hexes (26.15)
- Total VPs of cards you have played (26.16)
- Leaders in a town through the Night (26.17)
- Captured Commanders (26.18)
- Units that have exited the map (26.3)

26.12 Total Combat SPs Eliminated

At the end of the battle, total the losses in SPs by both sides, including the total SPs in the PEU, Unrecovered and Recovered boxes. Don't count SPs in the Full Strength Holding Box. Subtract the smaller from the larger total. The side losing the least SPs receives VPs as follows:

Difference	VP Award	Difference	VPs
0-4	0 VPs	20-24	4 VPs
5-9	1 VP	25-29	5 VPs
10-14	2 VPs	30-34	6 VPs
15-19	3 VPs	35-39	7 VPs, etc.

When calculating Total Combat Strength count the unit's Full Strength. EXCEPTION: For units *starting* the scenario at Reduced Strength, use reduced strength.

26.13 Enemy Formations Demoralized: Each Player receives [4] VPs for each enemy Formation demoralized at the end of play. EXCEPTION: only [2] VP are awarded for demoralization when the demoralization level of the formation is 4 or less.

26.14 Captured Baggage Trains: The Player receives [2] VPs for each Enemy Baggage Train captured (18.14).

26.15 Control: The Player receives [4] VPs for each *Enemy* Supply Source he controls. Each Player also receives the number of Victory Points printed on the map for each VP Hex he controls. EXCEPTIONS:

- The Scenario Victory Conditions may specify certain VP hexes that do *not* apply in that scenario.

To be considered in control of a hex, a friendly *Combat Unit in Supply* must physically occupy the hex, or be the last Combat Unit to have occupied or moved through it. An occupying unit that is Out of Supply at the moment it enters or moves through a hex does not control that hex.

To indicate the control of a hex, place a control marker of the proper side in the hex.

26.16 Cards: Add or subtract the VP Value of *each card* you have played during the game, if that card's instruction was actually used, as specified on the card.

26.17 Leader in a town throughout the Night: Each player receives ONE-HALF VP for every friendly Leader in a town or a Chateau who will remain there until 7 AM. (Round fractions down.)

26.18 Capture of Commanders: A player receives a number of VPs for each captured Commander equal to that Commander's Command Rating.

26.2 Levels of Victory

At the end of the battle the total of Victory Points achieved by the two players is compared as a ratio (French: Coalition), which determines the level of victory—Marginal, Tactical, or Strategic. Divide the French by the Coalition VP total.

26.21 Find VP Ratio:

1 to 2 or less	Coalition Strategic
1 to 1.5 / 1 to 1.99	Coalition Tactical
1 to 1 / 1 to 1.49	Coalition Marginal
1.01 to 1 / 1.5 to 1	French Marginal
1.51 to 1 / 2 to 1	French Tactical
More than 2 to 1	French Strategic

26.22 When Total of VPs is Zero: Convert scores of "0" to "1" in order to calculate VP ratio.

26.23 Levels of Victory in the Campaign Game:

In the Campaign Game at the end of each battle, the winner, Level of Victory and total VPs for each side must be recorded (26.5).

26.3 Exiting the Map

Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the "General Retreat" card once per game.

If not using the cards, the Phasing Player may declare one General Retreat per Army (20.5).

Exit hexes are not always marked on the maps. Individual units in a General Retreat move to the closest Supply Source of the appropriate army (20.51). Special Rules may specify additional exit conditions (29.36). Friendly units may exit where an enemy unit previously exited. The exiting unit pays the Movement cost of the hex it is leaving once again. Exited leaders may *not* reorganize units. Units that exit the map cannot be returned to play and are *not* considered eliminated for Victory Point purposes. Units forced to *retreat* off the map are eliminated (12.34).

26.31 VP Award: If he makes a "General Retreat" the Exiting Player receives [4 VP] for exiting each friendly baggage train, and [1 VP] for every five combat units exited. EXCEPTION: The *total number of VPs* from exiting

units may not exceed *the total number of enemy combat units* PEU and UAR. **EXAMPLE:** The Coalition player exits 25 units. The French lost 5 units, so all five VPs are counted.

26.32 Exit by March Order: A force may be assigned a March Order to exit the map.

26.33 No Award: Even if you do *not* declare “General Retreat,” you may choose at any time to exit individual units to prevent their destruction, but *unless* they exit at their own Supply Source, you receive no VPs, and the exited units cannot be returned to play.

26.4 Zero Loss Award

The Player receives [2] VPs if the total of eliminated SPs in the Friendly PEU + Unrecovered + Recovered boxes at the end of the game is zero.

26.5 Bonus Cards in the Campaign Game

The Campaign includes all four battles played sequentially in historical order. Score the Level of Victory at the end of each battle. A victory will allow the winning player to draw “Bonus Cards” from his card deck at the next battle.

Strategic Victory: 3 Bonus Cards per battle

Tactical Victory: 2 Bonus Cards per battle

Marginal Victory: 1 Bonus Card per battle

Each player receives a minimum of 2 Bonus Cards.

PROCEDURE: At the beginning of every battle, reshuffle the full Main Deck (24.23) then each player draws a new hand of cards.

The loser draws cards equal to his previous day’s hand.

The winner draws the number of cards stipulated by his victory level then discards down to his previous day’s hand size +1. The winner’s hand should always be equal to or greater than his original hand +1. Shuffle all discards back into the deck.

EXAMPLE: The French Player wins a Marginal Victory at Katzbach. He would draw one “Bonus Card” (plus the regular cards) on turn two of Kulm. The Coalition Player would draw the minimum of 2 Bonus Cards each day.

26.6 First Player

The first player sets-up first. The French Player is the First Player.

27.0 THE BATTLE OF GROSSBEEREN

To the Gates of Berlin, 23 August

27.1 Introduction

The battle of Grossbeeren was a meeting engagement in which the two forces were ignorant of their mutual presence in the area. Grossbeeren-Blankenfelde is a double

battle, with little possibility of interaction between battles because of swamps. Oudinot took a risk in separating his three corps on parallel routes as was customary when marching through open country. The IV Corps on the right, held-up as they emerged from the woods, were unable to assist VII Corps at Grossbeeren in the center; while Oudinot, on the left, tended to his own corps, considerably strung out after a long Forced March on the 22nd—instead of coordinating the battle.

27.11 Duration: 12N – 9PM (10 turns)

27.12 Mode Cards at Start: French 2, Coalition 3

27.13 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: (*Battle Game and Campaign*) French 3, Coalition 3

27.14 Counter Mix: (25.3)

27.2 Alternate Reinforcements

FRENCH:

#1. VII/32/Menu (3019)

#2. XII/29th Div., 29LC (3030)

#3. IV/38th Div. & IV/ 24th LC Bde. (3008)

#4. IIIC/5th LC Div (3030). *Inapplicable if already entered at 8PM.*

COALITION:

#1. IV/Hirsch Ldw, Hirsch-b Ldw (0934)

#2. Russian WORONZOW/XIV Corps (0123)

#3. IV/Wobes Ldw, Wobes-b Ldw (1501)

27.21 Alternate Commander:

These leaders arrive via play of Fog of War card 7.

FRENCH: NEY (3019).

COALITION: WINZINGERODE (0123).

27.3 Special Rules

27.31 Damaged Bridge at Start: None

27.32 March Orders at Start: None

27.33 Map Area in Play: Set up all units in accordance with the “GRO” column of the Initial Set-up. This scenario uses the Grossbeeren Map.

27.34 Coalition Supply: *The Army of the North was out of supply until after the battle, so it was very heavy to maneuver.* The Swedish, Russian and Prussian IV Corps baggage trains may not enter play in this scenario. Swedish and Russian units that enter the game may only trace to Coalition mapedge Supply Sources, and may not share the Prussian III Corps baggage. The Prussian IV Corps is out of Supply (17.2) for the whole battle.

27.35 Commanders: *There are no commanders in this battle. Oudinot didn't act the part of a commander, while Bülow was under Bernadotte and had to obey his orders.* No March orders (25.5). **EXCEPTIONS:** Both sides may issue March Orders to their Reinforcements (20.3) and Alternate Commanders (27.21).

27.36 Windmill. The Windmill in (1018) has no effect.

27.37 Second Day of Battle: If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until the 6PM (1800) turn of August 24th.

27.4 Victory Conditions

VPs are earned as per 26.1

27.41 Control:

A) The controlling player receives, at the end of each turn:

- 1 VP for control of Blankenfeld (1705)
- 1 VP for control of Grossbeeren (1117)

Keep a running total of the VP award per player.

B) The player who controls Blankenfeld and/or Grossbeeren at the end of the game receives 5 Victory Points additional for each of the two towns.

