



DILIGENCE IS DUE

The exploitation of migrant workers through G4S
Qatar's unfair recruitment practices

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List of acronyms

AGTC	Al-Attiyah Group of Trading Companies
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
G4S Global	G4S global business operations, part of Allied Universal®
G4S Qatar	G4S Qatar S.P.C., G4S franchise in Qatar; owned by Al-Attiyah Group of Trading Companies
G4S Kenya	G4S Limited, G4S branch in Kenya
GSS Certis	GSS Certis International (GSSCI), formed from a franchise agreement between Certis and Group Security System (GSS), Qatar
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KES	Kenyan shillings
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSI	Multi-stakeholder initiative
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
QAR	Qatari riyal
QDVC	Qatari Diar Vinci Construction
QVC	Qatar Visa Centre
TIP	Trafficking in Persons Report
UGX	Ugandan shillings
UNI	UNI Global Union
USD	United States dollars

Executive summary

Main concerns

In Qatar, the collection of recruitment fees and related costs from migrant workers is prohibited, yet the practice remains widespread. Qatari companies recruit migrant workers from various countries, where the labour laws and their enforcement, particularly regarding recruitment fees, are more lenient or completely non-existent. Private security giant, G4S Global, is no exception.

While G4S Global has committed to ending the collection of recruitment fees from migrant workers by 2026 under its Employer Pays Principle, no strategic plans have been announced for how G4S Qatar aims to achieve this goal. Furthermore, G4S Global has denied accountability for its G4S Qatar's unfair recruitment practices in the past, citing G4S Qatar's autonomous nature as an independent franchise. G4S Qatar has a workforce of 8,000 employees, many of whom are recruited from South Asian and African countries and report paying recruitment fees.

The collection of recruitment fees by migrant workers is deemed unethical and unfair by both the Government of Qatar and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). To secure jobs abroad, migrant workers regularly take out loans with interest in order to afford the exorbitant fees. This accumulated debt can increase a migrant worker's risk of falling into debt bondage while raising their vulnerability to

exploitation. Even in less extreme circumstances, it leads to situations in which workers are stuck in unfavourable working and living conditions. In such cases, returning home is not a realistic option as job insecurity could push them further into indebtedness. Migrant workers' salaries are split between loan repayment, remittances for family, and personal living costs. This inevitably delays their ability to save and meaningfully improve their socioeconomic status.

Research objectives and methodology

This report presents an in-depth study of the unfair recruitment practices of G4S's franchise in Qatar. The research was conducted between April 2021 and December 2021, with the aim of collecting and analysing significant evidence of G4S's engagement in unfair recruitment practices. This includes understanding the prevalence of recruitment fee payment by G4S Qatar migrant workers, the amount paid in fees, and the impacts of unethical recruitment.

Information was gathered through extensive surveys and interviews via social media with 40 former and current G4S Qatar employees from seven different countries: Kenya, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Nepal, and Uganda. These interviewees were found through connections via two UNI Global Union contract workers based in Kenya and social media (Twitter, Facebook,

LinkedIn). Workers explained the recruitment process from their home countries to G4S Qatar, with a focus on recruitment fee payment. They also elaborated on the methods of financing their recruitment fees, and the challenges of loan repayment. For every one worker that responded, there were numerous others who either did not reply or were too uncomfortable to complete the interview, highlighting the sensitivity of this issue.

To complement the data received from G4S Qatar migrant workers, individual interviews with three recruiters based in Kenya with links to G4S Qatar were interviewed via Zoom. Additionally, consultations with various migration and human rights experts were conducted throughout the research to better understand the context and support the formulation of recommendations.

Research findings

This report provides clear evidence of the collection of significant amounts in recruitment fees from migrant workers who are seeking employment at G4S Qatar. 39 out of the 40 former and current workers of G4S Qatar involved in this research reported having paid a recruitment fee. The average payment was US\$1,525, which is 4.6 times the reported monthly salary at G4S Qatar and 5.5 times the legal minimum monthly salary in Qatar. 70 percent of those who paid a fee had to take out a loan; of the workers who borrowed, 71 percent reported difficulties with loan repayment. The average time taken to complete loan repayment was 9.3 months.

Furthermore, interviews with the three Kenya-based recruiters with links to

G4S Qatar complemented the data collected from migrant workers. They all reported (i) charging G4S Qatar migrant workers recruitment fees, (ii) not receiving service fees or compensation from G4S Qatar in exchange for their recruitment services, and (iii) that if G4S were to bear the full cost of recruitment, they would no longer need to charge migrant workers any recruitment fees. Notably, two of the recruiters reported direct collaboration between G4S Qatar and G4S Kenya in organising local recruitment drives to recruit migrant workers for G4S Qatar. This implicates G4S Global in G4S Qatar's unfair recruitment practices because G4S Kenya is entirely owned by G4S Global. This finding explicitly contradicts the claim that G4S Qatar operates completely independently from G4S Global.

Key recommendations

This research report presents three proposals to G4S Qatar that will positively impact its migrant workers. All three proposals involve immediately ending the collection of recruitment fees and related costs from migrant workers is immediate. Proposal 1 includes a payback scheme in which all former and current G4S employees are reimbursed for the recruitment fees they unfairly incurred. Proposal 2 also includes a payback scheme, but only for current G4S Qatar employees. Proposal 3 solely involves the immediate end to the charging of recruitment fees on migrant workers. Further recommendations for a range of stakeholders, including G4S Global, G4S's clients, the Government of Qatar, and governments of origin countries, are also presented.

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We are deeply appreciative to have had the opportunity to conduct this research, and we hope that it leads to systemic changes that advance justice for workers worldwide.

Introduction

“All will pay because a job is necessary to survive.”

—A G4S Qatar employee who participated in the study

This report is the product of a capstone research project undertaken between March and December 2021 by a group of three students at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland. As part of the Capstone project, students are matched with an organisation that has agreed to partner with IHEID. The partner organisation for this project was UNI Global Union, which was represented by Eddy Stam, Head of UNI Property Services.

G4S and the context of the problem

G4S Global has faced numerous criticisms regarding its breaches in human rights. This report highlights the engagement in unethical labour recruitment practices by its franchise in Qatar. Headquartered in London, the United Kingdom, G4S Global is the world’s largest private security provider measured by revenue. Its services include providing security personnel and surveillance technology for clients in the public and private sectors, such as government, banks, and offices. They operate in 85 countries, employing 533,000 people worldwide. They provide two main services: security solutions (93 percent) focused on security and security technology, and cash solutions (7 percent) focused on cash management and cash technology

(*Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement (2020), 2021*). Between March and April 2021, G4S plc was acquired at a value of £3.8bn (US\$5.3bn) by Allied Universal, the largest security services company in North America (*Allied Universal Acquires G4S plc; Creating A Global Integrated Security Services Leader, 2021*). Following the acquisition by Allied Universal, G4S plc was subsequently delisted. As part of the takeover, G4S North America has been rebranded as Allied Universal® (*Where We Operate, n.d.*). However, G4S operations in the rest of the world are still currently managed by the G4S headquarters in London, rebranded as “G4S, an Allied Universal company.” For consistency and simplicity, this report will refer to the global operations managed by G4S’s London headquarters as G4S Global.

To meet the demand for security staff in its operations worldwide, G4S Global actively recruits workers from countries in Asia and Africa like Uganda, Kenya, India, and Nepal. Many of these workers pay fees for recruitment services, such as recruitment costs, health checks, visa applications, and airfare. However, since many of these workers borrow money in order to afford the fees, this places them at a high risk of debt bondage and forced labour. This practice is still customary for workers being recruited to work for G4S Qatar. Even though the charging of recruitment fees is illegal in Qatar, it is

still practised based on the argument that the violations take place in countries of origin, outside the Qatari jurisdiction.

Furthermore, according to resources by UNI, the G4S franchise in Qatar enjoys relative autonomy, so the parent company can turn a blind eye to their recruitment practices. G4S Qatar is notably not owned or managed by G4S Global. Rather, G4S Qatar is fully franchised and owned by the Al-Attiyah Group of Trading Companies (AGTC), which operates under a contract signed in 2010 that entitles them to use the G4S brand in Qatar (*Statement from G4S Group CEO Regarding Migrant Worker Policies and Practices*, 2019). This contract also awards the Al-Attiyah Group of Trading Companies (AGTC) a greater level of autonomy and independence in operating G4S Qatar. Despite this, according to statements released by G4S Global, “G4S proactively engages with AGTC to promote labour practices which comply with the ILO core labour conventions” (*Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement* (2019), 2020).

In response to external criticism of its recruitment practices, G4S Global has released the 2020 Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement, stating its commitment to “respecting human rights” and “enhancing the protection of migrant workers.” As part of this commitment, G4S Global has stated that it is committed to fully implementing the Employer Pays Principle by 2026, and that it has already completed implementation in Oman, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (*Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement* (2020), 2021). However, according to information supplied by UNI, although G4S Global has conducted interviews

with migrant workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council on their welfare, it has yet to publicly release its report and follow-up plans despite multiple requests by UNI to do so. Furthermore, G4S Global’s statement does not include a fair recruitment action plan or supply chain audit for G4S Qatar to implement. Indeed, in the past, G4S Global has displayed ignorance towards the unfair recruitment practices of G4S Qatar, citing the latter’s autonomy and independence from the parent company. As such, there is limited evidence suggesting conviction to end unfair recruitment practices in G4S Qatar.

Research objectives

Our research aims to confirm the extent to which migrant workers employed by G4S Qatar pay recruitment fees as a part of the recruitment process for their positions. As the largest private security provider in the world, G4S Global has both significant impact and influence in the industry. Its publicly announced intention to implement the Employer Pays Principle demonstrates that G4S Global acknowledges its unfair recruitment practice of imposing hefty recruitment fees and related costs on its migrant workers. However, the issue in Qatar is particularly nuanced because G4S Qatar is not owned or managed directly by G4S Global. G4S Global has used this as an excuse to turn a blind eye to and deny accountability for G4S Qatar’s unfair practice of charging migrant workers recruitment fees.

In doing so, this research is focused on determining (i) the incidence of recruitment fees being paid among the study’s sampled population, (ii) the amount in recruitment fees that were paid, (iii) who the fees were paid to, and (iv) what the fees supposedly went

towards paying for. In addition, this study aims to investigate (v) the motivating factors for and (vi) implications of charging migrant workers recruitment fees.

The information gathered in this study will be used to aid UNI in strengthening their case to successfully lobby G4S Qatar, and in turn, persuade other companies in the sector, to end the collection of recruitment fees from migrant workers. Therefore, the objective of this research is to serve as a foundation for UNI to craft a report on policy recommendations, and more broadly, facilitate global advocacy efforts towards fair recruitment, worker rights and protections against debt bondage, and justice for impacted workers.

