Abaye responded: According to your reasoning, they are sixteen actions, as even in the first part of our mishna, the one who receives the object and the one who places the object each participates in the performance of a prohibited action. Therefore, there are a total of sixteen actions.

Rav Mattana said to Abaye: That is not difficult, as granted.
The Gemara rejects this: There, the explanation is according to what we will need to say later in accordance with the statement of Abaye, as Abaye said: Here, the baraita is not dealing with just any situation. Rather, it is dealing with a special case where there is a tree standing in the private domain and its boughs\(^5\) lean into the public domain, and one threw an object from the public domain and it rested upon the boughs of the tree.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. The tree's branches are considered an extension of its trunk. Therefore, the entire tree is considered as a private domain, and one who throws onto it is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. Therefore, the boughs themselves are not considered to be a private domain, and one who throws onto them from the public domain is not liable. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi considers the boughs of the tree like part of the trunk, something thrown atop the tree is considered as if it were placed on the trunk, which is four by four handbreadths. If so, one cannot conclude from here that there is no need for a significant area according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

Rather, it is possible that Rav Yosef referred to this halakha of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a baraita: One who threw an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the public domain and the private domain was in the middle, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying out from domain to domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In that case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the one who threw the object is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as he violated two prohibitions: One, due to carrying from the public domain into the private domain, when the object passed through the airspace of the private domain; and one, due to carrying from the private domain out to the public domain. Apparently, he requires neither lifting nor placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths, as not only is he liable for carrying the object into a private domain and placing it by means of passing through its airspace, but he is also liable for lifting the object from that private domain and bringing it to the public domain. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, neither lifting nor placing requires a significant area.

The Gemara rejects this proof. Wasn't it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav and Shmuel both said:

Perek I
Dal 5 Amud a

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only deemed him liable in the covered private domain, with a roof, as we say: The house is considered as one that is full? The entire house with all its space is considered one unit, and each part of it is considered as if it is filled with actual objects. Therefore, an object passing through the house is considered as if it landed on an actual surface of at least four by four handbreadths. However, in a private domain that is not covered, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not deem him liable.

And if you say: Here too our mishna is speaking about a covered domain, and therefore the lifting from and the placing on the hand are considered as if they were performed in a place that is four handbreadths; granted, in a covered private domain lifting from and placing in a hand are considered as if it were lifted from and placed onto an area of four by four handbreadths, but in a covered public domain is he liable at all? Didn't Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda say that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits from place to place in a covered public domain, even though transferring an object four cubits in the public domain is like carrying out from one domain to another and prohibited by Torah law, in this case, he is not liable? The reason is that since the covered public domain is not similar to the banners in the desert,\(^6\) i.e., the area in which the banners of the tribes of Israel passed in the desert. The labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the labors that were performed in the building of the Tabernacle during the encampment of Israel in the desert, and the desert was most definitely not covered. Consequently, even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's opinion, it is impossible to explain that our mishna is referring to the case of a covered public domain.

\(^5\) Boughs

\(^6\) Banners in the desert

NOTES

With regard to the halakha of Shabbat, the encampment of Israel in the desert is the model upon which the definition of a public domain is based. Like the encampment, a public domain is at least sixteen cubits wide. It is an area through which many people pass daily; 600,000 people, according to some authorities.
κάρταλλος

The origin of the word is apparently a reordering of the letters of the Greek word κάρταλλος, meaning a basket with a pointed bottom.

The geonim explained that a teraskal is a light, portable table made from braided willow. People ate on it outside the home.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: There must be a different source for our mISHNA. Whose opinion is it in our mISHNA? It is the opinion of aHerim, as it was taught in a baraiTah: aHerim say: One who stood in his place on Shabbat and received an object thrown to him from another domain, the one who threw the object is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying out, as he both lifted and placed the object. However, if the one who received the object moved from his place, ran toward the object, and then received it in his hand, he, the one who threw it, is exempt. That is because, even though he performed an act of lifting, the placing of the object was facilitated by the action of the one who received it, and therefore the one who threw it did not perform the act of placing. In any case, according to the opinion of aHerim, if he stood in his place and received the object, the one who threw it is liable. Don’t we require placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths and there is none in this case? Rather, certainly conclude from this that according to aHerim we do not require an area of four by four.