27.42 Campaign Game: *If Grossbeeren had been a French Strategic victory—leading to the occupation of Berlin, which lies just 10 miles from the mapedge—the Battle of Dennewitz probably would not have taken place at all.* A French Strategic Victory at Grossbeeren means no Battle of Dennewitz in the Campaign.

27.43 Historical Note: *The Map Location VPs are based on the day's objectives of the French, to control the two towns as preparation for the final advance on Berlin.*

28.0 BATTLE OF THE KATZBACH

A Perilous Passage, 26 August

28.1 Introduction

The battle of the Katzbach on August 26th 1813 was another meeting engagement; neither commander expected to find his opponent in the area. Cavalry dominated the battlefield as muskets would not discharge in the heavy rain.

28.11 Duration: 10AM – 7-8PM (10 turns).

28.12 Mode Cards at Start: French 2, Coalition 1

28.13 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: (*Day of Battle, 2PM scenario and Hypothetical*); French 3, Coalition 3

28.14 Counter Mix: (25.3)

28.2 Alternate Reinforcements

FRENCH:

- #1. III/39th Div. (1801).
- #2. V/17th Div (0116); XI/31st Div. (0108).
- #3. MARMONT/VI Corps (0108).

COALITION:

- #1. VI/15,28 Art, IX/18,34 Art, X/34,3,19 Art, X/Urussov, Turtschaninow (1734)
- #2. IC/Grekov Cossack Bde, 6,16 Arty (2334).
- #3. ST-PRIEST/VIII (1934).

28.21 Alternate Commander:

These leaders arrive via play of Fog of War card 7.

FRENCH: NAPOLEON (0116).

COALITION: PAHLEN (1934).

28.22 Reduced Strength Units

Reduced Strength units are denoted by “®” on the Initial Setup.

28.3 Special Rules

28.31 Damaged Bridge at Start: None (see 28.35)

28.32 March Orders at Start: Each Player has one (20.1)

28.33 Map Area in Play: Set up all units in accordance with the “KAT” column of the Initial Set-up. This scenario uses the Katzbach (Kat) Map.

28.34 Langeron's Formation: All the units of Langeron's Formation (comprising three Russian Inf. Corps, VI, IX, and X) share the same officer Langeron and Langeron's “L” baggage train.

28.35 Thunderstorm: During all Thunderstorm turns the bridge at 2601 is marked with a “Burnt Bridge” Marker (washed-out). It cannot be repaired during a Thunderstorm turn. During all Thunderstorm turns the stream portion of the Katzbach may only be crossed at trestles (i.e., it is treated like a river). This portion of the Katzbach has a dashed line defining the bank.

28.36 IC/Dermon Brigade is attached to Lauriston's Vth Corps. Lauriston may place Dermoncourt in Command.

28.4 Victory Conditions

VPs are earned as per 26.1.

28.41 Control: VP Hexes that do NOT Count: none

28.5 Katzbach 2 PM Scenario

The battle starts with the battlefield situation at 2 PM.

28.51 Duration: 2PM – 7-8PM (6 turns).

28.52 Mode Cards at Start: None

28.53 Setup: Set up all units in accordance with the KAT-2PM column of the Initial Set-up.

28.54 All other scenario info: Same as 28.1 to 28.4

28.6 Katzbach August 17th Hypothetical battle

Many units on August 26th set up at reduced strength, due to the actions of the prior ten days. This same battlefield could have been contested on the 17th with almost the same forces had Ney so chosen.

28.61 Duration: 10AM – 7-8PM (10 turns). Use the KAT TRC (ignore French reinforcements).

28.62 Setup: Set up all units in accordance with the KAT column of the Initial Set-up but include:

- a) the French Player's 17th and 31st divisions—with their respective formations at start (they hadn't been detached to the south as yet);
- b) Commander Ney—with the III Corps;
- c) all units at Full Strength.

28.63 All other scenario info: Same as 28.1 to 28.4

29.0 THE BATTLE OF KULM

Enfilade in the Mountains, 29-30 Aug.

29.1 Introduction

After the Battle of Dresden on 26-27 August, several French Corps began the pursuit of the defeated Coalition Army through the mountain passes leading back into Austrian territory. Vandamme's I Corps, with two divisions of the best-trained conscripts of 1813, fought several rearguard actions with Ostermann's Russians, and expected this battle to be no different. The Emperor had already heard rumors of Macdonald's disaster on the Katzbach. With the possibility of having to defend his great depot of Dresden against an advance by both Bernadotte and Blücher, his hopes of being able to pursue far into Bohemia were vanishing.

29.11 Duration: 5 PM, 29th Aug.- 6 PM, 30th Aug. (18 turns)

29.12 Mode Cards at Start: French 1, Coalition 2

29.13 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: French 3, Coalition 3

29.14 Counter Mix: (25.3)

29.2 Alternate Reinforcements

FRENCH:

#1 MORTIER, YG/1st, YG/3rd Div. (3701).

#2 OG/1 Div. (3701).

#3 ST. CYR/XIV (less Creutzer, 7 Arty) (1901).

#4 LATOUR, IC (less 1st LC Div.) (1901 or 3701).

COALITION:

#1 Au. CHASTELER/1 Res. Div. (0726).

#2 Au. NOSTITZ/Cav. Div. (0726).

#3 Au. HOHENLOHE/H Div. (0726).

#4 Rus. III/2G, III/Arty (0726).

29.21 Alternate Commander:

These leaders arrive via play of Fog of War card 7:

FRENCH: NAPOLEON (3701)

COALITION: #1 KONSTANTINE (0726)

#2 WITTGENSTEIN (0726).

29.22 Reduced Strength Units

Reduced Strength units are denoted by “®” on the Initial Setup.

29.3 Special Rules

29.31 Damaged Bridge at Start: None

29.32 March Orders at Start: Each Player has two (20.1). The two Coalition March Orders are mandatory Pre-programmed March Orders (20.24, 25.61) that apply only to Bianchi and Colloredo and their respective Austrian Corps. Both Forces must march to the Coalition Supply Source at 0726.

In the chaos of the retreat nobody knew exactly where these troops were. There were other reasons why they

were not about to turn around and march across the plateau; they were in retreat mode and knew that the pursuing French XIV Corps was behind them.

29.33 Map Area in Play: Set up all units in accordance with the “KUL” column of the Initial Set-up. This scenario uses the Kulm Map. The Kulm map includes two types of terrain that are unique to this battle.

29.34 “Alto” Terrain: *In contrast to the battlefields in the sandy plains of Brandenburg, Kulm lies on the southern shoulder of the Erz Gebirge. Alto Terrain, 400-500 meters above Kulm, is on a slightly sunken plateau running from Vorderer Zinnwald to Ebersdorf and on toward Nollendorf.* Alto Terrain is treated like clear terrain (or, when attacked through a slope, as a hilltop). Alto terrain blocks the LOS of units on other Alto terrain. Any unit or leader on the edge of Alto terrain has a LOS over the lower-lying terrain down in the valley (and may see over but not into the woods lying on the slopes between for a distance of up to ten [10] hexes. EXAMPLE: Light Green hexes; e.g., 1004-1007.

29.35 Defile: Like a Trail, a Defile costs 1 MP per hex for infantry and cavalry, if entered from a Trail or Defile hex, regardless of other terrain. Artillery does not enjoy the Defile benefit, but must pay the cost of other terrain, ignoring the Defile. EXAMPLE: an artillery unit moving from hex 3308 must pay the woods cost of 2 MP to enter hex 3307.

29.36 Map Exit: *On the morning of the 29th, Vandamme sent five battalions to Aussig (off map) with a pontoon train, following an order of Napoleon to deploy the bridge on the Elbe there.* The French Player can make a General Retreat from the map at hex 3921 in addition to friendly Supply Sources.

29.4 Victory Conditions

29.41 Control: VP Hexes that Do NOT count: none.

29.42 Cards: At the end of the first day (9 PM), total all VPs achieved by both players and then reshuffle the card deck after removing any Card(s) No. 29 Alternate Reinforcements used during the first day.

30.0 THE BATTLE OF DENNEWITZ

Collapse in the North, 6 September

30.1 Introduction

Marshal Ney's Army of Berlin set out from Wittenberg on September 5th, side-stepping Bernadotte's main body and driving Tauenzien's IV Corps toward Seyda. That night they camped just off-map to the south, unaware that Coalition forces were five miles away.

30.11 Duration: 9AM – 10PM (11 Turns).

30.12 Mode Cards at Start: French 2, Coalition 2

30.13 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: French 3, Coalition 4

30.14 Counter Mix: (25.3) Reduced Strength units are denoted by “®” on the Initial Setup.

30.2 Alternate Reinforcements

Campaign Game Note: Any units already received at Katzbach or Kulm cannot arrive as ALT. Reinforcements now (31.55).