About UNI Global Union

UNI Global Union is a global union federation based in Nyon, Switzerland, representing more than 20 million workers from over 150 countries in the skills and services industries. It was formed in January 2000 under the name Union Network International as the result of a merger between four former global union federations and subsequently, changed its name to UNI Global Union in March 2009. UNI holds seats on several global organisations

and forums, including participation in biennial meetings convened between the Government of Qatar, the International Labour Organisation, and global union federations (*Follow-up to the Decision Adopted by the Governing Body at Its 331st Session to Support the Technical Cooperation Programme Agreed between the Government of Qatar and the ILO and Its Implementation Modalities*, 2018).

UNI has signed over 50 global framework agreements, negotiated between global union federations and multinational companies. This represents 26 percent of global framework agreements concluded worldwide, covering over 10 million workers (Hadwiger, 2016). These agreements, while non-binding, establish an ongoing relationship between the parties to ensure that the company respects the same standards in all countries in which it operates (*International Framework Agreement*, 2019). In particular, global framework agreements “specify the responsibility of a multinational company to follow particular standards concerning fundamental labour and social rights, working conditions, industrial relations, health and safety conditions, training, and environmental protection provisions in more than one country and often worldwide” (Hadwiger, 2016).

Background

Qatar

Qatar is a country that is extremely reliant on migrant labour. Qatar's workforce is made up of approximately 2 million migrant workers, which is about 95 percent of their entire workforce (Javaid, 2020). In Qatar as well as most of the Gulf Cooperation Council members, foreign labour was regulated by the *kafala* (sponsorship) system under which migrant workers were completely tied to their employer. Under this system, employers essentially had full control of their workers as the worker had to be permitted by their *kafeel* (sponsor) if they wanted to enter the country, change employment, or leave the country for any reason (*Reform of the Kafala (Sponsorship) System*, n.d.). Migrant workers were completely reliant on their *kafeel* for legal residence and livelihood. A common practice by the *kafeel* was to confiscate the workers' passports and travel documents to exert further control. Due to this dependency, employers escaped accountability for the abuses they inflict on their workers as debt accumulates and workers face the fear of retaliation if they were to speak out.

However, in recent years, the Qatari government has made commendable efforts to introduce progressive labour reforms. In October 2017, Qatar and the ILO entered a three-year technical cooperation programme to create labour reforms that would help uphold the 1930 Forced Labour Convention and the 1947 Labour Inspection

Convention. On the agenda, Qatar was to focus on key areas of improving labour practices: improvement in the payment of wages; enhanced labour inspection and Occupational Safety and Health; replacement of the *kafala* sponsorship system and improvement of labour recruitment procedures; increased prevention, protection, and prosecution against forced labour and promotion of workers' representation (*Leaflet on the ILO Project Office for the State of Qatar*, 2018).

In 2020, the Qatari government signed two important laws for protecting migrant workers (*Qatar Reforms Strike at Heart of Abusive Kafala System*, 2020). The first involved the elimination of the requirement for workers to get the consent of their employers to change jobs. Workers are now able to leave their employer as long as they provide a one-month written notice for those who have worked with an employer for less than two years, and a two-month notice for those who have worked longer. The transfer costs would also no longer be paid by the worker and their request would be processed by the Ministry of Labour. The second law created a minimum wage of QAR 1,000 (US\$275). For employers who do not offer housing and food, they must provide an additional basic living allowance of QAR 300 (US\$82) for food and QAR 500 (US\$132) for accommodation. While this was a significant improvement, it is still below the ILO recommended monthly minimum wage of QAR 1,250 (US\$340) (*Qatar Reforms Strike at Heart of Abusive Kafala System*, 2020). It is also

worth mentioning that Qatar's current wage policy still allows for wage discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin. This is significant as multiple respondents from this study's survey expressed that they were victims of racism while working for G4S Qatar.

Qatar has also recently come under international scrutiny after numerous cases of human rights abuses on migrant workers were exposed, particularly in light of the FIFA World Cup 2022. The Guardian reported that more than 6,500 migrants from India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have died since Qatar won the bid to host the FIFA World Cup 2022 (Pattison, 2018). These numbers do not yet include the deaths of people from countries that send a large number of migrant workers to Qatar, such as Kenya and the Philippines. Mostly to meet the infrastructural needs of hosting the FIFA World Cup 2022, Qatar undertook a massive construction programme in the past decade that included seven new football stadiums, a new airport, roads, hotels, and public transport systems. It is important to reflect on the fact that

most of these workers are working 12-hour days in a country with temperatures as high as 50 degrees Celsius. Another significant issue that was spotlighted was the charging of recruitment fees on migrants, which is illegal in Qatar. Appendix 1 shows a table representing the legal status of the payment of recruitment fees and related costs by migrant workers in various countries, including Qatar.

*Qatar Labour Law, Article 33 (2004):
"The person who is licensed to recruit workers from abroad for others shall be prohibited ... to receive from the worker any sums representing recruitment fees or expenses or any other costs."*

One example reported by the Guardian was Mohammad Shahid Miah, who paid €4,100 (US\$1,602) to secure his job in Qatar in 2017. When he was electrocuted and subsequently died from the incident, the debt he accumulated was passed down to his impoverished parents (Pattison, 2018). While the payment of recruitment fees by migrant workers is illegal in Qatar, companies circumvent this by



One of many construction sites in Qatar where migrant workers are employed.

Photo courtesy of Eddy Stam.

outsourcing the unfair practice to origin countries of migrant workers where the charging of recruitment fees is legal but regulated (see Appendix 1). While acknowledging the pervasiveness of this issue, the Qatari government has said this is a problem for the origin countries to address (Javaid, 2020).

In response to international criticism, Qatar agreed to pay back about 5 million USD in recruitment fees to workers employed to work on FIFA World Cup 2022 construction projects. It is expected to reach an estimated 30,000 workers (“Qatar to Pay Back \$5 Million in Recruitment Fees for World Cup Workers,” 2018). In 2020, Qatar had updated this by saying 30 million USD would be reimbursed by the contractors to workers who had paid recruitment fees in their home countries. Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy General Secretary Hassan al-Thawadi stated, “By 2020, about 83 percent of our workforce will have their recruitment fee reimbursed” (Varghese, 2020).

In 2020, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report for which they spoke to 93 migrant workers from 60 different employers and companies in Qatar between January 2019 and May 2020. Out of the 93 workers they spoke to, 72 said they had paid a recruitment fee (Javaid, 2020). These fees varied between US\$693 to US\$2,613. Workers told HRW that in order to pay these fees, they had to sell valuable assets, mortgaged family homes, or borrow significant amounts of money from private moneylenders who gave them high-interest rates (Javaid, 2020).

The unfair practice of collecting recruitment fees from migrant workers extends beyond the private security and

construction industries but also includes the hospitality sector in Qatar. Marsa Malaz Kempinski Hotel is a lavish hotel in Qatar frequented by Qatari elites. In 2018, it was reported that the migrant workers employed at the luxury hotel were paying exorbitantly high recruitment fees while working 12-hour shifts and earning little more than £8 (approximately US\$11) a day. The extremely low pay makes it difficult to pay back the recruitment fee which was recorded to be as high as £3,160 (over US\$4,200) (Pattison, 2018).

Recruitment agencies and debt bondage

Foreign labour migration has generated several noteworthy trends. 97 percent of migrant workers reside in middle- and high-income countries; GCC countries are among the top migrant-receiving countries where migrant workers dominate numerous economic sectors such as construction and form the majority of the population (*International Migrant Stock 2019*, 2019). Rapid urban development and growth in GCC countries such as the preparation for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar contribute to the strong demand for low-skilled male migrant workers (Michelle Buckley et al., 2016). This results in a striking gender imbalance across the region where the number of males is over five times more than that of females (*World Migration Report 2020*, 2019). The primary sources of migrant workers for this region are Africa and Asia, due to the significant income differentials between the countries of origin and destination. Migrant workers are motivated to work in destination countries where relatively attractive and high-paying job opportunities are abundant, compared to their home countries (Valenta & Jakobsen, 2016).

The demand for migrants in the region is expected to remain strong (*World Migration Report 2020*, 2019), and thus, it is important to examine the processes in which migrants are recruited from origin countries to work in destination countries to understand how unfair recruitment practices take place along the migrant supply chain.

Recruitment agencies in origin countries form an integral part of the recruitment process as they form the bridge between employers abroad and aspiring migrant workers in origin countries (Agunias, 2013). Their pivotal role in the multi-staged recruitment process facilitates the large-scale labour migration from origin countries to destination countries to take place. Their services include disseminating information via sub-agents and advertisements, offering job-matching services, providing administrative assistance such as passport and visa applications, as well as arranging logistics like travel and accommodation (Agunias, 2013). Upon receiving notice of labour requests from employers in the GCC states, private recruitment agencies in Bangladesh employ sub-agents, who are usually respected individuals of local communities, to disseminate information across rural areas and recruit prospective migrants. Personal documents and a service fee are collected from prospective migrants to send to employers abroad for processing upon successful job matching. Once approved, the official visa will be couriered to the local recruitment agencies who then arrange travel plans for the migrants (Rahman, 2012).

Despite official regulations in GCC countries that prohibit the charging of recruitment fees and related costs,

many origin countries allow recruitment agencies to engage in such practices. Although a price ceiling may be in place to limit the amount charged to migrant workers, the reality suggests recruitment agencies frequently flout government policies (Agunias, 2013; *Bilateral Agreements and Regional Cooperation*, n.d.). These fees may vary depending on the origin country, work location, nature of the job, and expected salary but they are generally high, often amounting to several months to a year's worth of salary (Agunias, 2013). In Ethiopia, although government-recognised private recruitment agencies are employed to facilitate labour migration, they frequently charge recruitment fees that exceed the official price ceiling (Fernandez, 2013). Ethiopian migrants also find it difficult to differentiate between legal recruitment agencies and unlicensed agents who may deceive and financially exploit them (Kuschminder, 2016).

The upfront charging of recruitment fees and related costs are often unaffordable to many migrants, who must borrow money from banks or friends and relatives in order to finance their migration to destination countries for work (Kuschminder, 2016). Some recruitment agencies also provide loans to migrants and repayments are made through salary deductions (Agunias, 2013). Exorbitant recruitment fees and related costs can raise the risk of debt bondage and unfree labour as migrants are compelled to stay in a job in order to repay the accumulated debt, hence limiting their ability to exit. Indeed, it is argued that debt bondage is used as a form of labour discipline by reducing migrants' bargaining and negotiation powers. Despite poor working and living conditions in destination countries, migrants are unable to return home as

they must earn enough money to repay their loans and send remittances back to their families; premature termination would be an unaffordable alternative (LeBaron, 2014).

Several factors can encourage debt bondage. Firstly, the high unemployment rates in origin countries continue to create a relatively elastic supply of migrant workers, thus, recruitment agencies can easily exploit migrants' desire to seek job opportunities abroad by charging high recruitment fees for profit (Rahman, 2012). Indeed, governments in origin countries recognise the importance of recruitment agencies as gatekeepers of foreign labour migration by facilitating large volumes of migrants abroad and subsequently, generating millions of dollars in remittances. As such, recruitment agencies hold significant bargaining power, hence their legal ability to collect recruitment fees from migrants (Agunias, 2013). Secondly, since the 1980s, commissions paid by employers in the GCC states to recruitment agencies in origin countries have reduced significantly. Thus, in order to ensure profits, recruitment agencies charge migrant workers high recruitment fees in order to recover the cost of recruitment (Gamburd, 2000; Gardner, 2010; Rahman, 2012). Finally, overseas employers faced with a seemingly unlimited supply of migrant workers may engage in unethical practices, including refusing to pay for the cost of labour migration. This results in the unfair need for migrants to bear the cost of medical tests, flight tickets, and visa applications (Rahman, 2012).

