

Phishing Freakonomics (aka “Picking Winners”)

Russell Butturini

Senior Information Security Architect, Top 20 CPA Firm

Defcon 27 Packet Hacking Village



(Not a picture of me)

-Senior security architect and head of all things IT security along with my governance and compliance dictatress at a top 20 CPA/financial services firm.

-@tcstoolhax0r on Twitter

-Presenter at various Bsides, Derbycon, PHV, etc.

-Occasionally releases poorly written Python code that does cool things.

-Everything said in this talk is mine and doesn't represent the views of my employer.

Why give this talk?

-“Phishing always works”

-“Users are stupid”


-“People are the weakest link”

-“It only takes one”


The Story

- No previous training and awareness program
- Never done phish testing
- Unstructured reporting for email threats, lack of centralized security awareness resources for end users

The story



The story



A New Approach

-Treat the problem like a software or code issue.

-Figure out why people are “vulnerable”.

-How do we patch them???

-USE THE DATA IN FRONT OF US

Warning: Not a Data Scientist



I do this instead...



American Pharoah

Own: Zayat Stables LLC





B. c. 3 (Feb) FTS AUG 13 \$300,000
 Sire: Pioneer of the Nile (Empire Maker) \$60,000
 Dam: Little Princess Emma (Yankee Gentleman)
 Br: Zayat Stables (Ky)
 Tr: Baffert Bob

Life	8	7	0	0	\$4,530,300	105	D.Fst	4	4	0	0	\$2,998,800	105
2015	5	5	0	0	\$4,168,800	105	Wet(393)	2	2	0	0	\$1,350,000	102
2014	3	2	0	0	\$361,500	101	Synth	2	1	0	0	\$181,500	101
							Turf(351)	0	0	0	0	\$0	-

6Jun15-1Bel	fst	1½	-48	1:13	2:02	12:26	Belmont-G1	105	5	1½	11	12	13	15½	Espinoza V	L126	*.75	102-05	American Pharoah126½	Frosted126²	Keen Ice126 ^{rk}	Ins,ask upr,drew clr	8
16May15-13Pim	sly	1¾	-46	1:11	1:37	1:58	Prknss-G1	102	1	11	12½	11½	14	17	Espinoza V	L126	*.90	82-17	American Pharoah126²	Tale of Verve126¹	Divining Rod126²½	Ridden out	8
2May15-11CD	fst	1¼	-47	1:11	1:36	2:03	KyDby-G1	105	15	31	32	3 ^{nk}	1 nd	11	Espinoza V	L126	*2.90	94-08	AmercnPhroh126¹	FiringLine126²	Dortmund126 ^{rk}	5wd turns,brushed late	8
11Apr15-110P	fst	1¼	-45	1:10	1:35	1:48	ArkDby-G1	105	6	22½	23	21	15½	18	Espinoza V	L122	*.10	101-04	American Pharoah122³	Far Right122½	Mr. Z118 ^{rk}	Moved at will,handily	8
14Mar15-100P	sly ^s	1¾	-24	-48	1:15	1:45	Rebel-G2	100	4	11½	11	11	14	16½	Espinoza V	L119	*.40	82-24	AmrcnPhroh119½	Mdfromlcky115²½	BldCnqst115½	Bobble str,kicked clr	7
27Sep14-6SA	fst	1¾	-23	-47	1:11	1:41	FrntRnnr-G1	101	5	1½	1½	1½	11½	13½	Espinoza V	L122	*.50	92-11	American Pharoah122³½	Calculator122½	Texas Red122½	Inside,ridden out	8
3Sep14-8Dmr	fst	7f	◆	:22	:45	1:08	DMrFut-G1	101	1	4	11	11	14	14½	Espinoza V	L116	3.20	98-06	American Pharoah116¼	Calculator116²½	IronFist117½	Speed,inside,cleared	9
9Aug14-4Dmr	fst	6½f	◆	:22	:45	1:08	Md Sp Wt 76k	75	6	5	2 nd	21	28	58½	Garcia M	L118 b	*1.40	85-10	Om118²½	Iron Fist118¹	One Lucky Dane118 ^{no}	3wd to turn,wkened	9

WORKS: Jun1 CD 5f fst 1:00¹ B 6/20 May26 CD 4f fst :48 B 5/22 ● Apr26 CD 5f fst :58² B 1/33 ● Apr5 SA 6f fst 1:11³ H 1/25 Mar29 SA 5f fst :58³ H 2/88



Key Questions

- Can we use various data points (“angles”) to predict which users have a higher likelihood of falling victim to a phishing attack than others?
- Are there seemingly unrelated factors that should be examined to find patterns of phishing failures?

HUMAN NATURE



SUMMED UP IN ONE PICTURE

Data Points

- 10 years of phishing test results and training data from 3 different large environments.
- Phishing related security incidents
- HR data
- Survey results
- Miscellaneous data
- Sample size of ~3,200 fails; not all correlations had the same amount of data


Elasticsearch/Kibana

-FREE

-Allowed for analyzing dissimilar events with different data points quickly.

-Simple to populate using Python

Failures by Years of Experience



-Subdividing the 10+ group further, 40% of the failures came from 22+ years of experience.

-New grads explained spikes....Timing changes risk!


Action: Have office managers work with “elderly” colleagues and new hires to ensure they not only complete but understand security awareness. Add additional content to new hire training.

Survey

-Did your previous employer conduct security awareness training or phishing tests?

-Do you feel internal mass communications (i.e. emails from IT, HR, benefits) are easy to identify as legitimate?

Did your previous employer conduct security awareness training or phishing tests?



-Not enough employers are investing time in training people!!!


-One round of training may not be enough.

Action: Continue to aggregate data and track participation in training programs to improved results at an individual level.

Failures by Category

Category	Failure Percentage
Human Resources	19.8%
IT	13.2%
Online Services (email notifications, file sharing, etc.)	10.9%
Coupons	7.1%
Business and Financial Services	6.3%

Do you feel internal mass communications (i.e. emails from IT, HR, benefits) are easy to identify as legitimate?



-Huge disconnect between the employees and corporate communications.


(i.e. They don't know what they don't know)

Action: Work with corporate marketing to develop a standardized look and feel for mass communications all departments can use.

Timing



Failures by Time to Complete Training




-Completing the training early doesn't mean it was effective.

-People who wait for the right time to do awareness training and maximize its value are the least risky.

Action: Communicate better with staff around training reminders. Don't make them feel rushed to complete it. If a busy time is coming up, encourage staff to complete beforehand.

Days since Last Training Before Failure



-Training effects last about 60 days!


-Less frequent reinforcement = More fail.

Action: Provide frequent reinforcement. Evaluate doing multiple small trainings throughout the year vs. one large annual training.


Environmental Factors/Weird Stuff



Failures by Time of Day



Weather Effects



A few more thoughts...

- Make contact human and personal

- Avoid shaming at all costs

- Contests don't work

- Always accentuate the positive

Results

- Haven't implemented everything yet, but still saw a nearly 2% improvement from the previous "bad" test to the next test.
- Not enough data accrued yet to decide if this is coincidental or a hard result.
- Informal, anecdotal feedback has been VERY positive!**

That's it!

-Thanks to PHV for having me and thanks to all of you!

-@tcstoolhax0r on Twitter

-Slides will be up at github.com/tcstool later

-Questions?