FRENCH:

- #1. MORTIER, FRIANT, OG/1st Div., YG/2nd Div., YG/4th Div. (3010).
- #2. MARMONT/VI Corps (3010).
- #3. LATOUR/IC Corps (3010) EXCEPT: IC/Montmarie, Heimrodt, 4th It. HArt, Piré.
- #4. YG/1st Div., YG/3rd Div. (3010).

COALITION

- #1. Ru. XIV/24th (1133)
- #2. Pr. IV/Wobes Ldw, Wobes Ldw-b (0501).
- #3. Pr. IV/ Hirsch Ldw, Hirsch Ldw-b (0634).

30.21 Alternate Commanders:

These leaders arrive via play of Fog of War card 7:

FRENCH: NAPOLEON (3010).

COALITION: #1. BERNADOTTE (0634)

#2. WINZINGERODE (0634).

30.3 Special Rules

30.31 Damaged Bridge at Start: None

30.32 March Orders at Start: Each Player has one (20.1)

30.33 Map Area in Play: Set up all units in accordance with the “DEN” Column on the Initial Setup. This scenario uses the Dennewitz (Den) Map.

30.34 Map Exit: *Historians surmise that Ney’s objective was to exit the eastern mapedge on his way to a planned rendezvous with Napoleon at Luckau. It is not quite clear why he chose to fight with all his forces at Dennewitz. If he plays the General Retreat Card, the French Player’s forces may exit at any of the following hexes: 0701, 0801, 0901, 1701, 1801, and/or 1901.*

30.35 Second Day of Battle: If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until the 6PM (1800) turn of September 7th.

30.36 I/27 Bertrand’s Polish Troops: French Officer Bertrand, IV Corps, may place I/27 Zoltowski, IVC Krukowski, and IVC/1st Polish HArt. in Command.

30.37 Historical Note: *The arrival of VII and XII Corps are based on Ney’s march plan, since “March Confusion” affected their historical arrival. Oudinot’s XII Corps was delayed when the VII Corps failed to show up at Gadegast. Oudinot didn’t get going until he received an order from Ney.*

30.4 Victory Conditions

VPs are earned as per 26.1

30.41 Control: VP Hexes that do NOT Count: none

31.0 THE CAMPAIGN GAME

31.1 Introduction

The Campaign Game is the “Link Game.” Each Battle Game is played successively, in chronological order.

31.11 Duration: Aug. 23 to Sept. 6

31.12 Mode Cards at Start: (27.12, 26.5)

31.13 Bonus Cards: (27.13, 28.13, 29.13, 30.13)

31.14 Counter Mix: (25.3)

31.2 Alternate Reinforcements:

(27.2, 28.2, 29.2, 30.2)

31.3 Special Rules

All Special Rules from the individual battles apply. (27.3, 28.3, 29.3, 30.3)

31.4 Campaign Victory Conditions

The total of VPs is tallied per player at the end of each day of the Campaign (26.5). See the “Campaign Ratio” Section of the Victory Worksheet to determine the overall level of victory for each day of the Campaign.

31.5 Initial Set-up

To start the Campaign, use the GRO set-up (27.0). Proceed to set-up and play the Grossbeeren battle. At the conclusion of the 9 PM turn of 23 August or at 6 PM if a Second Day of Battle was played, the action moves to the Katzbach map. Proceed through the battles of Katzbach, Kulm and Dennewitz (EXCEPTION: 27.42).

31.51 Force Structure: The forces present at each battle may vary from the Initial set up and reinforcements specified for each individual battle.

31.52 Grossbeeren: Make a list of eliminated units after completing the Grossbeeren battle. These will be reduced units at Dennewitz.

31.53 Katzbach: Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at *Grossbeeren* will be unavailable now.

31.54 Kulm: Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at *Grossbeeren* or *Katzbach* will be unavailable at Kulm.

31.55 Dennewitz: The units in the PEU box at the end of *Grossbeeren* will be returned to play at reduced strength for *Dennewitz*; units in the UAR will be out of play. Any Alternate Reinforcements that have arrived at *Katzbach* or *Kulm* will be unavailable. Alternative Reinforcements that appeared at *Grossbeeren* are available, again, as Alternate Reinforcements.

HISTORICAL NOTES

KEVIN ZUCKER

Background

After winning two major battles in the Spring of 1813, Napoleon agreed to an Armistice, ostensibly to prepare a path for peace, but actually as a cover for further war preparations. During the Armistice, Napoleon's administration completed the organization of five new brigades and six divisions of light cavalry; three divisions of heavy cavalry; two of Young Guard infantry, one division of Guard Cavalry, one of Old Guard infantry, and seventeen line infantry divisions;.

The French line infantry, mainly youths officered by newly-promoted survivors of the campaigns in Spain and Russia and recalled old soldiers, excelled in the use of cover such as woods or ravines. Dislike of the war increased from Majors and up in the officer corps; the highest ranking officers hated it the most.

After failing to persuade Napoleon to accept very reasonable terms,¹ the Austrian Emperor agreed to join the Coalition, effective the 12th of August, and so, despite the recruitment of his army, Napoleon was not only outnumbered but strategically surrounded by three large armies: Bernadotte's Army of the North, Blücher's Army of Silesia in the east, and Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia. The Allies had devised the Trachtenberg plan by which any one of these armies would retreat when faced by Napoleon in person, coordinated with an advance by the other two Armies. This plan was the undoing of Napoleon.

With the expiration of the Armistice on the 15th, Napoleon ordered Marshal Oudinot to capture Berlin while he advanced eastward against the retiring Blücher. Schwarzenberg's move toward Dresden caused the Emperor to turn over command of the Army of the Bober to Macdonald, ordering him to hold the river line to shield Oudinot's advance. Instead Macdonald continued the offensive, crossing the swollen Katzbach stream in a driving rain on the 26th. Blücher caught him in the act of crossing and the Army of the Bober collapsed.

On the next day, at Dresden, the Emperor won his last major victory in Germany, costing the Coalition 35,000 men. During the pursuit into the mountains, General Dominique Vandamme with the French I Corps was caught between Ostermann's Russians and

Kleist's Prussians, losing 15,000 men at the Battle of Kulm.

Coalition Forces, August 15th, 1813

The Prussian Army:

in Silesia

Guard (inf. and cav.)—7,001 men, 16 guns

I Corps, Yorck—38,484 men, 104 guns

II Corps, Kleist—37,816 men, 112 guns

in Brandenburg

III Corps, Bülow—41,135 men, 80 guns

IV Corps, Tauentzien—33,170 men, 42 guns

Partisans (Lützow, Reiche, Schill)—4,068 men.

Siege Troops—30,070 men, 40 guns.

Landwehr

These troops were completely untried and their value unknown at the start of campaigning on August 15th. Bernadotte had little confidence in them, and Napoleon shared this opinion. "All this swarm of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr infantry will retreat to Berlin if your march is determined," he wrote to Ney before Dennewitz.

The Russian Army:

in Silesia

Langeron—34,551 men, 130 guns

Sacken—18,553 men, 60 guns

Wittgenstein—34,926 men, 92 guns

St. Priest—13,586 men, 36 guns

Guards & Reserve—44,347 men, 182 guns

in Brandenburg

Winzingerode, Woronzow, Tschernitschew—

29,357 men, 92 guns

attached to Bülow—1,160 men, 22 guns

attached to Tauentzien—318 men

in Mecklenburg—6,525 men, 16 guns

The Austrian Army:

in Bohemia—127,345 men, 280 guns

between the Ems & Traun—30,070 men

in the interior—35,557 men

Of the Austrian forces the cavalry was good, the artillery fairly good, but the infantry was "below the standard of the other armies, having neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians."² Two-thirds were recruits of three months training.

¹ The terms were: dissolve the Duchy of Warsaw, return Prussia's and Austria's lost provinces, abolish the Confederation of the Rhine, and restore the Hanseatic towns.

² F.N. Maude, "The Leipzig Campaign."

FRENCH LEADERS

Of the eight Corps Commanders of the original *Grande Armée* of 1805, only Marmont, Mortier, Augereau and Ney were available in the theater. Bernadotte, become Crown Prince of Sweden, fought for the Allied cause. Davout—no longer the “Iron Marshal” of yore—defended Hamburg. Soult fought in Spain. Lannes had died in 1809.

Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio

Oudinot commanded the elite Grenadier division in 1806, expanded to the size of a small corps (21,000 men) in 1809. In 1812 he commanded the II Corps (37,000 men) and fought in battles around Polotsk. In 1813 he was given command of the XII Corps. He allowed his personal feelings to override his military judgement by “deliberately obeying” a catastrophic order of Marshal Ney at Dennewitz. “Though no doubt a capable commander of a division, perhaps even of a single corps, (he) was not of the calibre to command an army of 70,000 or 80,000 men. Whether any of Napoleon’s lieutenants was fit for it is perhaps doubtful. Of those then in Germany, Davout, Marmont, and St Cyr were alone possible. The last-named marshal says ... ‘In my opinion there was not then in the whole of the belligerent armies a single man capable of commanding a greater number (than 50,000 men).’”³

Marshal Etienne Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum

Served in Italy, and commanded Armies in Rome, Naples, and the Grisons. In 1809, he marched north and won his Marshal’s baton at the battle of Wagram. In independent command of the XI Corps in Russia, he accomplished little at the siege of Riga, but brought his sole French division back in good order. He was 48 years old in 1813. Like most other French generals he lacked the qualifications to lead an army.

Gen. Dominique Vandamme, Count Unsebourg

Another excellent executive officer of a division who had been elevated to corps command. He spoke German, led the Bavarian Corps in 1807, the Württemberg Corps in 1809, and the Westphalians in 1812. His “genuine military talents were unfortunately somewhat blemished by manners too redolent of the camp, and an excessive violence of temper.” Believed he should at length obtain the rank of Marshal and this thought “hurried him beyond the bounds of prudence”⁴ at Kulm, failing to provide security for the rear of I Corps. Napoleon stated that a general should ask himself, several

times a day: “What if the enemy suddenly appeared on my flank, rear, etc.? If the answer is embarrassing, then you are not well-posted.”

Marshal Michel Ney, Prince of the Moscova

A fairly good Corps commander, his executive ability was much-impaired in the absence of his long-time Chief of Staff, Antoine de Jomini, who departed during the Armistice to offer his services at Blücher’s headquarters. Ney, “the bravest of the brave” had a tendency to forget his rank and join the fray as a grenadier. He had many admirable qualities, but was out of his depth as an Army commander.

COALITION LEADERS

Ivan Ostermann-Tolstoi, Count

The grandson of Tsar Paul’s Chancellor, Ivan Andreievitch Ostermann (his daughter married the grandfather of Lev Tolstoi), distinguished himself at Eylau and Friedland (1807), Ostronovo and Borodino (1812) and at Bautzen (1813). At Kulm, his decision not to retreat towards Maxen that saved the army. Reinforcements arrived after Ostermann had attacked all day. Lost an arm to a ball while he was leading a counterattack of the Preobrashenski Regt.

Crown Prince Karl Johan Bernadotte

Commanded the I Corps of the French army in 1805-06, sent home by Napoleon after Wagram, traveled to Sweden where he became heir to the throne. Acted principally with an eye to preserving his Swedish Corps, in which he succeeded perhaps too well.

Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher

Joined the Swedish Army at age 14, serving against Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. Later he was captured by a regiment of Prussian hussars, a unit which he then joined. An implacable foe of Napoleon, he was still a fiery hussar fifty years later. In 1806, after Auerstädt, Blücher marched to Lubeck only to capitulate at Ratkau. On his release he was received by Napoleon with marks of distinction. He defeated Marshal Macdonald at Katzbach and reached the rank of field marshal after Leipzig. His troops entered Paris on March 31, 1814. The next year he fought Napoleon at Ligny and arrived in the middle of the battle of Waterloo, insuring Napoleon’s defeat. For this his monarch made him Prince of Wahlstadt. He relied heavily on his chief of staff von Gneisenau.

³ Petre, F. Loraine, *Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany*, p. 180

⁴ L.A. Thiers, *History of the Consulate and Empire*, IX, p. 145

Friedrich H. F. Emil Kleist, Graf von Nollendorf
Rose to prominence during the campaign of 1813. His arrival at Kulm surrounded Vandamme. He was present at Leipzig, and the following year fought at Joinvilliers where he was defeated, but he won the battle of Laon against Napoleon.

Johann David L. Yorck, Graf von Wartenburg
In 1794 he took part in the campaign against Poland. In 1806 he was taken prisoner by Bernadotte at Lübeck. Promoted major general after Tilsit, in 1812 he commanded the Prussian division, serving under Macdonald on the northern flank. Negotiated the Convention of Tauroggen with Russia. During 1813 he fought at Lützen, Bautzen and Katzbach. On 3rd October he won the battle of Wartenburg damaging the IV Corps of Bertrand. In 1814 he was at Montmirail and Laon.

Bolesas F. E. Tauentzien, Graf von Wittenberg
In 1806 he fought at Schleiz, leading 9,000 Saxons against Bernadotte, and commanded Hohenlohe's advance guard at Jena. In 1813 he conducted the siege of Stettin; he led IV Corps at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz. After Leipzig he besieged Torgau and Wittenberg.

Friedrich W. von Bülow, Graf von Dennewitz
Commanded the III Corps, distinguished resistance at Grossbeeren saved Berlin. Fought at Leipzig. The year after at Laon, enabled Blücher to hold his positions and repulse Napoleon. Arrival on 18th June 1815 near Plancenoit at 4.00 P.M. was critical to the battle of Waterloo.

THE GROSSBEEREN CAMPAIGN

French Forces

IV Corps (Bertrand)

One Italian, one French and one Württemberg division.

VII Corps (Reynier)

Two Saxon Divisions and one French: Durutte's 32nd Division. Assembled toward the end of 1812 from refractory troops, the division covered the retreat of the Grande Armée at the bridge of Volkovich on 13 November. At Grossbeeren, joined the retreat of the Saxons without firing a shot.

XII Corps (Oudinot)

Two French and one Bavarian divisions.
(*Each corps plus cavalry and artillery.*)

III Cavalry Corps (Arrighi)

Two Light and one Heavy Cavalry Divisions (French);
horse artillery.

As the Armistice expired, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to capture Berlin, cut off Bernadotte's Army and perhaps bring about his withdrawal to the coast. The Emperor highly estimated the moral effect of the capture of the Prussian capital, an administrative and recruiting center vital to the Prussian war effort.

The Prussians had built a defense line south of the capital among the marshes between the Nuthe and Notte Rivers. This line was inadequately defended by two brigades, Borstell's Fifth, in Mittenwalde, and Thümen's Fourth, in Trebbin (just south of the Grossbeeren map outlined on page 47). Recent rains had flooded the region and rendered the road to Trebbin impassable.

On August 17th Oudinot concentrated two Corps at Baruth, 38 miles from Berlin. Reynier's VII Corps joined the force on the following day. Leaving Bertrand in Baruth, Oudinot agreed to switch places with Reynier, taking his XII Corps on the 19th toward Luckenwalde on the left of the advance, with Reynier in the center, following trails to Schönefeld. Oudinot, as Army Commander, should have stayed centrally located. Bertrand's IV Corps, which had already marched from Peitz, had a short and direct route to Berlin, on the right.

Thümen, in Trebbin, reported Oudinot's appearance. Bülow marched out of Berlin with two brigades to Klein Ziethen. Bernadotte ordered the Russians and Swedes away to the west, to Beelitz and Potsdam.

On the 21st, Bertrand marched to Sperenberg and Saalow, camping in the woods around Schünow. Reynier took Nunsdorf, and camped at Christinendorf. Oudinot and Arrighi attacked Trebbin at 1 P.M. and captured it in a four-hour skirmish. The road to Berlin was now open. Thümen and Borstel were exposed to defeat.

Stedingk with the Swedish Corps was ordered to Saarmund, to meet Bülow's two brigades there. Bernadotte believed that Napoleon was present with Oudinot's Army, and wanted to withdraw over the Spree. Bülow refused to retreat, and Bernadotte agreed to remain south of Berlin until certain that Napoleon was present. He sent Bülow from Saarmund to Heinersdorf to block the road to Berlin, while the Swedes and Russians moved to Ruhlsdorf and Gütergotz. In the night of 22nd -23rd Bülow was ordered from Heinersdorf to Ruhlsdorf. At 7 A.M. his units were in place between Heinersdorf and Ruhlsdorf.

Continuing his march, Oudinot prepared to cross the Nuthe Canal at Thyrow, Wilmersdorf, Wietstock and Jühnsdorf. XII Corps on the left, was to march via Ahrensdorf, VII Corps in the centre, via Grossbeeren,

and IV Corps on the right, via Blankenfelde. The terrain, bisected by streams, gullies, marshes and woods precluded mutual support among the three columns.

Bülow ordered Thümen to Heinersdorf and (disobeying orders from Bernadotte) sent Borstell to Birkholz. They started moving toward Lichtenrade, leaving 3 battalions and some guns from Thümen's in Grossbeeren, when the sound of guns were heard coming from Blankenfelde around 10 A.M. (scenario start). Leggiere states that Bernadotte did keep Hessen-Homburg with him for a while leaving only Thümen and Krafft moving with Bülow. Later in the morning Hessen-Homburg was sent to Bülow.