Recognising the risk of debt bondage as a result of unfair recruitment practices, experts have produced a myriad of solutions and recommendations to

encourage fair recruitment. As part of the Fair Recruitment Initiative, the ILO published a non-binding framework outlining the guidelines and best practices for fair recruitment in 2019. It contains 13 general principles, including the ban on the charging of recruitment fees and related costs. It also addresses each actor of the labour market, including the government, employers, and labour recruitment agencies, outlining their respective responsibilities in protecting the rights of migrants (*General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment and Definition of Recruitment Fees and Related Costs*, 2019). The Global Compact for Migration, another soft law instrument, also addresses unfair labour practices and recommends a series of actions for governments, employers, international organisations, and trade unions to adopt in order to promote fair recruitment and decent working conditions.

Besides these multilateral agreements, origin countries and destination countries can enter into bilateral agreements or non-legally binding Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) to ensure commitment to agreed recruitment and work principles (Pittman, 2016). For example, Malaysia, a popular destination country in Southeast Asia, has MOUs with seven origin countries, including Indonesia and Bangladesh, to improve recruitment regulations (*Bilateral Agreements and Regional Cooperation*, n.d.).

Individual governments can also strengthen their internal regulations on recruitment. For example, Ethiopia has an approved list of private recruitment agencies that meet the national code of conduct. Qatar has also established Qatar Visa Centres in popular origin

countries to centralise and oversee the signing of work contracts, enrolment of biometrics, and conduct of medical examinations for migrant workers (*General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment and Definition of Recruitment Fees and Related Costs*, 2019).

Furthermore, research has shown that fair recruitment can be achieved through third-party audits (Pittman, 2016). In a pilot study conducted by the ILO on the recruitment of Bangladeshi construction workers to Qatar, it was found that a combination of external audits on recruitment agencies and compliance training for their employees significantly improved the recruitment process. There was a 92 percent reduction in the cost of migration, leading to 93 percent of migrants reporting having no accumulated debt (*Promising Practices for Fair Recruitment: Piloting Fair Recruitment from Bangladesh to Qatar in the Construction Sector*, 2021).

Similarly, companies may enter into multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that are overseen by a multistakeholder

board that engages NGOs and trade unions. Upon successful passing of random audits, companies are awarded certifications, attesting to their adherence to the agreed code of conduct (Pittman, 2016). The Voluntary Code of Ethical Conduct for the Recruitment of Foreign-Educated Health Professionals to the United States was produced through collaboration between a network of stakeholders in the healthcare sector, immigrant communities, and labour welfare advocates. Companies in the agreement are monitored and certified upon completion of the inspection (Virginia Alinsao et al., 2008).

Fair recruitment practices can be encouraged and achieved through various channels while engaging a variety of stakeholders. Strong commitments from the international community, governments, employers, and recruitment agencies, as well as the diligent implementations of agreed policies, are pertinent to the engineering of fair recruitment channels between origin and destination countries.

Methodology

This research utilises both qualitative and quantitative data. Descriptive statistics are collected based on interviews with migrant workers on their recruitment experience as well as interviews with recruiters on their recruitment operations. Qualitative information is also sourced from interviews with migrant workers and recruiters as they recount the circumstances of their recruitment experiences, as well as interviews with migration and human rights experts on the wider context of unfair recruitment practices.

Interviews with migrant workers

For the research, it was necessary to collect both quantitative and qualitative data in order to have an in-depth understanding of the recruitment process from the migrant workers' country of origin to their destination, Qatar, and provide statistical evidence that these workers are paying recruitment fees. To achieve this, data was collected from 40 current and former G4S Qatar workers, through an extensive survey and conducting semi-structured interviews when the workers were willing via social media (WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook). Appendix 2 shows the survey questionnaire and interview template used to interview migrant workers. Many workers were found through two UNI contract workers in Kenya, UNI Contract Worker A and UNI Contract Worker B. Others were found through social media by reaching out to

those who stated to have worked at G4S Qatar (LinkedIn), made comments on G4S Qatar worker pages (Facebook) or wrote comments about G4S Qatar on their own personal account (Twitter). While the snowballing method was attempted by asking the interviewees to connect the researchers with other G4S Qatar workers, it was limited in success as few workers knew others who were comfortable enough to answer questions about their employer.

There were many difficulties encountered while attempting to collect data. Firstly, most of the workers who were contacted simply did not respond or complete the provided questionnaire. Secondly, of the migrant workers who did respond, the majority were hesitant or unwilling to answer all the questions; many expected to receive benefits in return for answering the questions. In order to ensure the reliability and credibility of the data collected, no compensation was offered to migrant workers for answering the questionnaire. As such, those who asked for benefits would often stop replying after this was explained to them. Indeed, few of the workers willingly answered the questions without hesitation and it would usually take numerous messages to fully gain their trust.

Thirdly, even after gaining their trust, the migrant workers would still express discomfort and hesitation in elaborating on their responses, leading to unfinished interviews. The display of fear is understandable given the recent arrest of Malcolm Bidali, a former security

guard from Kenya at GSS Certis Qatar, a private security company headquartered in Singapore. Bidali “was taken into custody and placed under investigation for violating Qatar’s security laws and regulations” (*Concerns over Qatar’s Arrest of Kenyan Security Guard*, 2021). In reality, he was punished for publicly discussing his experience working as a security guard at GSS Certis Qatar. His arrest took place at the beginning of the data collection process, so it was no surprise that G4S Qatar migrant workers, especially those still based in Qatar and employed by the company, were uncomfortable with participating in the study. Indeed, the fear of potential retaliation by their employer prevented many migrant workers from discussing their experiences.

Fourthly, the apparent fear of visa fraud circulating on the internet amongst migrant workers also posed a challenge to gaining their trust. During the data collection process, one potential interviewee whose contact was given by another G4S Qatar worker abruptly ceased all communications with the researchers of this study. When asked why, the migrant worker who shared the contact said his friend “[was] afraid that [the researchers were] trying to make a US visa fraud. ... There are lots of fake people on [the] internet who try to deceive people by giving them a visa offer online. In this regard, they ask different sorts of information about the career.” While this explanation was only provided towards the end of the data collection, it could potentially explain why many other migrant workers similarly ceased communications abruptly during the earlier interviews.

Finally, due to travel restrictions imposed during the COVID-19

pandemic, in-person interviews were unfortunately unfeasible. As a result, a number of migrant workers who were insistent on in-person interviews declined to proceed with the study, as they were uncomfortable with both phone interviews and communications via messaging applications. Indeed, not a single worker agreed to speak over the phone. While the received answers were sufficient in answering the main research questions, the interviews likely would have been more fruitful and informative had they been over a phone call, video chat, or in person. Notwithstanding the limitations of survey questionnaires and interviews via text messaging, social media still allowed the possibility of follow-up questions and extended dialogue. Notably, four migrant workers were comfortable enough to send voice recordings of themselves recounting their recruitment experiences to work for G4S Qatar, which have been made into a short audio compilation to complement this research report.

Interviews with recruiters

To cross-reference the data collected from G4S Qatar migrant workers, this study conducted four interviews with recruitment agencies. Appendix 3 shows the list of questions used in the interviews with the recruitment agents. Three of the recruiters were based in Kenya (Recruiters A, B, and C) and one was based in Nepal (Recruiter D). The three Kenyan recruiters were directly linked to G4S Qatar as they have recruited migrant workers for the company in the past. Although Recruiter D from Nepal has not worked for G4S Qatar, he has recruited migrant workers to work in Qatar and Malaysia, thus, was able to provide a comprehensive and

informative overview of the recruitment process in Nepal.

The four recruiters were sourced with the assistance of UNI contract workers based in Kenya and Nepal. UNI Contract Worker B in Kenya was able to organise interviews with three Kenyan migrant recruiters while UNI Contract Worker C in Nepal was able to arrange an interview with a Nepali migrant recruiter. The interviews were conducted via Zoom, each lasting between 20 to 40 minutes. In all interviews, the respective UNI Contract Workers were present throughout the interview, but interview questions were asked entirely by this study's researchers.

The aims of the interviews with G4S Qatar-linked recruiters in Kenya were to (i) understand the recruitment processes, (ii) establish the nature of collaboration between the local recruiters and G4S Qatar, (iii) confirm the charging of recruitment fees and related costs on migrant workers and (iv) estimate the price of recruitment fees and related costs paid by migrant workers. Appendix 3 shows the question template used in each round of interviews with the recruiters; beyond this template, follow-up questions were asked depending on the information provided by the recruiters.

In order to improve the reliability of the interviews, measures were taken to reduce potential biases. Firstly, recruiters who were interviewed were not given any form of financial or material incentive. During the process of sourcing interviewees, a number of recruiters declined the invitations or rescinded their agreement to attend the interview at the last minute. Hence, only recruiters who were willing were

interviewed. Secondly, while the recruiters were informed of the academic nature of the study, they were not told the implications of the report on G4S Qatar. At the start of the interview, the researchers introduced the purpose of the study as improving the understanding of the general recruitment processes of Kenyan and Nepali migrant workers to Qatar. However, they were not told of UNI's aims of encouraging G4S Qatar to end unfair recruitment practices.

It is important to note the limitations of the interviews with the four recruiters. Firstly, evidence from the interviews suggests that there is significant underreporting of recruitment fees charged to migrant workers by the Kenyan recruiters. Upon pressing, the recruiters would revise their initial quotations of recruitment fees and related costs to higher estimates but even so, the amounts claimed by the Kenyan recruiters are significantly lower than the figures reported by the migrant workers. Secondly, the Nepali recruiter did not have direct working relationships with G4S Qatar, thus, the interview could only extract general information about the recruitment practices in Nepal but not specific data on G4S Qatar.

Interviews with migration experts

To better understand the context of fair recruitment in Qatar, a series of interviews with foreign labour migration and human rights experts were conducted. In total, 11 individuals were interviewed, including academics as well as representatives from G4S-linked labour unions, the ILO office in Qatar, and Securitas in the United Arab Emirates, a Swedish-owned global

security company. Appendix 4 shows the full list of experts and their represented organisations interviewed for this study.

The interviews were organised through two main sources, including UNI's contacts and the researchers of this study's own contacts. The interviews were conducted online via Zoom, each

lasting between 30 minutes and 75 minutes. During the interviews, questions on migrant supply chains in countries of origin, business conduct and standards in Qatar, and fair recruitment strategies were asked in order to obtain contextual information important to complement data collected from migrant workers and recruiters.

