

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Mao and "Maoism"

"Mao Zedong Si-xiang" ("Mao Zedong Thought"), is a doctrine for revolution developed by Mao and his associates in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It had its beginnings in the 1920s and continues to influence Chinese politics to this very day. Maoism represents a universal political philosophy based on a distinct revolutionary outlook. It does not require either a Chinese or Marxist-Leninist context.

The structure of Maoism took shape against a backdrop of profound crisis in China in the early part of the twentieth century. The nation was weak and divided. Its most serious problems were the struggle for reunification as a single political entity and the expulsion of foreign occupation forces. Young Mao was primarily a nationalist, and his sentiments were strongly anti-Western and anti-imperialist even before he became attracted to Marxism-Leninism in about 1920. Mao's nationalism combined with a naturally combative nature to make him an admirer of martial spirit and military glory. Both became cornerstones of Maoism. Indeed, the army held an important position both in the creation of the Chinese revolutionary state and in its later nation-building process. Mao always relied on army support and used it successfully in conflicts with his party throughout the 1950s and '60s.

Mao's political ideas crystallized slowly. He had a mentality that was opportunistic and wary of ideological niceties. The Marxist-Leninist tradition regarded peasants as incapable of revolutionary initiative and only marginally useful in backing urban proletarian efforts. Yet Mao decided to base his revolution on the dormant power of China's four hundred million peasants. He saw a potential in them by the very fact that they were "poor and blank". In his opinion, strength and violence were inherent in their condition. Proceeding from this theory, he proposed to instill in them a proletarian consciousness and make them alone the basis for his revolution.

For a time after the creation of the Chinese Communist State in 1949, Mao Zedong attempted to conform to a Stalinist model. But, by 1955, he and his followers found this policy unworkable. Rigid and bureaucratic institutions and the emergence of managerial and technocratic elites might be acceptable elsewhere, especially in the Soviet Union, but not in Maoist China! First Mao speeded up the process of agricultural collectivization. Then came the "Great Leap Forward", a refinement of the traditional five-year plan, and other efforts at mobilizing the masses into producing small-scale industries. The experiment failed due to waste, confusion, and inefficient management.

In 1966, party leaders, at Mao's instigation, launched the "Cultural Revolution", designed to squash emerging "bourgeois" elements, elites, and bureaucrats. "Anti-intellectualism" became the weapon of choice. Party leaders stressed egalitarianism and the value of the peasants' lack of sophistication. Thousands of city workers were forced to receive "profound class education" through agricultural labor alongside illiterate country folk.

Maoism's alternative to growth led by elites and bureaucracies was to be growth accomplished through revolutionary zeal and mass effort. Maoism undertook to pit the collective will of the Chinese people against the customary and rational dictates of economics and industrial management. The violent excesses of Maoism and its inability to achieve sustained economic growth led, after the Chairman's death, to a new emphasis on education and management professionalism. By the 1980s Maoism appeared to be little more than a revered historical relic.

The Birth of the "PRC"

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the "Jie Fang Jun" - People's Liberation Army (PLA), succeeded in driving General Chiang and the "Guo Min Dang" (nationalists) out of mainland China, establishing the "Zhonguo Renmin Gonghe Guo" or "People's Republic of China" (PRC). Within weeks, party chairman Mao Zedong and his supporters realized a fact of "revolutionary" life. It is far easier to discredit, belittle, or destroy institutions than it is to build or maintain them. The CCP was basically a peasant movement that had learned its techniques in the countryside. A peasant army had won the long civil war. Its primary goal had been the destruction of the old ruling classes. They had no experience in overseeing an industrial economy, or an understanding of the workings of China's huge urban centers. They knew only that they wanted socialism! As far as they were concerned, there was only one true socialist nation, the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was to the Soviets that they turned for guidance.

Between 1949 and 1952, with Soviet assistance, the PRC struggled with three critical transformations. First, the country had to turn complete economic collapse into rapid growth. Second, political anarchy had to be replaced by structure and discipline. Third, military rule had to give way to civilian rule. The pursuit of these goals led inexorably to an examination of the relationship between China's countryside and its cities. Under the "Agrarian Reform Law" of June 1950, the property of rural landlords was confiscated and redistributed. The property of capitalists (officially designated as "traitors") and foreign nationals was also confiscated. This property was then used by the state to lay the economic basis for its industrialization program.

PRC policy also focused on restoring order, rehabilitating the economy, and stopping runaway inflation in the great cities. To accomplish this, the CCP originally tried to win the confidence of capitalists by implementing severe fiscal austerity policies. These were surprisingly successful. By the end of 1950, many urban Chinese viewed the PRC leadership as reformers rather than revolutionaries. However, the CCP's real agenda soon became apparent. A campaign to "Suppress the Counterrevolutionaries" dealt violently with religious leaders and the last remaining supporters of the "Guo Min Dang". Next, the "Three Antis" campaign targeted communist cadres who had become too "chummy" with capitalists. Then, the "Five Antis" campaign took on the capitalists themselves. They were charged with bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property and economic information, and cheating on government contracts. Finally, the "Thought Reform" campaign targeted university professors and other intellectuals suspected of political "incorrectness". The Soviet system was now firmly in place.

The Korean War and its Aftermath

Although China supported the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, it never expected to participate in the war directly. When General MacArthur's "United Nations Forces" reached the Yalu River in October, the effect on the PRC was explosive. The Soviets had convinced them that the North Koreans would have the conquest of the South sewed up in short order. Now the North Korean army was a complete shambles and the American "dogs" were sniffing at the gates of Manchuria. China's industrially vital Northeast provinces were in serious danger of being overrun. Initial PRC moves can be best described as "tentative". They appear to have been aimed at "warning off" the UN forces, discouraging any advance into Chinese territory. The warning was thoroughly ignored. General Peng Te Huai and his "Chinese People's Volunteers" crossed into Korea secretly, at night, on October 14th.

The "November Offensive" made up of 200,000 Chinese troops, organized into six armies, took tired and overextended UN Forces completely by surprise, driving them south in disarray. Stubborn resistance by Turkish, British, and US 1st Cavalry Division troops in the West and the 1st Marine Division around the Chosin Reservoir, blunted the offensive, however. By the following summer, the war had degenerated into a horrific slugging match in which superior Western firepower (especially airpower) inflicted enormous casualties on the Chinese. When the fighting ended in July 1953, approximately two-thirds of China's combat divisions had seen service in Korea, suffering well over a million casualties.

The effort to consolidate the nation's political structures and the costly war in Korea produced significant consequences. Military and industrial resources became concentrated in Manchuria, along with a large number of Soviet military and economic advisers. Gao Gang, chief administrator in the region, became a Soviet pawn, adapting their techniques to Chinese factory management and economic planning. He promoted the Soviets on a national basis when he moved to Beijing in late 1952 to set up the "State Planning Commission", while working to reduce the influence of his rivals, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. The ensuing power struggle lasted more than a year, after which Gao was out!

The first cracks in the original Sino-Soviet relationship appeared when Moscow failed to adequately support Beijing in Korea. After the Gao Gang purge, Soviet influence slipped even further. When Stalin's death brought major changes in Soviet policy, the applicability of Soviet techniques to Chinese problems and the extent of hidden Soviet manipulation in the country came under close scrutiny. But Soviet influence continued to be strong in the PLA. The Chinese army was reorganized along Soviet lines, with a greater emphasis on heavy firepower and mobility. Under Soviet aid programs worth approximately \$US450 million, the Soviets supplied the equipment and technical aid for a large number of industrial projects.