The Gemara rejects this: This is not a proof, and one could say: Perhaps it is specifically for placing that we do not require an area of four by four; however, for lifting we require an area of four by four in order to consider it significant. And with regard to placing as well, one could say: Perhaps it was performed in a manner in which he extended the corners of his coat and received it, so in that case there is also placing upon an area of four by four. Therefore, there is no proof from here.

Rabbi Abba said: Our mISHNA is speaking about a special case where he received, i.e., lifted, the object that was in a basket [teraskal] and he placed it atop a basket. In that case, there is also placing performed upon an area of four by four handbreadths. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in the mISHNA: His hand? So how can you say that he received it in a basket? The Gemara answers: Emend the text of the mISHNA and teach: The basket in his hand.

The Gemara asks about this matter: Granted, when the basket was in the private domain, but if it was a basket that was placed in the public domain, doesn’t it immediately become the private domain? Presumably, the basket is ten handbreadths above the ground, and its surface is the requisite size for creating a private domain.

Since that is not the explanation given, let us say that this is a proof that our mISHNA is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraiTah: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it, and threw an object from the public domain, and it landed upon it, he is liable, because he threw it from the public domain into the private domain. Since the surface of the basket is four by four handbreadths and it is ten handbreadths above the ground, it is considered a private domain. Even though the stick, which is serving as the base for this basket, is not four handbreadths wide, since the basket is that wide, we consider it as if the sides of the basket descend in a straight line. Consequently, a type of pillar of a private domain is formed in the public domain.

Our mISHNA is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where the owner of the house extended his hand outside and placed an object in the basket in the hand of the poor person in the public domain, why is he liable? According to his opinion, the basket is considered a private domain and he, the owner of the house, is merely carrying out from private domain to private domain. This proves that the opinion of our mISHNA is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara answers: Even if you say that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, there, where we learned that a basket is considered like a private domain, was in a case in which the basket was above ten handbreadths off the ground. Here, in our mishna, the basket was below ten handbreadths off the ground. Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where it is below ten handbreadths it is not considered a private domain, rather it is part of the public domain. Therefore, it is considered carrying out and he is liable.

The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, this explanation is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu: Was the language taught in the mishna: A basket in his hand? His hand, was taught. There is no reason to emend the mishna in that way. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: The mishna here is referring to a case where the poor person lowered his hand below three handbreadths off the ground and received that object in his hand. Below three handbreadths is considered, in all respects, to be appended to the ground and, therefore, a place of four by four handbreadths.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t the mishna teach: The poor person stands outside? If he is standing, how is it possible that his hand is within three handbreadths of the ground? Rabbi Abbahu answered: It is describing a case where he is bending down. In that case, his hand could be adjacent to the ground even though he is standing. And if you wish, say instead that it is possible in a case where the poor person is standing in a hole and his hand is adjacent to the ground. And if you wish, say instead a different depiction of the situation: The mishna is speaking about a case involving a midget [nanos], whose hands, even when standing, are within three handbreadths of the ground.

About all of these Rava said: Did the tanna go to all that trouble in an effort to teach us all of these cases? It is difficult to accept that the tanna could not find a more conventional manner to explain the halakha. Rather, Rava said: The problem must be resolved by establishing the principle: A person’s hand is considered like four by four handbreadths for him. It is true that lifting and placing upon a significant place are required. However, even though a significant place is normally less than four handbreadths, the hand of a person is significant enough for it to be considered a significant place as far as the halakhot of Shabbat are concerned. And, so too, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yohanan said: A person’s hand is considered four by four handbreadths for him.

A person’s hand is considered like four by four – קָתָנֵי. In the halakhot of Shabbat, the hand of a person is considered as if it were an area of four by four handbreadths. Therefore, one who lifts an object on Shabbat from one domain and places it in the hand of a person standing in another domain, or one who lifts it from the hand of a person who is in one domain and places it in a different domain, is liable (Rambam Shabbat 132; Shulhan Arukh, Orach Hayyim 342:1).