Findings and discussion

Migrant workers

By the end of the research, 40 workers from 7 different countries, including Kenya (16), Uganda (12), India (3), Pakistan (3), Bangladesh (3), Nepal (2), and Sudan (1), participated in the study by either answering the survey questionnaire or participating in an interview. All 40 migrant workers surveyed/interviewed were working, or had previously worked, for G4S Qatar.

Of the 40 migrant workers linked to G4S Qatar, 39 reported having paid a recruitment fee. The average amount of recruitment fees paid by migrant workers was US\$1,525; the maximum was US\$3,058 and the minimum was US\$824. It is important to note that when calculating the average recruitment fee, one of the respondents' answers was omitted due to its highly anomalous nature, thus, the calculated average is based on 38 respondents (one

respondent reported not paying any fees). Furthermore, when stating the amount they paid in recruitment fees, most of the respondents answered using their local currencies. In order to get a more accurate representation of the amount of money the migrant workers paid, the quoted amount of recruitment fees was converted from the local currency to USD, based on the average exchange rate during the year they said they began working for G4S Qatar. For example, Interviewee 1 paid 170,000 Kenyan shillings (KES) in 2017. In 2017, the average exchange rate was KES 103.3896 for every US\$1; this conversion rate was then used to convert the original payment into USD.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the average recruitment fee in each of the countries where the migrant workers originated from.

Chart 1: Migrant Workers by Countries of Origin




Table 1: Statistics on Recruitment Fees Paid in Each Country

No.	Country	Recruitment Fee Average (USD)	Recruitment Fee Maximum (USD)	Recruitment Fee Minimum (USD)
1	Kenya	\$1,400	\$2,418	\$980
2	Uganda	\$1,596	\$1,977	\$1,224
3	India	\$1,190	\$1,500	\$1,011
4	Nepal	\$1,300	-	-
5	Bangladesh	\$1,868	\$2,560	\$824
6	Pakistan	\$1,517	\$1,795	\$1,000

Table 2: Recruitment Fees and Related Costs Paid by a Ugandan Migrant Worker

Item	Amount in UGX	Amount in USD
Visa application fees	UGX 4,000,000	US\$1,080
Medical tests	UGX 500,000	US\$135
Travel fees	UGX 200,000	US\$54
Others	UGX 300,000	US\$81
Total	UGX 5,000,000	US\$1,350

Recruitment fees paid by migrant workers cover a range of items, including visa application fees, medical tests fees, travel expenses, and commission. Table 2 shows a detailed breakdown of fees paid by a G4S Qatar migrant worker from Uganda.

One of the most striking takeaways from the interviews was the normalised culture of paying recruitment fees amongst the migrant workers. In an interview with a security guard from Uganda, when explaining the recruitment process in his home country, he said, “We are always told to pay ... it’s the practice.” This fatalistic

attitude was common among most of the interviewees, expressing no concern or grievances over the practice of paying recruitment fees. Indeed, when asked about their dissatisfaction with G4S Qatar, other issues with the company—including accounts of racism, long working hours, and low salaries—were raised, but none highlighted the payment of recruitment fees as a major concern.

The role of recruiters

Interviews with recruiters revealed the importance of their role as a crucial intermediary between employers in

destination countries and prospective migrant workers in origin countries. Their role includes (i) relaying recruitment information from foreign employers to local sub-agents and prospective employees, (ii) recruiting migrant workers, as well as (iii) assisting incoming migrant workers with the bureaucracy of travelling abroad for work. To complement the survey data collected from migrant workers regarding their recruitment process to G4S Qatar, we interviewed representatives from three recruitment agencies in Kenya (Recruiters A, B, and C) and one in Nepal (Recruiter D).


The interviews revealed the complex bureaucratic labyrinth navigated by recruiters to secure migrant workers for G4S Qatar. Flow Chart 1 and Flow Chart 2 illustrate the recruitment process in Kenya and Nepal, respectively. In Kenya, the role of recruiters in the recruitment supply chain begins when emails requesting a certain number of migrant workers are sent directly from G4S to the recruitment agencies. Recruiters A and B reported the involvement of G4S Kenya in the recruitment process, which will be elaborated on in later sections. In the case of Nepal, overseas employers must submit a labour demand letter, consisting of information regarding the terms and nature of the job as well as living conditions to the Embassy of Nepal. Once processed, the Nepali Embassy issues an attestation to the foreign employer, who will then send the demand letter and attestation to recruitment agencies in Nepal. Upon receipt of the demand letters or emails, recruitment agencies can choose to accept the job requests by G4S or not. According to Recruiter B from Kenya, before the acceptance of job requests received through emails, he clarifies the nature of the recruitment fee payment

with G4S Qatar—whether G4S Qatar or its clients or the migrant workers will pay the recruitment fee to him. Recruiter B stated that his agency charges approximately KES 15,000 (US\$135) in recruitment fees per worker, which would be collected from the migrant workers, if not borne by G4S.


Upon accepting the work request by G4S Qatar, recruitment agencies proceed with advertisements to initiate the recruitment process and attract prospective applicants. Job advertisements are placed in newspapers and broadcasted to sub-agents who are able to reach prospective migrant workers in other parts of the country. Recruiters are essential conveyors of information to migrant workers in the destination countries. According to the Centre for Social Change, a Nepal-based think tank on foreign labour migration, recruiters inform prospective migrants of the nature of work, immigration information, recruitment costs, and timeline. Once they receive applications from prospective migrant workers, the selection process to screen applicants starts. The recruiters explained that in Kenya, G4S Qatar primarily hires security guards; the job nature of private security favours individuals who are physically fit, healthy and strong or those who have a police or military background.

Once the candidates for G4S have been chosen, recruiters engage in a series of bureaucratic procedures to document the incoming migrant workers' health, educational background, and personal identification paperwork. Recruiters are in charge of ensuring migrant workers undergo medical examinations including tests for tuberculosis and HIV, which are

Flow Chart 1: The recruitment process in Kenya



Flow Chart 2: The recruitment process in Nepal




required to obtain a medical certificate that is mandatory to work abroad. For migrant workers who do not have passports, recruiters are also required to assist them in applying for one. As part of G4S Qatar’s latest recruitment requirements, migrant workers are mandated to provide a certificate proving the completion of secondary education. Recruiters are required to ensure that the education certificates are verified by the Ministry of Education in Kenya to validate their authenticity. Once the paperwork is complete, the recruiter hands the documents to G4S Qatar, who will then apply for a work visa for the migrant worker. Upon the successful issuance of the work visa, G4S Qatar will issue the documentation to the recruiter, who will then prepare for the migrant workers’ departure to Qatar, including making flight arrangements. According to the recruiters, the recruitment process from selection to departure takes approximately one month or more. Across all four interviews with the recruiters in Kenya and Nepal, they reaffirmed the importance of their role in the recruitment process. This is

supported by interviews with migrant workers; 24 participants reported learning of G4S Qatar vacancies through recruitment agencies (see Chart 2) while 38 respondents used a recruitment agency to secure their jobs.

Recruiters represent an important intermediary for foreign employers like G4S Qatar to tap into a network of potential migrant workers in countries of origin. According to Recruiter B, “without us [recruiters], [G4S] can’t get people. With us, we know how to source [migrant workers].” This sentiment is echoed by Recruiter A, who also emphasised the role of recruiters in easing G4S’s recruitment process. Recruiter C further explains that recruiters are crucial in preparing migrant workers for foreign work, handling all stages of recruitment bureaucracy and documentation. It is clear that recruiters are essential gatekeepers to a pool of migrant workers in origin countries for G4S Qatar, facilitating information dissemination, networking, and recruitment.

Chart 2: Method of Learning of G4S Qatar Vacancy



Recruitment fee payment

Interviews with the three Kenyan recruiters revealed that migrant workers recruited to work as security guards in G4S Qatar are charged with recruitment fees. Recruiters A, B, and C have direct working relations with G4S Qatar; they receive emails from G4S with requests for migrant workers. Interestingly, Recruiters A and B also collaborate with G4S Kenya in the recruitment drive for G4S Qatar (which will be further discussed later). Each year, Recruiter A recruits 10–15 migrant workers for G4S Qatar, Recruiter B recruits a maximum of 20, and Recruiter C recruits approximately 100.

While all three G4S Qatar-linked recruiters, Recruiters A, B, and C, admitted to collecting recruitment fees from migrant workers, the amount they charge varies largely between recruiters and migrant workers' nationalities. It is important to note that the fees quoted by the three Kenyan recruiters were far below the amount indicated by migrant workers in the survey. For example, Recruiter A claimed that he charged migrant workers a recruitment fee of approximately KES 5,000 (US\$45) while Recruiter B charged a recruitment fee of KES 15,000 (US\$135) and Recruiter C, an amount of KES 45,000 (US\$403). Indeed, all quoted figures by the recruiters are significantly below US\$1,525, the average recruitment fee reported by migrant workers in the study. Furthermore, when probed further, Recruiter B revised his recruitment fee from the initially quoted KES 15,000 (US\$135) to KES 70,000 (US\$628), suggesting that the true cost

of recruitment for migrant workers is even higher.

According to the recruiters, the recruitment fee paid by migrant workers covers a range of expenses. The total recruitment fee can be broken down into consultation fee, medical test fee, commission fee, paperwork fee, flight tickets as well as bribery for government officials in Kenya to speed up the process. Elaborating on this, Recruiter C stated that he charged KES 5,000 (US\$45) in consultation fee for any prospective migrant workers, regardless of whether they were successfully hired or not. Upon successful recruitment, he charged a further KES 7,000 (US\$63) in medical fee and KES 30,000 (US\$267) in commission fee. For Recruiter B, he collected a recruitment fee to cover a one-way flight ticket to Qatar (KES 50,000 or US\$448), a passport application fee (KES 6,000 or US\$54), and a service fee (KES 15,000 or US\$135).

During the interviews with the Kenyan recruiters, it was revealed that price discrimination in recruitment fees was applied to separate foreigners from locals. Recruiter B stated that Somalian migrant workers are charged a higher recruitment fee than Kenyans to work for G4S Qatar. He initially indicated that a Somali migrant was charged KES 30,000 (US\$269), it was eventually revised to KES 100,000 (US\$896) and finally to a maximum of KES 150,000 (US\$1,345). Similarly, Recruiter C charged foreigners a higher amount in recruitment fee to work for G4S Qatar; while Kenyans paid KES 42,000 (US\$375), foreigners were charged KES 50,000 (US\$448).

Table 3: Recruitment Fees and Related Costs Charged by Recruiter B on Kenyans

Type of Expense	Amount in KES	Amount in USD
Service fee	KES 15,000	US\$135
Passport application fee	KES 6,000	US\$54
Airfare to Qatar	KES 50,000	US\$448
Total	KES 71,000	US\$637

Table 4: Recruitment Fees and Related Costs Charged by Recruiter C on Kenyans

Type of Expense	Amount in KES	Amount in USD
Consultation fee	KES 5,000	US\$45
Medical fee	KES 7,000	US\$63
Commission fee	KES 30,000	US\$267
Total	KES 42,000	US\$375

Table 5: Price Differential in Recruitment Fees and Related Costs between Kenyans and Non-Kenyans

Recruiters	Kenyans	Non-Kenyans	Price Difference
Recruiter B	US\$637	US\$1,345	US\$708
Recruiter C	US\$375	US\$448	US\$73

Although the range of recruitment fees quoted by recruiters is lower than that of the amount indicated by migrant workers in the survey, the important message remains that migrant workers are unfairly charged a recruitment fee in the pursuit to work for G4S Qatar. While there are clear limitations to extracting honest and accurate information regarding the amount of recruitment fee charged to migrant workers, the fact remains that three G4S Qatar-linked recruiters have

confirmed the collection of recruitment fees from migrant workers.