Mao made no secret of the fact that his aim was to make China into the centerpiece of a worldwide revolution. This objective, he said, required transforming "consumer" cities into "producer" cities by merging the workers and peasants with urban administrators and bureaucrats. Police and party cadres in each locality, backed up by army units, began to crack down on any activity associated with economic inefficiency. Revolutionary priorities took precedence over other needs. The collectivization of Chinese agriculture spread rapidly. In the cities, a temporary accommodation was reached with non-communist elements. Many individuals from the previous regime were retained in positions of authority in factories, businesses, schools, and governmental organizations. The CCP recognized that these compromises endangered their revolutionary values, but necessity won out for the time being. Once their position was secure, the communists adopted more rigid, centralized, and bureaucratic attitudes. Many considered this change a betrayal of the revolution. Their objections became intense, and the issue eventually came to divide the once cohesive revolutionary elite.

The "Great Leap Forward"

The First Five-Year Plan was explicitly modeled on Soviet experience. The Chinese established a central planning apparatus and central ministries and that were close copies of Soviet models. Chinese plans adopted Stalinist priorities. In a country where more than eighty percent of the population lived in rural areas, eighty percent of all government investment was channeled into urban heavy industry. The "plan" established a "top down" system in which a highly centralized government apparatus exercised detailed control over economic policy through enormous ministries in Beijing. This differed substantially from communist priorities before 1949. Nevertheless, the First Five-Year Plan was linked with the transition of China's rural and urban economy into one capable of supporting a worldwide revolutionary movement. Communist theory was to be put to the test in the real world. The "Great Leap Forward", as this plan was popularly called, was a dismal failure.

Cultural Revolution

Mao became convinced that senior party and military officials were deliberately sabotaging all his efforts. On the strength of this conviction, a major purge was launched, striking dissident army leaders, especially the chief of staff. China then turned its back on all external affairs. In May 1966, Mao secretly assigned the bulk of cultural and educational matters to the army. There was to be a "revolution in the superstructure". The existing massive bureaucracy was to be replaced by a more popularly based system led personally by Mao, and a simplified administration under his direct control. In the "May Instructions", the educational system came under attack. "Big-character posters," or large wall newspapers (Da Ze Bao), appeared first on Beijing campuses, then all over the country. University officials and professors were singled out for criticism, while students held mass meetings.

In June the government dropped examinations for university admissions, called for reform of entrance procedures, and delayed reopening campuses. Party officials and their wives circulated among students to gain favor and to obstruct their opponents. Intrigue and political maneuvering were everywhere. The innermost circles of the Central Committee were actually fighting the revolution. The students were merely pawns. This first phase was over by the end of July, with the convening of a plenary session of the Central Committee. Mao issued his own big-character poster to "Bombard the Headquarters", meaning the renunciation and removal of senior officials he deemed dangerously "revisionist".

Mao feared that China was becoming too much like the Soviet Union, and that his own place in history was threatened. He decided the only way to prevent these two disasters was to throw China into turmoil in a gigantic effort to reverse the historic processes he felt were under way. He ultimately failed, and his successors would struggle for decades with the damage done, especially by vast hordes of glassy-eyed, fanatic, teenaged, locusts known as the "Red Guards".

Mao formally launched the Cultural Revolution in August 1966. During the following months he encouraged the "Red Guards" (student activists-cum-stormtroopers) to attack all traditional values and "bourgeois" things, and put CCP officials to the test by publicly humiliating them. These attacks were known at the time as struggles against the "Four Olds". These included old ideas, customs, culture, and habits of mind. The movement quickly escalated to the committing of criminal acts and atrocities. Many elderly people and intellectuals were physically abused, and many died. Nonetheless, Mao believed that this mobilization of urban youths would be beneficial for them and that the CCP cadres they attacked were "improved" by the experience.

The period from August 1966 to early 1969 constituted the true "Red Guard" phase of the revolution and included several important turning points. The latter half of 1966 witnessed not only the Red Guard mobilization, but also the removal from power of key Politburo leaders, most notably President Liu Shaoqi and CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. In October 1966 both Liu and Deng were forced into brutal public self-criticism, which Mao thought insufficiently thorough.

In January 1967, the movement actually threatened to overthrow provincial CCP committees and replace them with new structures. By summer, large armed clashes occurred throughout urban China, and even Chinese embassies abroad experienced takeovers by their own Red Guards. The Red Guards splintered into jealous factions, each purporting to be the "true" representative of

the thought of Mao Zedong. Mao's own personality cult, encouraged so as to provide momentum to the movement, assumed religious proportions. The resulting anarchy, terror, and paralysis threw the urban economy into a tailspin. The time had come to put an end to this madness! In 1968 Mao decided to rebuild the CCP and bring things back under control. Military personnel took over in schools, factories, and various government agencies. The army also forced millions of urban Red Guards to move out to the hinterlands, thereby giving the cities a chance to recover.

Back to School

Universities began to reopen, although the number of students shrank considerably. In July, Mao's latest instructions approved the resumption of science and engineering courses and called for the "return to production" of all graduates. In October, the Central Committee called for a party congress for the rebuilding of the CCP. Something had caused the CCP leadership to close ranks with unprecedented swiftness and solidarity.

The catalyst was the Soviet Union's "Brezhnev Doctrine", established after their invasion of Czechoslovakia. That doctrine explained this action in terms of the obligation of all Socialist countries to set things right (by whatever means necessary) if "scientific socialism" became threatened in any country in which a communist party held power. To Beijing's horror, even Hanoi came out in support of this threatening posture. Moscow made it clear that it believed a "military-bureaucratic dictatorship" had seized power from the "true communists" in Beijing. To add to Beijing's concern, since 1966 the Soviet Union had been building up a sizable military force along the formerly demilitarized Sino-Soviet border. While these forces were not adequate for a full-scale invasion, they certainly posed a serious threat, especially given the political divisions and social chaos that still prevailed across China.

There's a Bear at the Door!

When the Party Congress convened in April 1969, it did so in the wake of two bloody Sino-Soviet border clashes in March. A new party constitution included an unprecedented provision. Defense Minister Lin Biao was named as Mao's successor! The entire country found itself in the grip of army rule. Military men who now represented forty percent of the membership dominated both the Central Committee and the new party committees. Premier Zhou Enlai tried to cut back Lin Biao's power and to relieve some of the threat to China's security by engaging the Soviets in direct negotiations. But a series of serious military clashes along the border, and a limited but bloody Soviet thrust several miles into Xin Jiang, heightened tensions. Zhou briefly met with Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin at the Beijing airport in early September. The two men agreed to hold formal talks. Lin Biao declared martial law. Several leaders who had been purged by the Cultural Revolution died, including Liu Shaoqi. Mao became wary of Lin Biao as a successor and began to maneuver against him. Zhou Enlai joined forces with Mao in that effort, as did Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. The top leadership of the PRC was split again. This time the strain became too much for the old man.