Allied outposts at Trebbin and Munsdorf were forced to retreat. At 3 P.M. on 23 August, Reynier's VII Corps captured Grossbeeren and proceeded to bivouac for the day. Reynier's right was secured by the town of Grossbeeren and a canal just east of the town. On the left, in open ground, Reynier ordered Lecoq to form a large divisional square protected by a few guns.

Approaching from the north, Prussian General von Bülow was determined to retake Grossbeeren. The battle opened with an artillery duel at 5 P.M. Borstell's Brigade attacked Grossbeeren from the east. At 6 P.M., Krafft's Brigade was ordered to attack from the north, while Hessen-Homburg attacked the Saxons around the windmill height (in the fields west of Grossbeeren).

This concentrated attack by three Prussian brigades was too much for Sahr's Saxon Division. Falling back in disorder, the retreating Saxons took Durutte's Division (sent by Reynier to reinforce the Saxons), with them. Both Sahr's and Durutte's Divisions took refuge in the woods south of Grossbeeren. An attempt by Lecoq to take the windmill height failed. With two divisions in flight, Reynier had no choice but to retreat.

Meanwhile, at 8 P.M., Fournier's Light Cavalry Division appeared on the scene. Half an hour later, Guilleminot's 14th Division arrived. Both had been sent by Oudinot from Ahrensdorf to reinforce Reynier. However, it was too late. The battle was lost. Oudinot withdrew and Berlin was saved.

Conclusion

What if the Emperor had pressed ahead in person with the advance on Berlin? All would then hinge on a great battle at Dresden. He would be marching to the recapture of Dresden instead of to its rescue. Meanwhile Macdonald's collapse would enable Blücher to intervene on the Elbe by the 31st. Blücher and Schwarzenberg's juncture would bring about the decisive battle of the campaign. Napoleon would have had to win without the supplies stored in Dresden.

THE KATZBACH CAMPAIGN

Napoleon left Dresden in the afternoon of August 15th, reaching Bautzen on the 16th. There he heard of the transfer of the Russian Army from Silesia to Bohemia.

In the evening of the 17th Napoleon was at Reichenbach, on the 18th at Görlitz. Here he learnt that Wittgenstein, with 40,000 Russians, had reached Bohemia, and that the Austrians had passed the Elbe for parts unknown. Napoleon moved to Zittau on the 19th, to get a clearer picture of the enemy's intentions. During the day he went forward in person with a strong reconnaissance as far as Gabel, inside Bohemia.

He was back at Görlitz by 2 P.M. on the 20th, ready to move against Blücher, who that evening stood east of the Bober opposite Löwenberg. By then Napoleon had reached Lauban, on the Queiss, and issued orders for the attack.

Blücher determinedly avoided combat according to the Trachtenberg principles, and played cat and mouse with Napoleon, waiting to turn around and strike at Macdonald once the Emperor had moved off.

On the 22nd, the Emperor heard from St. Cyr of the danger threatening Dresden. Turning the command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, he hastened back toward Dresden with the Guard. Napoleon had lost the initiative. Macdonald was ordered to protect Napoleon's communications toward Zittau as well as Oudinot's flank. To prevent Blücher's interference, Macdonald was to push the Prussians back beyond Jauer and then take post on the Bober, with three divisions of III Corps near Bunzlau and three divisions of XI Corps at Löwenberg, the 4th division in reserve on the Queiss, and the V Corps near Hirschberg.

Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to Dresden, so as to leave only one marshal on the Bober. Misinterpreting his orders, Ney marched with his III Corps towards Bunzlau.

After some considerable losses in combat at Goldberg on the 22nd, Blücher fell back on Jauer on the 23rd, expecting to be attacked next day. The French took up their August 15th positions on Leignitz, Goldberg and Lowenberg. Descrying Napoleon's departure in the ensuing quiet, Blücher decided to advance. Misinterpreting Napoleon's directives, Macdonald at the same moment decided upon an offensive across the Katzbach. So far in the campaign, the French had lost about 5,000 men in combat and Blücher's Army of Silesia about 8,000. A further 8,000 French and 19,000 Coalition troops had fallen away from their colors. See Table on page 23.

French Forces

III Corps (Souham) 40,350 men

4 divisions, 8th-11th, Marchand's 39th having been provisionally transferred to the XI.

V Corps (Lauriston) 27,814 men

4 divisions, 16th-19th

XI Corps (Gérard) 24,691 men

4 divisions, 31st, 35th, 36th, 39th divisions

II Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani) 10,898 men

2nd and 4th Light, 2nd Hvy Cavalry Divisions

The Battle of the Katzbach

Macdonald ordered III Corps "to cross the Katzbach below Kroitzsch, and to reach the Liegnitz-Jauer road. XI Corps (less Ledru's divisions) and Sebastiani to cross the Katzbach at Kroitzsch, then to cross the Niesse and march towards Jauer... V Corps (only two divisions) to advance from Goldberg by Seichau on Jauer along the left bank of the Neisse. The Marshal, alarmed by the appearance of St. Priest on his right flank, detached Puthod's division of V Corps—marching on the Goldberg-Schoenau road just off the game map—to reach Schönau on the 27th, and to detach one brigade 18 miles to the right to Hirschberg, whither also Ledru's division of the XI Corps was to go."

"Before Blücher's orders of 11 A.M. on the 26th issued, the two advancing armies had met and begun the battle.

"At the commencement the opposing forces were thus grouped—

"On the left bank of the Neisse, Langeron with 31,000 men faced Lauriston with 23,000. Langeron's position ran from the Neisse along the Silberfließ brook and the Plinsengrund.

"On the plateau of the right bank were the allied forces of Yorck and Sacken, 48,000 strong; against these were advancing, though much separated, the XI and III Corps, and Sebastiani's cavalry, about 61,000 in all.

"Blücher was quite as surprised to find the French on the offensive as Macdonald was to find Blücher advancing."⁵

The French reached the plateau in two columns. Their cavalry, mingled in with their marching column, caused much confusion as it pressed forward through the infantry.

By 2 P.M. part of the XI Corps and Sebastiani had reached the line Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinberg while the others were still struggling to climb onto the heights from the Neisse. Souham with

the III Corps, which had been off marching on Dresden, had not yet reached the Katzbach.

Blücher advanced with Yorck's men, encouraging them with the words, "I have enough French over there," and telling them to use the bayonet, as their muskets would not go off in the heavy rain. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued. "In one place the pile of overturned guns and ammunition wagons completely blocked the Nieder Krain road.... The whole of the French who had ascended the plateau from the Neisse were sent streaming down again in wild confusion. The river, which had been small in the morning, was now a raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives were drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by the overcrowded bridge at Nieder Krain. That village was captured by the pursuing Prussians before darkness finally stopped the combat."⁶ The Prussians lost about 35% of their forces engaged. The French lost 36 guns, 110 wagons, and 12,000+ prisoners.

THE KULM CAMPAIGN

Leaving Macdonald in charge on the Bober, Napoleon was at Bautzen by 3 P.M. on the 24th. By 7 a.m. the following day, he was at Stolpen, where the road branches toward the Königstein fort on the Elbe. Any thoughts of debouching by that fort into Bohemia were dashed by Gourgaud's report on the incompleteness of the Dresden fortifications, and Napoleon decided to march direct to the Saxon capital with the bulk of his forces.

The Prussians began their attack on the outskirts of Dresden early in the morning of the 26th. "The early attacks spread alarm among the inhabitants, who were aware that the allied troops were especially bitter against them."

Leaving Stolpen in his carriage at 5 A.M., the Emperor traveled 12 miles to reach the outskirts of Dresden by 8:30. There he mounted his horse to gallop across the bridge and into town, between 9 and 10 A.M. He received an ovation from troops and citizens alike, and proceeded to direct his last great victory.

Coalition Forces

The Allies marched on Dresden with over 120,000 men. Of these some 38,000 men were lost in the battle of the 26th-27th and the subsequent pursuit. The whole left wing beyond the Weisseritz—manned by the Austrians of Weissenwolf, Meszko and A. Liechtenstein's columns—was practically destroyed. By the 29th the French had collected 12,535 prisoners in Dresden; this

⁵ Petre, p. 252. Petre quotes August 15th strengths here.

⁶ Petre, pp. 254-255.

number had reached 23,518 (including 15,000 Austrians) by the 8th of October.⁷

French Forces

Ist Corps—General Vandamme (31,610, 15 Aug.)