Reasons for recruitment fee collection

The motivation for recruitment fee collection from migrant workers is largely due to two factors. First, all three Kenyan recruiters indicated that G4S Qatar does not pay them a service fee for their assistance in recruitment, and thus, they have no choice but to extract recruitment fees from migrant workers.

Secondly, the cost of operations for recruiters is high, considering the labyrinth of bureaucracy they must navigate through in order to secure migrant workers for G4S Qatar.

In the interviews, all three Kenyan recruiters with working connections to G4S expressed that they charged migrant workers a recruitment fee because G4S Qatar did not compensate them for their service. Recruiter B indicated that although some of G4S Qatar's clients might be willing to pay for the recruitment fees, this was not the norm. Even in cases where G4S Qatar's clients paid a service fee to Recruiter B, the payment was dependent on the client and not G4S Qatar's willingness to compensate him for his recruitment services.

Furthermore, according to Recruiter C, he has appealed to G4S Qatar for a structured compensation agreement to guarantee payment in exchange for their service, but the company has given a perfunctory promise to do so and has yet to follow through. Indeed, all three recruiters indicated that should G4S Qatar compensate them appropriately for their recruitment services, they would not need to charge migrant workers a fee.

The need for G4S Qatar to pay recruiters for their service is further accentuated by the apparent high cost of operation for the recruiters in Kenya. According to Recruiter C, in order to obtain a government registration certificate legalising the recruitment agency, recruiters must pay a fee of approximately KES 500,000 (US\$4,482) to the Kenyan government. Although the Kenyan government's efforts to regulate the recruitment industry are commendable, the high barrier to entry in the form of expensive registration

fees deters some recruiters from legalising their operations. This highlights the need for foreign employers like G4S to appropriately compensate recruiters for their service in order to ensure recruitment agencies are able to operate legally.

Furthermore, as G4S Qatar does not pay for the cost of recruitment, including paperwork processing fee, medical fee, transport cost, and documentation applications, the burden of such costs is transferred to the migrants. Recruiter B noted that some clients did not have passports or resumés; while the application for a passport would cost the migrant worker KES 6,000 (US\$54), the assistance in creating a resumé would be included in the KES 15,000 (US\$135) service fee. The recruitment fee collected from migrant workers also pays for the recruiter and sub-agent's wages as well as the upkeep of the recruitment agency. In cases such as that of Recruiter C, where sub-agents are employed by recruiters to reach more prospective migrants, the cost of recruitment increases. This is echoed in the interview with the Centre for Social Change, where migration expert, Dr. Prakash Bhattarai, highlighted that even though some foreign employers pay Nepali recruiters a service fee, the amount may not be enough to cover the full cost of operation as a result of the large number of sub-agents. Dr. Bhattarai noted that in cases like that, recruiters may still charge migrant workers a recruitment fee despite the compensation from foreign employers in order to cover the full cost of recruitment. This showcases the need for foreign employers like G4S to not only pay a service fee to recruiters but ensure accurate calculation of the cost of recruitment in order to compensate the appropriate amount and avoid the

need to collect recruitment fees from migrant workers.

Moreover, the high cost of recruitment is further underscored by the culture of bribery and competition in the recruitment industry. In Kenya, Recruiter C noted that in order to speed up the process of recruitment, he must pay an additional KES 5,000 (US\$45) per migrant to government officials to ensure faster processing of paperwork. This exemplifies the long bill of costs needed to be paid by migrant workers, if not by G4S, to work in Qatar. In Nepal, the Centre for Social Change noted that the recruitment market is highly competitive; despite mandatory service fee payment by foreign employers to local recruiters, recruitment agencies are incentivised to deflate the cost of recruitment in order to win recruitment contracts from foreign employers. The remaining balance of the recruitment fee would then be borne by the migrant workers. This exemplifies the need for foreign employers to recognise and be willing to pay the full cost of recruitment to recruiters in order to ensure no recruitment fee or related costs are borne by the migrant workers.

Recruiters' requests

Across all interviews with the three G4S-linked Kenya recruiters, they expressed the desire to enter into a formal agreement with G4S to guarantee the payment of a service fee in exchange for their recruitment services. At present, none of the Kenyan recruiters have a recruitment contract with G4S Qatar despite sourcing migrant workers for the company. Instead, they receive notices for migrant workers via email by the company when labour is needed. All three G4S Qatar-linked recruiters in Kenya have

explicitly stated that they would prefer if G4S Qatar paid them a service fee; if the company bore the cost of recruitment, they would not need to charge migrant workers a recruitment fee. Although Recruiter D from Nepal does not recruit for G4S, he echoed the Kenyan recruiters' sentiment. He noted that if the foreign employer bore the full cost of recruitment, he would "never ask" for a recruitment fee. Recruiter D added that in this case, he would focus his recruitment efforts on low-income individuals because they would struggle to pay the recruitment fees if they were not borne by the foreign employer. Indeed, all recruiters interviewed communicated the preference for foreign employers like G4S to shoulder the financial responsibility of recruitment instead of charging migrant workers.

According to an interview with Zahra Khan, a Researcher/Adjunct Professor at the New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business, companies like G4S have an incentive to omit recruitment fees in the budgeting of their projects in order to reduce the cost of operation. Due to the highly competitive nature of various industries like the private security or construction sectors, companies are motivated to reduce the cost of operations in budget proposals submitted to potential clients in order to appear more attractive. As a result of the deliberate exclusion of recruitment fees from project budgeting, the financial burden of recruitment is unfairly transferred from multinationals like G4S Qatar to individual migrant workers in the origin countries. Similarly, Mustafa Qadri from Equidem Research and Consulting echoed that the delay in implementing fair recruitment policies in the private security sector is due to the lack of

industry culture in taking greater ownership of the migrant recruitment supply chain. The recruitment of migrant workers is mostly exported to external recruitment agencies in origin countries, where recruiters operate under little to no oversight from the employers. Qadri expressed the need for foreign employers to proactively map out the recruitment supply chain in origin countries in order to improve recruitment transparency and legal compliance.

Additionally, an interview with Impactt Limited, a business ethics and management consultancy firm in London, emphasised the need for G4S Qatar's business clients to assert pressure for companies to comply with international ethical standards. The importance of client pressure is exemplified in the series of changes introduced in the construction industry in Qatar following intense criticism on the human rights abuses related to the preparation for the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. Indeed, according to a report by the Centre for Business and Human Rights at New York University, when a Qatari construction company, QDVC, pursued fair recruitment practices in its 2015-2016 recruitment drive, the cost of recruitment incurred by the company was "far less than 1 percent of the overall cost of the construction project" (Gabriel Ng et al., 2019).


G4S Global & G4S Qatar

It is important to shine a light on the apparent working relationship between

G4S Qatar and other branches of G4S, such as that of Kenya. Although G4S Qatar was established under a joint-venture agreement of which 0 percent is owned by G4S Global group undertakings, there is strong evidence that it engages with other branches of G4S, including G4S Kenya. G4S Kenya is 100 percent owned by G4S Global through its complex corporate structure (*Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 2020, 2021*). According to Recruiter A, G4S Kenya is involved in the migrant worker recruitment drive for G4S Qatar; G4S Kenya also plays a role in the screening and selection of migrant workers to work for G4S Qatar. Similarly, Recruiter B stated that he receives recruitment notices from both G4S Qatar and G4S Kenya requesting for migrant workers to work in G4S Qatar. Flow Chart 3 shows the working relationship between G4S Qatar, G4S Kenya, and local recruitment agencies.

This apparent recruitment collaboration between G4S Qatar and G4S Kenya shows that despite the autonomy and independence enjoyed by the Qatari franchise, it still undertakes some degree of partnership with other branches in its recruitment drive. G4S Kenya, being fully owned by G4S Global, facilitates the recruitment of migrant workers for G4S Qatar and is aware of the recruitment process of migrants since they allegedly work directly with local recruiters. This highlights that G4S Kenya, and by extension G4S Global, is contributing and complicit to the unfair recruitment practices of G4S Qatar.

Flow Chart 3: The relationship between G4S Qatar, G4S Kenya, and local recruitment agencies in the recruitment process



Impacts

The consequences of recruitment fee payment for migrant workers can be largely played into two main sections: financial difficulties and debt bondage.

Financial difficulties

This section explores the financial challenges faced by migrant workers as a result of the need to pay recruitment fees in exchange for a job at G4S Qatar.

The need to borrow

The charging of recruitment fees on migrant workers instead of G4S Qatar represents a significant financial challenge for migrant workers and their families. To reiterate, 39 out of 40 of the migrant workers interviewed in this study reported paying a recruitment fee. It was revealed that 28 of the migrant workers, or 70 percent of respondents, had to borrow a loan in order to afford


the payment. Due to the expensive nature of the recruitment fee, migrant workers are often unable to afford to pay the full amount out-of-pocket and without loans. The study found that of the 28 migrant workers who borrowed, friends and family represent the primary source of loans (16), followed by banks and money lenders (11).

"I had to sell some few animals of my father to raise the cash, but I did not take any loan since in Kenya you have to be a working class with payslip to qualify for a bank loan, since I didn't have any job, I couldn't get any loan."

—A former G4S Qatar employee from Kenya

Although 12 migrant workers either did not indicate loan borrowing or reported not needing loans, it is important to note that some of them revealed using

Chart 3: Sources of Loan Reported by Migrant Workers



personal savings to pay the recruitment fees. One migrant worker revealed that in order to afford the recruitment fees, he had used a portion of his inheritance while his father had sold their family cows in exchange for cash. For migrant workers who did not borrow loans, recruitment fees remain a significantly large expense, hence requiring drastic financial actions in order to secure employment with G4S Qatar.

Difficulties repaying loans

Migrant workers who borrowed a loan to pay the recruitment fee are obligated to repay the amount, but most migrants found it challenging to do so. Of the 28 migrant workers who borrowed a loan, 20 of them indicated that they faced difficulties repaying their loans. It is important to note that the recruitment fees paid by migrant workers are often several times higher than their monthly salary at G4S Qatar. As mentioned, the recruitment fee paid by migrant workers in G4S Qatar is US\$1,525; a migrant worker reported that his agreed basic salary at G4S Qatar was approximately QAR 1,200 (US\$330) per month, with an additional QAR 300 (US\$82) for


overtime. This indicates that the average recruitment fee is 4.6 times the basic monthly salary of a migrant worker at G4S Qatar. Indeed, of the 20 migrant workers who reported facing challenges repaying their loans, low salary was the second most cited reason (7); one migrant worker noted that “It was too much difficult to save money in less salary.” As a result of the sheer difference between the recruitment fee and the migrant workers’ salary, on average, they require 9.3 months to complete the repayment of loans borrowed to pay the recruitment fee.