Mao's Last Years

The first signs surfaced at a meeting of the Central Committee in the summer of 1970, when Chen Boda, Lin Biao, and their supporters made a series of remarks that angered Mao. He purged Chen as a warning to Lin. Then he criticized Lin's top supporters in the military for "arrogantly turning a deaf ear to civilian authority". Things really got out of hand when Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguoguo, put together plans for a coup against Mao to save his father.

Zhou Enlai, meanwhile, was engaged in secret diplomatic talks with the United States. In July 1971, US national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, slipped secretly into Beijing, right in the middle of the Vietnam War! China was desperate to reduce antagonism with the US in the face of Soviet threats. Lin Biao strongly opposed this. He feared it would strengthen the hand of his key rival, Zhou Enlai. The Kissinger visit was a major defeat for Lin. In September, Lin Biao was killed in an "attempt to flee to the Soviet Union". A failed assassination plot against Mao was cited as the cause. Virtually the entire Chinese military staff was purged in the weeks that followed.

Lin's demise had a profoundly disillusioning effect on Mao's supporters. Lin had been the high priest of the Mao cult. Millions had gone through tortuous struggles to elevate him to power and crush "revisionist" challengers. They had attacked and tortured respected teachers, abused elderly citizens, humiliated old revolutionaries, and battled former friends in bloody confrontations. The sordid details of Lin's assassination plot and subsequent flight made all this just another unprincipled power struggle. Millions of Chinese concluded they had simply been manipulated by a pack of unscrupulous power mongers.

Mao suffered a serious stroke in 1972 and Zhou learned that he had a fatal cancer. There was now uncertainty over the succession. In early 1973, Deng Xiaoping was brought back to power in the hope of grooming him as a successor. Deng had been publicly humiliated by the "Red Guards" during the Cultural Revolution at Jiang Qing's insistence. His reemergence made her and her followers desperate. From mid-1973, Chinese politics shifted back and forth between Jiang's group, the "Si Ren Ban" (Gang of Four), and supporters of Zhou and Deng, with Mao in the middle.

With Zhou hospitalized for cancer treatment, Deng assumed a leading position in the summer of 1974. His strength was increased by other Cultural Revolution victims he brought out of political exile. Madame Mao and the "Gang of Four" convinced Mao that Deng would eventually repudiate the Cultural Revolution and even Mao himself. "Da Ze Bao" appeared denouncing Deng. When Zhou died in January 1976, Deng delivered his eulogy, then disappeared from public view. He was formally purged in April. Only Mao's death in September and the purge of the Gang of Four by a coalition of political, police, and military leaders in October 1976 brought this effort to vilify Deng to a close.

Mao's death on September 9th, 1976 and the purge of the "Gang of Four" left Hua Guofeng as official leader of China. Hua tried to consolidate his position by stressing his ties to Mao and his fidelity to Mao's basic ideas, but many others in the top leadership wanted to move away from precisely these issues. Hua's position eroded over the remainder of the decade. The 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress convened in August 1977 over a regime split once more between radicals and revisionists. Hua Guofeng and almost half of the members were individuals whose careers had gained from the Cultural Revolution. The rest, like Deng Xiaoping, were victims of the same movement. Though the process took quite a while, the tide began to turn decidedly in favor of Deng's group.

Deng Xiao Ping

Deng Xiao Ping was born the son of a Sichuan Landowner in 1904. While studying in France and the USSR in the 1920s he became an active communist. On returning to China he became a leading political and military organizer under Mao Zedong. Deng participated in the 1934-35 "Long March" and served as the commissar of a division in the "Eighth Route Army" in the civil war. He was appointed a secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945. In 1952 he was summoned to Beijing and became a vice-premier. Rising rapidly, he became general secretary of the CCP in 1954 and a member of the ruling Politburo in 1955.

From the mid-1950s Deng was a major policy maker in both foreign and domestic affairs. He stressed the use of material incentives and the formation of skilled technical and managerial elites in China's quest for economic development. This brought him into conflict with Mao, who stressed egalitarian policies and revolutionary enthusiasm as the key to economic growth. He was stripped of his high party and government posts during the Cultural Revolution, after which he disappeared from public view. In 1973, however, Deng was reinstated under the sponsorship of Premier Zhou Enlai and made deputy premier. In 1975 he became vice-chairman of the party's Central Committee, a member of its Politburo, and chief of the general staff. As effective head of the government during the months preceding the death of Zhou, he was widely considered his likely successor. However, in January 1976, he was purged again. It was not until Mao's death in September 1976 and the consequent fall from power of the "Gang of Four" that Deng was rehabilitated, this time with the assent of Mao's chosen successor to the leadership of China, Hua Guofeng.

By July 1977, Deng had returned to his old posts. He soon embarked on a struggle with Hua for control of the party and government. Deng's superior political skills and broad base of support soon led Hua to surrender the premiership and the chairmanship to protégés of Deng in 1980 and '81, including Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. After this, Deng proceeded to carry out his own policies. Operating through consensus, compromise, and persuasion, Deng engineered important reforms in virtually all aspects of China's political, economic, and social life.

He instituted decentralized economic management and rational, flexible long-term planning to achieve efficient and controlled economic growth. China's peasant farmers were given individual control over and responsibility for their production and profits. Deng stressed individual responsibility in the making of economic decisions, material incentives as the reward for industry and initiative, and the formation of cadres of skilled, well-educated technicians and managers to spearhead China's development. He freed many industrial enterprises from the control and supervision of the central government and gave factory managers the authority to determine production levels and to pursue profits for their enterprises.

War With Vietnam

Although Communist China had backed North Vietnam in its struggle against South Vietnam and the United States, the Chinese and Vietnamese had been traditional enemies for over a millennium. Therefore, when Vietnam strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union, invaded Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea) in late 1978, and expelled Chinese living in Vietnam, Chinese leaders were furious. On February 17th, 1979, some 120,000 well-equipped Chinese troops crossed the border into northern Vietnam and seized control of several towns. They penetrated more than twenty-five miles, encountering stiff resistance. Vietnamese divisions occupying Cambodia were rushed to the area, but failed to prevent the capture of the important city of Lang Son on March 3rd.

About the same time, a separate Chinese force reached the coastal town of Quang Yen, some one hundred miles from Hanoi, after several days of fierce fighting. Vietnamese counteroffensives into China's Yunnan province were repulsed. Declaring its punitive military operation against Vietnam a success, China began withdrawing its forces on about March 6th. Within two weeks they were all back on Chinese territory.

The invasion lasted twenty-nine days. Virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border district was involved. The Chinese attack employed infantry, armor, and artillery only. Air power was not employed at any time during the war. After a rapid initial advance, heavy Vietnamese resistance and difficulties within the Chinese supply system slowed and finally stalled the attack at all points.

Hanoi's post-invasion depiction of the border war was that Beijing had sustained a military setback if not outright defeat. Most observers doubted that China would risk another war with Vietnam in the near future. Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book, Defending China, concluded that China's 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure. "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition".

After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border. Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain good observation points in the mountainous terrain. Numerous talks were held to reach an accord, but no treaty or settlement has been concluded.