Two of the best-trained of Davout's divisions of French Cohorts, with newly-added Conscripts; one division formed during the armistice of French conscripts. Plus cavalry, artillery and train. *Troops en route—1,415*

Vandamme's force comprised the I Corps, above (less O'Meara's brigade of Teste's Div.); the 42nd Infantry Division, attached from XIV Corps; Corbineau's cavalry; Reuss's brigade on loan from II Corps; and the bridge train, taken up from Pirna, intended to be thrown across the Elbe further up.

Topography

The Erz Gebirge ("Ore Mountains"), a ridge running from the Elbe River SW along the Austro-Saxon frontier, has peaks above 2500 feet. From Aussig to Pirna the Elbe twists around this mountain chain in a horse-shoe bend.

Five roads traverse these mountains: (1) from Pirna through *Peterswalde* to Kulm; (2) from Maxen through *Glashütte* and Dittersdorf, Furstenwald and Muglitz to Priesten; (3) from Dippoldiswald to Altenburg, *Zinnwald*, Eichwald and Teplitz; (4) the main road to Dux; (5) the road from Marienberg to Komotau.

From Dresden to Kulm

After their defeat at Dresden, the Coalition forces were struggling back across the Erz Gebirge via the roads named above into Bohemia. The French pursued, hampered by a lack of cavalry, in several columns: (1) Murat, driving straight west toward Freiburg. (2) Marmont, whose orders were late, to follow the enemy main body on Dippoldiswald; (3) St. Cyr on Dohna and Maxen; (4) Mortier with the Young Guard following the Elbe toward Pirna, where initially Napoleon planned to move his HQ; (5) Vandamme advancing toward Berggieshübel on the Peterswalde road.

The original orders for the Coalition retreat were drafted by staff officers Toll and Radetzky, at 4 P.M. on August 27th. These called for three separate columns:

- Barclay de Tolly via the Peterswalde road. To avoid Vandamme, Barclay instead ordered:
- Russo-Prus. Reserves via Zinnwalde, Peterswalde or by Maxen if Vandamme stood in the way;
- Kleist's Prussians via Glasshütte;

- Wittgenstein's Russians as rearguard on the heights of Leubnitz (Klüt) and Prohlis.
- The Austrians east of the Weisseritz River (i.e., Chasteler, Colloredo, Nostitz, Bianchi and Hohenlohe) would retreat by the Zinnwalde Road. They reached Altenberg on the 28th, and Dux on the 29th. Their rearguard under M. Liechtenstein was at Wendisch Carsdorf on the 28th, Falkenhain on the 29th, and Altenberg early on the 30th.
- Klenau with the Left Wing (Czöllich and A. Liechtenstein with the remains of Mesko, Bianchi, Crenneville and Weissenwolf) was ordered via Tharandt and Freiberg to Marienberg and Komotau. Due to Murat's advance, Klenau moved by Potzschappel, Gittersee and Rabenau to Pretzschendorf on August 28th; Waltersdorf on the 29th; and Marienberg on the 30th.

Convinced that the Coalition main body was going by Dohna and Dippoldiswalde, Napoleon hoped to reach Teplitz by the shorter and better road through Peterswalde, with the three nearest corps of Vandamme, Mortier, and St. Cyr. Reaching Teplitz, first he would inflict great damage on their columns as they debouched in disorder from the mountain passes, pursued by the rest of his army. He rode off to Pirna intending to arrive early on the 30th.

However, at 4:30 P.M. on the 29th he received reports that the "enemy army is retiring by Altenberg on Teplitz," and, concluding that Vandamme would not encounter any serious opposition near Kulm, he redirected Mortier and St. Cyr, and returned, himself, to Dresden.

That day, Vandamme fought a series of actions on the Peterswalde road against Eugen of Württemberg and Osterman with the Russian Guard. Starting out in the morning at Hellendorf, there were rearguard actions at Peterswalde, Nollendorf, and Vorder Tellnitz.

Vandamme took possession of Kulm at 10 A.M. His troops were still spread-out in a long column in the pass over the mountains. Believing that "he was only going to have another small rearguard action like those he had already had earlier in the morning, he sent Reuss' brigade to try and cut the Russians from the mountains by their left."⁸ Osterman had 14,700 men with his left on the wooded heights above Straden (2013), his centre in and west of Priesten (2317), and his right between Priesten and Karwitz (2419).

Vandamme took Straden but was quickly thrown back. Then, as nine battalions of the 42nd division arrived, it was taken again. With more troops arriving,

⁷ The Austrians lost at Dresden 1,164 dead, 5,405 wounded, 3,779 captured, and 5,442 missing.

⁸ Petre, p. 234

Vandamme advanced against Priesten, took the village and then lost it again.

At 2 P.M. Philippon arrived with fourteen fresh battalions. Priesten was once again taken, and lost, by Vandamme. At 5 P.M. Vandamme made his decisive attack. But Coalition reinforcements under Barclay were now beginning to arrive, particularly cavalry, which drove the French back.

Marmont, following Wittgenstein, reached Falkenhain on the Zinnwald road. St. Cyr, following Kleist, had a sharp fight with him at Glashütte. In the mistaken belief he was opposed by a flank guard and not a rear guard, St. Cyr continued by the Rheinhartsgrinna valley, leaving Kleist on his own and unpursued.

During the night elements of Vandamme's force continued to arrive. Several columns of Coalition troops were nearby: Colloredo and Bianchi south of Teplitz, Chasteler on the road to Dux, Wittgenstein on the heights of Altenberg. The head of Kleist's column reached Furstenau (1105).

Proceeding directly to Ebersdorf (1909), Kleist learned that the direct roads over the Geiersberg, by Graupen (1216) and (1813), were blocked by friendly troops. The other forest roads, running through deep valleys, were impracticable for large forces, so Kleist chose to march through Streckenwald (2603) to Nollendorf (3603) and cut his way through Vandamme's Corps.

His orders were for assembly at 3 A.M. The troops set out at 5, and by 8 A.M. they had reached Nollendorf, but confusion caused delays and the head of the column only began to appear around the bend (3507) about 11 A.M.

The fighting at Kulm resumed at 7 A.M. Vandamme had his right up in the hills above the Eggmühl, his centre across the Teplitz road in front of Kulm (2714), and his left stretching as far as Böhmisch Neudörfel (3019). After his losses of about 6,000 on the previous day Vandamme had about 32,000 soldiers remaining. Having suffered equal losses, the Coalition forces facing him numbered about 44,000 men.

After taking the Striesowitz Berg, the Russians began to move on Arbesau (3212). Vandamme set up a defensive flank with Quiot's and Duhesme's brigades, and Kulm itself seemed untenable.

Then cannon shots were heard from the direction of Tellnitz. Vandamme, who believed Mortier still had orders to support him from Pirna, was convinced the troops were French; very soon he realized the truth. Deciding to abandon his artillery, he tried to fight his way through Kleist's Corps about Schande, Arbesau and up the highway. The Prussian Landwehr troops

were terrified to see a mass of French cavalry and infantry surging their way. They moved aside and were unable to prevent part of the French escaping.

Kleist himself only escaped capture by taking by-paths through the woods. Vandamme was captured as he sought to escape alone into the hills. To the allies after the disaster of Dresden this was a welcome victory.

The I Corps had been nearly destroyed. Prisoners numbered 8,000 to 10,000 and 5,000 were killed or wounded, 66 guns, 200 wagons and generals Haxo, Guyot and Heimbrot. By Sept. 2 the main battle force that had numbered 34,000, had only 8,400 survivors. The Austrians lost 817 men, the Russians 9,000, and the Prussians 1,500 including 1,000 prisoners.

The Emperor finally ordered Mortier to support Vandamme on the 30th, when it was too late. Had the order been dispatched by 5 P.M. on the 29th Mortier could have reached Peterswalde early on the morning of the 30th, and would have attacked Kleist at Nollendorf.

Marmont drove Wittgenstein's rear-guard from Altenberg, and again from the Zinnwald plateau (0807). Reaching almost up to Eichwald (0118), in the evening he heard through St. Cyr, in Furstenwalde, of Vandamme's disaster.

Conclusion

Knowing his own worth in battle and the miraculous effect of his presence on the young troops, the Emperor stands accused of not going where the action was. It is difficult to see how he can be defended from this charge—certainly not on the grounds of indigestion.

Why was Napoleon not in personal command at all four of these battles? The Emperor could not be everywhere, but might have been present at two, if not three of them. He might have been at the battle of the Katzbach—he had just been with Macdonald days before that battle. He didn't plan on going with Oudinot to Berlin. Had he been with Vandamme and Mortier at Kulm, the damage to the Bohemian army would have been severe.

His original plan to follow up behind Vandamme with the guard was correct. He changed his mind, some authors speculate, because of a dish of rabbit with garlic that made him feel ill. Also at that time he received news of the first two lost battles, and went back to Dresden instead of leading the pursuit, from where he could better evaluate the intelligence he was getting. The idea that the Allied army had retreated along one and the same road might have been succeeded by the realization that they had taken several roads.