“Desperation for greener pasture pushes people to do the unthinkable plus you're promised heavens on the other which some don't come true... It's all about sacrificing, you have a loan, bills to take care, a family to feed too.”

–A former G4S Qatar employee from Kenya

Furthermore, financial pressures at home also represent a significant hurdle in repaying loans because a portion of the migrant worker’s monthly salary is sent back as remittances to support

Chart 4: Reported Difficulties Faced During Loan Repayment



household expenses. Eight migrant workers who participated in the study expressed that their monthly salaries were spread thin between their own expenses in Qatar, family expenditure back home, and the repayment of loans. One migrant worker noted that he “had difficulties because it wasn't easy to pay back a loan and at the same time taking care of my family back home.” Another migrant worker expressed that the low salary at G4S Qatar “is not sufficient enough to cater for my family and pay the loan.” Indeed, although the average recruitment fee is technically only 4.6 times the migrant worker’s monthly salary, it is unrealistic to expect that the full amount of the salary would be dedicated entirely to loan repayments in the first few months of employment at G4S Qatar. This explains why migrant workers take an average of 9.3 months to complete their loan repayments; one migrant worker also reported taking as long as 18 months to fully settle his debts.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the financial challenge of loan repayment because some migrant workers faced salary suspensions and/or delays. At the beginning of the pandemic in the first half of 2020, Qatar went into lockdown for several months to clamp down on COVID-19 community transmission (Reuters, 2020). The closure of businesses affected migrant workers; a migrant worker expressed that he had lost his job posting as a result of COVID-19 measures. During the months of lockdown, he “wasn't paid any money” so he “had to depend on what [he] had saved.” Another migrant worker also echoed the same experience, expressing that he “was getting pressure from mama... to do faster in paying the loan” but “[his family] did not [know] that

during covid times [migrant workers] were not paid for 3 months.” Migrant workers who entered the lockdown with unsettled debt face additional challenges of salary insecurity, which could potentially extend the period of indebtedness. While some migrant workers were able to borrow interest-free loans from families and friends, others who took out loans from money lenders, banks, or other sources of credit may incur interest charges. One migrant took 12 months to complete his loan repayment because of the loan’s high-interest rate.

The opportunity cost of recruitment fees

The responses from migrant workers in this study have revealed the nature of recruitment fees as a significant financial expense for the migrant workers and their families. Thus, it is important to analyse the opportunity cost of such a large expense. Migrant workers dedicate a portion of their income for remittances to support their families, one migrant stated that his salary is used to “pay for my small brother's education and I was to support mama [and] baba.” Indeed, without the need to pay recruitment fees, more resources could be invested in the betterment of their families back home.

Furthermore, migrant workers must also allocate some financial resources for their own living costs in Qatar to cover expenses like food, since no extra allowance is provided for migrant workers. In a voice recording sent to the researchers, a migrant worker said loan repayment “was a bit tough because I had to deny myself many things for us to pay back the money.” It is also important to note that the redirection of such a significant amount of money towards

recruitment fees affects migrant workers' ability to save. A combination of low salary and recruitment fee payment means that migrant workers have to work an extended period of time before they are free of debt, able to start saving, and see an increase in wealth.

Debt bondage and working experience

Migrant workers who take out loans to pay for recruitment fees are at high risk of falling into debt bondage. Although migrant workers are legally allowed to leave their jobs under new labour reforms in Qatar, they are forced to remain in their current positions because of the need to repay the debt incurred to secure their current employment. Indeed, they are unable to afford returning home or change employment because, without a secured income, they would risk defaulting on their loans. The lack of exit options reduces the migrant workers' negotiation powers, thus, increasing

their risk of being trapped in unfavourable work and living conditions, or even in a job that is different from what was agreed in the contract. Many of the workers that were interviewed or who filled out the survey recounted their awful work experiences when given a space to air their grievances with G4S Qatar:

"There is too much racial discrimination especially guards coming from Uganda and Kenya are always given poor location, even though they are well experienced... Some location you have to bribe. If a black person wants to go for a vacation, they would make it hard for him compared to other races. The guards also sleep many in one room so there is no space for privacy. Some accommodations have no washing machines. This was another indirect way of forcing guards to take their uniforms to the laundry yet they can't clean uniforms properly."

—A former G4S Security Guard from Uganda



A G4S Qatar migrant worker's dormitory.

Photo courtesy of Eddy Stam.

“My expectations and what I came to get in the company was a totally different thing, [I] am glad that after having to undergo many medical treatment of taking drugs because of swelling of feet and back pain [I] am about to take my vacation.”

—A current G4S Security Guard from Kenya

“The company is good but [keep in] mind about the guards’ welfare for example, the dirty accommodation, less salary, no [days] off, no overtime payment.”

—A current G4S Security Guard from Uganda

The answers by interviewees on their experiences with G4S Qatar had common themes: (i) racism towards Africans, (ii) poor living conditions, and (iii) more working hours than what was previously agreed upon. In certain cases, it was found that workers had initially agreed to work for 8 hours per day but

were ultimately paid the same amount to work 12 hours a day.

Not only is charging a recruitment fee illegal in Qatar and by ILO standards, the fees paid by migrant workers are often so high that it would take months to pay it off, even if one’s entire salary was fully dedicated to loan repayment. One worker mentioned that “they placed me for [a] 12-hour location for 26 working days per month. 1,200 [QAR] (US\$330) basic for 8 hours didn’t happen, they paid me 1,200 [QAR] (\$330) for 12 hours.”¹ Beyond the fact that this person was deceived and working exorbitant hours with barely any time off, the average recruitment fee is more than 4.5 months’ worth of their salary. It makes sense that at least 71 percent of the workers reported facing difficulties repaying their loans, citing low salaries, the need to send money to support their family and support personal living costs in Qatar. These conditions have the potential to trap the workers for longer periods of time as they continue to try and pay off their debt.

¹ In March 2021, Qatar began enforcing the new non-discriminatory minimum wage, which applies to all workers, regardless of nationality or sector. The new policy stipulates employers to pay their employees a minimum monthly salary of QAR 1,000 (US\$275) for 8 hour working days. Additionally, employers must provide minimum allowances of QAR 300 and QAR 500 for food and accommodation respectively, if such benefits are not already provided by the employers (*Qatar’s New Minimum Wage Enters into Force*, 2021).

Conclusion

This report has provided strong evidence that G4S Qatar engages in unfair recruitment practices. 39 out of the 40 G4S Qatar migrant workers interviewed in this study reported paying significant amounts in recruitment fees and related costs. Averaging at US\$1,525, the amount in recruitment fees paid by migrant workers is 4.6 times the reported monthly salary at G4S Qatar and 5.5 times the legal minimum monthly salary in Qatar. To secure their employment at G4S Qatar, most migrant workers are forced to borrow loans while others have reported selling family assets and using family inheritance to finance their recruitment fees. This leaves migrant workers highly indebted and poorer as they arrive to work in Qatar. Most migrant workers who borrowed loans reported facing difficulties repaying their debts, citing low salary, COVID economic downturn, family expenses, and their own cost of living in Qatar as challenges. This report found that on average, migrant workers took 9.3 months to clear their debts.

Arriving in Qatar highly indebted can increase migrant workers' risk of falling into debt bondage. Having accumulated significant amounts in debt to secure their employment at G4S Qatar, migrant workers must maintain a secured income in order to repay the loans, support their families through remittances, and begin saving for the future. Although new labour reforms have enabled the possibility of leaving their jobs, migrant workers would risk falling into job insecurity while their

debt remains unsettled. Migrant workers have reported poor working conditions, such as low salary, long hours, and lack of rest; poor living conditions, such as unsanitary accommodation and cramped living quarters. In more extreme cases, migrant workers have reported deteriorating health as well as the discrepancy between what was promised in the employment contract and the reality. The state of indebtedness would deprive migrant workers of the option to exit as they would need a stable income in order to repay the loans they borrowed to secure their jobs with G4S Qatar in the first place, hence, their vulnerability to debt bondage and unfree labour.

Interviews with G4S-linked recruitment agencies have complemented and reinforced the evidence of unfair recruitment practices revealed from the interviews with migrant workers. All three Kenyan-based recruiters with direct working relationships with G4S Qatar have admitted to charging migrant workers recruitment fees and related costs. They have confirmed the lack of financial compensation from G4S Qatar in exchange for their recruitment services, hence, the need to extract service fees from migrant workers. Unprompted, all three recruiters state in separate interviews that if G4S Qatar paid them appropriately for their services, they would not need to charge migrant workers any recruitment fees or related costs. This exemplifies the crucial need for G4S Qatar to take ownership of the financial burden of

recruitment to avoid unfairly transferring the burden to migrant workers.

In the past, G4S Global has denied accountability for G4S Qatar's unethical recruitment practices, citing their autonomous status. However, this study has found evidence that G4S Global operations in Kenya are both aware of and facilitating the recruitment of Kenyan migrant workers to G4S Qatar. While G4S Global has begun laying the groundwork to enforce its Employer Pays Principle by commissioning a third-party audit of supply chains in selected countries, no such plans have been announced for its Qatar franchise despite stating that it "proactively engages with AGTC (owner of G4S Qatar) to promote labour practices which comply with the ILO core labour conventions." Immediate actions should be taken to ensure ethical reforms are introduced and implemented in all G4S Qatar branches and franchises.

Limitations

This section will discuss the three limitations of this study, including limited recruiter representation, relatively small sample size of migrant workers and the lack of involvement/response from G4S.

Recruiter representation

While this study was able to include interviews with 40 migrant workers from seven different countries, it was difficult to source recruiters who were willing to speak on the record, despite the condition of anonymity. In Kenya, at least six different recruiters were approached by UNI Contract Workers A and B but only three agreed to be interviewed, while others either rejected or withdrew at the last minute.

The study would have also benefited from conducting interviews with recruiters from a range of countries of origin in order to observe the recruitment supply chain oversights in different countries.

However, it is important to note that information obtained from recruiters has served its aim to complement and strengthen the testimonies shared by G4S Qatar migrant workers. Indeed, it was also challenging to find recruiters in other countries of origin due to a lack of contacts beyond Kenya and Qatar to help source willing recruiters. As such, future research could benefit from reaching out to contacts from a larger range of countries of origin in order to map out all of G4S Qatar's major recruitment supply chains.

Sample size

This study recognises that the sample sizes for both migrant workers and recruiters interviewed in this study are relatively small, at 40 and four respectively. However, the migrant workers were sourced through a range of different ways, including through two UNI Contract Workers based in Kenya as well as social media platforms such as LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook. This has enabled the collection of migrant workers from seven different countries of origin who have worked at various different periods (2010 to present), showcasing that the collection of recruitment fees and related costs from migrant workers has been a longstanding issue at G4S Qatar.