Tien'An Men Square

On January 17th, 1987, a "Pacific Command" intelligence summary reported the resignation of Hu Yaobang, from his post as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. The summary noted that Hu's resignation "is probably the result of the recent student demonstrations". After his death in April 1989, students gathered in Tian'An Men Square to mourn the loss of a respected leader. What began as a profound expression of sorrow, however, would soon develop into a massive pro-democracy demonstration.

Hard-liners in the party leadership prepared to move against both the students and the more conciliatory leaders within the party itself. A US State Department intelligence summary submitted on the morning of June 2nd notes that hard-liners "remain unable to resolve the leadership crisis or to remove students from Tian'An Men Square". The next day's morning intelligence summary reports on the first use of force by both sides, with police firing tear gas on crowds gathered near Tian'An Men (Gate of Heavenly Peace) and the crowds retaliating by stoning the police.

Developments at Tian'An Men shortly before the government employed force against the protesters included an "unorganized retreat" by a first wave of lightly armed soldiers. This may have been purposeful. It might have been intended to prove that much more force would be necessary for the state to regain control. Whatever the real reason, it was followed by the advance of a much more heavily equipped military force, including tanks. It moved toward the city center, oblivious of screaming crowds of protestors and crushed bodies alike. The protest became a bloody rout!

The US Embassy in Beijing was able to send out a blow-by-blow account of the proceedings. Troops equipped with automatic weapons advanced in armored personnel carriers and trucks from several directions. These were supported by large numbers of tanks (at least seventy drove past the US Embassy) that acted as roadblocks, channeling the demonstrators away from the square toward side streets where their numbers would be broken up into smaller, easier to control, segments. The American Embassy noted that estimates of fifty to seventy deaths reported in foreign media were ridiculously low. As events in Beijing unfolded, the American Embassy provided a near-continuous flow of reporting based on the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations of embassy officials.

The CIA intelligence summary for the morning of June 5th reported that "deaths from the military assault on Tian'An Men Square range from one hundred-eighty to five hundred. Thousands more are injured". It also described how "thousands of civilians

stood their ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails".

In addition, the summary provided dramatic examples of the kinds of intelligence provided by diplomats. An embassy cable reported on confrontations between soldiers and protesters, some of which ended in death, and vandalism by military personnel, who one source claimed were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings. On the same day, another cable from the US Embassy reported the statement of a Chinese-American who had witnessed the crackdown. He claimed, "The beating to death of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC to enter Tian'An Men Square, in full view of the other waiting PLA troops, appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed". In addition to these eyewitness accounts, other cables provided information on PLA troop positions and casualty estimates. The reports went on, "Troops continued to fire indiscriminately at citizens. Large numbers of military vehicles were destroyed. There were threats to execute students, and the potential for violent resistance by them in return".

After the square had been cleared, Chinese Army troops continued to occupy the city, with continuing reports of sporadic gunfire and fighting among PLA units. The possibility that units of the PLA would turn on each other was raised in the June 6th CIA summary. An embassy cable reported armored units from the PLA's 27th Army "poised for attack by other PLA units". It notes that a "western military attaché" largely blames the 27th for the June 3rd massacre, and says that the 27th "is accused of killing even the soldiers of other units when they got in the way". The report states that the 27th Army was "being blamed for the worst atrocities against civilians during Saturday night's attack on Tian'An Men Square" and also notes that "some clashes between military units reportedly have occurred".

As the day-to-day crisis atmosphere faded, the US sought to come to a precise understanding of the events and determine how they would affect China's future and US-Chinese relations. Reports based on the accounts of eyewitnesses represent an effort by the American Embassy in Beijing to provide a concise description of the events that led up to the deaths at Tian'An Men Square and to "set the record straight". This included eyewitness accounts of embassy officials, western reporters and diplomats, and US students present on or near Tian'An Men Square. In its introduction, it notes that while civilian casualties probably did not reach the figure of 3,000 used in some press accounts, "they surely far outnumbered official figures".

The New China

As the era of Deng Xiaoping was drawing to a close, the contradictions associated with the profound social transformation of the past fifteen years threatened to undermine national unity and political stability. Toward the end of 1993, the CCP unveiled an economic reform program aimed at accelerating the transformation of China into a market economy without threatening the prosperity, power, and privileged position of the party elite. About that time, a diplomatic initiative by President Clinton presented China with an opportunity to work with the US to reverse a downward spiral in Sino-American relations. But there were strings attached. China possessed a poor human rights record. Clinton made it clear that any renewal of China's "most-favored-nation" trade status depended on an improvement in this area.

Toward the end of his life, Deng's waning energy was focused on the problem of political succession. He selected Jiang Zemin as his main successor. Jiang was already CCP general secretary and chairman of the party's Central Military Commission. His actual sphere of domestic political power, however, was restricted to propaganda and general political exhortation. It was Jiang, for example, who kicked off the party's midsummer anti-corruption campaign, inveighing against officials who charged fees for what were supposed to be free public services and for establishing businesses from which they profited by abusing their authority. So vast was the scale of corruption that even the summary executions of crooked officials had little effect.

More worrisome to the CCP were demonstrations in Lhasa, Tibet, in late May. As many as a thousand protesters chanting anti-Chinese, pro-independence slogans had to be silenced by a show of force. The Tibet issue was so sensitive that China felt compelled to block the Dalai Lama from addressing the UN-sponsored "World Conference on Human Rights" in Vienna in June. Muslim discontent surfaced in remote Qinghai province when crowds in the provincial capital of Xining attacked government offices and police over the publication of a book they considered offensive to their faith. In addition, worker strikes and some two hundred small-scale but occasionally violent peasant protests against corrupt and rapacious local officials reportedly occurred in more than a dozen Chinese provinces. Rural discontent over a widening gap between urban and rural living standards accelerated migration to urban areas. Perhaps one hundred million unregistered job hunters crowded into the cities, straining the resources and capacity of municipal governments. None of these developments signaled an imminent social explosion, but they justified high-level anxiety.

Chinese society was also being stratified in other ways. The older communist elite discreetly enjoyed their special privileges behind curtained car windows, in unmarked special stores, and in off-limits resorts. The new class of affluent urban entrepreneurs, as well as officials on the take, flaunted their wealth, indulging in an overtly bourgeois lifestyle that contrasted sharply with that of ordinary workers and salaried professionals. Sexual mores that questioned traditional values and concepts, sharply rising suicide rates, and increased incidence of mental illness accompanied social change.

Deng generally favored high economic growth with the attendant risk of instability over the more cautious approach preferred by some of his colleagues. In the first half of 1993, China's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at the phenomenal rate of 13.9%. Industrial production increased by over 25%.

"Yang Gui-ze Men" (Foreign Devils)

China continued the generally successful courtship of its Asian neighbors, playing its economic trump card to expand trade and investment with the "Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN) as well as South Korea and Japan. The latter became China's biggest trading partner, surpassing Hong Kong! During a September 1994 visit to Beijing, Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Li Peng signed a landmark agreement to maintain peace along the long-disputed Sino-Indian border, pending a final disposition of the conflicting claims. Both sides pledged to refrain from the use or threat of force, to provide prior notification of military exercises, and to open up additional border passes to trade. The danger of a Sino-Indian war was at its lowest point in thirty-five years.