Napoleon is out of step in this campaign, and the Coalition holds the overall initiative, controlling events while Napoleon is reduced to delayed reactions, usual to cancel or weaken an offensive of his own—which alone could restore him the initiative.

THE DENNEWITZ CAMPAIGN

Coalition Forces

III Corps, Bulow: 3rd Bde Hesse-Homburg, 4th Bde Thümen, 5th Bde Borstell, 6th Bde Krafft.

IV Corps, Tautentzien: 1st Bde Dobschutz, 2nd Bde Lindenau

French Forces

IV Corps, Bertrand: 12th Div Morand, 15th Div Fontanelli, 38th Div Franquemont, 24th Lt Cav Bde Jett, 27th Div Dombrowski, 18th Lt Cav Bde Krakowski.

VII Corps Reynier: 24th Div Lecoq, 25th Div Sahr, 32nd Div Durutte, 26th Lt Cav Bde.

XII Corps Oudinot: 13th Div Paethod, 14th Div Guilleminot, 29th Div Raglovich, Cav Bde Beaumont.

III Cavalry Corps Arrighi: 5th Lt Cav Div Lorge, 6th Lt Cav Div Fournier, 4th Heavy Cav Div Defrance.

By the end of August, Napoleon's strategy was in disarray. With Oudinot's reverse at Grossbeeren, Bernadotte was free to descend on the rear of the Grande Armée and its vital supply line on the Elbe. To parry this threat the Emperor was determined to capture the Prussian capital and secure his northern flank. Leaving four corps at Dresden under Marshal Murat, Napoleon prepared to move north with the Imperial Guard, the VI Corps, and a portion of the I Cavalry Corps. These units, numbering 18,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry as they reached Grossenhain on the 31st, were recalled upon tidings of Vandamme's reverse at Kulm.

On September 2nd, Ney was placed in charge of the Army of Berlin and ordered to march to Baruth by the sixth, to attack Berlin on the ninth or tenth. Ney was instructed to avoid Oudinot's mistake: "He was so clever that he allowed one of his corps to be isolated and defeated. If he had boldly attacked the enemy, he would have defeated him everywhere." The Emperor was prepared to resume his march on Luckau to support the offensive on Berlin, but a renewed offensive by Blücher caused him to delay the Guard's march on Luckau and recall the troops that had already set out. He promised Ney on the 3rd that he would quickly march on Berlin after dealing with Blücher, but only started to move the VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps north early on September 6th. (This move was cancelled again when news arrived of Schwarzenberg's advance toward Dresden.)

Marshal Ney, still believing in a junction with Napoleon, started the offensive with an eastward move toward Dahme. On September 5th Oudinot's Corps advanced to Zahna, Reynier to Bülzig and Bertrand to Euper. At Zahna, General Dobschutz's twelve battalions, supported by cavalry and artillery, were driven back upon Zallmsdorf. The French bivouacked for the night at Leetza, Zallmsdorf and Sayda, Seehausen and Naundorf.

The Prussian von Bülow ordered his Third Corps to Werkzahna in order to shadow Ney's advance on its left. However, Borstell's 5th Brigade was detained by Bernadotte at the defiles of Köpnick, Woltersdorf, Werkzahna and Kropstädt, depriving Bülow of a quarter of his strength. Bülow's cavalry reached Kurzlippsdorf in the evening—a mile from the French IV Corps at Seehausen and Naundorf—followed by his three brigades and guns which arrived by daybreak. Bernadotte ordered the Swedes and Russians to concentrate at Lobbesse.

On the 6th Ney continued his march toward Dahme, with Reynier moving on Rohrbeck and Bertrand marching through Dennewitz to reach Jüterbog. Oudinot was ordered to Öhna, but waited for VII Corps to pass first through Gadegast. VII Corps, meanwhile, did not appear, marching direct on Dennewitz.

Bülow watched Bertrand's IV Corps march along the main highway toward Jüterbog. He ordered his Corps to Eckmannsdorf, where a chain of low hills provided cover for an attack. Each brigade formed two lines with the right on Dahna and the left on the road to Dalichow. At 9 AM the lead units of Bertrand's column crested the chain of hills south of Dennewitz. Tautentzien, who attempted to maneuver around Bertrand's column to unite with Bülow, was caught in the open plain northeast of Dennewitz. Bülow advanced with Thümen's brigade on his left and Krafft on the right, marching past Kaltenborn to Niedergörsdorf. The marshy Ahebach stream, arising there, and fordable only with difficulty, divided the battlefield. A strong southwest wind created swirling dust clouds that intermittently reduced visibility to 100 yards.

Tautentzien's single reserve infantry and four Landwehr regiments were driven back—the Kurmark Landwehr broke and ran. He launched his nine squadrons of Landwehr cavalry against Fontanelli's Italian Division which succumbed to this unexpected charge. French cavalry under Lorge, sent to break up the charging Prussians, were thrown back through their supporting infantry in turn. Finally the experienced Morand stopped the Prussians in their tracks. But the panic continued to spread through Dennewitz, infecting Bertrand's baggage train.

During the respite following the Landwehr's charge, von Bülow deployed his corps from Niedergörsdorf, causing Ney to withdraw upon Dennewitz. The fate of the battle then devolved upon control of the hills northwest of the town, the commanding Denkmalsberg and the adjacent Windmill Hill. Morand was driven off the hills and back into a gully between the Windmill Hill and the Pine thicket. Supported by Durutte's division, just arrived (from VII Corps), Morand retook the Windmill Hill until forced off by Prussian guns on the Denkmalsberg.

Ney refused to abandon the ground north of the Ahebach, counting on the arrival of Reynier and Oudinot to redress the balance of forces. The arriving VII Corps deployed between Dennewitz and Gölsdorf; further reinforcements drove the Prussians from Gölsdorf. Panic was beginning to spread in Prussian ranks.

Borstell had spent the morning awaiting permission from Berndadotte to leave his assigned position. Marching to the sound of the guns, he arrived at 3 P.M., deploying west of Gölsdorf.

A Saxon advance beyond Gölsdorf would decide the battle, and the approaching Swedes could not arrive in time to stop them (some Swedish cavalry and horse artillery were able to join in the pursuit).

Seeking to regain the northern sector, Ney sent Durutte's second brigade against the Dennewitz Windmill Hill, against a murderous fire from the Denkmalsberg. Outflanked by Thümen's troops from the Pine Thicket, they were forced to relinquish the hilltop again. By 4:30, Durutte's division was back behind the Ahebach.

Still determined to reach Jüterbog, Ney ordered Bertrand into one more attempt. Fatally depriving the Saxons of their moral support, he called-up Oudinot's XII Corps toward Dennewitz.

To restore morale, Bülow ordered his right wing to advance. This attack, corresponding with Oudinot's withdrawal, spelled the end of Ney's offensive. Krafft's Prussians pried the village away from Lecoq's Saxon troops by 4 P.M. The Prussians lost 40 officers and 1,228 casualties in retaking Gölsdorf; and 49 officers and 1,318 men in storming the hills north of the village. The Saxon defenders lost 1,500.

The victory cost the III Corps 6,700 men, plus 3,000 in Tauenzien's Corps. The Army of Berlin lost 8,000 dead and wounded, 13,500 prisoners, 53 guns, and 412 wagons—a third of the army.

DESIGN NOTES

KEVIN ZUCKER

Alessandro Fontana created the original version of the four battles in this package because of a love of the subject. These four share an accidental quality, unlike the massive battles of Lützen and Bautzen in the Spring, and Dresden and Leipzig in the Fall. These four lost battles—what we would call critical battles—occurred without Napoleon in person. It's like *Quatre-Bras* or *Wavre*, with only Ney and Grouchy. While the Allies attacked desperately in the Emperor's absence, the French Marshals failed to help each other when their master's eyes were not upon them. The outcome of these battles more than erased the French victory at Dresden, and led inexorably to Leipzig.

The basics of the four battles are the same as *Napoleon's Last Battles*. All leadership and command rules remain the same. As in *Last Battles* Leaders can fail, and units can be wasted, leaving players hesitant to commit them, like the real generals.

But since *NLB* time has not stood still.

From *Seven Days of 1809* and other games in the "Days" Series, we borrowed rules for Hidden Forces, Vedettes, Leader Escorts, March Orders, Road March, Trains, Repulse, Shock Combat, Heavy Cavalry and Bombardment (including a new Bombardment Table).

Then came the real challenge of this design.