Absence of G4S

Notably, this study was conducted without the involvement of both G4S Global and G4S Qatar. It would have been interesting to interview executive

officials of both G4S Global and G4S Qatar on the implementation of the Employer Pays Principle. Towards the conclusion of the study, the researchers of this study attempted to contact Catherine Hooper (Chief Human Resources Officer - International at G4S Global) and Elisabeth Fleuriot (Non-Executive Director and Chairperson of the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee at G4S Global) via LinkedIn to extend an invitation to G4S to an event held based on this research at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, though both did not reply.

Recommendations

This section will explore a series of recommendations for a range of actors, including both G4S Global and G4S Qatar, their business clients as well as the governments of Qatar and various origin countries.

Proposals for G4S Qatar

This research has three proposals for G4S Qatar, all of which recommend the immediate end to the collection of recruitment fees from migrant workers. Proposal 1 represents the most ideal

and drastic solution while Proposal 3 represents the mildest but least preferred solution.

While all three proposals will positively impact future migrant workers at G4S Qatar by immediately ending the collection of recruitment fees, only Proposal 1 includes a reimbursement scheme for both present and past migrant workers. As such, Proposal 1 is the preferred option as it would extend the scale of impact beyond incoming migrant workers by compensating both present and past migrant workers who have unfairly incurred recruitment fees and related costs.

This study recognises the potential logistical challenges of executing a reimbursement scheme for migrant workers. The clandestine nature of the recruitment fee payment means that there is often no formal documentation of the financial transfer, thus, making it difficult to prove both the transaction and the amount paid. Furthermore, migrant workers who have left G4S may be harder to contact, especially those who have changed their correspondence details.

Table 6: Proposals for G4S Qatar

	Ending recruitment fee collection from migrant workers	Reimbursement scheme		Level of change
		Current G4S Qatar workers	Past G4S Qatar workers	
Proposal 1	Immediate	Yes	Yes	High
Proposal 2	Immediate	Yes	No	Medium
Proposal 3	Immediate	No	No	Low

However, despite the aforementioned challenges, reimbursement schemes have been successfully managed by other companies in the past, including tech giants like Apple Inc, HP Inc and Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, as well as clothing brand Patagonia (Mustafa Qadri & Nikhil Eapen, 2017). In Qatar, the government launched the Universal Reimbursement Scheme in 2017 requiring contractors for the construction of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 infrastructure to reimburse migrant workers for the recruitment fees incurred (*Ethical Recruitment*, 2021). Critically, the repayment scheme requires employers to reimburse workers if they are unable to prove that the workers were hired ethically. This is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, it shifts the burden of proof away from migrant workers to employers (*Ethical Recruitment*, 2021). Secondly, the lack of formal documentation recruitment fee payment renders it difficult for migrant workers to provide evidence of unethical recruitment. Indeed, G4S Qatar can consider the existing models of reimbursement schemes implemented by other companies and/or collaborate with the Government of Qatar to extend the coverage of the Universal Reimbursement Scheme to include migrant workers in the private security industry.

Additional recommendations

G4S Global and/or G4S Qatar

1. Conduct an in-depth study of the recruitment supply chain

G4S Qatar should conduct an audit of the labour supply chains in all countries of origin where migrant workers are

recruited from. This is to identify the actors involved in the recruitment process (i.e., recruitment agencies, sub-agents, government officials, other G4S branches), the various costs incurred (consultation fee, commission fee, medical tests, travel costs, bribery, documentation, and paperwork fees) and the areas of clandestine practices (fraud, recruitment fees payment).

2. Launch a pilot programme to determine fair recruitment strategy

By mapping out the labour supply chains, G4S Qatar can proceed to design and introduce pilot programmes to trial ways to improve the labour supply chains. Existing models of fair recruitment trialled by the ILO and the QDVC should be studied in the designing of G4S Qatar's fair recruitment pilot programmes. Firstly, the pilot programmes should identify legally compliant recruitment agencies in countries of origin to enter into paid formal service agreements. Secondly, they should determine the appropriate amount of recruitment fees per hire by consulting both migrant workers and recruitment agencies. The amount of compensation to the recruiters should be sufficient so that migrant workers would not be charged with any recruitment fees or related costs. Thirdly, the impacts of the pilot programmes should be measured to understand the effectiveness of the various strategies. They should include indicators such as the number of migrant workers who paid a recruitment fee or not, the amount of recruitment fee paid by those who incurred a cost as well as changes in migrant workers' financial security and overall well-being.

3. Standardise the code of conduct for recruitment practices

Once the most effective fair recruitment practices have been identified through the pilot programmes, G4S Global and G4S Qatar should work towards formalising a standard code of conduct for recruitment to ensure all branches, whether franchised or not, are engaging in ethical recruitment. This should include an institutionalised guide on inter-branch collaboration in recruitment drives, given the evidence of G4S Kenya's involvement in the recruitment efforts for G4S Qatar.

4. Include the budgeting of recruitment costs in projects

As major companies in the global and Qatari private security industry, G4S Global and G4S Qatar should set industry standards by mandating the calculation of foreign labour recruitment costs in the budgeting of projects. This could normalise the practice of foreign employers paying for recruitment fees and encourage other companies to engage in fair recruitment practices.

5. Take greater ownership of the recruitment supply chain

Once fair recruitment practices are implemented, G4S Global and G4S Qatar must continue the oversight of recruitment supply chains in origin countries to ensure consistent compliance. A dedicated Recruitment Compliance Department could be established by both G4S Global and G4S Qatar to manage and govern overseas recruitment drives by directly communicating with local recruiters in countries of origin. The Department should conduct periodic unscheduled checks on contracted recruiters in

countries of origin to ensure continuous compliance with ethical recruitment practices. An external auditor can also be sourced to conduct third-party assessments on the recruitment practices.

G4S's clients

1. Enforce the inclusion of recruitment fees in tenders

In recognition of the clients' level of influence and bargaining power, they should actively mandate the inclusion of recruitment fees in the proposed budget covered in project tenders submitted by G4S Global and G4S Qatar. Clients should scrutinise the amount in recruitment fees proposed by G4S Global and G4S Qatar to ensure sufficient resources are allocated to compensate recruiters in origin countries in order to prevent the exploitation of migrant workers.

2. Normalise the payment of recruitment fees by employers and business clients

Clients of G4S should play a role in normalising the payment of recruitment fees by companies and actively condemn the practice of transferring the responsibility to migrant workers. In finding unethical practices, clients should assert pressure on the relevant actors to ensure that G4S Global and G4S Qatar are held accountable for the payment of recruitment fees.

Government of Qatar

1. Expand the role and capacity of Qatar Visa Centres (QVCs)

In nearly all interviews with migration and fair recruitment experts, the significance and influence of QVCs

established in countries of origin in improving the transparency of recruitment processes were reiterated. At present, QVCs are designed to oversee the signing of work contracts between employers and migrant workers in order to prevent fraud. Their role and capacity could be expanded to better scrutinise recruitment fee payments.

Firstly, QVCs could oversee the signing of service contracts between foreign employers and local recruiters. This could ensure foreign employers enter into formal, paid, service agreements with local recruitment agencies and legally commit to paying an appropriate amount of compensation to recruiters for their recruitment services. Secondly, QVCs could assist in identifying migrant workers who paid a recruitment fee by mandating discrete welfare checks on each migrant worker before the signing of work contracts. This should be done in a private setting without the presence of recruiters in the room to ensure migrant workers are able to speak in confidence.

2. Introduce legal obligations for companies to include recruitment costs in budgets

The Government of Qatar could instate a legal requirement for companies that recruit migrant workers to include the calculation of recruitment fees into their project and annual budgets. This could ensure that companies compensate recruitment agencies for their service and discourage them from unethically transferring the financial burden of recruitment to migrant workers.

3. Establish a tier system to scrutinise companies with unethical practices

The Government of Qatar could also introduce an annual human trafficking report similar to the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) released by the United States Government. This report should study and evaluate companies operating in Qatar on their compliance with fair employment and recruitment practices. It could include a four-tier system, categorising companies according to their level of compliance with ethical practices, with Tier 1 being most responsible and Tier 4 being least compliant with ethical standards. This name-and-shame approach could encourage ethically substandard companies to take immediate actions in order to improve their public image.

4. Launch a moral progress award to recognise companies compliant with human rights

To complement the four-tier ethics system, the Government of Qatar could introduce a formal recognition to credit companies that engage in ethical practices or have made commendable improvements in protecting human rights. Companies awarded with the recognition could receive an official logo suitable for public display on their websites to showcase their accreditation. This could attract positive press and encourage others to take strides towards greater human rights protections.

Governments of origin countries

1. Mandate formal paid service contracts between foreign employers and local recruitment agencies

Interviews with G4S-linked recruitment agencies have revealed the need to ensure foreign employers are held responsible for the financial burden of recruitment. In order to prevent the cost of recruitment from being unfairly transferred to migrant workers, governments of origin countries, such as Kenyan, Uganda, Nepal and beyond should legally require all foreign employers to appropriately compensate local recruitment agencies in exchange for their services.

2. Prohibit the charging of recruitment fees and related costs on migrant workers

At present, while Qatar explicitly prohibits the collection of recruitment fees and related costs on migrant workers, this practice remains legal but regulated in many countries of origin. Appendix 1 shows the status of recruitment fee payment by migrant workers in Qatar and the seven countries of origin included in this study. It is recommended that governments in countries of origin observe ILO's fair recruitment policy by introducing a complete prohibition of recruitment fee payment by migrant workers while simultaneously mandating foreign employers to shoulder the financial burden of recruitment. This reduces migrant workers' risk to debt bondage and unfree labour.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Legal status of recruitment fees and/or payment of related costs by country

Country	Prohibited	Regulated
Qatar	✓	
Kenya		✓
Uganda		✓
Pakistan		✓
Bangladesh		✓
India		✓
Nepal		✓
Sudan	No data	No data

Source: ILO [<http://ilo.org/gimi/FRI.action>]

Appendix 2: Survey questionnaire and interview template for G4S Qatar migrant workers

Thank you for participating in our questionnaire. This questionnaire is part of a research project in collaboration with UNI Global Union and the Graduate Institute, Geneva. The aim of the research is to understand the recruitment process of migrant workers by G4S. By default, we will not ask for your name or any personal information; however, if you wish, you may provide us with your name and contact details for a follow-up interview. If you are uncomfortable answering any questions, feel free to skip to the next one. Please be assured that all information collected will be confidential and anonymous, it is only used for the purpose of research.

The principal researchers for this project are Jason Nemerovski, Quah Wei Vei, and Nina Lam. Please feel free to reach out to us via:

Email: capstone2021.debtbondage@graduateinstitute.ch

WhatsApp: +1 415-830-2875

Information

1. Have you worked for G4S?
 - a. Yes or No
2. What is your home country?
 - a. What country were you recruited from (if different)?
3. Which country were you recruited to work in?
4. When did you work for G4S?
 - a. Start date
 - b. End date
5. What is/was your job title in G4S?