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HALAKHA

One who stood in his place...he moved from his place, etc. – Two forces in one person: should a person move from one domain to another domain, and the object is caught by a person who remained in his place in the second domain, the one who threw it is liable because he placed the object in another domain. However, if the second person moved from his place and caught the object in his hand, the one who threw it is exempt. This is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, with regard to which there is no dispute (Rambam, Sefer ha-Ḥokhmah, 1:5).

BACKGROUND

What is his dilemma – מה ימיעץ: This expression in the Gemara is a question that comes to clarify the essence of a certain dilemma. Frequently, the problem is, in and of itself, clear. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain the context of the dilemma and the broader issue that it comes to clarify.

NOTES

Two forces in one person – שניصيبות: According to Rabbeinu Hananel’s variant text, some explain: Are two forces in one person considered like two people, in the sense that it is considered as if one threw it so the other would catch it, and he is liable? Or, perhaps it is considered like one person performed each half of the prohibited labor independent of the other half and he would be exempt (Ramban).

HALAKHA

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who threw an object and it landed in the hand of another who is in a different domain is liable. The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us? What halakhic principle is conveyed through this statement? Is it that a person’s hand is considered four by four for him? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say that one time? Why was it necessary to repeat it, albeit in a different context? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the halakha cited by Rabbi Elai as well, lest you say that this, the principle that a person’s hand is significant, applies only where he himself deemed his hand significant by lifting or receiving an object with his hand. However, where did he not deem his hand significant, rather the object fell into another’s hand without his intention, perhaps the hand is not considered a significant place and he would not be liable. Therefore, he teaches us that the hand’s significance is absolute and not dependent upon the intention of the one initiating the action.

To clarify the matter, the Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Did one person perform a complete act of lifting and placing? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: His dilemma was with regard to two forces in one person. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma with regard to one who performs two separate actions rather than one continuous action. Are two forces in one person considered like one person, and he is liable? Or, perhaps they are considered like two people, and he is exempt? This dilemma remains unresolved and therefore, let it stand.

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he brought his hand into the courtyard of another and received rainwater that fell at that time into his hand and carried it out to another domain, he is liable. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: What is the difference to me if his friend loaded him with an object, i.e., his friend placed an object in his hand, and what is the difference to me if Heaven loaded him with rainwater? In neither case did he perform an act of lifting. Why then should he be liable for carrying out from domain to domain? The Gemara answers: Do not say: He received rainwater, indicating that he passively received the rainwater in his hand. Rather, read: He actively gathered rainwater in his hand from the air, which is tantamount to lifting. The Gemara asks: In order to become liable, don’t we require lifting from atop an area of four handbreadths, and in this case there is none? How, therefore, would he be liable?

Rabbi Hiyya, son of Rav Huna, said: It is a case where he gathered the rainwater from atop and on the side of the wall, so he lifted it from a significant place. Therefore, it is considered an act of lifting, and he is liable. The Gemara questions: Atop a wall, too, the rain did not come to rest. Rather, it immediately and continuously flowed. If so, the lifting was not from the wall at all. The Gemara answers: As Rava said in another context that the case involves an inclined wall, here too the case involves an inclined wall. The Gemara asks: And where was this statement of Rava stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna:
One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold and the book rolled from his hand, outside and into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends is still in his hand. However, if he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own area, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, he is prohibited to roll it back to himself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book should face down and should not be exposed and degraded. And we discussed this halakha: Why must he turn it over onto the side with writing, and he is prohibited to bring the book back to himself? Didn’t the book not yet come to rest upon a defined area in the public domain? Even if he brought it back it would not constitute lifting.

And Rava said: It is referring to the case of an inclined wall. Because it is inclined, the scroll is resting upon it to some degree. However, that answer is not effective in explaining the case of gathering water. Say that Rava said that the legal status of the slanted wall is different, specifically with regard to a book, as it is wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall. In contrast, is water wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall? It continues flowing. Consequently, the question with regard to water remains.