In most wargames, the force structure and arrival schedule is not a mystery. Everyone on both sides knows exactly who is coming. But in the Napoleonic era, the uncertainty faced by commanders on both sides played an important role in the way battles developed. In these four battles nobody really knew where the enemy was and in what strength, or even which other friendly corps might be joining him. We have used the cards to provide a taste of this uncertainty. The player will not really know whether he's facing all the troops he's eventually going to face and from which direction they will come.

In the Battle of Kulm uncertainty will play the largest role. Vandamme thought Mortier and even St. Cyr might be joining him. Instead, he got Kleist coming up behind him. When he began the engagement there was only one weak Allied corps in front of him. He ended up facing more than 40,000 enemies, even before Kleist arrived.

The deployment cards keep your reinforcement schedule hidden from you and the other player. Still, the French Player will know more than Vandamme

knew. That will make it possible to arrive on the battlefield more cautiously. He's going to know what forces are within striking distance of the battlefield, and will make allowances. If Vandamme had had scouts combing through those mountains in other directions, he would have had plenty of time to withdraw from the battle—possibly toward Aussig and safety behind the Elbe River—before Kleist arrived.

The second goal of the cards is to reveal in the Campaign Game how success or failure on one battlefield impacted the other battles. That is done through the provision of additional "Bonus Cards."

If you have a copy of *Struggle of Nations* (published by AH and long out of print), you will see each of the four battles taking in an area of eight by ten miles (4 x 5 hexes on that map). We studied the campaign on the *SoN* map to determine the attrition the forces would have suffered before arriving in battle.

LINE OF SIGHT

On a completely flat surface such as the ocean, the horizon is seven miles distant. The means of communication of the time would not allow the control of large forces at that range, even though one might be able to catch a glimpse of something through a gap in the trees and hills.

COMMAND AND TIME

A lot can happen in a short hour's duration. Units may await orders for minutes on end, then start in motion at a rate of up to 3 miles per hour (on roads), potentially attacking from the march (that has to take some time). It is unlikely that a single unit could march for more than 30 minutes in a turn when it also attacks.

COMMAND RADIUS

An army is an organism. It can only move in certain ways. It has to move in a coordinated way, and it has to remain in a relatively compact formation in order to be coordinated. Coordination on the battlefield comes from the top down, through the chain of command.

By the time word of an event reaches the commander, he issues an order and sends it off, 15 minutes may have been lost, hence the 4-hex Command Radius (just over one mile). The officer's 3-hex radius is based on keeping his entire corps in visual contact; he has to see in order to coordinate the action of his units. Possibly the officer's radius should be subject to LOS, blocked by crests and woods, but to avoid imposing a burden on the players, some latitude

was allowed for the use of gallopers in the case of officers too.

An aide carrying an order can reasonably travel about 5.6 miles (18 hexes) on the battlefield in one hour. That is the figure we have traditionally used. However, we found the rate of travel reduced in 1809, partly because of the “cumbrous troopers” borrowed for the staff from Nansouty’s Heavy Cavalry Division. These rates varied depending upon whether orders were dispatched and received during the day (range 4.2–8 mph; avg. 6.1 mph) during the night (range 1.2–5.7 mph; avg. 3.13 mph), or dispatched night and received day (range 0.8–2.6 mph; avg. 1.7 mph).

The most significant complication for the courier is when the recipient HQ is on the move. The average speeds above do not reflect wrong turns taken in trying to follow in its wake.

A table in van Creveld’s *Command in War* on page 88 covers 11-12 October, 1806. The speeds there are significantly higher: range 4.5–5.8 mph; avg. 5.6 mph; dispatched night/arrived day.

We don’t have any data on 1813 but have retained 5.6 mph in the rules, guessing that 1809 was an aberration because of the torpid pace of the mounts.

Once an order arrives, how long did it take to respond? If it was an order to march, the time lag before the start of the march ranged from one-half to four hours; average was 1:26.

MARCHES

Infantry Marches are based upon an average speed of 2.4 mph over roads. At 14 hours per day a unit could cover 28.8 miles, including two one-hour halts in that period. A normal march would take 8 hours on the road and two at rest (25.2 miles), then Forced March would add another 4 hours and another 10 miles or so.

Marches

<i>Pas</i>	<i>accélééré</i>	<i>Lt. Inf.</i>	<i>ordinaire</i>
Steps	100	85	76
Pace	x36"	x30"	x30"
	3,600"	2,550"	2,880"
meters	91.46	64.78	58
min.	x 55	x 55	x 55
	5030m	3560m	3186m
hexes	10.5	7.42	6.63
MPs	5	4	3

Note: “Steps” is steps per minute. “Pace” is the length of stride, estimated. (A military pace varies between 30" and 36" on good quality road.)

REORGANIZATION

Demoralized troops are harder to reorganize. The presence of cavalry was enough to keep units with wet powder from reforming anywhere on the battlefield.

When units broke they often fled (right through standing formations to rout them in turn) and that ended their part in the battle. One Prussian brigadier was mortally wounded by his own lancers at Katzbach, trying to rally them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Petre, F. Loraine, *Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany*
 Nafziger, Geo., *Napoleon at Dresden*
 Bowden, Scott, *Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813*
 Riley, Jonathan P., *Napoleon and the World War of 1813*
 Leggiere, Michael, *Napoleon and Berlin*
 Esposito and Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars*
 Fabry, G., *Gross Beeren*
 Foerster, F., *Beitrage zur Geschichte der Befreiungskreige Schlacht an der Katzbach*
 Friederich, Rudolph, *Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges 1813*
 Quistorp, Barthold v., *Geschichte der Nord Armee im Jahre 1813*
 Zucker, K., *The Struggle of Nations (simulation)*
 Mané, D., *Les Armées à Gross-Beeren—L’armée Française de Berlin*
 Mané, D., *La 32e Division du Comte Durutte.*
 MAP SOURCE: Woerl, J.E., *Schlachten-Atlas 1792 1815.*

(continued from page 2)

It is the most difficult to assess Attrition. We created March Tables for each formation to determine its rate of march (this would tell us whether it suffers for extra long marches at Forced March rates).

For example, here is the March Table that we used to determine Macdonald's Attrition prior to Katzbach.

	Souham	Lauriston	Macdonald	Sebastiani
13N	40,000 Liegnitz	27,000 Goldberg	24,000 Low- enberg	11,000 Liegnitz
14N		"		
15N		"		
16N	1,500 5 MPs			125 men 5 MPs
17N	1,500 4 MPs	"		1,500 4 MPs FM
18N	Bunzlau	"		1,000 4 MPs FM
19N		375 men 5 MPs	125 men 2 MPs	-0- 2 MPs
20N	Bunzlau	Low- enberg	Low- enberg 125 men 2 MPs	Bunzlau -0- 2 MPs
21N	1,500 5 MPs	125 men 2 MPs	Lauterse- iffen 125 men 2 MPs	-0- 2 MPs
22N	Haynau	Seiffenau 1,000 4 MPs	Seiffenau 1,000 4 MPs	625 4 MPs
23N	375 men 3.5 MPs	Flensburg		
24N		1,000 4 MPs	1,000 4 MPs	
25N	Liegnitz	Goldberg	Schmoglitz	Schmoglitz
	4,875	2,500	2,375	3,250

Attrition losses for this period: 13,000 men

Not shown: the 35th Division's 2nd Bde, which starts at Lahn.

Combat Losses in the Silesian Campaign ("Fr." means the French Army of the Bober and "Co." means Blücher's Army of Silesia.)

*Estimated losses in men, killed and wounded,
with prisoners included where known.*

	Fr.	Co.	
Goldberg (Rochlitz), 17 August			
Blucher's Adv Gd (Lobenthal)	40	41	k/w
Siebeneichen, 18 August			
Italians - 2,000	200	120	pris
Siebeneichen, 19 August			
	260	200	pris
Wolfshayn, 19 August			
French 10 th Div, 11 th Div - 3,000	544		k/w
Russian 27 th Div.		400	
Bunzlau (Modelsdorf), 21 Aug			
French 8 th Div, 9 th Div, II Res. Cav - 2,000	500		k/w
Sacken		750	k/w
		400	pris
Plagwitz, 21 August			
French V Corps , 16 th Div. - 1,000	500		
Yorck (Karl v Meck) and Kapzevich (X Corps)		500	
Lauterseifen and Pilgramsdorf, 22 August			
(Pursuit of Blucher) - 1,000	500	500	
Goldberg, 23 August			
French V Corps - 3,000	1200		
Mecklenburg's Bde		1780	k/w
Wolfsberg Hts, 23 August			
1,000	350	497	k/w
Subtotal of losses listed above	4094	5188	k/w/ pris
Combat losses for this period	5000	8000	

Attrition (From table at left) 13,000 19,000

TOTAL LOSS 18,000 27,000

CHARLES: PUT VOHLERS NOTES TO TABLES HERE

CHARLES: PUT COMBAT TABLES HERE