Shortly after the signing of the Middle East peace accords between Israel and various Palestinian organizations, China played host to Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. China and Israel had a long history of covert cooperation in military technology transfers. Elsewhere in the Middle East, China signed a deal to build a three hundred-megawatt nuclear power plant in Iran, and it maintained an active interest in the strife-torn neighboring post-Soviet republics of Central Asia.

The Chinese economy continued to grow in the 1990s, benefiting the urban middle and upper classes in particular, but none of the basic economic and social problems that a decade and a half of rapid growth had created seemed any closer to solution. Until

Deng's successor was firmly in charge, those favoring liberalization would be challenged by those attempting to restore a quasi-centralized authoritarianism. Underlying China's continuing preparation for the post-Deng era was a peculiar generational division of labor between the young and the old. While the dynamic non-state sector of the economy was dominated by young entrepreneurs and workers, the shuffle step of superannuated politicians sounded in the corridors of power. The ancient would be replaced by the elderly.

In a crude attempt at military intimidation, China carried out a series of missile and naval artillery tests and joint combat exercises in the East China Sea. Beijing's message about Taiwan's vulnerability was unmistakable. PLA leaders also publicly discussed the circumstances under which China might seize Taiwan by force! Throughout Asia there was a growing anxiety about the implications of China's growing military strength, and quiet discussions about how to counterbalance it.

An upsurge of popular nationalism, tinged with anti-foreign sentiments, swept China in 1996. As Beijing prepared for the peaceful takeover of Hong Kong on July 1st, 1997, Chinese leaders used another display of military force to warn Taiwan against drifting toward formal independence. Beijing next directed its anger at Japan, accusing it of harboring ambitions of regional domination. Chinese leaders traded on their country's growing global economic strength to enhance their leverage on issues that they considered vital to Chinese security. The CCP stepped up its campaign against rampant corruption, criticizing government and party officials for wasting public funds. In October Chinese prosecutors filed criminal charges against Zhou Beifang and twenty-nine others, including two ex-Beijing officials. Zhou reportedly paid millions in bribes to corrupt officials in return for favors.

Trouble flared again in Tibet. Monks at the Ganden monastery attacked Chinese police and officials after the imposition of a ban on photographs of the Dalai Lama. The police stormed the monastery, shot two monks, and arrested one hundred others. Beijing threatened economic reprisals against such countries as Australia, whose leaders disregarded Chinese warnings by meeting with the Dalai Lama. The Tibet Daily, the CCP's mouthpiece in the region, urged Tibetans to embrace atheism in order to counter the influence of the Dalai Lama. This was like asking Tibetans to renounce their cultural identity. In September Premier Li Peng reminded restive Muslims in Xin Jiang that they had to obey the law and support socialism. Violent clashes erupted between Muslim separatists and Chinese authorities. In May China tightened border controls to curb arms smuggling from Central Asia.

Imperial Succession

Deng Xiaoping died on February 9th, 1997 at the age of ninety-two. At the CCP's 15th Congress in September, Deng's designated successor, Jiang Zemin, further consolidated his authority and initiated an effort to solve the nagging problem of China's deficit-ridden state-owned enterprises. Avoiding the ideologically unacceptable concept of privatization, Jiang sketched the gradual transformation of all but a few thousand of the core state enterprises into joint stock companies in which the public would be able to invest. Such prospective ownership provided a socialist fig leaf of "public ownership" for what was essentially a divestment of state assets. The details remained to be worked out. The CCP would somehow have to cushion the potentially explosive problem of widespread urban unemployment if money-losing factories were shut down as well as try to block avaricious communist party officials from transforming state firms into their own private assets.

Uyghur nationalists, protesting what they said was China's execution of thirty fellow Muslim activists, rioted in Yining in the northwestern province of Xin Jiang, which led to further crackdowns and arrests as China's Islamic neighbors in Central Asia watched uneasily from across their borders. An internal CCP document in May 1996 identified national separatism and illegal religious activities as integral threats to Beijing's authority in Xin Jiang, where terrorist bombings in the provincial capital of Urumqi and assassinations of local officials by Islamic separatists prompted Chinese officials to make thousands of arrests.

An estimated thirty million Chinese invested in the stock market in 1997 (Karl Marx's ghost must be having fits!). China's prosperity drew strength from its export-oriented industries, in which average monthly wages were only a small fraction of those in Taiwan and South Korea, to say nothing of countries like Japan and the US. As a result, foreign investment capital continued to flow into China in unprecedented amounts throughout the year.

FOREIGN WEAPONS

All foreign weapons are of Russian design/manufacture unless their country of origin is specifically identified in the text.

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT CHINESE "PEOPLES' VOLUNTEERS": 1950-1953

Generation: I, Air Superiority Rating: 20, Class: Conscripts, Base Determination Factor: 40%

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Infantry Company: | 3xTL1 Infantry(D) or 3xTL1 SMG Infantry(B) |
| Infantry Support Company: | 3xTL1 Infantry Support(A), 1x82mm M37 Mortar(3) |
| Tank Company: | 2-3xT-34/85 |
| Heavy Tank Company: | 2xIS-2 |
| Engineer Company: | 3xTL1 Engineer(B) |
| Recon Company: | 3xHorse Cavalry(A)[R] |
| Infantry Battalion: | 1xTL1 Infantry(D) HQ, 3xInfantry Company, 1xInfantry Support Company |
| Pioneer Battalion: | 9xTL1 Infantry (F) |
| Artillery Battalion: | 1xGun/Howitzer Stand(3)/Limber, 1x45mm ATG/Limber, 1x120mm M43 Mortar(3)/Limber |
| Heavy Artillery Battalion: | 3x122mm M38(3)/Limber or 2x152mm M43(3)/Truck |
| Anti-Tank Battalion: | 3x76mm M42(3)/Truck |
| Infantry Regiment: | 1xTL1 Infantry (D) GHQ, 3xInfantry Battalion, 1xTL1 SMG Infantry(B), 1xHorse Cavalry(A)[R], 1x45mm M37 ATG, 1x76mm M27 "Infantry Gun"(2)/Limber |
| "1st Echelon" Division: | 3xInfantry Regiment, 1xArtillery Battalion, 1xHeavy Artillery Battalion, 1xAnti-Tank Battalion, 1xEngineer Company, 1xRecon Company, 1xZPU-4 |
| "2nd Echelon" Division: | 3xInfantry Regiment (Infantry and Infantry Support <u>only</u> , no other weapons) |

Infantry Army: 3xInfantry Division, 1xEngineer Battalion, 1xPioneer Battalion

Available Support Units: (One or more of these units or parts thereof, may appear in a particular action at your discretion.)
Rocket Battalion: 3x82mm BM-8(6) "Katyushka"
Artillery Regiment: 1xArtillery Battalion(152mm), 10x122mm M38(2)/Limber
Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3x37mm M-39 AAA/Truck
Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3x85mm KS-12 AAA/Truck
Recon Tank Company: 3xType 97[R] (JP)
Cavalry Regiment: 1xHorse Cavalry(B) HQ, 9xHorse Cavalry)[R], 1xCavalry Support)[R]
Anti-Tank Battalion: 3x85mm ATG/Truck
OR: 3x76mm M-42(3)/Truck
4xTank Regiment: 4xTank Company, 1xHeavy Tank Company

Notes: 1) PLA anti-tank guns consisted of various WWII weapons: 45mm (RU), 76mm (RU), 37mm (US), 57mm RcR (US), 37mm (JP), or 47mm (JP). Any combination is possible.
2) PLA Artillery consisted of various combinations of 76mm IG (RU), 76mm (RU), 122mm (RU), 152mm (RU), 70mm (JP), 75mm (JP), 105mm (JP), 150mm (JP), or 105mm (US). Any combination is possible.