Rather, Rava said: Here, it is referring to a case where he gathered the rainwater from on top of a hole filled with water. The Gemara asks: If he gathered it from on top of a hole, it is obvious that it is considered like lifting from a significant place. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since the water that comes down from the roof into the hole it is water on top of water and, perhaps, it is not considered placing. Therefore, he taught us that collecting water from on top of a hole filled with water is considered an act of lifting an object from its placement.

The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rava already said: It is obvious to me that water on top of water, that is its placement, and lifting the water from there is an act of lifting in every sense. It is also obvious that if a nut is floating on top of water, that is not considered its placement, and therefore lifting it from there is not considered an act of lifting. However, Rava raised a dilemma: In a case where a nut is in a vessel, and that vessel is floating on top of water, and one lifted the nut from the vessel, is that considered an act of lifting? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we go according to the nut and the halakha is decided exclusively based on its status, and it is at rest in the vessel? Or perhaps, we go according to the vessel and it is not at rest, as it is moving from place to place on the surface of the water. This dilemma remained unresolved, and therefore let it stand.
In a hole – בְּגומָא. A hole in the public domain that is less than three handbreadths deep is part of the public domain. A hole between three and nine handbreadths deep with an area of four by four handbreadths is a karmelit. It is not part of the community if there are more than ten handbreadths deep. It is a private domain. In that case as well, if it is less than four by four, it is an exempt domain, as per the statement of Rava (Shulhan Arukh, Daf 35b).

**Notes**

In addition to the practical similarity between a pit and a pillar, some explain the use of a pit in other ways. Some say that it is common for the multitudes to utilize a pit in the public domain to conceal their belongings. Since they utilize it, its legal status is like that of the public domain (Rashi); see Rash. Others explain that the reference is to a pit which is easily accessible; if the pit is nine handbreadths deep, people enter it and adjust the borders on their shoulders on the ground of the public domain.

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Based on Ulla's statement, Abaye said to Rav Yosef: A hole in the ground of the public domain, which is several handbreadths deep, is its legal status. Is it also considered, in accordance with Ulla's principle, part of the public domain? In general, with regard to these halakhot of Shabbat, there is no distinction between an area elevated above its surroundings and an area depressed below its surroundings. Rav Yosef said to him: And the same is true in a hole; these halakhot apply. Rava said: In a hole, these halakhot do not apply. What is the reason for this? Since use under duress is not considered use, and the use of a pit even if it is nine handbreadths deep is inconvenient, and it is not comparable to a pillar of the same height.

Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Rava's opinion from that which was taught in a baraita: One whose basket was placed in the public domain and it was ten handbreadths high and four wide, one may not move an object from it to the public domain nor from the public domain to it, since its legal status is that of a private domain. If it were less than that height, one may carry from it to the public domain and vice versa. The baraita adds: And the same is true for a hole. Is this statement not referring to the latter clause of the baraita: One may carry from a pit which is less than the ground level, the one handbreadth deep to the public domain? This supports the opinion of Rav Yosef, that a hole is subsumed within the public domain. Rava rejected this: This statement is not referring to the latter clause of the baraita, but rather to the first clause of the baraita: It is like a basket in that one may not carry from a hole ten handbreadths deep to the public domain because it is a fully-dug private domain. However, no conclusion may be drawn with regard to a hole less than ten handbreadths deep.

Rav Adda bar Mattana raised another objection to Rava's opinion from what was taught in a different baraita, which deals with the laws of joining of borders:

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**Background**

Above and below ten – ברוחב מעברת מעברת. In order to determine the halakhot status of the pit, draw an imaginary line which is ten handbreadths below ground level. Consequently, the expression above ten handbreadths refers to a case where the bottom of the pit is above that line, and therefore it is a karmelit. Below ten handbreadths is referring to a case where the bottom of the pit is below that line, and therefore it is a private domain.