Recruitment process

6. How did you find out about the G4S job?
7. Did you use a recruitment agency? If so, which one?
8. How long was the application process, from the start to signing to contract?
9. How long was the waiting period between signing the contract and starting work at G4S?
10. Were you told what to say by the recruitment agency during your visa application and entry into Qatar? If so, what were you told to say?

Recruitment fee

11. Did you pay a recruitment fee?
12. How much did you pay in recruitment fees? (Local currency)
13. What was the recruitment fee for?
14. Who did you pay the recruitment fee to?

Loans

15. Did you have to borrow a loan to pay the recruitment fee?
16. Who did you borrow from?
17. How much was the interest rate?
18. How long did it take to repay the money?

19. Did you face any difficulties in repaying the loan? If so, what are the difficulties?

Experience

20. What was your experience like working with G4S? (Rating: 1 = Poor, 5 = Excellent)

21. Please describe your experience at G4S?

22. During your time at G4S, are/were you aware of the Speak Out, G4S's feedback and reporting process?

a. Did/have you used Speak Out to provide any feedback to G4S?

b. Did/do you know anyone that has used Speak Out to provide feedback to G4S before?

Final Section

23. Anything else you would like to tell us about?

24. Would you be willing to have a follow-up interview with us regarding your experience with G4S? If so, please provide your contact information. Your contact information will only be used to schedule a follow-up interview. It will not be linked to the answers you provided today; your answers will remain anonymous.

Thank you for your time and participation. Please be assured that the information collected will be confidential and anonymous.

Appendix 3: Interview template for recruitment agencies

Information

1. What is the role of recruitment agencies like yours?
2. What are some of the challenges you face as a recruitment agency?
3. Does your recruitment agency work directly with G4S Qatar?
4. Does the recruitment agency you work for have a recruitment contract with G4S Qatar?
5. If yes, which country branch of G4S does your recruitment agency have a contract with? (Country name)
6. How long has your agency been working with G4S for recruitment?
7. How many workers does your agency recruit for G4S in a year?

Recruitment process

8. What is the recruitment process like for G4S workers?
9. How closely do you work with G4S for recruitment?
10. What are the criteria you are looking for when recruiting for G4S workers?
11. Who do you mostly recruit for G4S?
 - a. Age
 - b. Socioeconomic status
12. What is the visa application process like for workers?
 - a. Do you provide any help or tips for the workers so that their visa application is successful?
 - b. Do you ever walk them through what to say and what not to say to make sure their application is successful?
13. How is a G4S Qatar contract like and what does it cover/include?

Recruitment fees

14. How much do you charge in recruitment fee?
15. How do you determine the amount of the recruitment fee to charge?
16. What is the recruitment fee for?
17. Why do you charge a recruitment fee?
18. Do non-Kenyans pay the same amount in recruitment fees as Kenyan migrant workers?
19. Through your contract or demand letter with G4S, does G4S pay for any part of the recruitment?
20. If yes, what does the fee that G4S pay to recruiters cover?

Role of recruiter

21. What is the role of recruitment agencies after a migrant has arrived in Qatar?

Appendix 4: List of experts interviewed

No.	Name	Organisation	Country
1	UNI Contract Worker A	UNI Global Union	Kenya
2	Niyama Rai	International Labour Organisation	Qatar
3	Liesbeth Schiavo	Securitas	UAE
4	Dave Gigg	GMB Union	United Kingdom
5	Zahra Khan	Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, New York University	United States
6	Mustafa Qadri	Equidem Research and Consulting	United Kingdom
7	Pujan Mani Rai	The Graduate Institute, Geneva	Switzerland
8	Dr. Prakash Bhattarai	Centre for Social Change	Nepal
9	Kalpana Rana Magar	Centre for Social Change	Nepal
10	Manuel Silva	Impactt Limited	United Kingdom
11	Maham Javaid	Human Rights Watch (2019–2021)	United States

Appendix 5: Online advertisement recruiting workers in Nepal for G4S Qatar

कतारमा रोजगारको अवसर | कम्पनी: G4S QATAR W.L.L शहर: DOHA

पूर्व स्वीकृत मिति: २०७७/०५/०५ चालानी नं.: ६०१५३५३७ LT. No.: 235511 पून विज्ञापन

सि. नं.	कामदारको पद	मान संख्या		व्युत्पन्न योग्यता	मासिक तलब		ओभर टाइम सुविधा	प्रतिदिन काम गर्ने घण्टा	हप्तामा काम गर्ने दिन	वैयक्तिक विदा	साप्ताहिक सुविधा	बरने सुविधा	करार अवधि
		पुरुष	महिला		QR	बे. रू.							
1.	Supervisor	0	5	सम्बन्धित कामना दक्ष	3000	८६०	क.लि. अनुसार	८ घण्टा	६ दिन	क.लि. अनुसार	६	६	२ वर्ष
2.	Guard	16	0		1500	८३०							
3.	Driver	5	0		1500	८३०							

अन्तर्वार्ता मेनपावर कार्यालय काठमाडौंमा २०७८ साउन २० गते (4 August 2021) मा हुनेछ ।

स्वदेशमा गर्ने मेडिकलको सुलभ कस्तो व्यहोर्ने र कति लाग्ने	विदेशमा गर्ने मेडिकलको खर्च कस्तो व्यहोर्ने	स्वदेशमा खरिद म्याद जौकन विमा कस्तो व्यहोर्ने/कति लाग्ने	रोजगारमा विमा हुने/बुल्ने र प्रिमियम कस्तो तिर्ने	कामदारलाई हवाई टिकट कस्तो दिने र कति लाग्ने	भिया सुलभ कस्तो व्यहोर्ने	भिया स्ट्यान्डोर्ड सुलभ कस्तो व्यहोर्ने	अभिमूर्चीकरण सुलभ कति लाग्ने र कस्तो व्यहोर्ने	कल्याणकारी कोष सम्बन्धी व्यवस्था	सेवासुलभ कति लाग्ने र कस्तो व्यहोर्ने
रोजगारदाता कम्पनीले व्यहोर्ने	रोजगारदाता कम्पनीले व्यहोर्ने	रोजगारदाता कम्पनीले व्यहोर्ने	विमा हुने/प्रिमियम रोजगारदाताले	रोजगार दाताले दिने	रोजगार दाताले व्यहोर्ने	रोजगार दाताले व्यहोर्ने	रु. ७००/- रोजगार दाताले	रु. १,५००/- रोजगार दाताले	वि. सुलभ

वैदेशिक रोजगार विभागबाट मरासुको जानकारी :- १. आफ्नो सामान्य विमा प्राप्त भईको विहित मरासु मात्र कम्पनीमा गई रकम बुझाउनु होला । बुझाएको रकमको भीवर उतिबार्थ लिनुहोला । २. आफू काम गर्ने ठाउँ मनुकमा रोको नेपाली कुरैतिक विद्योको सम्पर्क देखाउनु र कोष नं. ६४ कायमा राख्नुहोला । आफू कतिदिनमा पर्दा सम्पर्क गर्न सकिने हुन्छ । ३. जस विज्ञापन (पुस्तक) मा उल्लेख भएको भन्दा बढी रकम कसैलाई नदिनुहोला । ४. विदेश जानु अघि अभिमूर्चीकरण वा इन्सुरन्स हासिल उतिबार्थ लिनुपर्ने छ । ५. विदेश जानु अघि आफू जाने मनुक, काम दिने कम्पनी, चाडपै सेवा तथा सुविधा र अन्य जानकारी सक्ने घरेर मात्र कम्पनीमा खसमा हस्तक्षर गर्नु होला र सो को एक (१) प्रति आफूले राख्नुहोला । ६. काममा विदेश जादा नेपालकै विभाजनस्थल प्रवेश गर्नुहोला, जसका टिके सम्भारना हुन्छ । ७. यस विज्ञापन सम्बन्धमा सबै कुरा बुझ्नुपर्नेमा वैदेशिक रोजगार विभाग, बुटवलसमा सम्पर्क गर्नुहोला ।

१०८ टोलुम पार नं. ३०३/०६१/०६१

पुकार इन्टरनेशनल ओभरसिज प्रा. लि.

टोखा न.पा.-११, महादेवटार, सामाखुसी, काठमाडौं,

फोन: ४९८८७५४, ४९८८७५५, मो. : ९८४१५८३९४४

chitwan : 056-522876, 9855060686 Pokhara : 061-551158, 9846031923

Butwal : 071-541534, 9857077872, Birtamod : 023-534105, 9806091708

E-mail : md@pukaroverseas.com.np, info.pukaragency@gmail.com, pukargm@gmail.com.np, www.pukaroverseas.com.np

Photo courtesy of Eddy Stam

Appendix 6: Recruitment demand letter from G4S Qatar



شركة جي 4 إس قطر
 G4S Qatar LLC
 Capital: QR 20,000,000
 PO Box: 18110
 Doha - Qatar
 T: +974 44660000
 F: +974 44660000
 Email: info@qatar.g4s.com
 www.g4s.com.qa

Ref. No: DL/G4S/PUR/11/2018 4th November 2018

M/s Pukar International Overseas Pvt. Ltd
 License No: 781/065/066,
 Regd. No: 55823/065/066
 Tel: 00977-14388754/14388755
 Tokha Road, Kathmandu, Nepal

DEMAND LETTER

Dear Sir/Madam

We request you to select and recruit the following suitable personnel for our company from Nepal as per the details given below.

No.	Position	GENDER	No. of workers	Salary (Mgt)	Salary (in words)	Air Ticket for joining the company and returning home after completion of contract period provided
01	Security Guard	MALE	60	1500.00 Q.R	Fifteen Hundred QAR	

The following Terms & conditions shall be included in the contract.

1. Period of employment : Two years (renewable)
2. Place of Employment : Doha Qatar
3. Air Ticket : For joining the Company for the first time (CTM-DCNA) and their up & down air ticket will be provided after the completion of two years contract.
4. Working Hour : 8 hrs per day, 6 days per week (48 hrs per week)
5. Over time : As per Qatar Labor Law.
6. Probation Period : 90 days from date of entry into Qatar
7. Visa & Resident permit : Visa & Resident permit will be provided by the company free of cost.
8. Accommodation : Free bachelor accommodation should be provided by the company
9. Water, electricity & gas : Provided by the company
10. Food : Provided by the company
11. Medical / Insurance : Provided by the company
12. Transportation (Bus) : Provided by the company (to and from the work site)
13. Uniform, and safety Materials : Provided by the company
14. Service Gratuity : Provided As per Qatar Labor Law
15. Leave Pay : Yearly 21 days provide by company
16. Service Charge : Not provided by the company.
17. Other Term & Conditions : As per contract to be signed.



DR. SAIF AL HAJRI
CEO



Regn. No. 15678/75/76
 Seen at the Embassy of Nepal

 Labour Attaché

Airport Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Al Khair Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Doha Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Hamad Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Sahra Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Wakra Branch
PO Box 18110
Doha - Qatar
T: +974 44660000
F: +974 44660000

Security is our priority

Photo courtesy of Eddy Stam

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DILIGENCE IS DUE: THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS THROUGH
G4S QATAR'S UNFAIR RECRUITMENT PRACTICES

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Cover photo courtesy of Eddy Stam