INFANTRY DIVISION: 1970+

Generation: II, Air Superiority Rating: 25, Class: Conscripts, Base Determination Factor: 30%

Infantry Company: 3xTL2 Infantry(B), 1xTL2 Infantry Support
Police Company: 4xTL2 Infantry(C)
Machinegun Company: 2-3xTL2 Infantry Support
Engineer Company: 3xTL2 Engineer
Anti-Tank Company: 3x82mm B10 RcR/Pack Horses
Tank Company ('70-'79): 3xType 59
Tank Company ('80-'89): 3xType 59 or Type 69
Mobile Recon Detachment: 2xTL2 Motorcycle Infantry[R], 1xType 63[R]
Recon Company ('70-'79): 3xHorse Cavalry(A)
Recon Company ('80-'89): 1xTL2 Motorcycle Infantry, 3xHorse Cavalry(A)
Battalion Mortar Company: 2x82mm M43 Mortar(1+), 1x75mm Type 52 RcR
Regimental Mortar Company: 3x82mm M43 Mortar(1+)/Pack Horses

Infantry Battalion: 1xTL2 Infantry(B) HQ, 3xInfantry Company, 1xMachinegun Company, 1xBattalion Mortar Company
Tank Battalion ('70-'79): 3xTank Company
Tank Battalion ('80-'89): 3-4xTank Company, 1xType 63[R]
Assault Gun "Battalion": 3xSu-76 or Su-85 or Su-100
Engineer Battalion: 4xEngineer Company
Mortar Battalion: 2x120mm M43 Mortar(3)/Truck or 2x160mm M160 Mortar(3)/Truck
Artillery Battalion: 3x76mm M42(3)/Truck or 85mm D48(3)/Truck or 100mm M55/Truck
Heavy Artillery Battalion: 3x122mm D30(3)/Truck
Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3x37mm M39 AAG/Truck or 3x57mm Type 59 AAG/Truck
Rocket Battalion: 3x107mm Type 63(12)/Truck

Infantry Regiment: 1xTL2 Infantry (B) GHQ, 3xInfantry Battalion, 1xRegimental Mortar Company, 1xAnti-Tank Company, 1xEngineer Company, 1xPolice Company, 1xZPU-1/Pack Horses, 1xZPU-1/Truck

Tank Regiment ('70-'79): 1xTL2 Infantry(D) GHQ/Truck, 1xTank Battalion, 1xAssault Gun Battalion, 1xMobile Recon Detachment, 1xTL2 Engineer /Truck

Tank Regiment ('80-'89): 1xTL2 Infantry(D) GHQ/Truck, 2xTank Battalion, 1xTL2 Engineer/Truck

Infantry Division: 3xInfantry Regiment, 1xTank Regiment, 1xRecon Company, 1xEngineer Battalion, 1xArtillery Battalion, 1xHeavy Artillery Battalion, 1xMortar Battalion, 1xRocket Battalion, 1xEngineer Company, 1xAnti-Aircraft Battalion

Notes: 1) TL2 Infantry (B) may be replaced by TL2 Infantry (A) beginning in 1980.
2) Units with "Pack Horses" may move at the standard infantry rate of 2" per phase, regardless of their printed movement rate.
3) ('70-'79) One stand per Infantry Battalion may contain an attached B10 RcR team (MP) or a "Red Arrow" ATGM team (MP).
4) ('80-'89) One stand per Infantry Battalion may contain one attached B10 RcR team (MP) and one "Red Arrow" team (MP).
5) T-34/85 Tanks continued to be used in some divisions.
6) Type 63 Light tanks are often used in divisions stationed in areas with difficult terrain.
7) You may replace 107mm Type 63 MRLs with 130mm models if you like.
8) ('70-'79) SMG Infantry stands may be used as "Tank Marines" or "Shock Troops" as desired.
9) Artillery Battalions no longer contained 76mm M42 guns after 1977.
10) "Air Superiority Rating" rises to 20 after 1982.

ARMORED DIVISION: 1980+

Generation: II, Air Superiority Rating: 30, Class: Conscripts, Base Determination Factor: 30%

Infantry Company: 3xTL2 Infantry(A)/Truck
 Mechanized Company: 3xTL2 Infantry(A)/K-63 or 3xTL2 Infantry(A)/WZ-501
 Police Company: 4xTL2 Infantry(C)/Truck
 Machinegun Company: 3xTL2 Infantry Support/Truck
 Mech MG Company: 3xTL2 Infantry Support/K-63
 Engineer Company: 3xTL2 Engineer/Truck
 Anti-Tank Company: 3x82mm B10 RcR/Truck
 Tank Company: 3xTank
 Recon Platoon: 1xTL2 Infantry(R)/Type 55, 2xTL2 Motorcycle Infantry[R]
 Battalion Mortar Company: 2x82mm M43 Mortar(2)/Truck, 1x75mm Type 52 RcR/Truck
 Mech Battalion Mortar Co: 2x82mm YW-304(1+), 1x75mm Type 52 RcR/Truck
 Regimental Mortar Company: 3x82mm M43 Mortar(1+)/Truck

Motor Infantry Battalion: 1xTL2 Infantry(A) HQ/Truck, 3xInfantry Company, 1xMachinegun Company, 1xBattalion Mortar Company
 Mechanized Battalion: 1xTL2 Infantry(A) HQ/WZ-701, 3xMechanized Company, 1xMech MG Co, 1xMech Battalion Mortar Co
 Tank Battalion: 3-4xTank Company, 1xType-63[R]
 Recon Battalion: 3xType 63[R], 3xTL2 Infantry(R)/Type-55
 Engineer Battalion: 3xEngineer Company
 Mortar Battalion: 2x120mm M43 Mortar(3)/Truck or 2x160mm M160 Mortar(3)/Truck
 Artillery Battalion: 2x85mm D48(3)/Truck or 100mm M55/Truck
 Heavy Artillery Battalion: 2x122mm D30(3)/Truck or 3xSAU-122(3) or SAU-152(3)
 Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3-4x37mm M39 AAG/Truck or 3-4xZSU-57/2

Mechanized Regiment: 1xTL2 Infantry (A) GHQ/WZ-701, 1-3xMotor Infantry Battalion, 0-2xMechanized Battalion, 2xZPU-1/Truck, 1xRegimental Mortar Company, 1xAnti-Tank Company, 1xPolice Company
 Tank Regiment: 1xTL2 Infantry(D) GHQ/Truck, 2-3xTank Battalion, 1xRecon Platoon, 1xTL2 Engineer/K-63

Armored Division: 3xTank Regiment, 1xMechanized Regiment, 1xRecon Company, 1xEngineer Battalion, 1xArtillery Battalion, 1xHeavy Artillery Battalion, 1xMortar Battalion, 1xEngineer Company, 1xAnti-Aircraft Battalion

Available Support Units: (One or more of these units or parts thereof, may appear in a particular action at your discretion.)