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One who intended to establish his Shabbat abode in the public domain at a specific site must place food sufficient for two meals for that site to be considered his legal residence. And if he placed the food used for his eruv in a pit above ten handbreadths, i.e., less than ten handbreadths below ground level, his eruv is an eruv. If he placed the eruv below ten handbreadths from ground level, his eruv is not an eruv. Because the pit is a private domain and he may not carry the eruv from that private domain to a public domain, where he has established his residence, the eruv is invalid.

The Gemara seeks to clarify the details of this case. What are the exact circumstances? If you say that the baraita is referring to a pit that has ten handbreadths in depth and the phrase: And he placed it above ten handbreadths, means that he raised the eruv and placed it within ten handbreadths of ground level, and the phrase: Below ten handbreadths, means that he lowered the eruv and placed it ten handbreadths or more below ground level, what difference does it make to me if the eruv is above ten handbreadths and what difference does it make to me if it is below ten handbreadths? In any case, the pit is a private domain, and the principle states that the private domain extends from its lowest point to the sky. There is no difference whether the eruv was placed higher or lower. In any case, he is in one place, in the public domain, and his eruv is in another place, in the private domain. Since he cannot take the eruv out of the pit, his eruv is not an eruv.

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He intended to establish his Shabbat… and placed his eruv, etc. – מַהְכַּס דְּמַר. The gemara mentioned here is the joining of borders [eruv tehumin]. The Sages decreed that one may not go more than two thousand cubits beyond the limits of the city in which one is located on Shabbat. However, in special circumstances, primarily for the sake of a mitzva, they allowed one to place food sufficient for two meals within two thousand cubits of the city limits during the day, before Shabbat. One thereby establishes that place as his residence and, consequently, is permitted to walk within a 2,000 cubit radius of that place. Although there is no obligation to eat the eruv, the food set aside for the eruv must be fit for consumption when Shabbat begins because that is the moment when one's place of residence is determined. It is then that he must have the possibility to take it and eat it if he so desires.
Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: Indeed the mishna can be explained as referring to minhah gedola and actually, even our ordinary haircut is prohibited. Ab initio, why may he not sit before the barber adjacent to the time of minhah? Due to a decree lest the scissors break, and considerable time pass until they repair the scissors or obtain others. When the mishna said: A person may not enter the bathhouse adjacent to minhah, it is prohibited even if he is entering just to sweat. Ab initio, why may he not enter? Due to a decree issued by the Sages lest he faint in the bathhouse and considerable time elapse until he recovers. And he may not enter the tannery adjacent to minhah, even if he intends just to examine the skins. Ab initio, why may he not enter? Due to the concern that perhaps he will notice damage to his merchandise and become anxious and come to restore what was ruined. And he may not enter to eat a meal adjacent to the time of minhah is referring even to a small meal. Ab initio, why may he not enter? There is concern that perhaps he will come to extend his meal for a long time. And he may not enter to sit in judgment adjacent to the time of minhah, the mishna is referring even at the conclusion of the trial. Ab initio, why may he not enter? Due to concern that perhaps he will find a reason, contrary to what he originally thought, and will overturn the verdict completely, necessitating the restart of the trial from the beginning.

We learned in the mishna that if he began one of the aforementioned activities, haircut, bath, tannery, meal, and judgment, he is not required to stop. The Gemara asked: From when is it considered the beginning of the haircut? Rav Avin said: From when he places the barber’s wrap over his knees. And from when is it considered the beginning of the bath? Rav Avin said: From when the one entering the bathhouse to bathe removes his outer wrap, his cloak. And from when is it considered the beginning of his visit to the tannery? From when he ties the leather apron between his shoulders (Me’iri). And from when is it considered the beginning of eating? Rav said: From when he ritually washes his hands for the meal. And Rabbi Hanina said: From when he loosens his belt.

The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree. Rather this, the statement of Rabbi Hanina, who said that the beginning of the meal is considered from when he loosens his belt, is for us, for the people of Babylonia, who are accustomed to close their belts tightly, and therefore the beginning of the meal is when one loosens his belt. And that, the statement of Rav, who said that the beginning of the meal is considered from when he ritually washes his hands, is for them, the people of Eretz Yisrael who did not close their belts tightly, and therefore only when one washes his hands does the meal begin.