Rocket Battalion: 3x122mm "BM-21(12)
 Artillery Battalion (SP): 3x152mm Type 83(3)
 Artillery Battalion: 3x152mmGHN-45(3)/Truck
 Helicopter Group: 4xS-70/UH-60A "Blackhawk or 2xSA342 "Gazelle"

- Notes:**
- 1) Armored Divisions are considered "Generation III" formations from 1990.
 - 2) Available tanks include Type 59, Type 69, Type 80, and Type 85.
 - 3) The K-63 APC is also called the YW531. The WZ-701 is the "HQ" version of the K-63.
 - 4) One stand per Motor Infantry Battalion may contain an attached B10 RcR team (MP).
 - 5) One stand per Motor Infantry Battalion may contain an attached "Red Arrow" ATGM team (MP).
 - 6) The WZ-501 is an IFV similar in appearance and performance to the Soviet BMP-1.
 - 7) One stand per K-63 (not WZ-501) mounted Mechanized Battalion may contain an attached "Red Arrow" ATGM team (MP).
 - 8) You may not mix APC types within battalions.
 - 9) The Type 55 APC is a Chinese built BTR-40/BRDM-1.
 - 10) Of the three battalions in the Mechanized Regiment, up to two may be Mechanized Infantry. The remainder must be Motor Battalions.
 - 11) Mortar battalions may use self-propelled 120mm YW381(3) Mortars.
 - 12) YW-304 and YW-381 SP Mortars are built on the K-63 chassis.

MECHANIZED DIVISION: 1990+

Generation: III, Air Superiority Rating: 40, Class: Conscripts, Base Determination Factor: 30%

Mechanized Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(A)/WZ-501
 Police Company: 4xTL2 Infantry(C)/Truck
 Machinegun Company: 3xTL3 Infantry Support/WZ-501
 Engineer Company: 3xTL2 Engineer/K-63
 Tank Company: 3xTank
 Recon Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(R)/Type 55
 Mortar Company: 2x82mm M43 Mortar(2)/Truck, 1x75mm Type 52 RcR/Truck
 Regimental Mortar Company: 3x82mm WZ-304 Mortar(1+)

Mechanized Battalion: 1xTL3 Infantry(A) HQ/WZ-701, 3xMechanized Company, 1xMachinegun Company, 1xMortar Company
 Tank Battalion: 3-4xTank Company, 1xType 63[R]
 Engineer Battalion: 4xEngineer Company
 Mortar Battalion: 2x120mm YW-381 Mortar(3)
 Artillery Battalion: 2x85mm D48(3)/Truck or 100mm M55/Truck
 Heavy Artillery Battalion: 2x122mm D30(3)/Truck or 3xSAU-122(3) or SAU-152(3)

Rocket Battalion: 3x122mm BM-21(12)
 Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3-4xZSU-57/2

Mechanized Regiment: 1xTL3 Infantry (A) GHQ/W701, 3xMechanized Battalion, 2xZPU-1/Truck, 1xRegimental Mortar Company, 1xPolice Company, 1xEngineer Company

Tank Regiment: 1xTL2 Infantry(D) GHQ/WZ-701, 2xTank Battalion, 1xRecon Platoon, 1xTL2 Engineer/K-63

Mechanized Division: 1xTank Regiment, 3xMechanized Regiment, 1xRecon Company, 1xEngineer Battalion, 1xArtillery Battalion, 1xHeavy Artillery Battalion, 1xMortar Battalion, 1xRocket Battalion, 1xAnti-Aircraft Battalion

- Notes:**
- 1) Available tanks include Type 69, Type 80, and Type 85.
 - 2) One stand per Mechanized Regiment may contain an attached SA-7 "Grail" AAGM team (MP).
 - 3) The K-63 APC is also called the YW531. The WZ-701 is the "HQ" version of the K-63.
 - 4) The Type 55 APC is a Chinese built BTR-40/BRDM-1.
 - 5) The WZ-501 is an IFV similar in appearance and performance to the Soviet BMP-1.

AIRBORNE DIVISION: 1980+

Generation: III, Air Superiority Rating: 40, Class: Professionals, Base Determination Factor: 35%

Para/Infantry Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(A)
 Machinegun Company: 2xTL3 Infantry Support
 Police Company: 4xTL3 Infantry(C)
 Mortar Company: 1x82mm M43 Mortar(1+)
 Mortar Company(1996+): 1x120mm 2S23 Mortar(1+)
 Engineer Company: 3xTL3 Engineer/Truck
 Para/Mech Company(1996+): 3xTL3 Infantry[R]/BMD-3
 Recon Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(R)

Para/Infantry Battalion: 1xTL3 Infantry(A) HQ, 3xPara/Infantry Company, 1xMortar Company, 1xMachinegun Company
 Para/Mech Battalion: 1xTL3 Infantry(A) HQ/BMD-3, 3xPara/Mech Company, 1x120mm 2S23 Mortar(3)
 Mortar Battalion: 3x120mm M43(1+)/Truck
 Mortar Battalion(1996+): 3x120mm 2S23 Mortar(1+)

Airborne Regiment: 1xTL3 Infantry (A) GHQ/Truck, 3xPara/Infantry Battalion, 1xPolice Company, 1xEngineer Company, 1xMortar Company, 1xZPU-1/Truck

Airborne Division: 3xAirborne Regiment, 1xRecon Company, 1xEngineer Company, 1xMortar Battalion, 1xZPU-1/Truck, 1x37mm M39/Truck

- Notes:**
- 1) Two stands per Para/Infantry Battalion may contain an attached B10 RcR team (MP) and two may contain a "Red Arrow" ATGM team (MP).
 - 2) The Red Arrow-8 may replace the Red Arrow-3 in 1997. These represent the Chinese version of the "Milan" ATGM system.
 - 3) By 1999, there were enough Para/Mech Battalions for one to be assigned to each Airborne Division, replacing one Para/Infantry Battalion.
 - 4) There are three Chinese Airborne Divisions. They are controlled by the Air Force not the Army.

NAVAL INFANTRY BRIGADE: 1990+

Generation: III, Air Superiority Rating: 40, Class: Professionals, Base Determination Factor: 35%

Infantry Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(A)/APC
 Heavy Weapons Company: 1x75mm Type 52 RcR/Truck, 1x82mm M43 Mortar(1+)/Truck, 1xTL3 Infantry Support/Truck
 Engineer Company: 3xTL3 Engineer/Type-77
 Tank Company: 3xType 63
 Recon Company: 3xTL3 Infantry(R)/Truck

Naval Infantry Battalion: 1xTL3 Infantry(A) HQ/WZ-701, 3xInfantry Company, 1xHeavy Weapons Company
 Tank Battalion: 3xTank Company
 Artillery Battalion: 3x122mm D30(3)/Truck or 3xSAU-122(3)

Naval Infantry Brigade: 1xTL3 Infantry (A) GHQ/WZ-701, 2xNaval Infantry Battalion, 1xTank Battalion, 1xArtillery Battalion, 1xRecon Company, 1xEngineer Company, 1x37mm M39/Truck

- Notes:**
- 1) Available APCs include K-63s, Type 77s (Chinese BTR-50s), and (yes) US LVT(A)4s!
 - 2) The above APC's are being replaced by the WZ-551, similar in appearance and performance to the French VAB-VCI (6x6).
 - 3) China maintains one active duty (Professional) Naval Infantry Brigade.
 - 4) There are eight reserve (Conscript) Naval Infantry Divisions. Each contains three Infantry Regiments of three battalions and one Tank Regiment of three battalions. Support assets are similar to those of standard Chinese infantry divisions.

TACTICAL NOTES

The tactical history of the PRC can be broken down into three periods. First is the Korean War period. The Chinese army that attacked MacArthur's forces in November 1950 was well trained, experienced, and highly motivated. Their cohesion should be high, especially during the initial encounters and should be based in infiltration tactics. I suggest that the basic scenario should be a "Hasty" attack with the Chinese deploying no more than five inches from the nearest UN stands. They should then rush in under cover of a short barrage and assault the defenders. Or, they can be defending against a UN attack, later in the campaign. In this case, they should be firmly dug in and resist with considerable determination. The later "Human Wave" battles just aren't much fun for me, but can be interesting if you like that sort of thing.

The second period covers the 1970s. After the "Cultural Revolution" ended, there was a lot of concern over a possible Soviet invasion of Manchuria and several bloody border clashes occurred. Scenarios here should be mobile affairs with lots of armor and artillery deployed on both sides. This period also covers the Sino-Vietnamese War. This was a short campaign, but produced a lot of casualties and included a lot of maneuvering. The various strengths and weaknesses of both sides became evident right from the start. Try running a Chinese assault on a town and follow it up with a Vietnamese counterattack. The Vietnamese perfected traditional PLA infiltration tactics to a high art fighting the US in the sixties and early seventies. The PLA was severely out of practice!

The third and last period begins with the Tian'An Men massacres and runs down to the present. The significance of Tian'An Men comes from reports that fighting broke out among various PLA units during the crackdown. The message is that there was a distinct possibility of a local civil war breaking out between supporters of the late Hu Yaobang and those of Deng Xiao Ping. Civil wars are always interesting, unless you're directly involved in one! Scenarios could be devised pitting one PLA force against another, illustrating once again the strengths and weaknesses of the system.

This brings us down to the ongoing threat of a Communist invasion of Taiwan. This threat has existed through all three periods, but the threat is particularly acute at this time for the following reasons. First, Taiwan has recently been moving more and more toward declaring itself a separate and distinct nation from the PRC. Second, mainland China has been enjoying a prolonged period of economic success. They know this may not last. There is a strong undercurrent in recent mainland Chinese political thought that if they are going to strike Taiwan, they must do it soon. Taiwan grows stronger and more independent each year. Soon it may be too late.

Tactics envisioned for a PLA invasion would include the use of airborne and amphibious units on a large scale. These will then be backed up by heavier "follow on" forces once a proper seaport is secured. The campaign must be completed quickly, however. The US can not be expected to sit still for this sort of thing. US naval strength and airpower is capable of making short work of any Chinese invasion fleet.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Jiang Zemin relinquished his title as Chinese Communist Party leader on November 15th, 2002, ceding the party's top jobs to the enigmatic Hu Jintao and a younger generation of leaders. But he held on to significant power, including authority over China's military. Major policy changes on economic reform, Taiwan, and other key issues appear unlikely following China's first orderly transfer of power. Jiang's influence in coming years remains certain. Six of his supporters were installed on the nine-member "Politburo Standing Committee". Hu has been groomed for more than a decade to succeed Jiang, and his elevation to party leader means he is certain to become president when Jiang's term ends next March.

Despite a decade at the center of power, Hu has kept his personality and politics a mystery to outsiders. The tactic was key to his rise in a system whose political landscape is littered with the wrecked careers of former heirs-apparent who offended their patron or were linked too closely to a policy failure. Diplomats and officials who met Hu on his trip this year to the United States and in other rare contacts with foreigners say he left an impression of intelligence, but little else. Most Chinese hadn't heard his voice until 1999, when he spoke on national television during anti-American rioting ignited by the NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade.

The new leaders inherit a growing economy with trade and foreign investment headed for new record highs this year, but there are still daunting problems. These include chronic corruption, enduring rural poverty, and mounting layoffs as state industry tries to become profitable. Ordinary Chinese seemed to exude genuine optimism for the new leadership. "They're young. They're able. They're for change. Things are going to be good. They are carrying on the work started by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin". As a Chinese politician once told me, "We will try everything. What works, we will call socialism".

2002 CHINESE ARSENAL

Vehicles: 10,000+MBTs (T-54, Type 59, T-62, Type 69, & Type 85), 800xType 63 Light Tanks, WZ-701, WZ-501, WZ-551, Type 55/56 & 5,000xK-63 (WZ-531) APCs
AT Weapons: AT-3 "Sagger", "Red Arrow-3" (Hong Jian), & "Red Arrow-8" ATGMs, 57m Type 55, 76mm Type 54, 85mm Type 56, & 100mm Type 73 Towed ATGs, 105mm Type 75 (SP) ATGs, 57mm, 75mm, & 82mm Type 65 RCRs
Artillery: 15,000+Towed Pieces (122mm Type 54 & Type 60, 130mm Type 59, & 152mm Type 66), 122mm & 152mm SP Howitzers, 3,500+MRLs (300mm A100, 130mm, 132mm, 253mm, & 284mm), 82mm, 120mm, & 160mm Mortars
Anti-Aircraft: 30xTOR-M1 AAGMs, 100,000+AA Guns (37mm Type 55, 37mm/2 Type 65, 57mm Type 59, 85mm & 100mm AAGs
SSMs: FROG-7, M-9, 100xSRBM-T5
Combat Aircraft: 100xJ-11/Su-27SK, 38+Su30MKK, 250+J-7/MiG-21, 1,000xJ-6/MiG-19, 200xJ-8, 55xJ-811, 500xQ-5
Helicopters: 400+Total (including 30 Z-6/Mi-8, 60+Mi-17, 8x"Gazelle", 20xS-70 "Blackhawk", some Mi-6, various others)
Small Arms: 7.62mm Type 51, 54, 64, & 9mm Type 59 Pistols, 7.62mm Type 43, 50, 64, & 68 Submachineguns, 5.8mm QBZ, 7.62mm Type 53 Carbines, 7.62mm Type 56 & Type 67 Rifles, 7.62mm Type 53, 56, & 58 Machineguns, 12.7mm Type 57 & 77 Heavy Machineguns, 30mm AGS-17 & 35mm W87 Grenade Launchers,

- Notes:
- 1) The "Red Arrow-3" (Hong Jian) ATGM is a Chinese manufactured AT-3 "Sagger".
 - 2) 76xSu-27s were purchased from Russia in three batches. Two hundred more are to be built on license.
 - 3) Russia delivered 38xSu-30 "Strike Fighters" in 2001. Another batch is on order.
 - 4) China's J-6s are being slowly withdrawn to be replaced by a new fighter, The "J-10" currently under development.
 - 5) China is currently working on acquiring ATGM systems for its helicopter fleet.
 - 6) For the foreseeable future, domestically built Mi-17s will be China's primary transport helicopters.

7) The WZ-551 is an APC similar in appearance to the French VAB-VCI (6x6) armed with an external 25mm cannon.

POINTS OF CONTACT

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